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Abstract 
Much has been written about Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky. His 
development of the "Deep Battle" military theory in the late 1920s and 1930s, the 
attendant mechanisation of the Red Army and his role in the development of the 
Soviet military/industrial complex have been well-researched. The "Tukhachevsky 
Affair", the discussion surrounding his execution in the military purge of 1937, 
continues to attract interest. However, a detailed analysis of his early life and Civil 
War command career has never been completed. This gap is filled by this thesis. 
Tukhachevsky's early life is explored to provide background, but also to provide a 
biographical account and to illustrate who he was when he joined the Red Army and 
Bolshevik Party in 1918. The thesis demonstrates that he was not a communist at this 
stage. However, his command experiences during the Civil War, combining military 
tactics of continuous manoeuvre warfare with constant frontline mobilisations, 
political agitation and repression, allowed him to develop a theory of class warfare 
and saw his conversion to a belief in the efficacy of Marxist principles when applied 
to military methods. Tukhachevsky's success in the Civil War is compared to his 
failure in the Polish-Soviet War and the basis for the latter is that his continuation of 
class warfare methods were unsuitable for the conflict in Poland. 
The success of Tukhachevsky's class warfare methods is explained by their 
relevance to the situation and social fabric of Russia at the time. The retention of 
these principles to form the basis of the operational side of "Deep Battle" is argued, as 
is Tukhachevsky's openness to innovation in weaponry and tactics gleaned during his 
Civil War command. Tukhachevsky's role in early Red Army formulation is detailed, 
as is his development of the concept of "unified command" involving the creation of 
Red Commanders. 
The Communist Party leadership's use of Tukhachevsky as a "troubleshooter" to 
deal with prioritised areas during the Civil War, leading to his service on every major 
Front at crucial stages is highlighted, as are the connections he made on the Civil War 
battlefields, friendly and hostile. It is shown that during his Civil War commands he 
met with those with whom he would later work and that their collaboration and 
experimentation began almost immediately. 
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Introduction 
Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky was a prominent figure in the history of the 
Soviet Union. Appointed one of the first five Marshals of the Soviet Union in 1935, he 
served as Deputy Peoples' Commissar of Defence and Chief of Armaments of the Red 
Army from 1931-1937, playing a major role in the formation and build-up of the an-ned 
forces of the Soviet Union and the military-industrial complex which was to dominate the 
nation for its duration. ' 
Executed in the military purge of 1937, he was written out of Soviet history for the 
next twenty years. Only with Tukhachevsky's rehabilitation in 1957, did literature begin 
to appear in the Soviet Union about his life. A selection of his written works appeared in 
1964, accompanied by a collection of memoirs by former comrades, biographies and 
works on his military theory. 2 He was finally credited with the development of the 
operational theories by which the Soviet Union conducted operations from 1943-1945 to 
defeat Nazi Gen-nany. Articles began to appear in newspapers and journals throughout 
the Soviet Union and over the next twenty-five years, ftirther biographical works were 
3 published . These 
Soviet biographies reflect the changing nature of the Soviet regime. 
The 1960s works of Nikulin and Todorskii carried on the rehabilitation process, lauding 
Tukhachevsky's military achievements and portraying a loyal communist soldier. 
Rakovskii and Popov, published during the Brezhnev era, typically for that time 
reiterated the earlier works, without adding anything new. However, Gorelik, Ivanov, 
Shchetinov and Starkov and Dairies provided a deeper insight, appearing during 
Gorbachev's glasnost'era, and able to admit, fitfully, that Tukhachevsky was perhaps not 
simply a pure communist soldier. 
1 The other Marshals appointed were Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov, Semen Mikhailovich Budennyi, 
Aleksandr Il'ich Egorov and Vasilii Konstantinovich Bliukher. 
2 M. N. Tukhachevsky, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, Tomy I-H, 1919-193 7, (Moscow, 1964); L. Nikulin, 
Tukhachevsky, biograficheskii ocherk', (Moscow, 1964); A. 1. Todorskii, Marshal Tukhachevsky, 
(Moscow, 1963); N. 1. Koritskii, ed., Marshal Tukhachevsky: Vospominaniia druzei i soratnikov, 
(Moscow, 1965); A seemingly unpublished biography by G. S. Isserson, a former Professor at the Red 
Anny General Staff Academy is held in RGVA, f 37605, op. 1, d. 6, pp. 1-145. 
3 L. Rakovskii, Mikhail Tukhachevsky - Povest', (Leningrad, 1967); A. S. Popov, Trud, Talant, Doblest', 
(Moscow, 1972); Ia. M. Gorelik, Marshal M N. Tukhachevsky, (Saratov, 1986); V. M. Ivanov, Marshal M 
N. Tukhachevsky, 2nd Edition, (Moscow, 1990); lu. A. Shchetinov & B. A. Starkov, Krasnyi Marshal, 
(Moscow, 1990). 
2 
The collapse of the Soviet Union did not immediately witness the appearance of 
further biographical works on Tukhachevsky, but towards the late 1990s, several have 
appeared, approaching the subject from varying angles. Smirnov attempts to turn the 
good communist theory on its head, whilst Sokolov takes a more balanced view. 4 Other 
works have looked at Tukhachevsky in relation to wider Red Army affairs in the 1920s 
and 1930s, notably Minakov. 5 
In the West, several works appeared from varying sources during the Soviet period. A 
biography by Gul', a White emigre from the Russian Civil War, predictably presented 
Tukhachevsky in an entirely different light from the Soviet biographies, emphasising his 
semi-noble background, but it is an interesting early source, written whilst Tukhachevsky 
was still alive. 6 The book by Pierre Fervacque, Le Chef de L Armee Rouge, recalled time 
spent by the author and Tukhachevsky in the German Ingolstadt prisoner-of-war camp 
and another memoir source by Lidia North provides useful material. 7 
Research surrounding Tukhachevsky after his rehabilitation concentrated predictably 
on his execution, as details were sought to explain why Stalin killed one of his most 
important commanders, on the eve of his clash with Hitler. Alexandrov's work began the 
speculation surrounding Tukhachevsky's death and this continues today. 8 Much study has 
been conducted on this part of Tukhachevsky's life. 
More recently however, research has focused on Tukhachevsky's work in the late 
1920s and 1930s. Simpkin and Erickson explored the development of "Deep Battle" in 
the 1920s, whilst Samuelson, Stoecker and Stone examined Tukhachevsky's role in the 
build-up of the mi I itary- industrial complex and the mechanised Red Army. 9 These areas 
have been well-covered. 
4 G. V. Smimov, Krovavyi marshal, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, 1893-1937, (St. Petersburg, 1997); B. 
Sokolov, Mikhail Tukhachevsky: zhizn'i smert'Krasnogo marshala, (Smolensk, 1999). 
5 S. T. Minakov, Za otvorotom marshal'skoi shineli, (Orel, 1999) and Sovetskaia voennaia elita 20-kh 
godow (Sostav, evoliutsiia, sotsiokulturnye osobennosti ipoliticheskaia rolý, (Orel, 2000). 
6 R. Gul', Tukhachevsky: krasnyi marshal, (Berlin, 1932). 
7 P. Fervacque, Le Chef de LArmee Rouge, (Paris, 1928); L. North, Marshal Tukhachevsky, (Paris, 1978). 
8 V. Alexandrov, (trans. J. Hewish), The Tukhachevsky Affair, (London, 1962). 
9 R. Simpkin & J. Erickson, The Brainchild ofMarshal Tukhachevskii, (London; Washington, 1987); S. 
Stoecker, Forging Stalin's Army: Marshal Tukhachevsky and the Politics of Military Innovation, (Oxford, 
1998); L. Samuelson, Plansfor Stalin's War Machine: Tukhachevskii and Military-Economic Planning, 
1925-1941, (London, 2000); D. Stone, Hammer and Rifle: The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926- 
1933, (Kansas, 2000). 
3 
However, a glaring gap exists in the literature on Tukhachevsky, which this thesis 
fills. Tukhachevsky's early life and Russian Civil War command career have not been 
researched in depth in either Soviet, Russian or Western publications. The Soviet 
biographies examine these areas, but only in a way designed to illustrate Tukhachevsky's 
good communist pedigree, and of the post-Soviet Russian biographies, only Sokolov adds 
anything worthwhile. Several Western biographical works have appeared, but whilst 
questioning the loyal communist line, and variously describing Tukhachevsky as an 
"aristocratic-communist" or a "noble revolutionary", they have relied too heavily on the 
Soviet biographies regarding Tukhachevsky's early life and Civil War career. They have 
not utilised archival or sufficient documentary sources to produce new insights. 10 
Study of Tukhachevsky's background and early life has thus far been neglected, but is 
crucial to draw the complete picture of the later man. In this thesis, I examine previously 
unused archival sources and newly-available published documentary collections to 
provide information surrounding Tukhachevsky's early life and Civil War career. 
Existing documentary collections and memoir sources, which have either not been used 
or only cursorily, are also examined in detail to give as detailed an assessment as possible 
of Tukhachevsky's early days and frontline command career, to show the origins of his 
later ideas. 
Tukhachevsky produced a plethora of written works on every aspect of the military. 
These were often written during or just after the events about which he was writing. This 
thesis has utilised a wide a selection of Tukhachevsky's works where relevant. In this 
way, the structure of Chapters 111, IV and V follow basically the same pattern. 
Tukhachevsky's assessment of the events in which he was involved are presented and 
considered alongside other sources to detennine his originality, accuracy and 
motivations. 
Chapter I provides an examination of Tukhachevsky's early life, civil and military 
education and Great War combat and prisoner-of-war experiences, concluding with his 
return to Russia in October 1917 and decision to join the Red Army in early 1918. The 
10 T. Butson, The Tsar's Lieutenant. The Soviet Marshal, (New York, 1984); A. F. Kaufmann Jr., 
Aristocratic Communist: The Life ofM. N. Tukhachevskii and the Continuity ofImperial Army Tradition in 
the Soviet Military, (PhD diss. University of Arkansas, 199 1); W. Spahr, Stalin's Lieutenants: A Study of 
Command Under Duress, (Novato, Calif, 1997). 
4 
character traits and personality necessary to succeed during the Civil War were evident in 
Tukhachevsky from an early age. Therefore, understanding who Tukhachevsky was and 
what his motivations were in late 1917, is crucial to determine why he chose the path he 
did in 1918. This chapter provides both a crucial early biographical account, but also 
essential background for studying Tukhachevsky's Civil War career, examining 
Tukhachevsky as a Tsarist Army officer. The source material for this chapter was 
initially based around biographical and memoir sources, but research in the Russian 
archives, particularly RGVA fond 37605, Lichnyi fond Mikhaila Nikolaevicha 
Tukhachevskogo (Personal fond of Tukhachevsky), has enabled the completion of a more 
in-depth early biographical account than has previously appeared. 
Chapter 11 covers the first eight months of 1918, during which time Tukhachevsky 
joined the Bolshevik Party. His motives for this are examined. He played an integral part 
in the formation of the Red Army at this time, initially working at the hub of the 
administrative organisational system, before being despatched eastwards to help build the 
materialising Eastern Front to fight the Czechoslovak Legion. This was not war in the 
conventional sense and the atmosphere of treachery, amid ad hoc measures and decision- 
making, introduced him to aspects of civil warfare about which he would begin to 
theorise. His performance under pressure was pivotal in showing his worth to Moscow 
and set him on his way to successful Civil War command. This chapter again draws on 
previously unused archival sources and also extensive memoir material on Tukhachevsky 
and the Eastern Front in 1918. Published documentary collections which have not been 
utilised in the available literature are used, as are others only partially employed to date. " 
Chapters Ill and IV study Tukhachevsky as a frontline commander in the Russian 
Civil War. Chapter III presents Tukhachevsky's analysis of the Civil War, suggests links 
between this and "Deep Battle", and studies Tukhachevsky's early commands from 
August 1918-March 1919. Chapter IV examines Tukhachevsky's commands from April 
1919-April 1920, during which time he emerged as perhaps the epitome of the "Red 
Commander" envisaged by Lenin and Trotsky. These chapters introduce Tukhachevsky 
11 Boevoi put'pervoi revoliutsionnoi armii Vostochnogo i Turkestanogofrontov, Iiun' 1918-fevral' 1921gg. 
(Sbornik dokumentov i materialov), (Ashkhabad, 1972); Direktivy Glavnogo komandovaniia Krasnoi Annii 
(1917-1920). Sbornik dokumentov, (hereafter DGkKA), (Moscow, 1969); Direktivy komandovaniiafrontov 
Krasnoi Arniii (1917-1922), Sbornik dokumentov v 4-kh tomakh, (Moscow, 1971-1978). 
5 
as an army commander of conventional forces, but also illustrate his development as a 
military theoretician and an advocate of revolutionary class warfare. By studying his 
campaigns individually to identify specific tactical experiments or discoveries, but also 
comparatively to find patterns in his command style and decision-making, the evolution 
of Tukhachevsky as a class civil war commander can be charted. His relations with other 
military personnel and the development in his thought and character this engendered is 
highlighted. How representative this was of the developing dynamics of Red Army 
leadership is illustrated by examining Red Army intra-hierarchical relations and 
Tukhachevsky's place in them. In examining both the military and political aspects of 
Tukhachevsky's developing thought process and the campaigns which inspired it, the 
origins of the operational side of "Deep Battle" can be traced directly to Tukhachevsky's 
Civil War command, both in the nature of his campaign leadership and in the writings he 
produced at the time to explain his experiences. His success in this period is traced to his 
methods, which were initially imposed upon him by an impatient Red leadership, 
matching the nature of Russian Civil Warfare in a military, political, social and economic 
sense. The role of troubleshooter he fulfilled for Moscow, being despatched to prioritised 
fronts at crucial times, is analysed. 
The source base for Chapters III and IV is almost entirely original. A more detailed 
use of DGgK, 4 and DkfK, 4 than has previously been attempted, combined with the use of 
other published documentary sources, memoir material and archival material, has 
allowed the compilation of a comprehensive collection of Tukhachevsky's and related 
commanders' battle orders througout the Civil War. 12 Using these alongside a wide array 
of Tukhachevsky's written works, including Voina klassov, has produced an analysis of 
Tukhachevsky's Civil War command, its origins, evolvement and nature. ' 3 
Chapter V examines Tukhachevsky in the role of Western Front Commander in the 
Polish-Soviet War. This is analysed in close comparison to Chapters III and IV to 
demonstrate that Tukhachevsky and the Red High Command fought this war in the same 
manner, but ultimately lost it because of this. Tukhachevsky's campaigns in Belorussia 
12 V boiakh rozhdeniia, 1918-1920: boevoi put'5 armii. Sbornik dokumentov, (Irkutsk, 1985); M. V. 
Frunze na Vostochnom Fronte, (Kuibyshev, 1958). 
13 M. N. Tukhachevsky, Voina klassov, (Smolensk, 1921). 
6 
and Poland are analysed, as is the aftermath of the Polish counter-attack. The reasons for 
the Soviet defeat are discussed to demonstrate the lessons which Tukhachevsky learned 
in defeat and their contribution to "Deep Battle" operational formulation. This chapter is 
again based almost wholly on original sources. A detailed study of DGgKA and DkJKA 
provides a unique compilation of Tukhachevsky's command orders. Analysing these 
alongside Tukhachevsky's works, Voina klassov once more, but especially Pokhod za 
Vislu, allows an accurate portrayal of Tukhachevsky's command style in Poland and a 
comparison with Civil War command. 14 Some concluding remarks relate back to 
Tukhachevsky's Civil War analysis presented in Chapter 111. 
In the conclusion, the various chapter themes and threads which run through the 
thesis are drawn together to sum up Tukhachevsky's contribution to the Red victory in 
the Russian Civil War, his evolution as a military theorist and person and the possible 
influence his Civil War career had on his later downfall. 
14 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pokhod za Vislu", Izbrannyeproizvedeniia, Tom 1,1919-1927, pp. 114-168. 
7 
Chapter 1: Backimound - 1893-1918 
"My real life began with the October Revolution". 
The above statement was made by Mikhail Tukhachevsky in 1935 at the pinnacle 
of his military career in the Soviet Red Army. Despite being a Marshal of the Soviet 
Union and Deputy Defence Commissar, Tukhachevsky's position was not secure and 
he would be executed as part of Stalin's military purge two years later. Remarks such 
as the above were necessary in the prevailing atmosphere of the 1930s. However, this 
quote has been reproduced by Soviet writers since Tukhachevsky's rehabilitation as 
proof of his commitment to communism and the Revolution in Russia. This is 
convenient as it allows Tukhachevsky's early life before 1917 to be ignored and 
discounted when explaining his influence on the Red Army. However, the 
experiences gained and opinions formed during this period shaped the man who 
joined the Red Army and Communist Party in 1918. Who was Tukhachevsky before 
he became a communist soldier and when did he make the decision to join the 
Bolsheviks? How did his early life, education and experiences lead him to these 
decisions and could he have followed another path? This first chapter will outline 
who Mikhail Tukhachevsky was as a young man to answer the above questions. 
Early Life 
Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky was born on 3rd (15th) February 1893 in the 
I 
village of Slednevo, on Alexandrovskii Estate in Dorogobuzhskii uezd, Smolensk 
Province. 2 He was born into a long line of nobles, originating from the Count Idris 
(Indris), an emigrant from the Holy Roman Empire who served the Grand Prince of 
Kiev, Mstislav Vladimirovich, in 1251. The family's 6th generation moved to 
Moscow to serve Great Knight Vasilii Dmitrievich in 1408 and assumed the name 
Tukhachevsky when Bogdan Grigorievich of the 7th generation was rewarded by 
Great Knight Vasilii Vasil'evich with the villages of Skorino and Tukhachevsky in 
I Rossiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenn)yl'Arkhiv (RGVA). fond. 37605, opis. 1, delo. 3, p. 38. 
2 Marshal TukhachevsAy: Vospominaniia druzei i soratnikov, (Moscow, 1965), p. 23 1. 
8 
Serpeisk uezd. Later generations gained land in Smolensk, Briansk and Penza 
Provinces and a tradition of military service for the Tsars emerged. 
On 25th August 183 1, Colonel Aleksandr Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky, 
Tukhachevsky's great-grandfather, was killed in action at Warsaw. He had joined the 
Semenovskii Life-Guard Regiment in 1810, commanding the 2nd Grenadier 
Company, but was transferred to the Archangelodskii Infantry Regiment for 
participating in a regimental uprising. He fought in the Fatherland War against 
Napoleon and the Turkish Wars at Tarytin, Ultsen and the fortress of Shumle, before 
his death. Tukhachevsky's great-great-uncle was a cavalry colonel and major-general 
and his great-uncle served as a major-general, commanding 7th Hussar Belorussian 
Regiment, falling in action in 1812 against Napoleon. 
3 Military traditions were strong 
in the family, giving credence to the suggestion that as a child Tukhachevsky liked to 
hear war stories, being especially proud of his great-grandfather fighting Napoleon 
4 
with Suvorov. Tukhachevsky later wore an engraved silver ring in memory of his 
great-grandfather. 
5 
Tukhachevsky's grandfather served as Smolensk Province Secretary, 
6 but his 
father lived as a landlord, not a working noble. 
7 However, he did not believe in the 
absolute rights of the autocracy and did not reinforce them. 
8 He did not participate in 
any governmental or societal activities, which perhaps contributed to his family's 
impoverishment, but devoted all his time to raising his family and ensuring they had 
the best possible education, instilling in them his beliefs in a fair, sobre lifestyle with 
respect for the peasant population. Tukhachevsky's sisters describe him as a man 
cultured in art and literature and an atheist who did not covet wealth, bringing his 
family up this way and probably ahead of his time in the late 19th Century. 
9 This was 
illustrated most clearly by his marriage. 
3 
RGVA, f. 37605, op. 1, d. 3, pp. 56-62. 
4 
V. M. Ivanov, Marshal M. N. Tukhachevsky, (Moscow, 1990), pp. 21-22. 
5 P. Fervacque, Le Chef de LArmee Rouge, (Paris, 1928), p. 33. 
RGVA, f 37605, op. 1, d. 3, p. 61. 
7 
L. Nikulin, Tukhachevsky. - Biograficheskii ocherk, (Moscow, 1964), p. 10. 
8 A. 1. Todorskii, Marshal Tukhachevsky, (Moscow, 1964), p. 8. 
9 E, N. An, atova-Tukhachevskaia & 0. N. Tukhachevskaia, "On liubil zhizn... Marshal Tukhachevsky: 
Vospoininaniia druzei i soratnikov, (Moscow, 1965), pp. 10 & 12; A. 1. Todorskii, pp. 9& 12. 
9 
Tukhachevsky's mother, Mavra Petrovna, was a simple peasant living on his 
grandfather's estate in the village of Kniazhino. Tukhachevsky's father married her 
despite her position and the shunning of high society which would have followed. 
Mavra Petrovna is described as an educated and intelligent woman who taught her 
family "respect for working people". 
10 She kept close ties with her large family, so 
from an early age Tukhachevsky knew of the rigours of peasant life. Ivanov suggests 
Tukhachevsky liked to think of his mother's ancestors as being in the ranks of the 
11 Smolensk Partisans in 1812, fighting the French, which is possible given his early 
interest in the Napoleonic campaign. 
Tukhachevsky was one of a large family, the second eldest of nine. Nikolai, 
Aleksandr and Nadezhda were bom, like Tukhachevsky, in Smolensk Province, but 
the five younger siblings - Igor, Sofia, Olga, Elizabeth and Maria - were born in 
Penza Province, to where the family moved in 1898. His father's material difficulties 
forced him to sell his estate and move to the estate of Tukhachevsky's grandmother, 
12 Sofia Valentinovna, near Vrazhskoe, in Chembarsk uezd. 
Tukhachevsky's grandmother is described as a great influence during his 
upbringing. Tukhachevsky is quoted as saying she was French. 
13 He also had a French 
governess, 
14 
possibly named Mademoiselle Zhegy, 
15 
making it no surprise that he 
spoke French, from childhood. 
16 Tukhachevsky also spoke German and it is suggested 
he had to devote little time to language classes later in cadet corps. 
17 His grandmother 
also contributed in a material sense to the family's education, mortgaging her estate 
18 
repeatedly to pay for it. 
10 L. Nikulin, pp. 12-13; E. N. Arvatova-Tukhachevskaia & 0. N. Tukhachevskaia, p. 10. 
II V. M. Ivanov, p. 2 1. 
12 Ia. M. Gorelik, Marshal M. N. Tukhachevsky, (Saratov, 1986), p. 5; V. M. Ivanov, p. 20; In 1990 a 
settlement remained here named Tukhachevsky. 
13 V. Alexandrov, The Tukhachevskii Affair, (trans. J. Hewish), (London, 1962), p. 80. General de 
Goys de Mezeyrac, interned with Tukhachevsky later in Ingolstadt commented he was "... not a little 
surprised to hear him speak impeccable French"; Nikulin writes that Tukhachevsky later surprised 
Eduard Herriot, a French Government Representative, with his lingual abilities, p. 17. 
14 
P. Fervacque, p. 20. 
15 R. Gul', Krasnyi Marshal, (Berlin, 1932), p. 10. However, Gul' inaccurately states that 
Tukhachevsky's mother died early leaving his upbringing largely in the hands of the governess. 
16 RGVA, f, 37605, op. 1, d. 3, p. 39. 
17 
Ia. M. Gorelik, p. 10. 
18 
R. Gul', pp. 14-15. 
10 
School Life 
Tukhachevsky's family lived in Vrazhskoe during the summer and Penza in the 
winter. Penza is described as one of the most enlightened Russian towns in the early 
20th Century, being named the "Mordvinian Athens". It contained male and female 
gimnasii, 
19 
an art school with a large gallery, a good library named after Lermontov 
and a reading-room named after Belinskii, which Chekov had helped found. It was a 
very cultured town, which Nikulin suggests was probably why Tukhachevsky's father 
20 
moved the family there. Monetary difficulties were the main reason for the move, 
21 
but Tukhachevsky's father, a man who "loved only music and art, " must have hoped 
the cultured surroundings of Penza would influence his children in their careers. They 
were all encouraged to play musical instruments alongside the father and 
22 
grandmother, cementing Tukhachevsky's interest in music from an early age. In later 
years, although himself admitting he was only an average violinist, he became an 
accomplished instrument maker, building five violins and a cello for his brother 
Aleksandr, prompting his family to call him "golden hands". 
23 He had equipment for 
laquer preparation in his flat and wrote essays on techniques of preparing the best 
lacquer for priming violins to create the finest sound quality. 
24 A more poignant 
postscript to this musical interest came in 1937, when Tukhachevsky, knowing his 
fate was sealed, reminisced to one of his sisters, "How I in childhood asked to have a 
violin bought for me, but father because of eternal poverty was not able to do this. 
Perhaps if I had been a professonal violinist ...... 
25 This may have been his father's 
wish, but Tukhachevsky had other ideas. 
From a young age, Tukhachevsky asked to attend cadet corps, but his father 
refused permission. 
26 As the son of a noble he had this right, but his father again 
could not afford it, falling outwith the categories which qualified for state-funding 
19 
Russian secondary schools. 
20 
L. Nikulin, pp. 16-17. 
21 
RG VA, f. 3 7605, op. 1, d. 3, p. 5 1. 
22 
E. N. Arvatova-Tukhachevskaia & 0. N. Tukhachevskaia, p. 13. 
23 
Ibid. p. 11; One of these violins is displayed in the Central Armed Forces Museum in Moscow. 
24 RGVA, f, 37605, op. 1, d. 3, p. 9. These essays are also held in Tukhachevsky's personal file. 
25 E. N. Arvatova-Tukhachevskaia & 0. N. Tukhachevskaia, p. 18. 
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(these were mainly sons of military men). Therefore, a combination of his father's 
wishes and poverty led to Tukhachevsky's initial schooling. He attended lst Penza 
28 
Belinskii Gimnasiia from 1904-1 909 . 
Varied accounts are provided of Tukhachevsky's Penza school days. Gul' writes 
that he was nothing like the Communist Red Army Commander he would become, 
but an arrogant, unsociable loner who courted no friendship. Maintaining the distance 
and reserve of an aristocrat, he had no scientific interests, dismissed learning Latin as 
nonsense and had only his "noble circle" which discussed ancient family trees, coats- 
of-arms and heraldry. Also his teachers did not like this impudent character, with 
Tukhachevsky renowned for his tricks at school and constantly being excluded from 
29 
classes by the schoolmaster Kutuzov. This is at odds with other accounts. 
V. G. Ukrainskii writes of Tukhachevsky as a decisive leader amongst those of his 
age. He read a great deal, finding study easy, especially history and geography, but 
was willing to share his knowledge with others. Tukhachevsky associated little with 
those of the aristocratic and landholding class, but would split up fights between 
schoolfriends, prevent bullying and implore others to do the same. Ukrainskii relates 
the boys played wargames, with himself and Tukhachevsky leading one class against 
the other. They always won with Tukhachevsky organising an HQ, conducting 
reconnaissance and using the relief of the gimnasiia territory - alleys etc. - to carry out 
ambushes and manoeuvres for envelopments. Ukrainskii's account differs markedly 
from Gul's, but he does echo this in one area - Tukhachevsky was not popular with 
several teachers. However, this came not from arrogance or unsociability, but from 
Tukhachevsky inheriting his father's atheism and being repeatedly excluded from 
classes for mocking religion. 
30 
Soviet biographies have based their version of Tukhachevsky's Penza schooling 
31 
on Ukrainskii and similar accounts . V. 
Studenskii, another classmate who later 
26 
Ibid. p. 12. 
27 
V. M. Ivanov, p. 2 1. 
28 RG VA, f. 37605, op. 1, d. 8, p. I&d. 3, p. 23; L. Nikulin, p. 19; V. M. Ivanov, p. 2 1. 
29 R. Gul', p. 11. Tukhachevsky met Kutuzov 12 years later in Penza, where the latter had become 
Peoples' Commissar for Education of Penza Province. His four sons were killed in street-f ighting with 
the Czechoslovaks before the I st Red Army under Tukhachevsky drove them out. 
30 RGVA, f. 37605, op. 1, d. 8, pp. 1-3. 
31 Ia. M. Gorelik, p. 7; L. Nikulin, pp. 19-20. 
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served with Tukhachevsky in the I st Army Staff during the Civil War, remembered 
great musical evenings Tukhachevsky and his friends had at the Tukhachevsky's 
house and Studenskii's room at the gimnasiia. He describes Tukhachevsky as honest 
and popular with many friends. Despite being the strongest and best at gymnastics, 
gaining the nickname begemot - "hippopotamus" or more likely "behemoth" - 
possibly inheriting this strength from his peasant mother, "... the weak had a friend in 
Tukhachevsky". However, he did not study hard, especially in 4th year when he 
wanted to enroll in cadet corps. 
32 
Similar recollections are cited by Nikulin from Sergei Stepanovich Ostrovskii, 
33 
another classmate who later joined Ist Army in Penza, under Tukhachevsky. 
However, Nikolai Dimitrievich Volkov, a teacher at the 2nd Penza Gimnasiia who 
knew and befriended Tukhachevsky, spoke of him as a champion gymnast, but not to 
the detriment of his studies. 
34 
One of Tukhachevsky's reports is held in the Penza Gimnasiia records, noting 
"Despite his abilities, he studied badly", "Application - 3", "Attention - 2", "During 
the year he missed 127 classes", "He had 3 tellings-off for talking in classes". There is 
35 
also a note by a priest recording, "Tukhachevsky is not devoted to God's laws. " 
The Soviet biographies, despite variations, appear generally more accurate about 
Tukhachevsky at Penza Gimnasiia, backed as they are by memoir sources, although 
these probably painted a purer picture than actually existed. During his 5th Year, 
Tukhachevsky left Penza Gimnasiia with a certificate for completing 4th Year. 
Conflicting reasons are provided for this. 
The family moved to Moscow in 1909. It is suggested this was because the 
children were growing older and Tukhachevsky's father wished them to start 
attending specialist schools. Penza, although the Province town, held narrower 
opportunities than Moscow. Also, monetary worries surfaced again, with maintaining 
two houses in Penza and Vrazhskoe proving difficult. Therefore, Tukhachevsky was 
32 Ia. M. Gorelik, pp. 6-8. 
33 RGVA, f 37605, op. 1, d. 11, p. 52. 
34 L, Nikulin, pp. 17 & 19-20. 
35 RGTA, f 37605, op. 1, d. 11, p. 73; L. Nikulin, p. 19. 
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withdrawn from Penza Gimnasiia, as indeed his siblings must have been, and he 
enrolled at the I Oth Moscow Gimnasiia, completing his 6th Year in 1911, aged 18.36 
Nikulin however, suggests Tukhachevsky was excluded from Penza Gimnasiia for 
not once attending communion or confession in his 5th Year and this was the reason 
for the move to Moscow. 
37 Given the remark on Tukhachevsky's report card, it is 
possible he was excluded from gimnasiia for anti-religious behaviour. Tukhachevsky 
later described himself as an atheist from a young age, relating how as children he and 
his brothers had three cats whom they called God the Father, Jesus and the Holy 
Ghost and when looking for these, shouted "... in terrible voices "Where the devil is 
38 God the Father"". However, it seems unlikely this would prompt his father to move 
the entire family to Moscow. Monetary reasons and concern over education are more 
plausible. 
Tukhachevsky appears to have been quite popular at school and, in common with 
pupils of this age, applied himself at subjects he enjoyed, but not others. Elizabeth 
recalled he studied badly at Penza Gimnasiia and it is suggested he neither liked the 
strict conditions of male schools after the 1905 Revolution with tight discipline and 
constant observation, nor enjoyed the classical education of the former noble 
boarding-school, which perhaps explains his behaviour. 
39 The simple fact that 
Tukhachevsky's upbringing would have been different to that of his classmates should 
not be overlooked. This may have isolated him from other pupils in his early school 
years or indeed elicited prejudiced responses from teachers who did not approve of 
his background or upbringing. Moving from the provincial surroundings of Penza, 
despite its apparent enlightenment, to the capital Moscow, where opinion would be 
less unforgiving, was possibly a factor in his educational transformation which 
occurred later. 
However, whilst still in Penza, he expanded his interest in military history. The 
first cousin of Tukhachevsky's father, M. N. Balkashin, a former infantry regimental 
commander, who became a White emigre, wrote of visiting the Tukhachevsky 
household as a junker and an officer. As a child, Tukhachevsky adored him in his 
36 
lu. A. Shchetinov & B. A. Starkov, Krasnyi Marshal: Istoricheskii Portret Mikhaila 
Tukhachevskogo, (Moscow, 1990), p. 10; V. M. Ivanov, p. 22. 
37 
L. Nikulin, p. 20. 
38 P. Fervacque, pp. 18 & 20. 
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military uniform, stealing his sabre, spurs and service-cap to play with. As a 10-year- 
old, Tukhachevsky read about the subjugation of the Caucasus under Ermolov and 
Paskevich, and as a youth, about the marches and battles of the great commanders. He 
read Russian history and knew it well, reading about Peter the Great, Suvorov and 
Skobelev. 40 Still in Penza, he read a Suvorov biography, explaining his system of 
training and educating troops, and many other books such as History of the 
Generalissimo Prince Suvorov by Fuchs and Generalissimo Prince Suvorov by 
Petrushevskii 
.41 
This ties in with his sister Olga's recollections that he developed his 
French and German, but also picked up Latin, reading Julius Ceasar's Essays on the 
Gallic War in the original Latin. He loved literature, but especially Tolstoi, reading 
War and Peace, and persuaded his father to take him and his brothers from Penza to 
42 Tula to meet Tolstoi himself, who took Tukhachevsky for a ride in his trap. This 
suggests an early penchant for self-education, studying the subjects he liked outwith 
the school environment. 
Other recollections of his early childhood relate how Tukhachevsky, with his 
older brother Nikolai, loved astronomy, plotting their own star charts, and chess. He 
was apparently a good gorodki (skittles) player because of his strength, a lively 
inventive child full of pranks and liked horseriding, weightlifting and wrestling, in 
which he was rarely beaten. He showed his independent streak from an early age, but 
43 loved especially to go horseriding with his favourite sister Nadezhda (Nadia) . 
By 1911, when Tukhachevsky completed his 6th Year at I Oth Moscow Gimnasiia, 
he had already developed a keen interest in military history and stated an interest in 
following a military career, but had also developed wider interests incorporating the 
arts, literature and sports. He had displayed a lack of tolerance for religion, perhaps 
leading to exclusion from Penza Gimnasiia and while displaying independent 
leadership qualities, appeared to be a well-rounded popular figure. In this year 
however, he made the decision which shaped the path his life would follow for the 
next six years. 
39 
RGVA, f 37605, op. 1, d. 3, p. 16; Ia. M. Gorelik, p. 8; Gul', p. 10. 
40 lu. A. Shchetinov & B. A. Starkov, pp. 14-18. 
41 
L. Nikulin, p. 17. 
42 RGIA, f 37605, op. 1, d. 3, p. 39. 
43 Ia. M. Gorelik, p. 9; E. N. Arvatova-Tukhachevskaia & 0. N. Tukhachevskaia, pp. 10- 11. 
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Ekaterinskii Cadet Corps 
On 16th August 1911, Tukhachevsky enrolled in the 7th (final) Year of the I st 
Muscovite Empress Ekaterina II Cadet Corps, in Lefortovo. 44 It had existed as a 
military training institution since 17th February 1732 and until 1762 was the only 
one. 
45 Again various reasons for this step are forthcoming. 
In 1911 , it would have been another two years until Tukhachevsky received his 
school-leaving certificate and could go to university, which would have meant six 
years in all for his family to support him. Todorskii suggests that, to relieve the family 
burden, Tukhachevsky finally convinced his father to allow him to attend cadet corps 
and enter the military profession for practical, financial reasons, not because of 
romantic notions of becoming a soldier. 
46 Gaining an income at military academy 
after cadet corps would remove the financial responsibility from his family, which 
would have remained, had he attended university. 
Shchetinov and Starkov note other biographers of Tukhachevsky emphasise him 
joining the Communist Party as the main driving-force behind his wish to join the 
military, but the Tukhachevsky family traditions of military service cannot be 
ignored, with the possibility that he joined the military to become famous and 
47 
glorious, dreaming of becoming a general, the latter opinion being shared by Gul'. 
Popov notes this, but also mentions Tukhachevsky's father agreed to him going to 
cadet corps, despite the material difficulties, implying that this was still a bind for the 
family. 
48 
However, the most likely reason why he enrolled at cadet corps was that of fiscal 
reality allowing him to fulfill his wish to follow a military career. As a landowner's 
son, he was entitled to attend the closed military institutions, but he had to pass a 
rigorous entrance exam first. His father only accepted his career choice because he 
44 
A. 1. Todorskii, p. 11; Ia. M. Gorelik, p. 9. 
45 
Ia. M. Gorelik, p. 10. 
46 
A. 1. Todorskii, pp. 10- 11 
47 lu. A. Shchetinov and B. A. Starkov, p. 19; R. Gul', pp. 12-13. 
48 A. S. Popov, Trud, Talant, Doblest'. (Moscow, 1972), p. 3. 
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had studied so badly at gimnasda, but passed the entrance exam and promised to 
49 
study well at cadet corps. 
The Director of Ekaterinskii Cadet Corps was General V. V. Rimskii-Korsakov, a 
relative of the composer. He was an enlightened, forward-thinking man and, because 
of him, the cadet corps provided a higher standard of education than gymnasii or 
normal colleges. Situated in Moscow, the teaching staff contained many officer-tutors 
who were veterans of the Russo-Japanese War, eager to teach and restore pride to the 
Russian Army. 50 
Alongside military education, a wide range of other subjects were taught to 
develop self- initiative, including the works of progressive authors such as Jean- 
51 
Jacques Rousseau and Jan Amos Komenskii . 
Similar subjects were taught as in 
gimnasda, including swimming, gymnastics, music, singing and dancing, but not 
52 
Latin. 
Smartness and plainness in way of life were demanded and internal organisation 
was along paramilitary lines, with cadets organized into companies, divided into 
sections. These were led by officer-teachers. Military training consisted of drill 
instruction, shooting, hikes/excursions (called junior reconnaissance) and 
manoeuvres/wargames. Gymnastics competitions were held and fencing taught. 
53 
Cadets sat end of year exams and an inspection was conducted by the Director. 
During the summer, an excursion was held to Borodino, the site of the major battle 
between Russia and France in 1812, learning reconnaissance, signalling, food 
54 
preparation and other skills necessary for mobile military existence. 
With 1912 marking the 100th Anniversary of the 1812 War, cadets studied, "The 
Great Fatherland War and its Heroes", for which War and Peace was read, along with 
the Textbook on Russian History by S. Soloviev and The History of the 19th Century 
55 
by P. G. Vinogradov. 
49 
50 
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For Tukhachevsky, already well-read in the history of Napoleon, Suvorov and the 
1812 War, these subjects finally provided him with topics of interest to study within 
the educational environment. He apparently began to compile his own dictionary of 
events of Russian military history, recording quotes, slogans and proverbs of famous 
Russian Commanders and learning Suvorov's military teachings by heart, considering 
56 it necessary to follow these in his later career. Also, despite finding the literature 
classes hard, Tukhachevsky was stimulated by studies connected with being out in the 
57 
field, resolving practical matters of field service . 
This certainly seemed to be the case as Tukhachevsky was appointed vice- 
sergeant-major as top pupil for the year. Ivanov suggests this rapid rise of a new pupil 
was resented by some, especially the landed nobility, with emigres later considering 
Tukhachevsky a traitor to his noble class, fabricating tales of an unconventionally 
vain, power-loving "Red General" from the landed classes. This was published in the 
Western press but reached Russia, where Tukhachevsky spent his later life refuting 
them. Ivanov dismisses these as bitter White emigre lies. 
58 1 shall return to this later. 
Nikulin describes Tukhachevsky as initially being looked down upon by the 
monied landowners offspring, but winning unforced respect with his extraordinary 
physical strength. However, Tukhachevsky did not take part in "peeling" or Tsuk 
59 
whereby senior junkers mocked and bullied the juniors . This was 
designed to instill 
discipline and demonstrate the role of rank with juniors continuing the practice upon 
becoming seniors, but probably added to the cowed nature and lack of self-initiative 
of the Russian officer corps. Tukhachevsky did not receive this due to his size, but did 
not partake in it either, preferring the freer conditions he had known previously at 
gimnasiia, to carrying out practices "Imported from German military institutions". For 
this he was nicknamed the "Newly-enlightened Prince Andrei Bolkonskii" after the 
character in "War and Peace" . 
60 
However, Nikulin suggests Tukhachevsky preferred Moscow to Penza because he 
could attend concerts and the cinema. Many cultured people lived there with liberal 
56 
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views, even amongst the nobility, who talked of the Tsar and courtiers sarcastically. 
61 
This latter assertion matches the scorn and disdain Tukhachevsky held towards the 
Tsar and autocracy from this period onwards. 
62 
The growing revolutionary movement in Russia was apparently also felt inside the 
cadet corps. Cadets produced a bi-weekly handwritten journal entitled Ekaterinets, 
which was closed down for printing charicatures of disliked tutors, calling for reforms 
of the Moscow Cadet Corps and making "revolutionary pronouncements". 
63 However, 
there is no indication that Tukhachevsky was involved in this. 
On I st June 1912, Tukhachevsky received his graduation certificate, finishing first 
in the year with his name engraved on a plaque. 
64 As a reward, he had the choice of 
which military academy to attend. However, when he chose to join Aleksandrovskii 
Academy, an infantry academy, instead of the elite Academies - Mikhailovskii for 
artillery, Nikolaevskii for engineering, or Pavlovskii for infantry - which did approach 
him, there was great surprise amongst his year. Tukhachevsky chose Aleksandrovskii 
because he knew it gave the best military training, rather than the quick rise up the 
65 
career ladder which the other academies provided, suggesting Tukhachevsky was 
not a careerist at this point, but genuinely wished to gain the best training possible. 
Would these ambitions change as he progressed? 
61 
Ibid. p. 25. 
62 
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Aleksandrovskii Military Academy 
Tukhachevsky studied Military Science at Aleksandrovskii Military Academy in 
the Arbat, Moscow, from 1912-1914.66 He later commented that the Aleksandrovskii, 
"prepared officers entirely well". 
67 The Director of Aleksandrovskii was Lieutenant- 
General N. 1. Genisht, who later became Senior Inspector of the Chief Administration 
of Military-Training Institutions of the Red Army, under Tukhachevsky. 
68 The future 
Red Army Supreme Commander Sergei Sergeevich Kamenev, with whom 
Tukhachevsky would work closely, had earlier studied at Aleksandrovskii. 
69 
The merits of Aleksandrovskii Military Academy at this time are debated, with 
Gorelik suggesting the library did not contain a wide enough selection of military 
literature. The works of V. Cheremisov were still popularly used, which upheld the 
old Suvorovian principle of "Bayonet wise, bullet foolish" and attacked and 
underestimated the advance of technology. Therefore, Tukhachevsky read other books 
not officially listed such as A. G. Elchaninov's, Conduct of Modern War and Battles, 
in which questions on the development of forms and methods of military operations 
70 
and the roles different types of weapon would play, were posed . Nikulin similarly 
describes Aleksandrovskii as out-of-date with the works of Leer, Boban and Totleban 
used and the emphasis on drill steps not preparing Russian officers for war. He 
mentions a book published in 1928-1932 by Aleksandr Ivanovich Kuprin entitled 
Junker, which describes life in the Aleksandrovskii Academy, from which Kuprin 
graduated at the start of the 20th Century. Nikulin states it was much the same in 
Tukhachevsky's time, 71 noting it turned out junkers imbued with discipline, bravery 
and endurance and was rated as the best for a sound course of military training. 
Todorskii comments the Aleksandrovskii had an excellent library with over 3,000 
books donated by former student V. A. Berezovskii, containing especially valuable 
critical analyses on the Russo-Japanese War. The book market was saturated with 
66 
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books on this, but amongst the most valuable were those by participants such as A. A. 
Svechin. 72 
This reflected the Russian military's preoccupation over the preceding seven 
years, searching for the reasons for Russia's defeat by Japan in the 1904-05 Russo- 
Japanese War, the first occasion a "modem" European Army had been defeated by an 
Asian foe. This had encouraged calls for modernisation of the Russian armed forces, 
including the military academies, making this a fertile period in military education. 
This was the period of debates between the "Young Turks" and Russian Nationalist 
schools of Russian military thought, which had developed from the twisting road of 
military development and modernisation that the Russian military establishment had 
undergone since the disastrous Crimean War of 1853-55. A brief glance through this 
process is useful to reflect the atmosphere under which Tukhachevsky studied at 
military academy. 
D. A. Miliutin, an advocate of Suvorov's offensive strategy, had attempted to 
modernise the Russian military establishment before the Crimean debacle, but only 
the backwards display of the Russian forces and accession to the throne of the 
progressive Tsar Alexander 11 in 1855, provided the necessary impetus for his ideas to 
be implemented. He founded the military district system in 1862, made the first 
moves towards a general staff and modernised the army's weaponry in light of 
American Civil War developments. In 1863, he reformed the military education 
system, forming twenty new gimnasii with wide curricula, no longer emphasising 
drill. The policy was introduced whereby the top half of graduating years were 
commisioned 2nd Lieutenants and the bottom half ensigns. Entrance exams were 
introduced to raise admission standards and summer field exercises accompanied 
theoretical course work for the first time. Miliutin also created a Military History 
Commission in 1879 to combine current military developments with past campaigns, 
but his advances stagnated or were reversed after the assassination of Tsar Alexander 
11 and Miliutin's resignation in 1881. 
The succession of the conservative Alexander III in 1881 and Nicholas 11 in 1894, 
prevented rapid modernisation by Miliutin's successors as War Minister, Vannovskii 
72 
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(1881-97) and Kuropatkin (1897-1904). The Russian victory in the Russo-Turkish 
War of 1877-78 was never properly studied, with Napoleonic tactics and those of von 
Moltke in Bismarck's wars, still used as a template, not the Russian Army's recent 
experiences. Therefore, incorrect lessons were drawn, with the lack of technology 
used leading to misconceptions in the use and changing roles of artillery, infantry and 
cavalry on the modem battlefield. Instead, the tactics employed by Dragomirov of 
using quick massed infantry attacks without sufficient artillery support and no 
effective cavalry reconnaissance, which succeeded against the technologically- 
deficient Turks, because of the well-drilled patriotism of the Russian soldier, was 
taken to be the correct way forward. The Suvorovian maxim "Bayonet wise, bullet 
foolish" was thus adopted and maintained through the Russo-Japanese War and even 
into The Great War. Dragomirov, as Commandant of Nikolaevskii General Staff 
Academy from 1878-89, remained the battlefield tactical supremo of the Tsarist 
Army, whilst his successor as Commandant, Leer (1889-98), dominated theatre-level 
strategical thinking before 1904. The Young Turks/Russian Nationalist debate 
Tukhachevsky studied under was preceded by debates invoked by the continued 
separation of these two military fields by these two figures. 
Leer headed an "academic school", publishing Strategiia (Strategy) in 1867 and 
repeated reproductions to meet challenges to his theory. He was a devotee of 
Napoleon and viewed the latter's role as proof that the genius of the individual 
commander was the vital component in warfare. He believed Napoleon should be 
viewed as the example by which all commanders and campaigns should be measured, 
not as a phenomenon of his era. The ideas of Jornini were chosen ahead of 
Clausewitz, with the latter's inclusion of politics in his military writings 
uncomfortable to the Russian military within the Tsarist regime. Clausewitz's Vom 
Kriege (On War) was not published in Russia until 1899, but Jornini was more 
accessible to the Russian readership, being published in French, which was more 
commonly used in Russia than Clausewitz's German. The shock strike advocated by 
Jomini was therefore advocated by Leer, accompanied by the Napoleonic maxim of 
every action leading to the final battle, to achieve ultimate victory. Von Moltke's 
methods of the 1860s-1870s, using technology, new weaponry and mass forces to 
deploy, concentrate and attack rapidly, a strategy of "annihilation", were viewed as 
the natural progression of these ideas and the method to be followed. 
22 
This strategy was challenged in 1892 with the emergence of the Russian 
Nationalist school led by Bloch and Gulevich, an instructor at the Nikolaevskii 
Academy. 73 This school maintained Russia should look internally for military 
guidance, espousing Suvorov, the great Russian commander, over the German von 
Moltke. Its advocates believed all military eras should be studied, including recent 
events, not just the Napoleonic and Bismarckian periods favoured by Leer. The 
publication in 1900 of Suvorov in the Studies of the Professors of the Nicholas 
Academy, by the Academy of the General Staff, meant Suvorov was studied alongside 
Napoleon. However, the debate continued through the Russo-Japanese War debacle, 
which finally proved Dragomirov's ideas outdated, and into the post-War reflective 
period. 
Weaknesses in the Russian Army exposed by Japan had to be remedied. Partially, 
these followed similar lines to Milititin's reform attempts - creating an intelligent, 
uniformly-educated officer corps which displayed initiative and an ability to think 
independently. Combined with this was the need to incorporate new technology - 
artillery, transport and communications networks - to move large numbers of troops to 
and from the battlefield and maintain contact and control when in battle. The need to 
combine historical lessons with current developments was emphasised and Leer's 
utilisation of Napoleon and Moltke as a template challenged. 
However, the offensive was still viewed as the method to bypass technological 
development, using march-manoeuvres and envelopments in meeting battles to avoid 
costly frontal clashes and reduce modem weaponry's effectiveness. However, strategy 
and tactics were still separated between academic "theorists" and officer 
"practitioners" and the Young Turks seeking modernisation of the Russian Army 
clashed with the Nationalist school, which still insisted on Suvorovian principles as 
the maxims to be employed. Amidst this debate, new instructional programmes were 
drawn up by the Nikolaevskii Academy staff for this and the other army institutions, 
which included the Aleksandrovskii Academy, although Mikhnevich, Commandant of 
74 
the Nikolaevskii Academy, limited their impact . 
73 Ivan Stanislavovich Bloch 0 83 6-190 1), a Russian military theorist and economist. 
74 1 have relied heavily for this section on the seminal work of B. Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets: 
the Iniperial Russian Army, 1861-1914, to illustrate the ideas which Tukhachevsky may have ingested 
during his military education. 
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It was amidst this debate and politicking that Tukhachevsky gained his military 
education. Figures such as Svechin, who published the first critical appraisal of 
ground operations in the Russo-Japanese War in 1910, emerged. Neznamov, an 
instructor at the Nikolaevskii Academy, began linking tactics and operational ideas to 
strategic issues in an effort to combine them into a unified doctrine, but this was 
75 
stopped by Tsar Nicholas 11 in 19 12. Neznamov believed in the application of 
history to modem industrial and technological developments to predict and plan for 
future wars and prescribed manoeuvre warfare, successive operations and combined 
operations as possible methods by which to win campaigns. These ideas were being 
discussed in military circles at this time. How much of them Tukhachevsky would 
have picked up during his Academy education is difficult to say, but figures such as 
Neznamov and Svechin would join the Red Army and Tukhachevsky would 
encounter them later. Debates over strategies of "annihilation" and "attrition" would 
continue after The Great War within the Red Army envirom-nent and Tukhachevsky 
would be part of these. As to the content of Tukhachevsky's studies at 
Aleksandrovskii, various suggestions are given and they are worth considering. 
It is suggested he spent most time studying the new regulations and directions 
revised and published after the Russo-Japanese War, which became the 1912 Tsarist 
Army Field Regulations. He attempted to compare these with previous regulations to 
conclude what the changes meant. 
Tukhachevsky read 40-50 military books whilst at Aleksandrovskii, including 
those by Mikhnevich, Leer and Dragomirov. 
76 
He read works by A. K. Puzirevskii, 
the 8-volumed Encyclopedia of Military and Naval Science, Atlas of Battles of the 
77 
19th Century, the series Soldiers Library, textbooks and memoirs. 
He also read fiction, for example, rereading Tolstoi, and received lectures on past 
Russian military campaigns and military history. Lectures on tactics, artillery and 
fortifications were given by teachers who had graduated at various times from the 
75 
Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Neznamov (1872-1928). 
76 Ia. M. Gorelik, p. 11; A. 1. Todorskii, p. 13; V. M. Ivanov, p. 23, puts the number at over 50 books. 
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Nikolaevskii General Staff Academy and therefore possessed excellent educational 
met ods. 
78 
GO writes of Tukhachevsky reading the works of Clausewitz, biographies of 
Napoleon, Blukher, Suvorov and Moltke, 
79 
while Shchetinov and Starkov note that he 
read works in French, German and Latin, indicating it was at this time that he read 
Essays on the Gallic War by Julius Ceasar. 
80 Whether he read this now or earlier, 
knowledge of foreign languages would have enabled Tukhachevsky to expand his 
military knowledge and possibly progress more quickly than fellow junkers without 
such linguistic talent. That he did read widely and continued to do so was suggested 
by N. 1. Koritskii, Chief-of-Staff of Simbirsk Division under Tukhachevsky in 1918, 
who noted, 
On Tukhachevsky's writing desk I noticed a volume of Pushkin open at 
"History of the Pugachev Rebellion". Beside it lay Campaigns of Gustav 
Adoýf, Applied Tactics by N. D. Bezrukov, Strategy by Mikhnevich. 
Mikhail Nikolaevich caught my gaze. 
"Yes", he sighed, "From the time of Razin and Pugachev this krai has 
81 
not known war. And now here we are.... 
A. M. Kavelin, an officer-teacher at Aleksandrovskii who later went on to serve 
under Tukhachevsky in 5th Army, described him as being well-read, especially in 
military science and an acknowledged authority amongst his comrades. He recalled 
Tukhachevsky surprised him in this and also in his disregard for his future career and 
place "in society". 
82 
This confinns the assertion that Tukhachevsky attended Aleksandrovskii to gain a 
sound military education instead of a rapid rise up the military and societal ladder. 
The head start he had as a child, learning military history and foreign languages, stood 
him in good stead, and allied with the fact he had finally found a subject in which he 
was interested - military science - he applied himself to his studies as his father had 
demanded. The knowledge Tukhachevsky gained at Aleksandrovskii, examining 
works of military theory and history, studying tactics and the strategic decisions of 
78 
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79 
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81 N. 1. Koritskii, "V dni voiny iv dni mira" Marshal Tukhachevsky: Vospominaniia druzei i 
soratnikov. (Moscow, 1965), p. 57. 
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past commanders, and analysing these to gain a deep theoretical knowledge of tactics 
and the basis of strategy, gave him a deep professional military education. He was a 
product of the Tsarist military educational system, attending a highly rated cadet 
corps and military academy and his later success came from the study he carried out 
here and not just from some inner talent or his wish to be a soldier. He learned the 
basic knowledge behind the problems of military science and military art and the 
theory of tactics and strategy and developed these later, commanding in the Civil 
War, still studying volumes relevant to where he was fighting at any given time. 
Theoretical knowledge was accompanied by practical exercises at 
Aleksandrovskii. In the summer, in Kholinskii Field, tactical training, shooting and 
topographical surveying were conducted. The junior junkers were formed into 
companies with the seniors to give them experience of fon-nations, marching 
procedures and military operations at this level, with the seniors helping the juniors 
with their knowledge. 
83 
On 12th July 1914, Tukhachevsky graduated first in his year and was 
commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant. 
84 He scored II "A" or top marks in military subjects 
and 9 in his others. 
85 The reward as first graduate was the choice of regiment. 
Tukhachevsky chose the Semenovskii Life-Guards Regiment, confirming further the 
theory he was following family tradition into the military. Suvorov had also started 
his military service in this regiment. 
86 Again however, other theories are suggested for 
his entry. 
Gul' asserts that to gain a commission to the elite Semenovskii or Preobrazhenskii 
Life-Guards Regiments, money or connections were required and it was necessary to 
graduate from the Pavlovskii Military Academy. However, the advent of The Great 
War pen-nitted Tukhachevsky entry as "war does not need money, but bravery and 
87 
talent". This however, ignores Tukhachevsky's exceptional academic performance 
and the fact he had the choice of regiment. 
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Suggestions are made that Tukhachevsky's political views were forming at this 
time. Popov writes that Tukhachevsky could see the everyday life of the autocracy in 
Moscow and at this time began to analyse it, coming to the conclusion he did not hold 
88 the same beliefs as the upper-classes . 
This is probably based upon Nikolai Kuliabko 
who records that he met Tukhachevsky in 1912 and discussed the 1905 Revolution 
and the situation in Russia. Kuliabko was sure Tukhachevsky did not hold the same 
beliefs as the majority of cadets and junkers. 
89 Tukhachevsky would undoubtedly 
have discussed and considered life in Russia under Tsarism, although it is unlikely he 
formed any political leanings at this time. It has already been mentioned he had no 
great respect for the Tsar, but he was concentrating on gaining his military education. 
It is possible he was troubled with the role the army had played in 1905, suppressing 
the uprisings, but from his later conduct this was not because he saw this as a role the 
army should not play, but from the weakness of the current regime in Russia. 
Tukhachevsky's conduct during his academy education produces the greatest 
divergence in opinion. Ivanov suggests Tukhachevsky at this time possessed the 
abilities to manage people which were required in an officer and had no need to raise 
90 
his voice or act in a threatening manner. However, the emigre accounts Ivanov 
decried so vehemently emerge here. Vladimir Nikitich Postoronkin describes 
Tukhachevsky as detached and cold towards other students, making him the perfect 
drill instructor. He had no close friends or relations and as sergeant-major in the 
senior year, was a strict disciplinarian, even to juniors who had just started at 
Aleksandrovskii and were not used to the lifestyle. He would hand out punishments 
for errors without waiting to find out the reasons behind them and his conduct caused 
a trail of incidents and conflicts with sad endings - two junkers transferring away and 
three committing suicide. 
91 Ivanov dismisses Postoronkin as a Whiteguard emigre, 
bitter about the "red general from the nobility", calling his reliability as a source into 
question. However, Postoronkin tallies with Gul's account written in 1932. Gul' was 
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another emigre and possibly used Postoronkin as a source. If Postoronkin was 
genuine, did the independent leadership streak evident in Tukhachevsky from an early 
age manifest itself more dominantly when he reached a position of power over others 
and did this give an indication of what was to come? 
The Great War - First Combat Experiences 
Following his graduation ball in Moscow on 12th July, Tukhachevsky began the 
92 
summer in training camp at Khodinskii Field, before receiving leave. Travelling to 
Penza, he spent only two days with his family before the outbreak of The Great 
93 
War. 
The scale of the Russian Army and limitations of the transport and 
communications network had led Stavka to formulate a plan of general mobilisation 
simultaneously against Germany and Austria-Hungary. 
94 Two Russian Fronts were 
formed, the North-West against Germany in East Prussia and the South-West against 
Austria-Hungary in Poland and Galicia. Despite the cumbersome initial process, 
slower than either of the Central Powers they were facing, the Russians envisaged an 
offensive strategy, striking quickly, utilising all available resources, with no thoughts 
of an extended conflict. 
Eastern Front fighting in 1914 differed entirely from the stalemate which quickly 
closeted the Western Front. Poorer reconnaissance and wider space encouraged 
manoeuvre operations on a grand scale with envelopments involving huge numbers. 
This was the first type of warfare Tukhachevsky experienced and it would stay with 
him. 
The Semenovskii Life-Guards Regiment became a component of Ist Guards 
Corps under Adjutant-General Bezobrazov. Earmarked for General Rennenkampf s 
I st Army in East Prussia, the Semenovskii began moving there from their surnmer 
camp with the Preobrazhenskii Life-Guards at Krasnoe Selo. However, initial 
deployment plans were changed, with mobilisation still not completed, as pressure 
grew from the Entente Allies for a Russian offensive to relieve the Western Front. 
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28 
New 9th and 10th An-nies were ordered on 6th August for an offensive on Berlin, 
95 
with the Guards Corps to join 9th Army under General P. A. Lechitskii, assembling in 
the Warsaw Region. Tukhachevsky, initially posted to the Semenovskii Reserve 
Battalion in Petrograd, joined his regiment on the march to Warsaw. 
96 
However, the Berlin Offensive was postponed, with the Guards transferred to the 
stalling South-Western Front, to aid 4th Army under General Salza, who was replaced 
by General Evert on 25th August, in Ivangorod-Lublin Region, Poland. 
97 The 
Semenovskii became involved in the massive Galician Campaign, involving a series 
of meeting battles and complex manoeuvre operations of whole armies, between the 
Wisla and Dniestr Rivers. This lasted 20 days with over half a million men on both 
sides fighting on a 500 verst front. 
98 The Russians were initially successful around 
Lublin-Kholm, but then retreated towards Lublin. 9th Army arrived at this point on 
Ist September and went into battle with the Semenovskii fighting at the village of 
99 Sukhodoly. 
General Mrozovskii's detachment, including General Olokhov's Guards Division 
of which the Semenovskii Regiment under General Von Etter was a component, 
inflicted a crushing blow on 10th Austrian Corps, taking 5,000 prisoners, on 2nd 
September. 100 The Austrian corps lost two-thirds of its men and guns. 
101 During the 
Galician campaign, the Guards further stood out in battles at the settlements of 
Zarashevo and Urshulin, south of Lublin and at Krzheshov, South-West of 
102 
Sandomierz, the latter being taken on 14th September. 
Tukhachevsky won the first of six decorations achieved during the Great War at 
Krzeshov. The town was to be taken whatever the cost, but despite fierce fighting 
between the Semenovskii and the Austrians, the fighting was indecisive. 7th 
Company of 2nd Battalion, in which Tukhachevsky fought, outflanked the Austrians, 
95 
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appearing in their rear. Retreating over the River San, the Austrians set fire to the 
bridge, defending their line of retreat. 7th Company Commander, Lieutenant 
Veselago, and Tukhachevsky led a bayonet charge over the burning bridge onto the 
far bank, winning the battle and capturing prisoners. Veselago received the George 
Cross and Tukhachevsky the Order of Vladimir, Level IV, with swords and bows. 
103 
Both Tukhachevsky and Veselago were missing in action for a time. 
1 04 
The Austrians lost East Galicia and half the fighting capacity of their anny, some 
400,000 men - each division losing around 4,500 men and 400 guns. Russia lost 230- 
250,000 men, but the loss of officers was never recovered during the War. 
105 After the 
Russo-Japanese War, the Officer Corps had been increased from 46,000 to 80,000, 
but the vast majority of these were commissioned in front-line units and so were lost 
in the initial fighting. This left a vastly insufficient number in reserve to train new 
officer recruits. 
106 Tukhachevsky rose from platoon to company commander with the 
107 
high casualties. 
9th Army, including Semenovskii Regiment, and 4th Army were withdrawn from 
the River San area and moved cast of the River Wisla in late September/early 
October. The Russians attempted to cross the Wisla at Ivangorod and Novy- 
108 
Aleksandrovo from Ilth-15th October, but were repelled by the Germans, who 
109 
launched an offensive towards Warsaw and the fortress of Ivangorod. The 
Semenovskii again excelled in battles South-West of Ivangorod, then fought in the 
Czqstochowa-Krakow operations, north of Krakow and east of Oswiecim. 
110 At 
Ivangorod-Warsaw, units from South-Western Front (including the Guards) marched 
over 100 kms to help repel the German/Austrian offensive. lst Austrian and 9th 
German An-nies retreated in panic as the Russians pushed them back over 100 kins, 
but supply shortages and a lack of cooperation between North-Western Front of 
Danilov and Ruzski and South-Western Front of Ivanov and Alexcev, stopped the 
103 
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advance on 8th November. 9th Army had suffered staggering losses gaining these 
victories, with its numbers reduced from 196,000 to 93,000, the Guards Corps 
suffering 14,000 casualties. 
III These huge losses began to affect morale. 
In December, a renewed German offensive pushed the Russians back to a 
defensive line along the Rivers Bzura and Rawka, which despite German 
breakthroughs, held until the freeze of deep winter ended campaigning until 1915, 
with the Russians thirty miles south-west of Warsaw. Russian supply shortages were 
growing critical, with some 800,000 recruits without rifles by 21st December and 
shell output far below expenditure, severely curtailing artillery capabilities. 
112 The 
industrial backwardness of Russia vis-a-vis Germany was beginning to tell. This 
forced a change in the nature of the Eastern Front with manoeuvre warfare, because of 
Russian ammunition and supply shortages, giving way to smaller offensive operations 
and to static defensive trench warfare. 
In January 1915, the Semenovskii were bivouaced at the settlement of Gostynin 
recuperating, using this time to assess operations, ingest new tactical knowledge and 
carry out exercises. On 24th January the Guards Corps were transferred from the 
Grodzisk area, 25 versts west of Warsaw, in South-Westem Front, to North-Western 
Front, joining General Sivers' 10th Army, as part of Danilov's and Ruzski's new 
offensive through the Masurian Marshes into East Prussia. 
1 13 A simultaneous 
offensive was planned by Ivanov and Alexeev through the Carpathians to Hungary, 
but again no cooperation existed between the two fronts. 
1 14 
Germany preempted the offensives, launching their Masurian offensive on 7th 
February, using poison gas for the first time in a diversionary attack on 31 st January. 
This proved a disaster with the wind turning to blow the gas back towards the 
Germans and the severe cold negating its effectiveness. 
" 5 Significantly, however, 
Tukhachevsky had encountered poison gas, a weapon he would experiment with later. 
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Documents taken from a dead German officer by the Russians, indicating the 
Germans planned a giant pincer movement to envelop Sivers' 10th Army around the 
forests of Augustow, were ignored. The German 10th Army attacked from the north 
and 8th Army from the south along the line of AugustOw and Suwalki, where the 
Guards Corps was positioned, west of the River Nieman. Terrible blizzards initially 
hampered the German advance, but simultaneously hid their numbers, with Sivers 
taken completely by surprise. Instead of digging in, the Russians decided to launch 
their offensive for Berlin again with the Prasnishskii Operation, from the fortress of 
Prasznysz. However, German artillery superiority was immense with "suitcase" 
shells, as they were dubbed, fired constantly against the Russian positions, with little 
116 in reply. 
10th Army advanced into AugustOw Forest between Suwalki and Augustow, 
straight into the German pincer movement, becoming isolated strategically from 
Plehve's 12th Army, still advancing to the south. An attempted retreat from 14th 
February was prevented by the German 21st Corps marching 22 miles on 15th 
February, to complete the encirclement of 70,000 Russians in AugustOw Forest by 
17th February. This centre group comprising mainly Bulgakov's 20th Corps were 
forced into rearguard breakout actions, whilst the northern and southern (including 
Guards Corps) groups of 10th Army fell back. Some 56,000 Russians died and 
Bulgakov surrendered with barely 12,000 survivors of 20th Corps, mostly wounded, 
117 
on 21 st February. 
A counter-attack launched by 12th Army and the Guards Corps on 20th February 
near Lom: ýa and Plock, to relieve the trapped central group failed, 
118 
with the 
Semenovskii encircled and cut to pieces and Tukhachevsky taken prisoner. On 27th 
February, Regimental Order No. 34 reported Tukhachevsky and others as lost. 
119 His 
family only knew he was alive when he wrote later from prison. 
120 
116 lu. A. Shchetinov & B. A. Starkov, pp. 43-44. 
117 R. Gul', pp. 2 7-2 8; N. Stone, pp. 116-119; W. Rutherford, pp. 116-118; R. Gray & C. Argyle, pp. 
80-86. 
118 R. Gray & C. Argyle, p. 86. This included 6th Company of the Semenovskii Regiment led by 
Tipol't, who sustained a shrapnel wound to the head, A. A. Tipol't, "Takoe ne zabyvaetsia" Marshal 
Tukhachevsky: Vospominnaniia druzhei i soratnikov. (Moscow, 1965), p. 20. 
119 
A. 1. Todorskil, p. 18. 
120 E. N. Arvatova-Tukhachevskaia & 0. N. Tukhachevskaia, p. 14. 
32 
A Semenovskii Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), who by the 1960s was a 
Lieutenant-General, K. P. Trubnikov, recalled Tukhachevsky as well-liked and 
respected by the men, not just as an officer, but as a person. Trubnikov related that on 
19th February, the Semenovskii, along with the Egerskii and Kurinskii Regiments, 
occupied a forest before the village of Vysokie Duzhi, halfway between Lom. 2a and 
Kolno. The Germans shelled the Semenovskii the whole day, but were unable to 
break them down. At night the Germans attacked in two companies, made a deep 
breakthrough and cut off 7th Company. The reserves restored the position, but 7th 
Company had already perished. It later emerged that Tukhachevsky led the remaining 
troops after Veselago had been killed, until being injured in the leg and captured. The 
prisoners were loaded onto trains at Suwalki and taken into East Prussia. 
1 21 
The Senior NCO of Semenovskii Regiment, Petr Dorofeevich Riabov, recalled 
Tukhachevsky as the best officer in the regiment, highly educated and above all the 
knights, barons and princes who made up the majority of the officers. He described 
Tukhachevsky as a humanitarian man who would meet with the soldiers, even at this 
time when officers and soldiers were deeply divided. Riabov later fought for the Reds 
122 
in the Civil War. 
Todorskii notes that Tukhachevsky finished the War a hero. Todorskii served in 
24th Siberian Rifle Regiment, fighting in the Warsaw Region, but he could remember 
of noone else winning six decorations in only six months of fighting, as 
Tukhachevsky did. He received three Orders of Anna: level 4 with the inscription 
"For Bravery", level 3 with swords and bows, level 2 with swords; two Orders of 
Stanislav: level 3 with swords and bows, level 2 with swords; and the Order of 
Vladimir already mentioned. 
123 
It is likely Tukhachevsky received these decorations for the battles at Ivangorod, 
Warsaw and Krakow where the Semenovskii fought well and for leading 7th 
Company after Veselago's death at Lom2a. 
One example of bravery and self-initiative he may have been decorated for is 
described by A. A. Tipol't, recalled to 6th Company of the Semenovskii in 1914 with 
the rank of ensign, having served his military service in 1907 when a final-year 
121 A. 1. Todorskii, p. 18; lu. A. Shchetinov & B. A. Starkov, pp. 44-45; Ia. M. Gorelik, p. 13. 
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jurisprudence student. He met and befriended Tukhachevsky and describes an episode 
of September/October 1914, when the Semenovskii were positioned on the right bank 
of the Wisla, near Krakow. The Germans had fortified the left bank, but in the middle 
of the river lay a small sandy island. While the officers debated how to reach this 
island to carry out reconnaissance unnoticed, Tukhachevsky obtained a small fishing- 
boat and sailed at night to the island. The boat was so small the side barely came out 
of the water. Tukhachevsky spent the night and part of the next day alone on the 
island, returning with information on the German positions. He returned not knowing 
whether he would be praised or reprimanded for his actions, but was possibly 
1 24 decorated for this. 
Smirnov suggests Todorskii invented some of these decorations because if 
Tukhachevsky received the Order of Vladimir, Level 4 with swords and bows in 
September 1914, he would not have received lesser awards after this, as this did not 
happen. 125 However, this is an unlikely scenario with decorations awarded 
specifically for separate deeds and not dependent upon decorations already received. 
Tukhachevsky served actively on the Eastern Front for barely six months, but 
witnessed a great deal of savage, bitter and varied fighting in this time. He could 
evaluate operations as an officer in action, witnessing the initial emphasis on 
manoeuvre warfare giving way to more static defensive entrenchment as supplies ran 
low, but then having to attack in 1915 with few supplies and scant ammunition or 
artillery support. The shortcomings of the Tsarist war machine were glaringly 
apparent and would have been considered by him in his years of captivity to come, as 
would the contrast between the brave performance of the Russian soldier with the 
inept leadership above. He would also have contemplated how effectively he had been 
trained at cadet corps and military academy and wondered if changes could be made 
here to create a more capable and professional army. Tukhachevsky possibly began 
reaching the conclusions he would record in December 1919 for Lenin when 
evaluating voenspetsy in the Red Army, that the most capable were the young, 
educated in the military academies after 1908-10.1 
26 His wartime experiences thus far 
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would be supplemented by those of the prisoner-of-war camps in Germany and how 
he reacted to incarceration. 
POW Camps and Escapes 
Information on the two and a half years Tukhachevsky spent incarcerated is 
contradictory with most sources relating he made five escape attempts, but not 
agreeing where or when these occurred or the methods used. Tukhachevsky wrote 
letters to his family from the prison camps and if he was planning an escape he would 
write in the letters for them to read the Tale of the Igorev Regiment, indicating he was 
127 
planning to escape. 
Tukhachevsky was first detained in the officers' camp on the small island of 
128 
Danholm on the German Baltic coast between Stralsund and the island of Rugen. 
Ivanov and Popov write that Tukhachevsky first attempted to escape en route to 
Stralsund, but failed, 129 while Fervacque suggests Tukhachevsky first escaped from 
Danholm by swimming from the island, but was recaptured. 
1 30 Gorelik writes 
Tukhachevsky waited until a wann July Sunday before going for a walk and not 
returning. He intended stealing a fishing-boat to sail to Rugen and on to Sweden, but 
was picked up on the shore three weeks later. He used this time to get his bearings, 
but was put into solitary confinement, then transferred to Beeskow, between Berlin 
and Frankfurt-den-Oder, which housed around 100 officers. Gul' suggests this was 
because Tukhachevsky and others were termed "disruptive" for not removing their 
shoulder straps. 
1 31 
At this time apparently, the German Military Administration had banned the 
wearing of shoulder-straps by POWs. Walks outwith the camp were abolished and 
solitary confinement given for any absence without special permission. Under these 
conditions and hoping to be transferred from Beeskow, a very difficult camp from 
127 
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which to escape, Tukhachevsky penned a letter to the commandant asking if he could 
have pen-nission for a walk outside the camp, in order to escape and return to Russia. 
132 
Half a day later he was confined in solitary. 
His wish was granted however, as he was soon transferred to Bad Stuer in 
Mecklenberg with several other officers. This housed around 150 officers in a looser 
regime allowing literature reading and chess. It is suggested Tukhachevsky first read 
the works of Lenin here in 1916, which were brought into the camp via the Swiss and 
Swedish Embassies. Ivanov writes of no international agreement existing for the 
treatment of POWs, meaning conditions inside the German camps could be terrible, 
especially for Russians. Therefore, since the Bolsheviks were the only Russian 
organisation to attempt any contact with POWs, this made a big impression. The 
Tsarist Government did not try to help, even hindering civilian organisations in 
Russia from doing so, putting the Bolshevik efforts in an even better light. Lenin 
formed a Commission in Berne in 1915 for the distribution of literature to the camps 
with works sent such as Alexandra Kollontai's "Who Needs War". 4,000 copies of this 
were distributed to the camps with an editorial by Lenin. After the February 
Revolution, Lenin informed the inmates and stated they should choose to fight for the 
people when they returned to Russia. A questionnaire was sent containing questions 
designed to help inmates support the Bolsheviks. 
133 Blagodatov recalls that later, in 
Ingolstadt, where Tukhachevsky was incarcerated when the February Revolution 
occurred, information about this and subsequent events reached the inmates via 
"agitators". 134 Information from Bolshevik sources appears to have reached POWs, 
but whether Tukhachevsky first encountered this in Bad Stuer or Ingolstadt is unclear. 
However, Speed suggests the Tsarist policy was not deliberate, but a symptom of 
the autocratic system collapsing under the strains of waging war. This is likely, given 
that frontline troops were already experiencing shortages from late 1914 onwards, as 
Tukhachevsky himself had witnessed. This administrative chaos prevented Russia 
sending food packages to her POWs. Western prisoners received these to supplement 
the diet provided by the Gen-nan authorities, but Russians and other East Europeans 
132 R. GO, p. 34; Ia. M. Gorelik, p. 14. 
133 Ia. M. Gorelik, pp. 14-15; V. M. Ivanov, pp. 6-7. 
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did not. 94% of East Europeans and Italians existed purely on prison food, but 97% of 
Western prisoners had this diet supplemented with food packages. This led to a death 
rate twice as high amongst the former group and contributed greatly to Russians 
comprising 70-80,000 of the 118,000 POWs dying in German prisons during the 
135 War. 
Speed's assertion perhaps needs qualifying by the simple fact that since Russians 
comprised 59% of prisoners in German camps, 
136 
more Russians inevitably would 
have died in captivity than any other nation, but the impression created on the inmates 
would obviously have been bad. This must have influenced opinion. With 2,417,000 
Russian POWs held in Germany during The Great War, upon returning to Russia after 
1917, the majority of these would have baulked at the thought of a Tsarist restoration 
after their experiences. This was very likely a factor in White recruiting difficulties 
during the Civil War. 
The German authorities would have encouraged Bolshevik literature in the camps, 
given the defeatist message the Bolsheviks preached and with the above 
circumstances, it would have seemed more appealing. Gorelik suggests reading the 
ideas of Lenin had a great effect on Tukhachevsky and stiffened his resolve to 
escape. 
137 Tukhachevsky would speak of this later in Ingolstadt, but in Bad Stuer and 
earlier, escape was already foremost in his mind, with the wish to return to Russia and 
rejoin the War against his captors the most likely reason. It is unlikely he decided to 
escape from here because he read a pamphlet by Lenin. 
Tukhachevsky's next escape attempt was from Bad Stuer. The camp was 
surrounded by two rows of barbed wire and prisoners were guarded round-the-clock. 
As a rule escape attempts were unsuccessful and Tukhachevsky had witnessed several 
failures before he tried. Varying versions of this are furnished with Ivanov suggesting 
the escape attempt was made with a 2nd Lieutenant Phillipov. 
138 On 7th September 
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1916, they hid in boxes of bedlinen taken out of the camp, 
139possibly devising this 
from a story Tukhachevsky had read about political prisoners in Siberia escaping in a 
wagon inside a box of cabbage. 
140 Hiding in a rubbish pit or forest outwith the camp 
until nightfall, they covered twenty kilometres a day for 26 days, travelling 500 kms 
to the Dutch border, with their knowledge of foreign languages helping them. 
Literally a step from the Dutch border they were captured. Philippov managed to hide 
and escape later, but Tukhachevsky was caught and imprisoned in a local jail. 
Escaping from here, he swam the Elbe in a bid for freedom, but was again captured. 
141 
Ivanov writes Tukhachevsky was then incarcerated in Ingolstadt, but he was first 
transferred to Fort Zomdorff, a strict penal camp in the Cilstrin Fortress, east of 
Berlin. Here he dug a tunnel with English and French POWs including Roland 
Garros, but half an hour before they were due to go, it was discovered, possibly via an 
142 
informer, leading to his transfer to Fort 9, Ingolstadt. 
Within the German penal system, officers and lower ranks were separated with 
non-officers put to work. Officers were spared this, but Shchetinov and Starkov 
suggest they were kept in old castles and fortresses, in especially strict isolation. 
143 
However, Speed lists Bad Stuer and COstrin as enlisted men's camps, which suggests 
segregation was perhaps not always strictly adhered to. Camp regimes did differ 
markedly between the German military districts, with local authorities running them 
under no central coordination. 
144 Possibly, disruptive officers such as Tukhachevsky 
would be transferred and housed with lower ranks in securer regimes. In Ingolstadt, 
however, Tukhachevsky had reached the securest officer facility in Germany. 
Major A. J. Evans of the Royal Flying Corps was imprisoned in Ingolstadt after 
repeated escape attempts in late 1916/early 1917, when Tukhachevsky was there. He 
provides a tremendously detailed and entertaining view of life in the camp and writes 
that it was populated by those who had repeatedly escaped or were tagged 
"disruptive". Around 150 officers were housed in Ingolstadt, of whom "... at least 130 
139 
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had made successful attempts to escape from other camps, and had only been recaught 
after from three days to three weeks temporary freedom". 
145 Barbed wire surrounded 
the camp. 
146 The bars on the windows were as thick as two fingers and the cells had 
steel doors. The fortress was surrounded by deep and wide ditches filled with water 
and there were as many guards as there were prisoners. To make escape attempts even 
harder, the Germans mixed POWs of different nationalities - Russian, French, British 
and Italian. "Attempt to converse! ", wrote Blagodatov, a Russian detained with 
Tukhachevsky. 147 Undeterred however, Tukhachevsky and others tried to dig under 
the walls. This was detected and vigilance became even more strict. 
148 Evans recalls 
tunneling was impossible because water from the moat flooded in, but he writes "The 
camp was nothing less than an escaping club. Each man was ready to help anyone 
who wished to escape and had a plan, quite regardless of his own risk or the 
punishment he might bring upon himself'. 
149 The descriptions of Tukhachevsky's 
activities within Ingolstadt fit this, with more attempts tried. Blagodatov provides 
several examples, recalling that whilst everyone attempted to escape and disrupt life 
in the camp, making it more difficult for the Germans, Tukhachevsky was one of the 
most active and inmates were "... always ready to follow him on any risky affair". 
150 
At one point the commandant tried to change the taking of appel from the cells to 
the courtyard. When he ordered the guards to summon the prisoners, the inmates 
began whistling and shouting. The French sang the Marseillaise and fights broke out 
between prisoners and guards. The commandant eventually flung his an-ns up in the 
air in despair and left. Tukhachevsky was an instigator of this demonstration which 
characterised his and the whole camp's mood. When the inmates gathered in the 
French quarters to celebrate Bastille Day with bottles of wine and beer provided in 
145 
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French aid packages, Tukhachevsky toasted to a land of no camps, fortresses or 
jail. 151 
Blagodatov further recalls Tukhachevsky responding to a rich landowning fellow 
inmate, Colonel Leotiev, on hearing him condemning the February Revolution as 
being carried out by "Black Rebels", that the land should go to those who worked 
152 
it. 
Tukhachevsky was very close with many of the French inmates and helped 
several of them escape. He helped a French officer, de Jaubert, by preparing a 
German uniform for his escape and personally staging a concert to divert the attention 
of the guards and hide the noise of cutting through the window bars. De Jaubert 
escaped through the window and walked out of the fortress in the uniform when the 
guards changed. 
153 He reached the railway station, escaped to Holland and later the 
inmates heard he had shot down a German plane. This success led to even stricter 
security and barbed wire covered with bells strung round the camp. Several days later, 
a French naval officer, Captain Bogino, was killed trying to escape. However, helping 
successful escapes and the revolutionary events back in Russia strengthened 
154 Tukhachevsky's desire to escape. 
Blagodatov also refers to accounts included in The Tukhachevskii Affair. 
155 In this 
book Alexandrov cites General de Goys de Mezeyrac, honorary president of the 
Amicale de Ceux du Fort No. 9, who arranged a reunion for Tukhachevsky with 
twenty French officers incarcerated with him in Ingolstadt. De Mezeyrac recalled how 
Tukhachevsky had been mainly responsible for the former's escape, on 3rd April, with 
a British Major Gaskell in a biscuit case. For this, someone had to answer for de 
Mezeyrac at appel the next morning. This was a highly risky undertaking and would 
have resulted in death if detected. However, de Mezeyrac asked Tukhachevsky and he 
agreed instantly to do it, donning the Frenchman's uniform and greatcoat the next day. 
Another officer remembered an inspection by a German general, several colonels 
and other officers. Tukhachevsky stood with his hands in his pockets and refused to 
151 
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salute the general. The general "nearly had apoplexy" and asked his aide-de-camp 
who this was refusing to salute him, but Tukhachevsky replied, "A Russian officer 
who does not salute those who massacred the French at Senlis and elsewhere". 
Tukhachevsky was put in irons, narrowly escaping being shot. 
156 
An escape attempt made by Tukhachevsky himself originated with a French 
officer, Lombard, who had been detained in the Ingolstadt jail and returned with the 
news that a Swiss smuggler was imprisoned. He suggested Tukhachevsky have 
himself detained in the jail, meet the smuggler, and escape with him to the Swiss 
border. Tukhachevsky agreed to this, but since he could not write German well 
enough, asked an Ensign Tsurkov to write a report from one of the fort NCOs to the 
commandant, stating stolen items had been discovered in Tukhachevsky's room 
during a search. This was done and Tukhachevsky was thrown into the jail, but failed 
to meet up with the smuggler. The reason he had agreed to this plan was that Lombard 
had criticised him for wanting to attempt simple, amateurish Russian-style escapes 
such as just walking out of the prison. After this failed though, Tukhachevsky decided 
to do just that. 157 
Lombard himself escaped and returned to France, which along with the growing 
popularity of the Bolsheviks in Russia, Fervacque suggests inspired Tukhachevsky to 
escape and return to Russia. 
158 
Tukhachevsky finally escaped successfully, donning civilian clothes, walking out 
of the camp and vanishing. 
1 59 An international agreement existed which allowed 
POWs to walk outwith the camps if they signed a document giving their word not to 
escape whilst doing so. However, Tukhachevsky and a General Staff Captain 
Cherniavskii signed each other's documents for one of these walks and escaped. 
1 60 
They wandered for six days and nights, but on the seventh day ran into police. 
Tukhachevsky managed to escape, crossing the Swiss border later, but Chemiavskii 
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was captured. 
161 A Swiss newspaper reported the corpse of a POW found on the 
Swiss border by Lake Geneva a month after the escape and it was thought this was 
Tukhachevsky. A requiem was held in the camp, with a French curate taking the 
service in the absence of a Russian priest. Blagodatov did not know Tukhachevsky 
was alive until back in Russia himself during the Civil War. 
1 62 
Evans recalled the British were suspicious of orderlies in the camp who were 
Russian or French, but remembered other Russians better. He described them as, 
... very generous fellows... With regard to escaping, if you needed anything 
such as a leather coat or a greatcoat (the Russian greatcoat can, with little 
alteration, be turned into a very respectable German officer's greatcoat), 
you could be sure to get it as a gift or by barter from the Russians if they 
could possibly spare it. The difficulty of saying anything about them is 
added to by the fact that I cannot recall their real names. 
He did however recall, 
There were... several Russians, real good fellows, whom I never got to 
know well. One of them had escaped from a camp with some friends, and 
had reached the frontier after walking for over thirty days. His friends had 
got across, but he had been recaptured. I heard a short time ago that he had 
escaped and had crossed the Swiss frontier at the same place as Buckley 
and I did. 
1 63 
This was a description of Tukhachevsky, his escape attempt to the Dutch border and 
successful flight from Ingolstadt. 
Crossing into Switzerland, Tukhachevsky received documents at the Russian 
Embassy for his return home. With war waging, the direct route from Switzerland to 
Russia crossed two fronts and Germany. Therefore, Tukhachevsky had to go through 
France, Britain, Norway, Sweden and Finland. 
164 He travelled to Paris, meeting the 
Soviet Military Attache, Alexei Alexeevich Ignatiev, who progressed to the 
Administration of the Higher Military Academic Institution of the Red Army in 1936. 
He remembered his meeting with Tukhachevsky, retaining a document about this, 
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which he had sent to N. S. Ermolov, Military Attache in London, asking him to help 
Tukhachevsky return to Russia. 
1 65 He did this just before the October Revolution. 
Fervacque's memoirs in Le Chef de LArmee Rouge provide arguably the most 
illuminating insights on Tukhachevsky in Ingolstadt. At the reunion organised by de 
Mezeyrac in 1936, Alexandrov notes Tukhachevsky, 
... suddenly remembered that his fellow inmate at the camp, "Remy 
Roure", had written a book citing Tukhachevsky's remarks on Napoleon 
and his Napoleonic ambitions. The author was present, and so much the 
better. At least Tukhachevsky had the chance to put things in their right 
perspective. So he replied soberly that he was very glad to talk of the past 
and that, having read the book about himself, he would comment on the 
views he held very early in 1917. 
"I was still very young... a novice at politics, and all I knew about 
revolutions was the last phase of the citizens' revolution in France: the 
Bonapartism whose military triumphs filled me with boundless 
admiration. When we celebrated the taking of the Bastille together, on 
14th July, 1917,1 already realized that our revolution was only in its first 
stage, like yours in 1789. But your sans culottes went no further. I felt that 
our revolution would be very different. And that is why I joined the 
Bolshevik Party when I got back to Russia. I had read a great deal; I had 
been able to complete my political education. I knew that Bonapartism on 
the French model could never be the outcome of the Russian Revolution. 
Ours is not a bourgeois revolution; its aims are different from those of the 
great French Revolution. I have set out my views in a book: The Class 
War; I became a Marxist. I never think of my views at Ingolstadt without 
regretting them, since they could cause doubts about my devotion to the 




This was Tukhachevsky emphasising his loyalty to the USSR and dispelling any 
notion he was a threat to Stalin. Tukhachevsky attended the reunion as part of a 
diplomatic visit to London and Paris, representing the USSR at the funeral of King 
George V, along with General Vitovt Putna, Soviet Military Attache in London. 
However, Alexandrov writes that Tukhachevsky was closely shadowed by OGPU 
agents in Paris and de Mezeyrac recalled Tukhachevsky seemed "tormented" and 
anxious to talk to him privately, but this was impossible because of the constant 
attention of "... the two Soviet civilians who were with him". The plot against 
Tukhachevsky which originated with Stalin's secret police was being fabricated at this 
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time, with Tukhachevsky accused of contact with Nazis and Western anti-Soviets 
during these visits. According to de Mezeyrac's recollections, Tukhachevsky was 
evidently already worried, but, with this being the case, it is significant he did not 
simply deny his earlier beliefs when he knew they could be held against him. Instead 
his explanation does add credence to the views Fervacque attributes to Tukhachevsky 
in Ingolstadt. 
Blagodatov refers to the Fervacque book for Tukhachevsky's political views at 
this time and Shchetinov & Starkov point out Tukhachevsky never did deny these 
167 
were his beliefs in 1917. It is highly likely these views were used against 
Tukhachevsky in 1937 and were used to add fuel to emigre claims about him. 
1 68 Gul', 
a White emigre writing in 1932, when Tukhachevsky was Deputy Minister for 
Defence, quotes extensively from Fervacque, but later Soviet biographies either quote 
Fervacque selectively or not at all. Shchetinov & Starkov provide the only Soviet 
biography to cite Fervacque significantly, but this was not until 1990 with Perestroika 
and Glasnost' undoubtedly allowing a more critical appraisal of Tukhachevsky than 
Gorelik or Ivanov could make five years earlier. If the object is to portray 
Tukhachevsky turning against his noble blood at a young age to support socialist 
ideals, then eventually joining the Bolsheviks when he had the opportunity, 
Fervacque's comments are a problem. However, if we see Tukhachevsky becoming 
gradually disillusioned with the class he was born into as he grew older and finally 
turning against it and the way Russia was governed after his Great War experiences, 
the views Fervacque attributes to him are more fitting. 
In his own words Tukhachevsky stated he was politically immature in 1917 and 
this is commented on later by various biographers. He had not read Bolshevik or other 
left-wing literature extensively, with his time spent studying military works. He 
probably had an interest in politics as his father was an advanced, liberal man who 
associated with left-wing people. Tukhachevsky was exposed to these ideas, but until 
his war experiences, had probably never fully considered the effect of politics on his 
life. The assertion he was a fully-fledged Bolshevik in 1917 is almost certainly not 
true. Fervacque recalled asking Tukhachevsky if he was a socialist. Tukhachevsky 
replied, 
167 
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Socialist? Certainly not! What a need for classification you have! Besides, 
the great socialists are Jews and the socialist doctrine is a branch of 
universal christianity. I laugh at money, and whether the land is divided up 
or not is all one to me. The barbarians, my ancestors, lived in common, 
but they had chiefs. No, I detest socialists, Jews and Christians. 
He had earlier said, 
The Jews brought us Christianity. That is enough to make us hate them. 
And then they are a low race. I do not speak of the dangers which they 
have brought to my country. You French cannot understand that; for you 
equality is a dogma. The Jew is a dog, a son of a bitch, who sheds his fleas 
in every country. It is he who has contributed most to infecting us with the 
plague of civilisation and who would like to give us his morality, the 
morality of money and capital. 
1 69 
However, despite this, Fervacque related a later discussion, in which he suggested 
a Bolshevik victory in Russia would lead to a separate peace in the War and the 
Russia of Tukhachevsky to defeat, implying Lenin would not represent 
Tukhachevsky's nation. Tukhachevsky replied though, 
If Lenin could relieve Russia of its fetters of prejudice, de-Europeanise it, 
I would follow him. But he would have to make a clean sweep and throw 
us deliberately into barbarism. What a pure spring! With Marxist formulas 
mixed with democratic couplets he could raise up the world. The right of 
peoples to be their own masters! There is the magic key which will open 
to Russia the gates of the East, and which will close them to the English. 
Fervacque - But in the West it would cause you to lose Poland, Finland 
and perhaps more. 
Tukhachevsky - It is here that the Marxist formulas come in. A 
revolutionary Russia, propagating the class struggle, would extend its 
boundaries well beyond the limits marked out by treaties! We could in this 
way, and only in this way gain Constantinople. But we need a new 
religion. Between Marxism and Christianity I would choose Marxism. 
With the red flag rather than with our cross we shall enter Byzantium and 
consecrate Saint Sophia anew. 
Fervacque - In the meantime there will be defeat and a separate peace. 
Tukhachevsky - For us it is the same thing. Your victory cuts us off just 
as much as our own defeat. Just think! The Emperor Kerensky, victorious 
with the allies, will nevertheless be the defeated one. What a gaping 
wound on Russia's flank! Your democracy and your right of self- 
determination would tear Poland from us. The English contest the East 
with us. Only revolution and the most extreme form, will leave our hands 
free. Let the Polish workers and peasants also overthrow their bourgeoisie 
and they will become again the brothers of the Russian workers and 
peasants and the unity of our empire is assured. What a potent lever the 
168 
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169 P. Fervacque, pp. 24-25. 
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revolution can be! And if the English bar our way to the Balkans and Asia, 
we shall rise up against them. 
Fervacque - You are joking Mikhail! Are you dreaming? 
He looked at me for a moment in silence, then he burst out in a laugh that 
was at once ironic and despairing. 
Tukhachevsky - Of course I'm joking. 
170 
Here we have Tukhachevsky presented in 1917 as a Panslavist, anti-semitic, 
Russian nationalist-imperlalist, willing to follow Lenin and use Marxism if this would 
secure the age-old territorial aims of the Tsars and cement Russia's position in the 
world. The comment about using revolution to hold Poland and the Balkans is 
especially interesting in light of Tukhachevsky's later proposals in the Polish-Soviet 
War. He said on another occasion that Poland must remain within the Russian 
Empire, whether under the Red Flag or otherwise. 
1 71 The classic SlavoPhile view 
Tukhachevsky outlined above is repeated in further statements he made to Fervacque. 
Tukhachevsky was said to have been pleased with the overthrow of the Tsar, but 
felt Nicholas 11 had been at fault, not for failing to implement reforms, but for not 
being a "great intelligent tyrant". Tukhachevsky praised Napoleon for using the 
Jacobins and Robespierre and also praised Catherine the Great and Peter the Great for 
achieving their aims. He had no faith in the Cadets, socialists or Kerensky who 
wanted a democratic Russia, as he felt a constitutional democracy, as in France with 
its sense of "perspective", would never solve Russia's problems. Despotism was the 
only way to rule Russia, combining the guile of Peter the Great with the barbarism of 
the East. He felt the suspension of the death penalty by Kerensky was wrong and the 
"Democracy of Kerensky decked out with Marxism" disgusted Tukhachevsky and 
172 
made him want to escape more than ever to play a part. 
Tukhachevsky is described as holding futuristic and avantgardist views, stating 
when the Bolsheviks gained power they should dispose of old cultural norms and 
practices. Latin and Greek cultures were not for Russia and the Renaissance and 
Christianity were the greatest misfortunes to befall man. "Harmony and measure must 
above all be destroyed". He derided Petrograd as "cosmopolitan and damned", but 
believed Moscow should become the Russian capital and "a shining light for the East 
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around which the ancient races, those called barbarians in the West, could gather". 
173 
Tukhachevsky loved to read and quote from Dostoevskii, whose works epitomised the 
barbaric nature of Russia and how it should be, and at one point compared Russia to 
Beethoven, stating that, "It does not know which symphony to present to the world, as 
it does not know even itself. It is confused now, but wait, one beautiful day all will be 
defeated by it ...... As to the role he would personally play, Tukhachevsky stated, "At 
thirty years old I shall be a general... or I shall be dead. " 
174 As we shall see shortly, he 
effectively achieved this the following year, when he was only twenty-five. 
The question about the reliability of Fervacque as a source must be raised again, 
with Ivanov possibly also referring to Fervacque when condemning emigre literature 
against Tukhachevsky. However, Tukhachevsky did not deny these beliefs later and 
why would former fellow French prisoners invent such stories in the late 1920s and 
1930s? In sifting through the multitude of opinion on Tukhachevsky, Fervacque is a 
controversial source, but when taken with Tukhachevsky's background and later life, 
he appears reliable. 
Tukhachevsky in 1917 saw in Marxism a method by which Russian supremacy 
could be maintained and the empire held together. The political and socio-economic 
underpinnings of this philosophy could be learnt later. It was truly a new religion 
which matched his atheistic beliefs and which would allow the Slavic Empire of 
Russia to show the way to Europe and the rest of the world, as Russia had been 
threatening to do for so long. Now was the time for this to happen and Tukhachevsky 
saw himself as part of this. 
Shchetinov & Starkov suggest Tukhachevsky used his time in Ingolstadt as 
effectively more time in military academy, reading many books and perfecting his 
French, with Charles de Gaulle as his language teacher. 
175 Fervacque recalled 
Tulchachevsky enthusiastically reading the Memorial de Saint-Helene about Napoleon 
and said history was one of Tukhachevsky's "great passions", further backing earlier 
assertions about this. 
176 Nikulin contradicts this, stating no books were pennitted, but 
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that this resulted in great discussion amongst the officers. 
177 Whether books existed or 
not, political and military discussions would have been commonplace, alongside plans 
to escape. 
However, despite the differing cosmopolitan views and experiences 
Tukhachevsky amassed in his years of imprisonment, especially in Ingolstadt, he 
himself looked on this period as lost time and did not like to talk about it. 
178 This 
perhaps explains the dearth of material by him on this time, or perhaps a reluctance to 
bring up the views he had expressed so explicitly and a need to move away from the 
past prevented him mentioning Ingolstadt. 
POW Camps: Influential Fij! ures 
Undoubtedly the most famous and potentially influential fellow inmate of 
Tukhachevsky's was Charles de Gaulle. Simpkin and Erickson state there is no finn 
evidence that their meeting and sharing a cell, if it took place at all, influenced 
179 
Tukhachevsky's thinking. 
However, the gathering of old Ingolstadt inmates held in 1936 for Tukhachevsky's 
diplomatic visit to France is mentioned in a de Gaulle biography, with the two men 
sitting next to each other at the dinner. 
180 This was again the reunion organised by de 
Mezeyrac who recalled, "Mikhail Tukhachevskii arrived at the Ingolstadt internment 
camp on the 19th or 20th of October, 1916, a week or so after the arrival of another 
young officer - Charles de Gaulle. I remember both events very well. " 
181 This would 
suggest the two men did know each other and Tukhachevsky is listed amongst 
inmates de Gaulle met and associated with. 
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It is suggested Tukhachevsky and de Gaulle followed the War via German 
newspapers and spoke extensively, influencing each other-1 
83 They made reviews of 
events at the Fronts, discussed the development of military operations, strategy and 
tactics, their war experiences, how war might develop in the future, the advent of the 
tank and the need for massed tank strikes, which both would pursue later. 
1 84 This is 
conjecture, but Tukhachevsky did later congratulate de Gaulle on his work with tanks 
and the two men were interned together in a prison which only housed around 150 
inmates. 185 From Evans' recollections, all the inmates met, cooperated and conversed 
with each other about various topics. 
Back in Russia 
Tukhachevsky reached Russia on 16th October, only ten days before the 
Bolshevik uprising, travelled to Moscow and spent a few days with relatives. 
1 86 His 
family had returned to Vrazhskoe after the death of his father, younger brother Igor 
and sister Nadia. Nikolai and Aleksandr were serving with the Semenovskii which left 
Tukhachevsky's mother with four young daughters. 
1 87 Obviously wishing to see his 
family, but also undoubtedly concerned about their fate, with the revolution occurring 
and nobles being dispossessed, Tukhachevsky travelled to Vrazhskoe. 
He arrived unexpectedly, dressed in rags, looking like a "mummy", his family 
only recognising him "by his smile". Any fears he may have harboured were 
dispelled, as the peasantry repaid the good treatment received from the 
Tukhachevskys as landlords, by allowing them to retain their house and some land. 
1 88 
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Staying only three days and nights, probably until certain his family were in no 
danger, Tukhachevsky returned to his regiment, travelling to the Semenovskii 
Regimental Depot in Petrograd. 189 The Regiment had been situated on the South- 
Western Front, but was now in reserve. Reaching here on 20th November, 
Tukhachevsky was reunited with his two brothers. 
1 90 
Hardly any officers remained and after the Kornilov Affair they were under 
suspicion. 
191 Authority was held by a Regimental Soldiers Committee, but its 
authority had also largely disappeared with the situation in Petrograd. 
192 However, 
upon his arrival Tukhachevsky was elected commander of 9th Company and possibly 
promoted to Captain. 
193 He was called Tukhachevsky the First in staff documents, 
194 
undoubtedly because his two younger brothers were in the regiment. Tukhachevsky 
was apparently greeted well by the men as he was not aloof like other officers. 
Officers who had escaped from POW camps were treated with respect and interest, if 
195 
guardedly. Riabov recalled Tukhachevsky was treated in such a way because he 
1 96 had earlier been a fair officer, treating his men with respect. 
Tipol't relates he met Tukhachevsky again in late autumn 1917 and saw him 
almost daily, recalling "It seemed my room was converted into a Regimental speech 
club. To it came officers, NCOs and soldiers. Noise, debates, tobacco, smoke. " The 
War, Revolution and what was to happen in their country was discussed during these 
meetings, but Tukhachevsky did not say much, listening to the views of everyone 
else. It seemed he was considering events and different opinions, searching for an 
answer. Tipol't thought that only in late autumn 1917/early 1918, did Tukhachevsky 
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decide which way to turn. 
197 These meetings would presumably have continued until 
the Semenovskii was disbanded. 
Tukhachevsky returned to Petrograd at this time because he was a soldier and his 
regiment was in reserve here. Tipol't's account backs up the assertion that 
Tukhachevsky had no real idea, despite his political views, over which way to go. At 
this stage he merely wished to get back into the War, to defend his homeland against 
the Germans, who had held him prisoner for the past two and a half years. 
However, varying versions of Tukhachevsky's motives and movements are 
provided for this period. Suggestions are made that Tukhachevsky had decided by this 
point that the Bolshevik Revolution was the only way forward, but was concerned 
about the fate of the Russian Army, because as a military man he could not conceive 
of goverment without a military force and was concerned about the Red Guard force 
198 
currently employed by the Bolsheviks. 
The Tsarist Army was disintegrating at this time through desertion and Bolshevik 
agitation with unreliable formations disbanded. The Semenovskii were similarly 
viewed as untrustworthy and open to counter-revolution. 
1 99 The Petrovskii Brigade 
had played a decisive role in the February Revolution, but did not back the 
Bolsheviks, supporting the convoking of the Constituent Assembly. It still published 
the SR newspaper Seriia shinel' (Grey Overcoats), caricaturing the Red Guards and 
attacking Lenin as their enemy. 
200 Tukhachevsky apparently met Nikolai Krylenko, 
who spoke at a regimental meeting, trying to turn regimental opinion towards the 
201 Bolsheviks . 
However, he was barracked by the troops and approached the 
Regimental Committee, upon which Tukhachevsky sat, advising it to convince their 
troops to change their minds. Although Krylenko was unsuccessful at this meeting, he 
was the first speaker to impress Tukhachevsky with his manner and tone in front of 
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No direct proof exists of this occurrence and it seems inaccurate to suggest 
Tukhachevsky had definitely decided to follow the Bolsheviks at this point. What is 
certain is the Semenovskii Regiment was disbanded, probably in November 1917. 
Tukhachevsky's sisters recall he returned to Vrazhskoe in December and stayed for a 
month, carrying out physical work such as gathering firewood for the family, before 
travelling to Moscow in January. 203 
The reason Tukhachevsky travelled to the capital now was almost certainly the 
15th (28th) January Sovnarkom decree announcing the formation of the Workers and 
Peasants Red Army (RKK, 4). This decree gave Tukhachevsky the opportunity to once 
again serve in the Russian Army, a regular army being established by the government 
to replace the Red Guard militia. Tukhachevsky was a professionally-trained soldier 
who wished to fight in an organised professionally-based regular army. If the 
Bolsheviks had not formed such a force, but retained the militia Red Guard, it is 
doubtful Tukhachevsky would have joined the Red forces. The opportunities provided 
by a new army were immense and Tukhachevsky wished to be part of it, defending 
his country and building the army from scratch. 
As the son of a landed noble, Tukhachevsky was ineligible to join the Red Army, 
but he decided to try to join this newly-emerging force anyhow. 
204 Therefore, he 
travelled to Moscow as a professional soldier attempting to find his place in the new 
society, seeking employment in the field he was trained in - the military. He was not 
driven here by support of the Bolsheviks or any wish to join them in a civil war, but 
by the wish to move on with his life after his recent experiences and rejoin the army 
to continue the fight with Germany. Joining the Red Army to defend his country was 
the reason Tukhachevsky travelled to Moscow, as so many other former officers and 
soldiers of the Tsarist Army did at this time. 
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Conclusion: Who was Tukhachevsky in January 1918? 
By January 1918, Tukhachevsky was twenty-four years of age, had completed a 
professional military education in the Tsarist Army, served through The Great War in 
battle and imprisonment, and had been elected Company Commander in the 
"democratised" Semenovskii Life-Guards Regiment shortly before its disbandment. 
205 
Tukhachevsky came from an unusual background. His father was of noble blood, 
his mother a peasant girl. In late 19th Century Russia, this placed him wholly in 
neither the aristocracy nor the peasantry. His father could most accurately be 
described as a member of the new intelligentsia emerging during the 1800s. 
Tukhachevsky was raised to appreciate literature, music, the arts, and to recognise the 
importance of history, with definite ideas of what Russia represented. Living in a 
household constantly hampered by impoverishment, he developed a disregard for 
wealth and a disdain for those who coveted and exploited via money. His father was 
an atheist and instilled this in his family, with Tukhachevsky adopting this belief 
fully, ridiculing and resenting religion. After an apparently chequered early schooling 
in Penza where he displayed the above tendencies and performed poorly, his 
academic performance changed remarkably in Moscow. Attending credited military 
educational institutions where he could finally concentrate on subject matter he found 
stimulating, Tukhachevsky graduated top of his year to join the Semenovskii Life- 
Guards Regiment, following in the footsteps of his great-grandfather and Suvorov to 
fulfill his childhood ambition. 
At this stage, politics and revolutionary ideals did not play a part in 
Tukhachevsky's life, but his experiences in The Great War altered this dramatically. 
He witnessed the sheer ineptitude and incompetence of the Russian Army High 
Command, twinned with the shambolic supply system of the Tsarist war machine, as 
compared to the devotion and bravery displayed by the rank-and-file soldier. This 
convinced Tukhachevsky that the autocracy, headed by a weak Tsar, ruling Russia 
through monetary corruption and manipulation of the weak Orthodox Church, 
required changing. 
205 "Democratisation" was the Bolshevik term for the process of altering the Imperial Army to a 
socialist force. 
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Hardened by this combat experience and two and a half years imprisonment in the 
strictest German POW camps, Tukhachevsky never lost faith in his home nation or 
what he envisaged Russia to be, but looked to alter and rebuild the weak ruling strata 
before it was too late. In this way, the rise of Bolshevism in 1917 with its militant 
Marxist outlook and wish to drag backwards Russia into the Twentieth Century, 
appealed to him. Prejudices harboured by Tukhachevsky against religion, semitism 
and socialism were overcome by the sheer radicalism he saw in the Bolshevik Party, 
which could root out the corruption of the current regime and lead Russia onwards 
more effectively than the weak alternatives of liberalism or moderate socialism. 
Despotism was the natural order for Russia and the combination of Marxism with 
Russian Nationalism could provide this potent force. To enforce this, however, an 
army was required. 
The Tsarist Army had all but collapsed when Tukhachevsky returned to Russia 
and the new Bolshevik Government employed a militia force to deal with internal 
opposition. A regular, professional army no longer existed and the polarisation of 
Russian society, culminating in the revolutionary Bolshevik takeover, had created a 
chaotic, anarchic internal situation, leaving Germany the opportunity to occupy vast 
tracts of European Russia to destroy any chance of Russian recovery. Tukhachevsky 
wished to rejoin the defence of Russia against the foreign aggressors. Only the 
decision forced upon the Bolsheviks to create the Red Army in January 1918 provided 
the opportunity to do this. 
Alternatives provided by anti-Bolshevik forces did not emerge until later in 1918, 
but these emerged in regions distant from Tukhachevsky and his family, making the 
Red Army based on his doorstep, around Moscow, a better prospect. The family home 
was in Vrazhskoe and with his father dead, Tukhachevsky would now feel responsible 
for their care. These were times of hazardous travel for a man alone, far less with his 
whole family, but uprooting the family from Vrazhskoe would never have been a 
realistic option and probably did not cross his mind. He did not want to leave his 
family alone and going to fight for the anti-Red forces would effectively have meant 
saying goodbye to them for ever. Besides, these forces were led by generals who 
wished to restore the regime which Tukhachevsky had personally witnessed as 
already failing Russia. The emergence of a regular army created by the Bolshevik 
Goveminent, the regime ruling Russia and the one Tukhachevsky felt most likely to 
54 
restore the nation again, was a golden opportunity he grasped, despite being officially 
ineligible to join in January 1918. Therefore, all roads led to Moscow and to finding 
some involvement in the Bolshevik Red Army. 
In the next chapter I shall examine how Tukhachevsky did this by joining the Red 
Army and building upon his Tsarist military education and Great War experience, to 
become a Red Army Commander by summer 1918 and launch his active Civil War 
career. However, he also joined the Communist Party, a highly unusual step for a 
former Tsarist officer at this early stage. This perhaps reflected the individual 
leadership streak evident in him from a young age and would be significant for the 
ambitions he began to display in this new stage of his military career. The changing 
nature of the Bolshevik state, as pre-revolutionary ideals were reconsidered in the 
light of the practical reality of Russia in 1918, meant that Tukhachevsky did not have 
to wholly adjust his beliefs to fight for the regime, as it developed closer to the ideals 
he had voiced in Ingolstadt than he could possibly have hoped. 
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Chapter 11: From Tsarist Lieutenant to Red Army Commander-Communist: 
January-August 1918 
Joining the Red Army 
The first eight months of 1918 were turbulent for the young Bolshevik regime in 
Russia. By March, Lenin had withdrawn Russia from The Great War, but peace only 
lasted until May, when the first large-scale fighting in the Russian Civil War began in 
the Volga Region. By the end of August, a Red Eastern Front had been formed and 
organised into five Revolutionary Armies, the first of which was commanded by 
Tukhachevsky. How had he advanced so quickly in such a short period? He left 
Vrazhskoe in late January, a company commander of a disbanded regiment, but by 
early September, was Ist Army Commander, leading his troops against anti-Soviet 
forces in Lenin's hometown of Simbirsk. Events within the Soviet Republic, 
especially the evolution of the Red Army, developed in such a manner as to propel 
Tukhachevsky into his Red Army career. His previous experience combined with 
work he carried out and key decisions he made in the months ahead, and a sizeable 
element of luck, to set him on his way. In this chapter, I shall examine how he joined 
the Red Army and the Communist Party and proved his worth in administrative posts 
before gaining his first frontline command. Tukhachevsky played a vital role in the 
formation of the Red Army in 1918 and I shall closely examine the origins of the 
Bolshevik anned force to highlight Tukhachevsky's importance in this process. 
Tukhachevsky recorded his experiences on the Eastern Front in an essay written in 
192 1, Pervaia Armiia v 1918 ("First Army in 1918"). Studying Tukhachevsky's 
recollections alongside other memoirs, documents and archival sources, I shall 
analyse his contribution to events in this period. 
Conflicting versions exist over how Tukhachevsky joined the Red Army. Gul' 
provides a dramatic account of Tukhachevsky attending the Constituent Assembly 
meeting in Petrograd and encountering Nikolai Kuliabko. 1 He took Tukhachevsky to 
1 Kuliabko's parents were old family friends of the Tukhachevskys and had been active in the 1905 
Revolution. Kuhabko had known Tukhachevsky since 1912, N. N. Kuliabko, "Ia rekomendoval ego v 
partiiu", Marshal Tukhachevsky: Vospominaniia druzel'i soratnikov, (Moscow, 1965), pp. 26-27. 
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the Smolny Institute, 2 introducing him to various high-ranking Bolsheviks such as 
Sverdlov and Antonov-Ovseenko, the latter giving Tukhachevsky a position in the 
3 Red Army. However, this is almost certainly inaccurate. Gul' fails to record 
Tukhachevsky returning to Vrazhskoe after the Semenovskii's disbandment and no 
other source mentions him attending the Constituent Assembly or returning to 
Petrograd. Furthermore, the Constituent Assembly met on 5th January, ten days 
before the Red Army was proclaimed, making it impossible for Tukhachevsky to join 
it on that day. 
Tukhachevsky's sisters also write of him meeting Kuliabko, but in MOSCOW. 
4 
Kuliabko was working with the Bolshevik Government and transferred with it from 
Petrograd to Moscow on II th March, 5 by which time Tukhachevsky was already 
working with the Red Army, in the Military Department of the Central Executive 
Committee (CEC) of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. Todorskii and Ivanov 
suggest Tukhachevsky found temporary accomodation with Kuliabko's parents in 
Moscow. Kuliabko's father worked for the Bolsheviks and, knowing Tukhachevsky's 
military background, recommended him to the Military Department. 6 However, 
although Tukhachevsky possibly lived with the Kuliabkos, it is possible he joined the 
Red Army via another source. 
Lidia North suggests Tukhachevsky met his old Aleksandrovskii Military 
Academy friend, Nikolai Kuibyshev, in the railway station in Moscow. Nikolai is 
described as aa career soldier with no special interest in politics, 7 very similar to 
Tukhachevsky. However, Nikolai was on his way to enlist in the Red Army, 
encouraged by his older brother Valerian Vladimirovich, a former military doctor 
turned Bolshevik, who headed the Red Army Political Department at this time. 
Nikolai introduced Tukhachevsky to Valerian, who acquired him the military position 
three days later. 8 Therefore, a significant element of chance was involved at this early 
stage. 
2 Smolny was the seat of the Petrograd Soviet from February 1917 and the base of the Bolshevik 
Government until it transferred to Moscow on I Ith March 1918. 
3 R. Gul', Tukhachevsky: krasnyi marshal, (Berlin, 1932), pp. 60-61. 
' 1. N. Arvatova-Tukhachevskaia & 0. N. Tukhachevskaia, "On liubul zhizn"', Marshal 
Tukhachevsky: Vospominaniia druzei i soratnikov, (Moscow, 1965), p. 15. 
5 N. N. Kuliabko, P. 28. 
6 A. 1. Todorskii, Marshal Tukhachevsky, (Moscow, 1963), p. 25; V. M. Ivanov, Marshal M, N. 
Tukhachevsky, 2nd Edition, (Moscow, 1990), pp. 15-16. 
7 L. North, Marshal Tukhachevsky, (Paris, 1978), p. 3 1. 
Ibid. 
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The Military Department had existed since early November 1917, providing the 
link in military matters between the CEC and the Bolshevik Party Central Committee 
(CC), 9 and specifically at this time, the creation and construction of the Red Army. 
Joining this body was an important step for Tukhachevsky, involving him in the 
military process at a crucial point. Brest-Litovsk had just been signed and the 
breathing-space of the next three months would enable the Bolsheviks to appraise the 
situation within Russia and begin the formation of an army. This intense activity and 
military build-up had been preceded by several months of fierce activity and debate, 
especially within Bolshevik ranks, and by simultaneously dismantling the old Tsarist 
army, whilst attempting to build a new army. 
A glance through the first few months of military formation after October 
introduces many important Bolshevik figures and illustrates various strands of 
opinion within the Party. Visible from the outset are people important for 
Tukhachevsky's short and long-term prospects. 
Assessing how the Red Army became the force by which the Bolsheviks won the 
Civil War, understanding the complex process this encompassed and the varied 
characters and cliques which emerged at this initial stage, is important for placing 
Tukhachevsky in the picture. How he compared to those involved in military 
construction, how it evolved before and after he appeared, and how he fitted in, are 
crucial in determining his early contribution to the development of the Red Army. 
Early Developments in Red Armed Forces 
The necessity of defending the gains of 25th October was pressed home only a 
day later when a force of 1,000 cossacks under Kerensky and Krasnov had to be 
repelled at Pulkovo Heights north of Petrograd. 10 On 29th October, a rising led by 
Colonel G. P. Polkovnikov and the "Committee for the Salvation of the Fatherland" 
was repressed, with 200 killed in these actions. This was accomplished by 10,000 Red 
Guards under A. P. Antonov-Ovseenko, a professionally-trained soldier who now 
chaired the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee (MRCIRevvoensovet, 
9 lu. A. Shchetinov & B. A. Starkov, Krasnyi Marshal, (Moscow, 1990), p. 62. 
10 Aleksandr Fedorovich Kerensky (1881-1970) was leader of the Russian Provisional Government; 
Petr Nikolavich Krasnov (1869-1947) was a Tsarist Lieutenant General. 
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R VS). 11 He proceeded to lead forces comprising Red Guards, revolutionary soldiers, 
sailors, armed workers and partisans along Russia's railway lines into the Northern 
Caucasus, Southern Urals and Ukraine, defeating the Cossacks of Dutov and Kaledin 
and the Ukrainian National Government in Kiev. 
By February 1918, Lenin declared the Civil War won and that no imminent 
internal threat to Bolshevik consolidation existed. Antonov-Ovseenko had won the 
Railway War (Eshelonnaia Voina) with relatively few forces, which, out of necessity, 
had been very quickly thrown together, created by local Party organisations, Soviets 
and RVS-y, acting under general instructions from the "All-Russian Bureau of Front 
and Rear Military Organisations under the Central Committee" (Voenka). 12 This had 
been created in summer 1917 to agitate amongst the Tsarist soldiers and sailors and 
begin forming Red Guard detachments, with Bolshevik figures such as Lenin, 
Sverdlov, Dzierzyn'ski and Bubnov involved. 13 
These were voluntary militia forces, with elected commanders, who had little 
experience of conducting modem large-scale warfare and no knowledge of military 
theory. Centralised administrative and command apparatuses did not exist. Although 
these detachments successfully defeated internal insurgents, external factors 
developed to necessitate a larger, centrally organised military force to defend the 
Soviet Republic. 
On 26th October 1917, the 2nd Congress of Soviets had proposed an armistice of 
three months for the negotiation of a general peace between all belligerent nations, to 
end the Great War. 14 No response from Russia's former Anglo-French Allies 
prompted Soviet moves for a separate armistice with the Central Powers, which was 
signed on 2nd December at Brest-Litovsk. 15 Allied reaction was to begin plans for 
intervention into Russia to reopen the Great War Eastern Front, 16 but the more 
immediate threat was still posed by the 1.5 million strong Austro-German Army along 
11 Vladimir Aleksandrovich Antonov-Ovseenko (1883-1939) became a Bolshevik Party member in 
1903. 
12 S. M. Kliatskin, Na zashchite Oktiabria: Organizatsiia regularnoi armii i militsionnoe stroitel'stvo v 
Sovetskom respublike, 1917-1920. (Moscow, 1965), p. 45. 
13 S. V. Lipitskii, Voennaia deiatel'nost'TsK RKP(b), (Moscow: 1973), p. 87; Feliks Edmundovich 
Dzierzy-fiski (1877-1926) became head of the Cheka in December 1917; Andrei Sergeevich Bubnov 
(1884-1940); lakob Mikhailovich Sverdlov (1885-1919). 
14 J. Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, The Bolshevik Revolution: 1917-1918. Documents and Materials, 
(California, 1934) pp. 124-128. 
15 lbid, p. 273. 
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Russia's European border. The potential threat posed by the Central Powers, 
especially with armistice negotiations stalling, had already supplied the stimulus for 
the Bolsheviks to begin the process of creating a regular "standing army". Practical 
realities outweighed revolutionary principles, although few theoretical guidelines 
existed in Marxism for military construction. However, the ideal of a "people's 
militia" was never abandoned and militia construction was to continue side-by-side 
with the creation of regular army formations. The contradictions between theoretical 
want and practical necessity set the scene for great debate in late 1917/early 1918. 
The Peoples Commissariat of Military and Naval Affairs (Narkomvoen) was 
formed at the 2nd Congress of Soviets, comprising Antonov-Ovseenko, A. 1. 
Dybenko (Head of Naval Affairs), Krylenko (Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces) and Podvoiskii as members, and Mekhonoshin, Lazimir, Eremeev, Vasiliev 
and Sklianskii as candidates. ' 7 Meeting from 3rd-5th (16th-18th) November, 
Narkomvoen discussed what to do with the Tsarist War Ministry and Tsarist Army. 
Commissars were placed at the head of War Ministry departments and had to sign all 
documents for them to be legal. Counter-revolutionary activities by former War 
Ministry members, Generals A. A. Manikovskii and V. V. Manushevskii, led to a 
Sovnarkom decree of 6th (19th) November for their arrest, and the formation of the 
"Collegiate of Narkomvoen" of B. V. Legran, Mekhonoshin, and Sklianskii, led by 
Podvoiskii, which took over War Ministry duties on I Ith (24th) November. 18 
Meanwhile, on 8th November Krylenko announced "democratisation" of the old 
army. 19 This envisaged abolition and replacement of rank by elected commanders, 
with full citizens' rights and education for soldiers, confirming Bolshevik promises 
made throughout 1917 in their efforts to undennine the Tsarist Army. The 
"democratisation" policy aimed to replace anti-Bolshevik officers and generals with 
approved, elected men and use those components of the old army trustworthy enough 
to form the core of the new army. Bolshevik fears over the numbers of anti-Bolshevik 
16 However, recent evidence suggests the Allies hedged their bets by supplying advisers for Antonov- 
Ovseenko, whilst preparing separate interventionary plans against the Reds. 
17S. M. Kliatskin, p. 60. 
18 V. 1. Lenin, Voennaia perepiska 1917-1922, (Moscow, 1987), (hereafter L- Vp), p. 23; S. M. 
Kliatskin, pp. 63-64. 
19 S. M. Kliatskin, p. 63. 
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voenspetsy still active in the army were in fact exaggerated, as only 3% of the officer 
corps were actively prepared to oppose the October Revolution in late 1917.20 
To achieve democratisation, Sovnarkom began demobilising the Tsarist Army on 
1 Oth November. As mentioned in chapter 1, the Semenovskii Life-Guards Regiment 
was deemed unreliable and disbanded during this democratisation process. Lenin 
already envisaged the use of Voenspetsy (Military Specialists) to work out the 
"military-technical supply of a revolutionary army", 21 with Stavka recruited for this. 
On 30th November, the RVS at Stavka provided a "Project of the Position about 
Democratisation of the Army", which was telegraphed to all soldiers' committees. 22 
These by now ran army formations at all levels, but needed guidance from Moscow 
on demobilisation. 23 
The idea of using a core of the old army to form the new one, favoured by the old 
General Staff, was but one strand of opinion at this time. The General Staff of the Red 
Guard proposed expanding their force, whilst M. S. Kedrov, who was appointed to 
Sovnarkom on 23rd November and was in the Collegiate of Narkomvoen as Head of 
the Army Demobilisation Department, proposed a "People's Guard" composed purely 
of workers, not using the old army at all . 
24 Discussions were held at the "All-Army 
Conference on Demobilisation" on 17th (30th) December at which Lenin produced a 
questionnaire for delegates to complete. 
Krylenko had reported to Sovnarkom on 16 
th (29th ) December, "About 
Transitional Forms of Construction of the Army in the Period of Demobilisation", but 
no decision on the matter was reached. However, with the aid of the questionnaires, 
Sovnarkom instructed Narkomvoen to commission Stavka to produce a plan for 
reorganising the army and reinforcing the fronts. The need to maintain military action 
against Germany with a new voluntary an-ny was particularly stressed. In this way, on 
21st December (3rd January), Stavka produced a plan for retaining 100 infantry 
20 A. G. Kavtaradze, Voennie spetsialisty na sluzhbe Respubliki Sovetov, 1917-1920 gg., (Moscow: 
1988), p. 50. - The heavy losses suffered by the Tsarist Army early on in the Great War resulted in 
"democratisation" of the officer corps already taking place as more and more lower ranking officers 
and NCOs were drafted to replace the casualties, thus changing the social composition of the officer 
corps and removing a buttress of the autocratic regime. 
2 'J. Erickson, "The Origins of the Red Army", R. Pipes ed. Revolutionary Russia, (Harvard, Oxford, 
1968), p. 295-, Voenspets ,v 
was the title bestowed by the Bolsheviks on former officers and generals of 
the Tsarist Army as the word "specialist" was deemed not to have the same autocratic overtones as the 
military terms and therefore to be more acceptable to the common soldier to gain trust and obeyance. 
22 J. Bunyan & Fisher, H. H., pp. 232-275 on Bolshevik takeover of Stavka. 
23 S. M. Kliatskin, p. 67. 
61 
divisions on Russia's borders for the War's duration, whilst raising a new army of 
360,000 men, 36 divisions, in the Moscow Region, using soldiers from units 
25 
withdrawn from front areas and volunteers . 
This was the embodiment of the Bolshevik wish to use the old army as a 
temporary stopgap measure and also to aid in the creation of a new militia volunteer 
force. However, this ideal remained just that. Reports from the Rumanian Front noted 
the an-ny had all but dissolved, with desertion reaching new heights. 26 The General 
Staff plan was impossible with a new army required to defend the European borders 
immediately. 
A meeting in Petrograd, chaired by Podvoiskii, discussed this and a staff was 
formed containing members of Voenka and the Red Guard General Staff, including 
Nikonov, Trifonov and lurenev (the latter given the task of formulating how to create 
27 
the new army) . This group met on 26th December 
(8th January) with Podvoiskii and 
V. 1. Nevskii elected the heads of Voenka. Plans were outlined to raise a new army of 
300,000 men within one and a half months, comprising politically conscious 
volunteers at the core. 28 Party cells were to be an integral part of the an-ny, 
maintaining Party control and ensuring loyalty. 29 
Sovnarkom allocated 10 million roubles on 23rd December (5th January) for 
raising volunteer detachments and Krylenko assigned Bonch-Bruevich and Stavka to 
formulate orders for troops joining the new army at the front. On 28th December 
(10th January), Stavka produced a "General Report on Forming the Army by 
Voluntary Origins" and "Approximate Instructions on the Formation of Revolutionary 
Battalions of the Peoples-Socialist Guard in Raion Divisional Reserves and in Units, 
Situated in Pre-Front Areas", the latter becoming the basis for the later Sovnarkom 
decree on the formation of the Red Army. 
Under this system, Corps Soldiers Committees should select elements of their 
corps suitable for the new army, enlist volunteers from these and reorganise them into 
battalions and regiments. Unsuitable elements would go into "regular" formations, 
24 J. Erickson, "The Origins of the Red Army", p. 295; S. M. Kliatskin, p. 75. 
25 S. M. Kliatskin, pp. 75-79. 
26 J. Bunyan & Fisher, H. H., pp. 567-568 on situation at front. 
27 Valentii Andreevich Trifonov (1888-1938), a Bolshevik since 1904; Konstantin Konstantinovich 
lurenev (1888-1938), a Bolshevik since 1905. 
28 Vladimir Ivanovich Nevskii (1876-1937). 
29 S. M. Kliatskin, pp. 81-82. 
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continuing guard duties until new units were prepared, at which point the "regulars" 
would be demobilised. 30 
The plans for the new army were discussed at the All-Army Conference and 
pushed through by Podvoiskii by 153 votes to 40 with 13 abstentions, to proceed with 
army formation immediately. These plans were laid out by Stavka, Voenka and the 
Petrograd Red Guards General Staff, after discussing the two aforementioned Stavka 
reports, and instructions were telegraphed by Krylenko on 17th (30th) December to 
all troops. The Conference formed an Agitational Collegiate to raise volunteers, but 
by 2nd (15th) January, the Red Army on the Northern Front numbered only 7,500, 
with similar levels elsewhere. Krylenko's plan of raising and basing the new force at 
the fronts from volunteers of the old army was replaced by Podvoiskii's scheme to 
organise it in the rear, drawing recruits from the poor and unemployed proletariat and 
peasantry. Reports of more desertions and chaos at the fronts supported this. The first 
appeal for volunteers appeared in newspapers on 29th December (I Ith January) and 
the name Raboche-Krest'ianskaia Krasnaia Armiia (RKK, 4, Workers'-Peasants' Red 
Army) was first mentioned in Lenin's 3rd (16th) January 1918 report to the CEC 
which became the "Declaration of Rights of Workers and Exploited Peoples". Twelve 
days later, 15th (28th) January, the RKKA was announced as a regular volunteer 
army .31 
This decree provided the opportunity for Tukhachevsky to again defend his 
country against Germany. 
In January 1918, the Agitational Collegiate created the "Provisional Bureau for 
the Creation of the Red Army", made up of Grigoriev, Litke, Iorgensberger, Mikosho 
and Nikonov. 32 This existed from 8th (2 1 st)- I 8th (3 1 st) January and worked with 
Narkomvoen and the delegates from the front, at the 3rd Congress of Soviets, to 
produce a report on forming the "All-Russian Collegiate for the Organisation and 
Administration of the Workers'-Peasants' Red Army", which was accepted by 
Podvoiskii on 18th (31st) January. The All-Russian Collegiate was created by 
Sovnarkom on 21 st January (3rd February), but only one of the eight departments the 
Provisional Bureau had proposed for it - the Organisation-Agitation Department - had 
been created. Therefore, a commission including Grigoriev, lorgensberger, Litke and 
30 Ibid. pp. 82-87. 
31 Ibid. pp. 88-98. 
32 Grigorn Timofeevich Grigoriev (1894-1966). 
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Mikosho of the Provisional Bureau, with Andreev and Sheshukov, was formed to 
work out the functions and tasks of the remaining departments. 33 
The Provisional Bureau had also proposed an Operational Department for the All- 
Russian Collegiate (Operod), setting various matters for it to resolve, and the 
formation of a "Provisional Staff' for the Red Army. A five-man leadership of 
Krylenko, Podvoiskii, Mekhonoshin, Trifonov and lurenev was appointed for the All- 
Russian Collegiate with the Heads of Departments becoming Grigoriev, Litke, 
Mikosho, Nikonov and Sheshukov. 
The voluntary nature of the new army was underlined by the omission of a 
Mobilisation Department from the final organisation. Instead of this, the All-Russian 
Collegiate attempted to coordinate the work of local Soviet Military Departments 
which had appeared throughout the country from 17th (30th) January. (These were 
coordinated by the Military Department of the CEC in which Tukhachevsky would 
work). Narkomvoen aided this instance of the localities leading the Centre by 
dismantling the old Tsarist military apparatus gradually (on the same lines as the 
demobilisation of the army), using any reliable supply networks which already 
existed, whilst dispensing with the rest and handing responsibility for these to the 
Military Departments of the Soviets on 22nd January (5th February). On 31 st January 
(12th February), "Instructions for Leaders of Soviets and Committees in Localities for 
the Creation and Administration of the Red Army", prepared by the All-Russian 
Collegiate, were sent out by Narkomvoen. 34 
This was the fragmentary structure through which the Red Army was intended to 
evolve. However, even as Tukhachevsky travelled to Moscow to rejoin the fight with 
Germany, events with his recent hosts escalated to further accelerate Red Army 
development. Negotiations between the Soviets and the Central Powers at Brest- 
litovsk had been stuttering forward since 9th (22nd) December. On 29th January (I Oth 
February) 1918, Trotsky informed the astounded German delegation that the new 
Bolshevik Republic believed a state of "no war, no peace" existed. This invited a 
telegram from General Hoffman on 16th February (New Style) declaring the armistice 
33 Ivan I l'ich Andreev (1896-1920). 
34 S. A Kliatskin, pp. 93-112; J. Erickson, "The Origins of the Red Anny", pp. 300-308. 
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at an end from 12.00pm on 18th February and an invasion of Soviet territory at that 
hour. 35 
Brest is a perfect example of the deep divisions within Bolshevik ranks in all 
policy areas in early 1918. Splits over Brest encompassed military, political, social 
and economic elements and displayed the essence of the Bolshevik position at this 
time - attempts to secure their state to enable Marxist development were being pushed 
further and further from their ideals by circumstance, as internal opposition emerged 
alongside the German juggernaut, threatening to smother the Republic in its infancy. 
Left Communists, with the young Nikolai Bukharin prominent, wanted a 
"revolutionary war" against the Imperialist Central Powers, carrying the October 
Revolution into Europe by force. This was entirely unrealistic with the armed forces 
in such disarray, but the idea of "exporting revolution on the points of bayonets" did 
not go away and would be picked up by Tukhachevsky in 1920 against Poland. 
Trotsky's "No peace, No war" was just as unrealistic in terms of imperial power 
politics and showed the absolute idealism the Bolsheviks hoped to impose on the 
world. Lenin again had to grasp reality and, after initially acquiescing to Trotsky's 
judgement, forced the Bolsheviks to agree to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3rd 
March, accepting much harsher terms than previously offered, with German troops 
now close to Petrograd and threatening Moscow. 36 This secured the breathing-space 
necessary for building the Red Army, but undermined the governmental coalition the 
Bolsheviks had enjoyed with the Left SRs, which worsened to a complete breakdown 
by July 1918 when the Left SRs revolted in Moscow, assassinating the German 
Ambassador Mirbach. This would play an important part in Tukhachevsky's career. 
However, in early March, events leading to Brest-Litovsk forced a further 
reevaluation of Red Army construction. The poor quality and numbers of 
disorganised detachments formed via voluntary recruitment led to the creation of the 
Supreme Military Soviet (Vysshii Voennyi Sovet/VES) under Trotsky's chairmanship 
on I st March. 37 This contained voenspetsy from the Tsarist General Staff to direct and 
command the new Red Army and the Central Committee decision on 21st March to 
Use voenspetsjý at all levels legalised Tukhachevsky's participation in the Red Army. 
35 j. Bunyan and Fisher, H. H., pp. 476-540, for documents on the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. 
36 The severe splits in opinion are clearly shown by the CEC vote to accept the Brest-Litovsk Treaty - 
116 for, 85 against, 26 abstentions -a majority of only 5. 
37 Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia interventsiia i, SSSR: Entsiklopediia, (Moscow, 1983), pp. 137-138. 
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With the German invasion, detachments of troops like Tukhachevsky, who wished 
to defend their nation, had appeared spontaneously all over Soviet-held Russia. 
However, before a Military Department could be created on any level, Soviet power 
had to be secure there, with a Soviet in existence and enough trained staff available 
locally to run the Military Department. By the end of March, 27 of the 33 provinces 
of European Soviet-held Russia had Military Departments, but only 70 of the 314 
38 uezdy. Lack of these necessary preconditions prevented improvement, with German 
occupation, following Brest and White risings in the South, reducing even these 
figures. The disaster of the German invasion illustrated clearly the need to move from 
partizanshchina to regular formations. 39 Established and new Red Guard detachments 
and the sole part of the Tsarist Army which readily sided with the Bolsheviks, the 
Latvian Rifle Regiments, provided the core for these new formations. 
The decision to employ voenspetsy widely on all levels of the military apparatus, 
which Lenin himself forced through after much bitter debate on 25th March, provided 
the necessary expertise to pull together these dispersed detachments and provide the 
discipline and leadership for them. Many of the former Imperial General Staff had 
already thrown their lot in with the Bolsheviks, wishing to organise the army to fight 
against Germany. Bonch-Bruevich, Vasilevskii, Eremeev and Lashevich had been 
appointed members of the "Extraordinary Petrograd Military District Staff' along 
with Mekhonoshin and lurenev, 40 by the Petrograd Military Affairs Commissariat. 
This had been formed in answer to the German invasion, alongside the 15-man 
"Committee for the Revolutionary Defence of Petrograd", chaired by Sverdlov, with 
Gusev as Secretary and five of the "Extraordinary Staff' also members .41 This 
Petrograd Defence Staff developed into the VVS under Trotsky and from early March 
42 began to organise defences against German encroachments . The transfer of 
Podvoiskii, a militia advocate, to Vsevobuch, to begin construction of militia reserve 
forces accompanied the resignation of Supreme Commander Krylenko, a staunch 
38 S. M. Kliatskin, p. 109. 
39 Partizanshchina was the Soviet term used to describe unregulated militia or partisan formations. 
40 Mikhail Dimitrievich Bonch-Bruevich (1870-1956), a Tsarist Lieutenant-General; Aleksandr 
Mikhailovich Vassilevskii (1895-1977), a Tsarist Staff-Captain; Konstantin Stepanovich Eremeev 
(1874-193 1), an RSDLP member since 1896; Mikhail Mikhailovich Lashevich (1884-1928), an 
RSDLP member since 1901 -, Konstantin Aleksandrovich Mekhonoshin (18 89-193 8), a Bolshevik since 
1913. 
" Sergei Ivanovich Gusev (1874-1933). 
42 J. Erickson, "The Origins of the Red Anny", pp. 306-308; S. M. Kliatskin, pp. 125-140. 
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advocate of voluntary, workers-only militia forces. The latter's replacement by 
Trotsky, who also became People's Commissar for War, heading Narkomvoen, shows 
the axial shift which occurred at this point. Therefore, Tukhachevsky, a staunch 
advocate of a regular, central ly-orgam sed army, joined the CEC Military Department, 
the hub of Red Army formation, at precisely the time Trotsky assumed control of the 
process at the Centre. Practical realities had moved the Bolshevik regime towards 
Tukhachevsky's ideal of a centrally-organised, regular army, just as he appeared. 
What impact would he have on the construction and development of the Red Army? 
A Communist in the Military Department of the All-Russian Central 
Executive Committee 
The 4th All-Russian Congress of Soviets met in Moscow from 14th-16th March 
1918. Nikolai Kuliabko was elected a member of the CEC and appointed Military 
Commissar of the Moscow Defence Staff, making him a good friend to have. 43 Upon 
finding Tukhachevsky working for the Military Department, leaming of his military 
record and asking his opinions on the state of Russia, Kuliabko recommended 
Tukhachevsky join the Communist Party. Kuliabko recalled Tukhachevsky was 
"deeply anxious" and thought it over "very seriously" before agreeing. Tukhachevsky 
had joined the Red Army to fight Germany, but joining the Communist Party was 
another matter. This was the step by which he chose sides for the forthcoming Civil 
War. Hitherto, he had not involved himself in civil unrest and had paid scant regard to 
politics. Therefore, joining a political party was a big decision. However, he decided 
to do so and on the oral and written recommendation of Kuliabko, Tukhachevsky 
joined the Khamovniki District Party in Moscow on 4th April 1918.44 
By joining the Communist Party, Tukhachevsky completed his credentials for 
advancement in the Red Army. This was a regular army, but a politically-based one. 
Tukhachevsky had professional military training and wartime experience, but now 
also had a "Party Father" in Kuliabko and was a Party member, not just another 
voenspets. This was a rare phenomenon in Russia at this time. Indeed Smirnov 
43 Kuliabko rose to become Deputy Chief-of-Staff of the RKKA during the Civil War, a figure of some 
influence, A. 1. Todorskii, p. 25, note 2. 
44 N. N. Kuliabko, p. 28. 
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suggests only around 100 "Commander-Communists" existed and believes this 
explains the rapid rise Tukhachevsky achieved over the next few months. 45 
Tukhachevsky would have realised the favourable position Party membership 
combined with professional military training and experience would give him, when 
deciding to join the Party, and it was most likely this consideration which led to his 
decision. Political loyalty was essential in the new climate and Party membership 
guarded him against his noble heritage, but now he had to prove his worth to advance 
further. 
Tukhachevsky had been working at this for some 5-6 weeks before joining the 
Party. His work in the Military Department involved him at the very heart of the 
military construction process. He could study the evolution of the Red Army, note 
limitations and possibilities imposed by the prevailing situation and conclude from 
this how army development could best proceed. 
Working in the Military Department, Tukhachevsky encountered a plethora of 
advisers from whom he could learn and understand the military and political 
processes developing around him. The Military Department lay at the hub of the 
simultaneous demobilising of the Tsarist Army and the formation of the Red Army. It 
was the link between the CEC, the Central Committee, Narkomvoen and local 
military organs (Soviet Military Departments and from 8th April the Commissariats 
of Military Affairs (voenkomaty) at okrug, guberniia, volost and uezd level), which 
were forming military detachments across the Republic. 46 This generated a mountain 
of work for Military Department employees. Operating since early November 1917 
under Avel' Safronovich Enukidze, 47 between Ist November and Ist March 1918, it 
entertained 1,397 delegations from the fronts. These brought letters, surveys and 
requests to be answered by Military Department staff. Special Front and Rationing 
Commissions were set up, receiving around 400 delegates a month, supplying them 
with political and military literature published by the Military Department and 
answering questions on subjects such as peace, land, the organisation of Soviet 
power, national self-determination and the worsening conflict with counter- 
45 G. V. Smirnov, Krovaiyi marshal, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, 1893-193 7, (St. Petersburg, 1997), pp. 
244-245. 
46 A. 1. Todorskii, pp. 29-30. 
47 lu. A. Shchetinov & B. A. Starkov, p. 62; Avel' Safronovich Enukidze (1877-1937), a member of 
the RSDLP since 1898. 
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revolution. 48 Therefore, by the time Tukhachevsky joined, the personnel employed, 
although probably completely embattled, were the most experienced figures in Red 
Army construction - experts in the field. This was the perfect place for Tukhachevsky 
to rapidly hone his military knowledge, following the fluctuations of current political 
and military events, to become an expert in the field of Red Army formation, viewing 
and learning the process from all angles. 
Possessing the keen mind for this, Tukhachevsky would have quickly anticipated 
the central role of politics in creating the new army and the need to apply Marxism, as 
preached by Lenin, to military problems. Understanding Marxism and its symbiotic 
relationship with the new army the Communists were creating was vital if 
Tukhachevsky was to fulfill his duties correctly. He had the military acumen 
necessary, but knew very little of MarxiSM. 49 However, this problem was solved 
during his first months in Moscow. The Moscow and District Party Committees held 
courses of meetings, lectures and discussion groups on Marxist Science and the 
theories behind socialist construction, which Tukhachevsky attended. He also saw 
Lenin speaking in the capital . 
50 This supplemented the theoretical and practical 
knowledge he gained working within the Military Department. Besides Enukidze, 
Tukhachevsky encountered almost every major figure in the military construction 
process outlined above, as they were either in the CEC or worked through or with the 
Military Department. He met such figures as Podvoiskii, Krylenko, Dzierzyn'ski, 
Mekhonoshin, Trifonov, Dybenko, Antonov-Ovseenko, Eremeev, Kedrov and 
Sverdlov. 
Working closely with such prominent Bolsheviks who had spent years in the 
revolutionary underground, suffering exile and imprisonment for their political 
beliefs, could only benefit Tukhachevsky in terms of learning Marxist theory and 
practice. Also, exposure to such people during his earliest weeks in the Military 
Department before joining the Communist Party left Tukhachevsky with no illusions 
about the regime the Bolsheviks wished to create and their preparedness to fight for it. 
Tukhachevsky joined the Party with his eyes wide open, knowing exactly what it 
entailed. The Cheka had been set up on 7th (20th) December 1917 and Red Guard 
detachments had been requisitioning grain from the peasantry for the towns since late 
lu. 1. Korablev, V. L Lenin i zashchita zavoevanii Velikogo Oktiabria, (Moscow, 1979), p. 164. 
49R. Gul', p. 62. 
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1917.51 Working with the Military Department, Tukhachevsky knew this and the need 
for extreme wartime measures if the Bolsheviks were to survive. Arriving in Moscow 
during the February German advance, Tukhachevsky would have appreciated this all 
the more, witnessing at first hand the panicked retreat of Red forces, which illustrated 
starkly the need for an organised army to defend against external aggression. With 
German occupation augmented by rising civil unrest, Tukhachevsky joined the 
Communist Party and worked at the hub of the intense military build-up in the 
Military Department, knowing precisely what was occurring and the measures 
employed by the Reds in the early stages of the Civil War. He threw his whole weight 
behind this. The heady combination of a strong Bolshevik Russia, opposing Germany 
and any restoration of the rotten Tsarist autocracy, with the excitement and 
possibilities of being involved at the very origins of the new Red Army, proved too 
much for Tukhachevsky to resist. The Marxism underlining it all was simply 
something to be learned and applied to his work towards this process. It provided the 
alternative to weak autocracy and a centre for the Russian nation to rally round. 
Tukhachevsky became a master of applying Marxism to military theory and 
practice, using this to great effect in later years. He learned this swiftly after joining 
the Military Department. That he did so is shown by reports he produced for the 
Military Department and then as Military Commissar for the Moscow District of the 
Western Screens, before transfer to the new Eastern Front. To understand the 
significance of these reports and appreciate the importance of the Military 
Department, it is useful to first briefly assess the process of Red Army formation from 
March-May, a period of development no less complex or tempestuous than the 
previous three months. 
Moves Towards Conscription and Red Army Re2ularisation 
This period began with the creation of the Supreme Military Soviet (VVS) and 
witnessed Lenin treading the line between pro-militia leftists in the Communist Party 
and the VVS voenspetsy building a "standing army" to face Germany. Lenin himself 
still envisaged the ideal workers' armed force as a territorially-based militia, but this 
5 0 A. 1. Todorskii, pp. 25-26, Todorskii suggests Tulchachevsky saw Lenin "at least 20 times". 
5' J. Bunyan & Fisher, H. H., pp. 297-298. 
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could only be built up gradually and needed unchallenged Soviet control of Russia. 
This was not the case in the first half of 1918 with German occupation and the 
emergence of anti-Bolshevik movements in the south. 
To deal with the latter, the VVS formed the North Caucasus Front in early May. 52 
The German threat was addressed on 5th March with the creation of the Northern and 
Western "Screens" (zavesy) and the Petrograd and Moscow Zones of Defence. 53 
Collegial command of one voenspets with two political commissars was first 
experimented with here and, proving effective, lasted throughout the Civil War. 54 
This illustrated Bolshevik mistrust of former officers and the perceived need for 
political control of the army from the outset. 
Disparate detachments which had developed within different sectors were drawn 
together into regular formations, with seven divisions formed by April in the two 
"screens", four in the Moscow Defence Zone, one in Petrograd and four in other 
areas. The VVS plan had been for 88 divisions, with 28 to be raised in the western 
frontier areas, requiring 720,000 men at full wartime complement. However, with 
only 450,000 men raised, half-strength companies (36 men) were ordered. 55 This was 
as far as Red Army development had proceeded by the time of the Czechoslovak 
Uprising, but even this point was only reached through great ruptures and debates 
within the Party and Goverrunent. 
The "screens" were intended as temporary measures to enable the build-up of the 
main body of the army in the rear. To facilitate this, the administrative apparatus had 
to be streamlined and Sovnarkom brought the separate Peoples' Commissariats of 
Military and Naval Affairs within the VVS on 19th March, uniting voenspetsy like 
Bonch-Bruevich, Miasnikov and Aralov with Bolsheviks like Podvoiskii, Sklianskii 
and Mekhonoshin. 56 Whilst removing the parallelism of these agencies, this inevitably 
produced antagonisms within the enlarged VVS. 
Alongside the VVS, Sovnarkom had created a Special Commission for planning 
militia construction, including voenspetsy such as former Generals A. N. Aledogskii 
52 S. M. Kliatskin, p. 190; J. Erickson, "The Origins of the Red Army", p. 312. 
53 Direkthy Glavnogo komandovaniia Krasnoi Armii (1917-1920). Sbornik dokumentov, (Moscow, 
1969), (hereafter DGkKA), doc. 29, pp. 30-3 1. The "screens" were a defensive system whereby 
infantry units were supported by artillery, with cavalry used for reconnaissance and communications. 
54 S. M. Kliatskin, pp. 153-155. 
55 J. Erickson, "The Origins of the Red Army", p. 312. 
56 S. M. Kliatskin, pp. 147-148. 
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and lu. N. Danilov and Rear-Admiral V. M. Al'tfater. 
57 it compiled a report for 15th 
March on creating an army based on socialist militia and universal arming of workers 
58 
and peasants, but, as this Commission worked, the VVS proceeded with its own 
plans. 
Initial intentions were for a 1.5 million man army to match that of the Central 
Powers, organised into regular divisions, regiments etc, with one-man command 
replacing elected commanders and soldiers' committees. This army would be raised 
through the Tsarist military district system by compulsory mobilisation. With the 
abolition of elected commanders, 59 accompanied by the decree on the deployment of 
voenspetsy within the Red Army on 21 st March '60 "leftist" Bolsheviks were 
incensed 
and intra-Party disputes ensued, leading to heated debates on 25th March in Lenin's 
study in the Kremlin, where 40-50 of the top military men argued for several hours 
over how the process of Red Army construction should develop. The results of this 
meeting were discussed by Lenin at a CC plenum on 31 st March and on 7th April the 
CC ratified the decisions reached here .61 Lenin and the 
Central Committee basically 
compromised between Party ideals, the professional expertise of the voens etsy and P 
practical reality. 
The compromise solution which emerged was aI million man army led by R VS-y 
through collegial command of one voenspets and two political commissars. Voluntary 
recruitment would be maintained, but the military district system favoured by the 
voenspetsy was installed, with six created in March and a further five in Asia and the 
Caucasus on 4th May. 62 
The retention of voluntarism was to prevent industry, ravaged after four years of 
war, being stripped of workers by conscription. Also, harvest time was approaching 
and Trotsky declared on 22nd March, "For the time being we shall confine ourselves 
to introducing universal compulsory military training and the formation of volunteer 
57 Vasilii Mikhailovich Al'tafer (1883-1919), was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Fleet 
on 29/12/18, J. Meijer, ed., The Trotsky Papers, Vol. 1, (The Hague, 1964), p. 80. 
58 S. M. Kliatskin, p. 149. 
59 L. D. Trotsky, How The Revolution Armed: The Military Writings and Speeches ofLeon Trotsky, 
Vol. 1, (trans. & annotated Brian Pearce), (London, 1979), p. 137, This was ratified on 22/4/18 by the 
CEC, at Trotsky's instigation, at the same time Vsevobuch was decreed. 
60S. M. Kliatskin, p. 159. 
61 Ibid. pp. 160-16 1; J. Erickson, "The Origins of the Red Army", p. 309. 
62 Trifonov bitterly opposed this and proposed the Red An-ny be raised through four "proletarian 
centres" in the South, the Urals, Siberia and the Volga, J. Erickson, "The Origins of the Red Army", 
pp. 309-3 10. 
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fighting units which will serve as the skeleton of the new army". 63 Demobilisation of 
the old army was still continuing (it was completed on 17th April) and general war- 
weariness dictated the adverse reaction which would have accompanied another 
mobilisation, was best avoided. Besides, apparatus for mobilisation did not exist and 
could not be created quickly. 
The All-Russian Bureau of Political Commissars was founded on 8th April under 
lurenev to recruit the vast numbers of commissars needed for collegial command. 64 
This organisation took over the Agitational-Educational Section of the All-Russian 
Collegiate, giving commissars the dual role of watching the voenspetsy, whilst 
educating and politically inculcating the troops, thus cementing the Party grip on the 
Red Army from top to bottom. 
The temporary nature of this army was underlined by the 22nd April decree on 
Compulsory Training (Vsevobuch). 65 The population was to be prepared militarily to 
defend the country and reserves were to be raised, but in the longer term, a militia 
army was to be prepared to succeed the "standing army" currently forming. 
Vsevobuch would come under Podvoiskii, who was disillusioned by the VVS plan, 
but he was first appointed Head of the Supreme Military Inspectorate (VVI), founded 
on 24th April by Narkomvoen. 66 This body sent representatives around the country, 
settling disputes or confusion which arose over Party or Government decrees on 
military construction, but this temporarily contributed to an overlapping of agencies. 
The VVI, VVS and the All-Russian Collegiate on the Organisation and Fon-ning of 
the Red An-ny were all at this time involved in Red Army construction, but were 
entirely uncoordinated, preventing effective central control and hindering progress. 
Alongside this, Operod, the Operations Section of Narkomvoen, was independently 
handling internal insurgency matters. Comprising seasoned revolutionaries, not 
voenspetsy, other Party bodies preferred to deal with Operod. This unsatisfactory 
situation was addressed on 8th May by the creation of the All-Russian Main Staff 
(VserosgIavshtab), which assumed organisational matters, leaving the Military- 
Economic Soviet to handle financial or quartermastering activities and the VVI to 
ensure military development ran smoothly. These organisations were under 
63 L. D. Trotsky, How the Revolution Armed. Vol. L pp. 124-125. 
64 S. M. Khatskin, p. 177. 
65L. D. Trotsky, How the Revolution Armed, V'ol. I, pp. 126-130. 
66S. M. Kliatskin, p. 174; J. Erickson, "The Origins of the Red Army", pp. 310-311. 
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Narkomvoen and acted in their own fields, thereby removing parallelism, but 
complete coordination was only achieved with the creation of the Revvoensovet 
Respublika (RVSR) in September 1918, which centralised all military administrative 
and command structures. 
The March-May 1918 period witnessed the Red Anny developing further towards 
regulation and centralisation, with figures like Podvoiskii, Krylenko and Trifonov 
either falling by the wayside or having to compromise to remain active. However, 
matters still did not proceed as smoothly as the leadership hoped with some local 
soviets standing by their military departments. Lenin and Sverdlov had to send out a 
threatening circular to soviets on all levels with instructions to fulfill the 8th April 
decree to create military commissariats (voenkomaty), as only 14 of the 33 provinces 
and 50 of the 304 uezdy in Soviet territory, had done so by 18th May. 67 
This was not just down to intransigence, but also because of the shortage of 
trained staff to set up voenkomaty and the lack of secure Soviet rule in many areas. 
Vsevobuch workers began setting up soviet organs in areas where none existed, with 
soviets and voenkomaty later developing around these, quickening the organisation of 
soviet and army organs in the localities. 
The complexities involved in this overlapping of agencies, attempted 
centralisation of the military process and two different armies being created at the 
same time are plain to see. The Military Department of the CEC provided the crucial 
link in the fragmentary chain. The ever-growing number of detachments required 
constant guidance on how to proceed and the CC and CEC required information on 
the situation around the Soviet Republic. This task was still performed by the Military 
Department, even with the appearance of the VVT The former still gathered 
information from the constant stream of delegations, letters, surveys and requests it 
received from the localities, but was now also sending representatives to all areas of 
Soviet-held territory to assess the situation, report back on this and advise 
detachments and local organs how to fulfill Moscow guidelines. These reports were 
carried out by Inspectors of Red Army Formations, the post Tukhachevsky held by 
May. 
67 Etapy bol'shogo puti - Vospominaniia o grazhdanskoi voine, (Moscow, 1963), p. 117. 
74 
Inspector of Red Army Formations within the Military Department 
On 18th May, Tukhachevsky submitted a report to Enukidze, compiled from a 
tour of Riazansk, Voronezh and Tambov Provinces and the Don Region, inspecting 
recently formed military commissariats, 68 apparently experiencing his first Civil War 
fighting in skirmishes with White Cossacks here. 69 He began, 
As a basis for this work I was presented with a principal plan, but I 
encountered various local conditions which often forced me to deviate 
from it. Following this I was forced to compile the report not as a reply to 
the prescribed questions, but to throw light on the work, which involved 
the whole essence and peculiarities of local conditions. 70 
This suggests that conditions were far worse than the Military Department in 
Moscow perceived them to be. This is bome out by the report which provides an 
excellent insight into the disarray which exemplified Red Army construction in these 
early days. Tukhachevsky initially reported on each area individually, highlighting 
problems specific to each locale, then reported on the "general position and general 
needs", noting conditions common to all four regions and providing recommendations 
from his conclusions. 
He reported that the "Sovnarkom decree about military commissariats is very 
slowly, sometimes even unwillingly put into practice. There are even cases of open 
hostility". The effect of the Lenin/Sklianskii telegram was evidently limited thus far, 
but Tukhachevsky stressed, "It is essential to insistently put into practice the decree 
about military commissariats. Only this will mean a uniform army" and "All traitors 
should be brought before the courts" to enforce this. He noted the decree had to be 
developed to provide definite guidelines and boundaries for the various departments 
within the commissariats - formation and training, transport, artillery, medical and 
paymaster. Existing military commissariats were functioning poorly, but these 
measures would create five uniform departments in each one which would have to be 
68 V. 0. Dairies, "Istoricheskie Portrety - Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevskii" Voprosy Istorii, No. 10, 
(1989), p. 4 1. 
69A. 1. Todorskii, p. 30. 
70 M. N. Tukhachevsky, Doklad Voennomu otdelu VTsIK Sovetov tov. Tukhachevskogo o resul'tatakh 
obsIedovaniia sovetskikh chastei Krasnoi Armii v Riazanskoi, Tambovskoi, Voronezhskoi guberniiakh i 
Donskoi respublike, published as appendix in V. M. Cheremnikh, Na zashchite zavoevanii revoliutsii: 
Voennoe-organizatorskaia deiatel'nost' VTsIK vpeM-e gody sovetskoi vlasti, pp. 219-234. (hereafter 
Doklad 1, "oennomu otdelu), (Moscow, 1988), p. 219. 
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centrally controlled for efficient administration and positive results. Further 
centralisation should be introduced for supplying food and horses to the troops. 
As to unit composition and discipline, relations between command staff and 
regulars were good, but Tukhachevsky felt this was only because military action had 
yet to begin. Troops were still enlisted by voluntary means, although conscription was 
now being introduced. This had been carried out without using the recommendation 
system, 71 therefore, unreliable elements existed. Most of these had signed up for 
purely monetary gain and with a scarcity of committed socialists enlisted, 
revolutionary discipline was absent. 
To remedy this, Tukhachevsky insisted a proper command cadre was necessary 
and, 
In recruiting officers of the old army for the command cadre, it is essential 
to see this as a necessary, but temporary measure. 
Military academies are needed. At least part of them must be with 
shortened courses, in order to have some socialist commanders by the 
autumn. For the old officers it is necessary to weed out the traitorous 
elements. Now specialists must be used - officers and NCOs, especially of 
the cadres. 72 
Therefore, a careful endorsement of his fellow former officers was given here, 
illustrating he already felt he had moved from this status himself. He was calling for 
socialist commanders like himself to be quickly trained. 
The lone plus point Tukhachevsky identified was in cultural-educational 
activities, with libraries, clubs and lectures well-established. However, any impact 
this had would have been negated by other problems he identified - absence of 
military courts and general conditions. Most barracks were in disrepair and supplies 
of clothing, food, horses and weaponry were scarce and unregulated, with no cartage 
supply system or quartermaster and paymaster sections organised. These problems 
would be solved by the administrative restructuring and organisation of cart supply 
lines, but he noted in general, 
The composition of the army is the same everywhere. The system of 
recruitment is the same everywhere. It would be criminal to close one's 
eyes to the composition of the army. The system of recruitment altogether, 
as is shown by military history, was always found to be the weakest 
71 This was the system by which recruits had to be recommended by two others for entry to the Red 
Army, with one referee usually being a Party member. Evidently the system was not uniformly in use 
at this stage. 
72 M. N. Tukhachevsky, Doklad Voennomu otdelu, p. 233. 
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system. It is giving especially bad results now, when there is hunger in the 
country and we see this in the army kitchen. In the army there are no 
staunch socialists. In this way there is no self-discipline... discipline is in 
total collapse. There is no sense of socialist duty. Towards their signature 
[about registering for military service - NC], soldiers regard this with 
complete indifference and do not believe they are bound by it. This is the 
real situation. Commanders are powerless. They avoid giving out orders. 
Even among the soldiers such a position sometimes rouses fear and they 
themselves establish order. 
To instill discipline and prevent a total collapse of the army, he recommended 
setting up military tribunals. 
From the highest commander to the lowest soldier, no-one must remain 
outside the law. The main buttress of discipline - is the military tribunal... 
Military laws must hurriedly be prepared and brought within the new 
socialist structure... There is no doubt that the brave and energetic 
introduction of practices of ordered measures will create new 
revolutionary discipline, and together with it even a mighty socialist 
army... No less important than discipline, is the ignition of a spirit of 
creative work. For this it is necessary to promote people who are talented 
and who believe in success. This guarantees all. Creative work is not 
possible without self-sacrifice, and this is why this last demand must be a 
73 principal one . 
Tukhachevsky's report was a critical assessment of the disorganisation he saw in 
local military commissariats and the voluntary detachments they had formed. He was 
accustomed to the order of a regular army, saw the current methods did not work and 
emphasised the need for a disciplined force with a proper command system. The way 
to do this was to temporarily recruit profess ionally-trained voenspetsy and ensure only 
those worthy of promotion received it, whilst training Red Commanders. A proper, 
fair and effective disciplinary system was required and military tribunals would 
provide this. Tukhachevsky would be the first to install military tribunals in the Red 
Army in the summer, carrying out his own recommendations. The experience gained 
during his May tour would prove vital, preparing him for what to expect in the East, 
and he would implement other measures reported here. 
Daines suggests this report was used in formulating the CEC decree of 29th May 
announcing compulsory military service and mobilisation. 74 This is very likely. 
Military Department reports were submitted to the CEC to provide guidance on 
military construction, based on evidence collected, and it apparently participated in 
73 Ibid. pp. 220-234. 
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drafting decrees. 75 Tukhachevsky's report, completed eleven days before the CEC 
decree, does suggest measures which were introduced. The decree announced the 
transition from a voluntary army to one based on conscription of workers and poor 
peasants. However, due to difficulties in conducting this in all areas of the Republic, 
it would begin in those areas most threatened and the main centres of the working 
movement. In this way Moscow, Petrograd, the Kuban and the Don were selected. 
Soviet institutions were urged to energetically and actively ensure military 
commissariats fulfilled their tasks. 76 
As noted, Tukhachevsky had recommended conscription, heavily criticising 
voluntary recruitment as the "weakest" link and he had reported on the patchiness of 
military commissariat work, specifically criticising voluntary recruitment in the Don 
Region. He also reported that the Don was a "theatre of operations, little by little 
going to the enemy", with military organs collapsing, possibly explaining why it was 
recognised in the 29th May decree as one of the areas most under threat. He had 
advised that two members of the military collegiate, newly-formed in the Don, had 
gone to Moscow and they should be consulted for information. 77 This also very likely 
occurred before the decree was published. 
Similarly, the lack of a command cadre was addressed by mobilising voenspetsy 
and on 2nd August, a mobilisation specifically for NCOs raised 17,500 recruits. Did 
Tukhachevsky's report have any influence here? 
The report also demonstrates Tukhachevsky's rapid assimilation of Marxism in 
relation to Red Army formation. He had to date encountered most major Bolshevik 
figures, but whilst touring the provinces, he met Red Guards, partisans, armed 
workers and revolutionary soldiers and sailors - the fighting men of the Red forces. 
He would have appreciated the depth of feeling and hopes these people had for the 
new society and their willingness to fight for it. He noted the motivation of the 
politically-active core compared to those indifferent to Bolshevism and recaltricant 
78 about fighting, ie. peasantry joining the Red Army purely for money. This made an 
impression on Tukhachevsky and he acted accordingly in his future organisational 
work. Whether this early encounter of the motivational Power of revolutionary 
74 V. 0. Daines, p. 4 1. 
75 A. 1. Todorskii, p. 29. 
76 Sbornik dekretov, 1917-1918gg, (Moscow, 1920), p. 39. 
77 M. N. Tukhachevsky, Doklad Voennomu otdelu, p. 230. 
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ideology altered his perception of Marxism is doubtful, but he now knew political 
trust was necessary not only for advancement, but also to strengthen the army in the 
current climate. With sides being drawn, the troops needed something to fight for and 
he had witnessed at first hand the binding ability of Marxism. Also, with his report 
influencing the mobilisation decree, he saw the advantage of using Marxism to have 
his ideas accepted. His appreciation of the intrinsic link between politics and military 
policy and organisation was demonstrated clearly in the next work he produced. 
Military Commissar of the Moscow Section of the Western Screens 
Tukhachevsky wrote this next work in June 1918 while serving his short stint as 
Military Commissar of the Moscow District of the Western Screens. Enukidze had 
recommended Tukhachevsky for the post of Province Commissar, three days after 
receiving his report on Red Army organisation, stating, 
21st May 1918. To the Bureau of Military Commissars. The present 
Military Department recommends the appointment of comrade 
Tukhachevsky to the post of commissar, as one of the experienced 
workers of the department. Comrade Tukhachevsky inspected: Riazansk, 
Tambov, Voronezh Provinces and the forces of the Don in relation to the 
organisation of the Red Anny, about which a detailed report was 
presented by him, in which he made a mass of valuable directives. 
Comrade Tukhachevsky, in the opinion of the department, can fully cope 
with the duties of Province Commissar. 79 
Enukidze's recommendation was endorsed by Kuliabko, now Deputy Chairman of 
the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars . 
80 However, Kuliabko's superior 
lurenev intervened and recommended to Trotsky that Tukhachevsky gain the higher 
posting of Military Commissar of the Moscow District of the Western Screens. 
81 
Tukhachevsky was installed in this post on 27th May. 82 He only occupied it for 22 
days, before being posted to the Eastern Front, but these three weeks provided 
experience in mobilisation, the reorganisation of variegated detachments into regular 
anny formations and handling supply matters. Ivanov notes that Tukhachevsky 
perfon-ned well in this period, gaining respect from those he worked with as both an 
78 Ibid. pp. 220,222 & 224. 
79 lu. A. Shchetinov & B. A. Starkov, p. 66. 
80 N. N. Kullabko, p. 28. 
81 V. 0. Daines, P. 42. 
82 A. S. Popov, Trud, Talant, Doblest', (Moscow, 1972), p. 15. 
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administrator and commander, and by his respectful and sympathetic nature. 83 
Whether this is overstated or not, military commissar was one of the most responsible 
posts at this time. This was a direct reward for his Military Department work and an 
important development in his career. 
Whilst in this post, Tukhachevsky was very likely commissioned by Kuliabko or 
lurenev to write his "Project on the Organisation of Courses for Military Commissars" 
for the Ist All-Russian Conference of Military Commissars, held in Moscow from 
7th- II th June. Around 3 00 delegates attended the conference, with the opening and 
closing speeches delivered by Trotsky and lurenev respectively. 84 The conference was 
held to outline the rights and duties of military commissars and discuss how 
construction of the Red Army and cultural-educational work amongst the troops was 
to proceed, based on information collected in the localities by military workers who 
comprised the conference delegates. 85 Military Commissar Tukhachevsky would have 
attended this conference and, with reports submitted on 8th June on conditions and 
military construction in the localities, 86 he would have delivered his May report as 
well as preparing his project. 
As illustrated, Tukhachevsky stressed the need in his report for military academies 
to create an organised command cadre. Kuliabko or Iurenev, upon reading this, very 
likely commissioned Tukhachevsky to prepare his project for the June conference. 
Korablev suggests this was used in December 1918 to work out a programme for the 
87 Central Courses for Military Commissars . Tukhachevsky sent the project to lurenev 
on 4th December, with a brief note stating, "Compiled in the month of June of this 
year in Moscow by military commissar of the Moscow District". In a covering letter 
Tukhachevsky wrote, "I send to you for your consideration regarding political 
agitation in the armies at the current moment, a project for the organisation of Courses 
for military commissars... ". He had earlier written to lurenev about the lack of 
military experience amongst the majority of commissars and in the introduction to his 
83 V. M. Ivanov, p. 3 1. 
84 Voennoe delo, No. 3, (15th June 1918), pp. 14-15; The conference is recorded as meeting from 6th- 
II th June with 359 delegates, 271 of whom were communists, Partiino-politicheskaia rabota v 
Krasnoi Armii (Aprel' 1918-Fevral' 1919). Dokumenty, (Moscow, 196 1), p. 343. 
15 Ibid. p. 78 
81 Voennoe delo, No. 3, (15'hJune, 1918), pp. 14-15; L. D. Trotsky, (trans. B. Pearce), How The 
Revolution Arnied, vol. I, (New York, 1979) p. 559. 
87 V. Korablev, "0 maloizvestnoi stranitse deiatel'nosti A N. Tukhachevskogo v gody grazhdanskoi 
voiny (k 80-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia)" Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 2, (1973), pp. 79-83. 
80 
project, commented on the fon-nation of RVS-y containing two political commissars 
and one voenspets, stating, 
Such an organisation is considered temporary and will only exist until 
Party commanders are prepared... 
For this aim it is proposed to form "Courses for military commissars" 
with two-month courses. Completing such courses, military commisars 
will be completely knowledgeable in the circumstances, in the demands of 
military art, and receiving valuable experience in practice, will easily 
make independent revolutionary commanders. 
Military commissar courses did not begin until 10th October 1918, probably 
because all efforts were concentrated towards aiding Eastern Front. On 25th 
September, by which time the Eastern Front had rallied, Sklianskii instructed the All- 
Russian Bureau of Military Commissars to create courses. 88 By the end of the year, 
1,773 from a total of 6,389 serving military commissars had passed through the 
special short courses . 
89 However, Trotsky criticised the standard of these graduates in 
October and, on 14th November 1918, the VVI Political Department was transferred 
to the Military Commissars' Bureau, 90 to help with political and cultural-educational 
work. It is possible Tukhachevsky sent his project to lurenev two weeks later to aid 
with this, or that lurenev requested it, as he had done in June. Whether the project was 
used or not, it provides an excellent insight into Tukhachevsky's ideas and 
capabilities at this time. 91 
The ideas Tukhachevsky advocated in his report and project matched the direction 
Trotsky was taking the Red Army. Tukhachevsky almost certainly met Trotsky for the 
first time at the conference. In his opening address, Trotsky commented on the 
evolution of the Soviet armed forces, saying, 
The small voluntary detachments of the first period of the October 
Revolution, despite all their bravery and enthusiasm, showed it was 
impossible to fight with success an army organised in all matters of 
modem technical warfare. The previous administrative apparatus is 
88 Partiino-politicheskaia rabota v Krasnoi A rmii (aprel' 1918-fevral' 1919). Dokumenty, (Moscow, 
1961), pp. 85-86 & 343. 
89 Direkthy komandovaniiafrontov Krasnoi Armii (1917-1922). Sbornik dokumentov v4-kh tomakh, 
(Moscow, 1971-1978), (hereafter DkfKA), Tom IV, pp. 342-343; V. G. Kolychev, Partiino- 
politicheskaia rabota v Krasnoi Armii v gody grazhdanskoi voiny, 1918-1920, (Moscow, 1979), pp. 
98-99. 
90 Paniino-politicheskaia rabota v Krasnoi Armii (aprel' 1918-fevral' 1919), Dokumenty, p. 90. 
91 The report is reproduced in full in Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 2, (1973), pp. 79-83. 
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ruined, the new one is just created. We do not even know how much 
military hardware we have in the Centre or in the localities. 92 
This set the background to the conference. Progressing to outline the evolution of 
Red forces to date and how the Red Army was to be constructed, Trotsky infonned 
the delegates that military commissars were the vital link needed to complete the 
chain and form a socialist army. Outlining Military Commissar duties, Trotsky stated, 
... one of the fundamental tasks falling to the lot of the military 
commissars is that of bringing to the working masses, by means of 
ideological propaganda, awareness of the need for revolutionary order and 
discipline, which must be persistently mastered by each and everyone... 
We took steps urgently to establish in the localities the nuclei of 
commissariats, to consist of two representatives of the local soviets and 
one military specialist. 
The local board, a sort of local military commissariat, will be the 
organisation that can, in a given locality, fully embrace the planned 
formation and servicing of the army. Everyone knows that the army which 
we are now building on voluntary principles is regarded by the Soviet 
Government as merely provisional... 
We appealled for volunteers for the Red Army in the hope that the best 
forces of the working masses would respond. Have our hopes been 
realised? It must be said that they are realised only 33 1/3 percent. There 
are, of course , in the Red Army, many 
heroic, self-sacrificing fighters, but 
there are also many worthless elements - hooligans, ne'er-do-wells, the 
dregs. 
Undoubtedly, if we were to give military training to the whole working 
class, without exception, this element, which in quantity is comparatively 
small, would not constitute any serious danger to our army: but now, when 
our forces are so small, this element is an unavoidable and undesirable 
thorn in the flesh of our revolutionary regiments. 
It is the responsibility of the military commissars to work tirelessly to 
raise the level of consciousness within the army and ruthlessly to eradicate 
the undesirable element which had got into it... 
We must draw into the work of creating the army the younger 
generations, the youth who have not experienced war, and who are always 
distinguished by the elan of their revolutionary spirit and their display of 
enthusiasm... But here arises the question of the commanding apparatus: 
experience has shown that lack of technical forces has a baneful effect on 
the success of attempts to form revolutionary annies, because the 
revolution has not brought forth from the midst of the working masses 
warriors with a knowledge of the military art. This is the weak spot of all 
revolutions... 
If among the workers there had been a sufficient number of comrades 
who were military specialists, the problem would have been solved very 
92 Voennoe delo, No. 3, (15th June 1918), p. 14; excerpts of this speech are also in No. 2, (8th June, 
1918), p. 15. 
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simply, but, unfortunately, we have extraordinarily few persons with 
military training. 
The duties of members of the commanding apparatus can be divided 
into two parts... The commissar is a political worker, a revolutionary. The 
military leader answers with his head for all his activity, for the outcome 
of military operations and so on. If the commissar has observed that there 
is a danger to the revolution from the military leader, the commissar has 
the right to deal ruthlessly with the counter-revolutionary, even to the 
point of shooting him. 
In order that we may be able quickly to train our own peasant and 
worker officers, fighters for socialism, we have in a number of places set 
about organising schools of instruction which will train and instruct 
representatives of the working people in the art of war. 
... 
At this congress we shall exchange our observations, we shall learn 
something from each other, and I am sure that you will go back to your 
localities and continue your creative work in the interests of the labour 
revolution. 93 
This was the critical point in Tukhachevsky's entry into the Red An-ny, meeting 
Trotsky to "exchange observations [and] learn something from each other". Trotsky 
would have wanted to meet the man recommended to him so recently by lurenev as 
Military Commissar of the Moscow District of the Western Screens, one of the most 
important zones during German occupation. Tukhachevsky's May report matched 
Trotsky's demand for "the need for revolutionary order and discipline"'. His June 
project provided a platform for the "schools of instruction" about which Trotsky 
spoke. Discussing these issues with Tukhachevsky, Trotsky found a man experienced 
in military affairs and Red Army organisational work, but also crucially a man 
capable and prepared to deal with the "worthless elements" and to "ruthlessly 
eradicate the undesirable element" within the Red forces, whilst organising partisan 
bands into regimented formations. Also, Tukhachevsky was a Communist Party 
member, not just a voenspets, providing a military specialist from within the ranks of 
socialism who could prepare commissar courses, but more pressingly would receive 
respect from the rank-and-file in the East, which a voenspets would not. No matter 
that Tukhachevsky was not an old revolutionary or pre-October Bolshevik. His 
political experience would develop, but he had already imbibed the ideology, he 
seemed reliable and had the necessary military capabilities. 
Trotsky later wrote on 23rd July, 
93 L. D. Trotsky, How The RevolutionArmed, Vol. 1, pp. 164-167. The speech reproduced in this 
volume differs from the excerpts in Voennoe delo. 
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A very important, although alas, as yet only small group consist of officers 
who, to a greater or lesser extent, understood the significance of the 
revolution and the spirit of the new age. These officers are now working 
tirelessly at the creation of the armed forces for the Soviet Republic. To 
require that they repaint themselves as Bolsheviks would be absurd. They 
must be appreciated and given support. 94 
In Tukhachevsky, Trotsky had a voenspets who "understood the significance of 
the revolution and the spirit of the new age" to such a degree, he had joined the Party. 
This was enough for Trotsky if Tukhachevsky would build a successful Red Army to 
keep the Bolsheviks in charge. Trotsky knew Tukhachevsky was not a born-again 
Marxist devotee, but was willing to serve the Bolsheviks. The goal of the June 
conference was to discuss the situation, discover solutions and despatch delegates 
with these, to aid military construction in the localities, thus beginning the 
centralisation and regularisation of the Red Anny. Tukhachevsky wished to build the 
Red Army in the same manner as Trotsky and had presented his ideas at the 
conference. Trotsky had found one of his first Red Commanders. He would become 
the one to implement and experiment with these measures first. After meeting 
Trotsky, Tukhachevsky was destined to go eastwards. All that was required, was an 
escalation in the situation. This occurred in May-June 1918. 
Outbreak of Civil War in the Vol2a 
The second half of 1918 was a period of extreme danger for the Soviet Republic. 
Uprisings by internal counter-revolutionary forces comprising Right and Left SRs, 
Mensheviks, Liberal and Rightist Parties, White officer battalions and the 
Czechoslovak Legion, combined with German occupation of European Russia and the 
Crimea. Anglo-French, Japanese and American intervention into the far north, south 
and east of Imperial Russian territory began. The Soviet Republic was beset from all 
sides and with no organised army. 
However, by December 1918, the Reds had won Eastern Front battles on the 
Volga and in the Urals, and the end of the Great War signalled the withdrawal of the 
Central Powers from Russian soil, with Germany in revolutionary turmoil and the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsing. This heralded increased Allied intervention and 
94 Ibid. p. 188. 
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offensives by far larger and better-equipped White forces in 1919, but the crucial 
difference was the existence of a large, experienced, organised, regular Red Army. 
The Reds did not enter 1919 defenceless as they had 1918. 
To achieve this required enormous efforts at central and local levels and 
coordination from both ends. Numbers had to be raised quickly for the emerging 
armed forces from both frontline and central areas. With commanders having to 
simultaneously judge men capable or not of serving in and around the battlefields, 
whilst tackling enemy forces, the critical situation soon showed who were able, loyal 
fighters, agitators and organisers and who were not, or were simply treacherous. 
Trotsky later stated, "it was precisely the acuteness of the danger to which we were 
subjected that saved us. If we had had more time for discussion and debate we should 
95 probably have made a great many more mistakes". In September 1918 he noted, "It 
can be said that if the Czechoslovak Legion had not existed, they would have had to 
be invented, for under peacetime conditions we should have never have succeeded in 
forming, within a short time, a close-knit disciplined, heroic army" . 
96 These hint at the 
methods Trotsky deemed necessary for moulding the Red Army - absolute in style 
and content and to be complied with unquestioningly. 
The above assessments can also be applied to Tukhachevsky. If the Czechoslovak 
Uprising had not occurred, he would not have been propelled into the limelight so 
dramatically. On the surface it appears surprising a more seasoned Bolshevik or 
higher-ranking voenspets than young former 2nd-Lieutenant Tukhachevsky was not 
selected as I st Revolutionary Army Commander in June 1918. The fact he was both a 
voenspets and a communist played its part, as did the relationship he had forged with 
Lenin and Trotsky. His work for the Military Department had brought him to their 
attention. The emergence of the Eastern Front gave Tukhachevsky the opportunity to 
prove himself in the frontline and this combined with events, which, although not 
apparent at the time, were great strokes of luck for Tukhachevsky, who happened to 
be in the right place at the right time. 
The " breathing- space" won with the signing of Brest-Litovsk ended on 25th May 
with the uprising of the Czechoslovak Legion. This had been formed by the Tsarist 
95 Ibid. p. 26. 
96 Ibid, p. 347. 
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Government in 1914 from Czechs and Slovaks settled on Russian territory. They had 
fought during the Great War and after the February Revolution, swelled in number 
with the Provisional Government releasing Czechoslovak prisoners of war. 97 By mid- 
1918, the Czechoslovak Legion numbered 38,000 men. 98 The crumbling Hapsburg 
Empire sparked Czechoslovak nationalist sentiments with hopes for an independent 
state centred around Tomas Masaryk in Paris. To help achieve this, plans were 
hatched to extricate the Legion from Russian soil to fight on the Great War Western 
Front with the Allies. Agreement was reached between the Soviet Government and 
Czechoslovak Legion representatives for their departure along the Trans-Siberian 
Railway through Vladivostok, with the intention of crossing the Pacific, America and 
the Atlantic to eventually reach Western Europe. 
This scheme had little chance of success in 1918 Russia. Mutual suspicion from 
all sides made a clash almost inevitable. The Czechoslovaks wished to leave 
immediately, fearful of the Bolsheviks handing them over to Germany, currently 
advancing eastwards and southwards into Russia. The Bolsheviks meanwhile grew 
ever more suspicious of Allied intentions, with the latter vacillating over employing 
the Czechoslovaks in Europe or inside Russia, to reopen the Great War Eastern Front. 
Japanese landings in the Far East also threatened the possibility of a joint Japanese- 
Czechoslovak force on Russian soil. 
One of the terms imposed by the Bolsheviks for the Czechoslovak withdrawal was 
handing over the majority of their weaponry. This had been supplied by the Tsar and 
in the Bolsheviks' opinion was now theirs by right. The retention of only 120 rifles 
and one machine-gun per rail echelon was permitted. 99 The Czechslovaks never 
intended to do this. With the interception of a telegram from Trotsky instructing 
Soviets, Military Departments and Red forces to disarm any Czechoslovaks or shoot 
them, ' 00 followed swiftly by an armed clash with Hungarian troops at Cheliabinsk on 
14th May, ' 01 the Czechoslovaks decided to fight their way eastwards. 102 
97 W. B. Lincoln, Red Victory -A History of the Russian Civil War, (New York, 1989), p. 93. 
98 j. D. Smele, Civil War in Siberia: The anti-Bolshevik government ofAdmiral Kolchak, 1918-1920, 
(Cambridge, 1996), p. 26. 
99 N. 1. Koritskii, "Sozdanie Pervogo armil i osvobozhdenie Simbirska" Simbirskaia guberniia v 1918- 
1920 gg: sbornik vospominanii, (Ul'ianovsk, 1958), p. 50. 
100 L. D. Trotsky, Hoiv the Revolution Armed, Vol. 1, pp. 277-28 1. 
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The situation swiftly deteriorated for the Soviets. Spread out along the Trans- 
Siberian Railway in three main groups, 103 the Czechoslovaks occupied virtually every 
major town along it. In the Urals, Cheliabinsk and Ekaterinburg fell, the occupation of 
the latter on 17th July prompting the panicked execution of Tsar Nicholas 11 and his 
family three days earlier, on Sverdlov's orders. On the Volga, Penza, Syzran' and 
Samara were occupied and the Czechoslovaks agreed to fight for the SR-Menshevik 
Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly (Komuch) Government, which 
was proclaimed in Samara on 8th June. 104 
Other uprisings occurred in towns such as Vologda, Murom and Iaroslavl. The 
latter was led by the Right SR Boris Savinkov on 6th July to coincide with the Left 
SR uprising in Moscow, 105 lasting until 21st July when it was suppressed by 6th and 
8th Latvian Rifle Regiments. ' 06 Unchecked, these threatened to link the 
Czechoslovaks in the east with British forces landing in Arkangel'sk and Murmansk 
in the north. 107 
However, the crux of the matter was not that the Czechoslovak Uprising occurred, 
but that the Reds had no forces in the east with which to quell them, with no more 
than 300,000 volunteers, scattered around some 8,000 kms of frontiers at the end of 
May. 1 08 The largest and most effective Red formations were the 18,000 strong 
Latvian Rifle Regiments. 109 They matched the Czechoslovaks when they eventually 
met, but in May they were scattered around the Soviet zone, forming the core of the 
existing Red forces. 
Most Red troops were deployed on the Western "screens" with German 
occupation preventing a withdrawal of troops from west to east. 110 Also, the Red 
leadership initially under-estimated the seriousness of the Czechoslovak Revolt. Not 
103 J. D. Smele, p. 26. 
104 Where Komuch is used to describe those fighting against Red forces, this means a mixture of 
Czechoslovak, White and "Peoples Army" troops. The latter was the force proclaimed by the Komuch 
social-democrat members, but never attracted great numbers. 
105 Boris Viktorovich Savinkov (1879-1925); E. I. Medvedev, pp. 147-148, Savinkov later stated that 
the Right SRs intended to occupy the towns of Iaroslavl, Rybinsk, Kostroma and Murom and had 
received 2 million roubles from the "Imperialists" for this; W. Bruce Lincoln, p. 143. 
106 V. V. Shtein, Boevoi put' latyshskikh krasnikh strelkov, (Riga, 1978), pp. 18-19. 
107 Voennye bumagi L. D. Trotskogo, 1918-1924, reel 67, delo 142, p. 11. 
108 S. V. Lipitskii, pp. 207-208. 
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110 In fact, in mid-June the Germans advanced towards the Crimea on the pretext of the Soviet 
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until the formation of Eastern Front R VS on 13th June was the danger really 
acknowledged. "' Even then, once Lenin and the political hierarchy grasped the 
gravity of the situation, the VVS, with its voenspetsy concentrating on Germany, was 
reluctant to turn east and leave the west open. ' 12 
The eastern situation was dire for the Reds. Small partisan and armed worker 
detachments could not match the Czechoslovaks. A regular army under one unified 
command system was needed. ' 13 Help was needed from Moscow to form this, 
providing the catalyst to launch Tukhachevsky eastwards. 
Postin2 to the Eastern Front 
Kuliabko relates that, on his suggestion, Lenin interviewed Tukhachevsky as a 
candidate for posting to the east after the Czechoslovak Revolt. Returning from this, 
Tukhachevsky told Kuliabko that Lenin had asked him two main questions - Why had 
he escaped from Germany and how did he envisage the construction of a new socialist 
army? Tukhachevsky replied he could not stay in jail when such revolutionary events 
were occurring in Russia and then "laid out his thoughts about how to unite the 
scattered Red Guards cadres into one regular army", presumably reiterating his May 
report. Kuliabko notes, "Evidently these thoughts pleased Lenin and very soon 
yesterday's Lieutenant received the promotion to the post of I st Army Commander of 
Eastern Front". 114 
S. 1. Aralov's recollections of Lenin being closely involved with the military 
process on a daily basis, taking decisions personally if necessary, suggest this could 
have occurred, 1 15 but doubts have been cast over Kuliabko's authenticity. Ivanov 
comments that no record exists of this meeting in the Biograficheskaia khronika 
could otherwise have been released for the east, J. Meijer, ed., The Trotsky Papers: 1917-1922, Vol. 1: 
1917-1919, (The Hague, 1964), pp. 48-57. 
11 DGkK, 4, doc. 104, pp. 97-98. 
112 A Bolshevik Party CC debate on the international situation and upon which front Red forces should 
be concentrated, in light of the increased threat of a Japanese and American presence in the East, 
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6th May to still concentrate nearly all available forces in the West, due to its close proximity to the Red 
heartland, S. V. Lipitskii, pp. 218-219. 
113 E. 1. Medvedev, p. 94, Three uncoordinated Red command staffs existed in the East at this point: 
Ural-Orenburg Front Command; Front Command headed by M. Kadomtsev; and the Communist 
An-ned Workers Detachments. 
'" N. N. Kuliabko, pp. 28-29. 
115 A. 1. Todorskii, p. 26; see S. 1. Aralov, Lenin vel nas kpobede. Vospominaniia. (Moscow, 1962). 
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Lenina, which lays out Lenin's day to day activities in great detail. ' 16 This is true, but 
does not prove the meeting never occurred. Kuliabko is not listed as a source used for 
compiling the Khronika which would explain his absence. Tukhachevsky was in 
Moscow for a four month period and his report in May was used towards drafting the 
29th May decree. Through his work it is highly likely Tukhachevsky met Lenin, even 
if briefly at a meeting or after a speech by the Party leader, and very possibly at the 
Ist All-Russian Conference of Military Commissars. Kuliabko's story is consistent 
with Tukhachevsky's sisters and Koritskii, who recall Tukhachevsky met Lenin 
before leaving for the east and discussed how to proceed with army reorganisation. 1 17 
Party workers deemed most qualified and capable of salvaging the situation in the east 
were mobilised and sent there in mid-late June and Tukhachevsky was one of these. 
Lenin spoke publicly to many of them before their departure. Perhaps Tukhachevsky 
met Lenin at a briefing about his tasks ahead. 
Kuliabko's account is inaccurate insofar as Tukhachevsky was not sent eastwards 
specifically as I st Army Commander, but in fact with the following mandate, 
The bearer of this, Military Commissar of the Moscow Region - Mikhail 
Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky is despatched on a mission at the disposal of 
Supreme Commander of the Eastern Front Murav'ev for fulfilling work of 
exceptional importance in organising and forming the Red Army into 
higher troop formations and commanding them. 
An accompanying letter from the Moscow Military District Staff to Murav'ev 
gave a CEC recommendation of Tukhachevsky as one of the few military specialists- 
communists who should therefore be given the most responsible work at the Front. " 8 
Aralov sent a telegram from Narkomvoen Operations Section (Operod) to Murav'ev, 
which would have had Trotsky's backing, stating Tukhachevsky, "was one of the few 
military specialists in the Communist Party" and should therefore be entrusted with 
"the most important and responsible work in the struggle with the Czechoslovaks". ' 19 
In possession of the mandate and covering letter, Tukhachevsky travelled by train 
eastwards, leaving Moscow on 19th June and arriving at Kazan', on the Volga, on 
25th June. 120 
116 V. M. Ivanov, pp. 30. 
117 E. N. Arvatova-Tukhachevskaia, & 0. N. Tukhachevskaia, p. 15; N. I. Kofitskii, "V dni voiny iv 
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Smimov's assertion that Tukhachevsky was sent eastwards because he was one of 
only around 100 "commander-communists" is partially true, with the shortage of 
similarly qualified candidates making him a prime choice. However, he had reached 
this position through his own efforts, by virtue of his military career and decision to 
join the Party. The fact he was a "commander-communist" gave him both the political 
credibility a voenspets did not have, and the military background a Party member did 
not enjoy. However, he was not posted as Ist Army Commander, as Smirnov 
maintains, but to carry out organisational work, as he had done already in the Military 
Department, to put into practice the recommendations of his May report. His work in 
the Military Department and as Military Commissar had gained commendations from 
Kuliabko and Enukidze, the latter being one of the most seasoned Bolsheviks in the 
game. Tukhachevsky was adjudged capable of repeating this work on the frontline 
and brought to the attention of the military and Party hierarchy, notably Lenin and 
Trotsky. Tukhachevsky had earned his position by merit, with his report and project 
demonstrating his high level of military knowledge on a theoretical and practical 
organisational level, and personal interviews with Lenin and Trotsky demonstrating 
his political reliability. It perhaps seems ironic he was one of the rare "commander- 
communists", but his devotion to the Communist cause was not for political ideals, 
but the opportunity to lead the army of a great Russian state rising through these. 
However, Tukhachevsky provides the perfect example of how the escalation of civil 
war brought together the Bolshevik regime and specialists from the Tsarist era. Lenin 
and Trotsky knew what Tukhachevsky was -a professional soldier who wanted to 
patriotically serve his nation - but in his Party membership and military record they 
saw the embodiment of the Red Commander they wished to create and were willing to 
take a risk on him, as the Bolsheviks did with many others. Tukhachevsky saw in the 
Bolsheviks a party which wished to create a powerful Russian nation and empire, 
with a new powerful army to defend it, in which he could serve at a senior level. He 
had studied Marxism and been impressed by its impact on the core of the evolving 
Red Army, but whether he was impressed personally by these ideals remains 
doubtful. He did not want Tsarist autocracy, but did not believe in the pure 
communist state either. Events in 1918 Russia brought Tukhachevsky and the regime 
together. 
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Eastern Front RVS Headquarters were established at Kazan'. Its initial 
membership was Commander-in-Chief Murav'ev (despite Podvoiskii's 
disagreement), 121 Political Commissars Kobozev and Blagonravov, and Mironov as 
Secretary. 122 
On 18th June, the RVS received instructions from the VVS, outlining actions to be 
taken against the Czechoslovak forces, which were identified as being in three main 
groups around Samara, Cheliabinsk and Omsk. 
Red forces in Simbirsk, Syzran' and Nikolaevsk were to concentrate in Simbirsk, 
then move to Ufa, to cut off the Czechoslovaks in Samara, enabling an attack on the 
latter from the north and north-east. Troops in Ekaterinburg, Zlatoust, Troitsk and 
Kamyshlov were to crush the Czechoslovaks in the eastern sector up to Kurgan, 
occupying the right bank of the River Tobol', to cut off the second Czechoslovak 
group from the third in Omsk. 123 This presumably would be faced after these 
operations, as no instructions concerning it were forthcoming. This was due to the 
lack of Red forces in the east in June 1918, forcing them to tackle enemy groups in 
adjacent areas first. These instructions show immediately the fluidity of the Eastern 
Front, with conventional set fronts replaced by manoeuvre amid constantly changing 
circumstances and positions of forces from both sides. This was typical of Civil War 
fronts throughout the conflict. 
Eastern Front R VS put these instructions into practice on 19th June, combining all 
124 
troops along the railway lines of Syzran'-Simbirsk sectors, into Ist Soviet Army. 
Local Soviets, military heads and military organisations were instructed to begin 
mobilisation and A. 1. Kharchenko, nominated Ist Army Commander on 16th June, 
was to prepare an offensive from Penza and Inza sectors. 125 
On 20th June, Osobaia Army was created from troops in Saratov-Ural'sk sectors 
to cooperate with I st Soviet Army against the Samara Czechoslovak Group and on 
3rd July all troops in Saratov and Saratov Province were subordinated to its 
12 1 E. 1. Medvedev, p. 135. 
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124 Troops were still travelling and living in their eshelony, fighting under the conditions of 
eshelonnaia voina, with no other transportation organised as yet. 
125 BpPRA, doc. p. 25; 0. lu. Kalnin, p. 36; DkfKA, doc. 326, pp. 386-387; BpPRA, doc. 2, p. 25. 
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Commander Rzhevskii. 126 On 22nd June, 2nd Soviet Army was formed from troops in 
Ufa and Orenburg sectors to act against the Czechoslovaks there, under the command 
of the Left SR lakovlev, former Supreme Commander of Ural-Orenburg Front. 127 
Efforts to create 3rd Soviet Army by regulating Northern-Ural-Siberian Front 
were made from 14th June, 128 but it was not officially decreed until 20th July in 
response to the fall of Ekaterinburg three days earlier. 129 Also on 20th July, Osobaia 
became 4th Army, 130 with 5th Army forined at Sviiazhsk after the fall of Kazan' on 
6th-7th August, with the task of retaking the town. 13 1 These were the five armies of 
the Red Eastern Front. 
Tukhachevsky and Murav'ev 
Tukhachevsky replaced Kharchenko as I st Army Commander on 26th June, the 
day after reaching Kazan' to begin his organisational work. 132 Kharchenko had 
commanded Ist Army barely a week, but already dissatisfaction was rife. 
Tukhachevsky immediately departed for Inza Station, location of Ist Army HQ, 
arriving on 28th June and accepting command. 133 The circumstances surrounding 
Tukhachevsky's appointment as I st Army Commander encapsulate the whole Eastern 
Front situation in summer 1918. Czechoslovak support of Komuch added a new 
dimension to Bolshevik-Left SR policy differences which were pulling their 
governmental coalition apart. These had degenerated into open rivalry and disputes 
over regularisation and control of the disparate Red forces in the East would 
culminate in the Murav'ev revolt, in which Tukhachevsky was directly involved, 
narrowly escaping execution. However, this proved to be the greatest stroke of luck 
for Tukhachevsky, who benefited from being in the right place at the right time, was 
able to take advantage of situations presented by Bolshevik-Left SR rivalries and 
emerged from his first few weeks in the East as Ist Army Commander, fully trusted 
by Moscow, if not by all those around him. 
126 DkfKA, Tom 1, docs. 327 & 339, pp. 387 & 393. 
127 lbid, doc. 33 1, p. 389. 
128 lbid, p. 392. 
129 lbid, doc. 346, p. 398. 
130 Ibid, doc. 347, p. 398. 
13 1 N. 1. Koritskii, "Sozdanie pervogo armii i osvobozhdeniia Simbirska", Simbirskaia guberniia, p. 58. 
132 DkfKA, Tom 1, p. 386; BpPRA, p. 25. 
133 BpPRA, doc. 3, pp. 25-26. 
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How much the local SRs; and Murav'ev's actions before I Oth July were 
premeditated and fulfilled on orders from the Moscow Left SRs is uncertain, but 
likely. 134 The Left SR Central Committee decided on 24th June to rebel against the 
Bolsheviks, to overturn Brest-Litovsk and reopen the Great War Eastern Front for a 
"revolutionary war" against the Central Powers. 135 Tukhachevsky described Murav'ev 
as "Napoleonistic" and "... an adventurous scoundrel and nothing more. His Left 
SRism was completely false, serving only as a label for hirn", ' 36 but the revolt 
coincided with the Left SR uprising of 6th July in Moscow. Murav'ev ordered an 
Eastern Front offensive on this day to disguise and prepare his coup. He intended to 
win control of the Volga area either to aid the Left SR rising or, as Tukhachevsky and 
Chistov suggest, to use this to his own advantage and set up his own "Independent 
Volga Republic") . 
137 
With the fall of Samara, Simbirsk was crucial for the Reds in the East, guarding 
the railway line westwards to the Red interior and the Volga to Kazan' and the north. 
The Simbirsk Communist Party was small compared to the Left SRs, who held 
several important posts in the Executive Committee of the Simbirsk Province Soviet, 
such as Head of Simbirsk Army Group (Klim Ivanov) and Province Military 
Commissar (Nedashkovskii). 138 With Murav'ev, they recruited voenspetsy loyal to 
their Party, which proved crucial in the days after Murav'ev's uprising as mass 
betrayals aided the Komuch advance on Simbirsk. 139 
The Simbirsk Bolshevik Party's first step to recovering their position, vis-a-vis the 
Left SRs, was the arrival in May 1918 of 1. M. Vareikis, a 24 year-old locksmith- 
134 A. P. Nenarokov, Vostochniifront 1918, (Moscow, 1969), p. 100; 1.1. Mints, Grazhdanskaia voina 
vpovolzh'e. - 1918-1920gg, (Kazan', 1974), p. 63; E. 1. Medvedev, p. 145. These sources suggest 
Murav'ev, when Supreme Commander, kept in close contact with and acted through only the narrow 
circle of Left SRs he had secured military postings for. He instructed them to hinder reorganisational 
work within the Red Army in the period before his revolt. However, Nenarokov writes there is no hard 
evidence these actions were carried out on the instructions of or in concert with the Left SR CC in 
Moscow. 
135E. 1. Medvedev, p. 147. 
136 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pervaia anniia v 1918 godu", Iibrannyeproizvedenda, Vol. 1,1919-1927, p. 
76. 
137 B. 1. Chistov, "Partorganizatslia v dni grazhdanskoi voiny", 1918 god na rodine Lenina, 
(Kuibyshev, 1936), (hereafter 1918 god), pp. 64-65; M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pervala an-niia v 1918 
godu", p. 76. 
138 V. M. Kadyshev, "Iz perezhitogo", Simbirskaia guberniia, p. 155; B. I. Chistov, 1918 god, p. 65; B. 
1. Chistov, Sinibirskaia guberniia, p. 173. 
139G. D. Kauchukovskii, "Simbirskie bolsheviki i avantiura. Murav'eva", Simbirskaia guberniia, p. 
123. 
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toolmaker, who became head of the Simbirsk Town Party Organisation. 140 
Kauchukovskii, a 20 year-old technician, became secretary. 141 With the help of 
Podvoiskii, who was in Simbirsk whilst touring Volga Region as Head of VVI, 142 and 
Oskar lu. Kalnins, who arrived at Inza on 14th June to became Ist Army Political 
Commissar on 16th June, 143 Vareikis worked to strengthen the Bolshevik's military 
position. On 22nd June, Simbirsk Party Committee instructed its Military 
Commission to select Communists to form a political apparatus under the Staff of 
Simbirsk Army Group, which was being created for Ist Army. ' 44 Amongst those 
selected were B. 1. Chistov, Pershin, S. M. lzmailov (Head of Communications) and 
K. S. Shelenshkevich (Head of Transport Department). 145 Lavrov, who had just 
arrived from Kazan' with an RVS mandate for service, became Simbirsk Group 
Political Commissar. Samara Revolutionary Committee members, who had arrived in 
Simbirsk on 9th June after the fall of Samara, were drafted into the Staff. 146 
Podvoiskii appointed Kuibyshev, Chairman of Samara Revolutionary Committee, as 
Ist Army Political Commissar. 147 Working closely, the Simbirsk and Samara 
Bolsheviks formed I st and 2nd Simbirsk Regiments. 148 
The Simbirsk Communists strove to gain more influence than the Left SRs in the 
local institutions as relations deteriorated in the East. The tightening up of Simbirsk 
Party Organisation, launching of armed patrols in Simbirsk and agitation in the 
surrounding countryside were steps in the right direction, but crucial to supremacy 
was control of Ist Soviet Army. The formation of the two regular Simbirsk 
Regiments, headed by the new Staff, helped redress Left SR dominance of the 
140 A. M. Ural'tsev, "Ego ukrashala skronmost", Marshal Tukhachevsky: Vospominaniia soratnikov i 
druzei, p. 102. 
141 Ibid. p. 102; G. D. Kauchukovskii, p. 122. 
142 B. 1. Chistov, "V tiazhelye dni obrony Simbirska", Simbirskaia guberniia, p. 173; DGkKA, p. 794, 
endnote 19. 
143 Geroi grazhdanskoi voiny. Sbornik, (Moscow, 1974), p. 17; DkfKA, Tom I, p. 533. 
144 The "Special Party Military Comission" was selected on I st June at a General Meeting of the 
Simbirsk Communists, where Vareikis passed the resolution to forrn a "Military Detachment" under 
the Simbirsk Party Committee. The Military Commission of Zvirbul', Oleinik, Neiland, Shver and 
Chistov were to organise this, B. 1. Chistov, "Partorganizatsiia... ", pp. 47-48. 
"' Ibid, p. 53. 
146 Ibid, p. 47. 
147 DkfKA, Tom IV, p. 573 - The exact date for Kuibyshev taking this post is given as 15th July 1918, 
after the Murav'ev Revolt, but it is highly likely he was working unofficially in this capacity, as 
Chistov suggests, before this date. 
148 B. 1. Chistov, -V tiazhelye dni... ", pp. 173-174. 
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unregulated, partisan Simbirsk Army Group and Extraordinary Staff, 149 but the Left 
SRs still tried to hold onto the important posts, counter-acting any Bolshevik 
influence from new postings. Also, although the Bolshevik P. Smimov became 
Commander of 2nd Simbirsk Regiment and the Left SR, lagodin, Commander of lst 
Simbirsk Regiment, this seemingly fair distribution was undermined by the existing 
town militia being drafted into Ist Battalion of Ist Regiment, ensuring Left SR 
control of the best troops, if necessary, for use against the Bolsheviks. ' 50 
The crucial post was still held by the Left SR Kharchenko as 1 st Army 
Commander. Therefore, the arrival of Tukhachevsky in Kazan' on 25th June, a 
"commander-communist" with excellent credentials and recommendations, was 
viewed as a godsend by Vareikis and Kalnins. Chistov notes that Kalnins, "exposed 
Kharchenko as a traitor", 151 which is perhaps slightly inaccurate at this exact time, 
with Murav'ev securing Kharchenko another posting as 2nd Army Commander, from 
3rd-18th July, before the latter defected to the Whites during their later advance on 
Simbirsk. 152 However, Kalnins did succeed in convincing Kobozev and Blagonravov 
in Eastern Front RVS of the need to replace Kharchenko. 1 53 In this way, the 
candidature of Tukhachevsky, the right man in the right place, at the right time, was 
forced on Murav'ev. Murav'ev was probably not too disappointed at Tukhachevsky's 
appointment, believing he could win over the former "noble" officer. 154 
Therefore, Tukhachevsky was a man both sides felt they could use, meaning no 
opposition was raised to him becoming Ist An-ny Commander. Chistov recounts 
Vareikis introducing lst Army Commander Tukhachevsky to him on 3rd July 1918 
and registering him with Simbirsk Party Organisation. He recalls, "When I told 
friends at the Communist Club later of Tukhachevsky's visit to the Party Committee 
149 Th is headed Simbirsk Army Group and had been formed on 31 st May by the Province Executive 
Committee. The Military Commissar of Simbirsk Province, Gladyshev reported, "At the head of the 
Staff, Military Commissar of Simbirsk Province Ivanov, Chief of Staff Pen'evskii, members of staff: 
Freiman, Gol'man, lzmailov, Gladyshev and Dolnikov", 1918 god na rodine Lenina, p. 322. 
150 B. 1. Chistov, "Partorganizatsiia... ", p. 53. 
151 B. 1. Chistov, "Komandarm-Kommunist", Marshal Tukhachevsky: Vospominaniia druzei i 
soratnikoi,, (Moscow, 1965), pp. 33-34. 
152 DkfKA, Tom IV, p. 534. 
1530. lu. Kalnin, p. 38. 
15' Murav'ev did try this at Simbirsk on 10th July after Tukhachevsky had reacted with derision to his 
plans stating, "Lieutenant Tukhachevsky, you are a Russian landowner! I promise you any responsible 
post in the armies, which I shall organise on the Volga unifying the Red Army with the Czechs", B. I. 
Chistov, "Komandarm-Kommunist", p. 42. 
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they took it almost as victory on the Front. And indeed it was a victory over the Left 
SRs for position in the Army". 155 
The arrival of Tukhachevsky and Kuibyshev began the second period In the 
formation of I st Army, 156 when real, effective organisational work commenced, 
transforming it from a partisan to a regular force. Tukhachevsky travelled to 
Simbirsk, arriving there on 3rd July, after appraising Ist Army's condition and 
assessing the need for urgent mobilisation of a command staff to bind together the 
variegated Red forces. He and Vareikis did this the next day, but proper 
reorganisation of Red units in Simbirsk Province into a regular army was impossible 
in early July. 
The Czechoslovaks, with virtual control of Siberia, tried to extend this with their 
Southern Urals and Volga Groups. Therefore, Red units, instead of pulling back for 
reorganisation and regrouping, were constantly forced into skirmishes to prevent 
further advances. This hindered reorganisation, meaning the scattered, partisan nature 
that the Red High Command was so anxious to extinguish, remained. In this state, 
hindering the organised Czechoslovak forces was possible, but Eastern Front could 
never hope to match or defeat them. In late June however, in an effort to stop the 
Czechoslovaks' advance, the RVS were forced to try, ordering counter-attacks to 
crush the Czechoslovak Groups in the Volga Region at Samara and in the Urals at 
Cheliabinsk. 
The main thrust of the offensive was to concentrate on Samara, Komuch's base, 
but Tukhachevsky recorded, this "simple task was expressed by Murav'ev in the form 
of a fantastic and completely impracticable plan". 157 Murav'ev was laying the 
foundations for his revolt. Northern-Ural-Siberian Front was ordered to move on 
Omsk, Cheliabinsk and Kysht on 20th and 23rd June. 158 On the Volga, Osobaia Army 
at Saratov, was instructed on 20th June to move towards Samara, Buzuluk and 
Ural'sk. 159 It was then to continue north-east to Orenburg. 160 Also on 20th June, Ufa 
Military Detachment was to advance towards Samara, occupying Miass, or digging in 
155 lbid, p. 33. 
156 B. 1. Chistov, "Partorganizatsiia... ", p. 52; V. V. Kuibyshev, "Pervaia revoliutsionnaia anniia", 
Simbirskaia gubernil'a, p. 42. 
157 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pervaia armiia v 1918", p. 75. 
158 DkfKA, Toni I, docs. 329 & 333, pp. 388-389. 
159 lbid, doc. 328, pp. 387-388. 
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before it, if it was occupied. 161 On 23rd June, 2nd Army, was ordered to take Buzuluk 
and combine with Osobaia Army's left flank at Nikolaevsk, 162 then coordinate with 
3rd Army at Cheliabinsk. 163 Ist Army was to attack along an initially wide front 
stretching from Kuznetsk- Sengi lei-Bugul'ma, gradually closing a pincer movement 
around Syzran' and Samara, with troops moving from Surgut and Bugul'ma, cutting 
the Czechoslovaks' line of retreat from Samara to Ufa. Tukhachevsky relates this 
elaborate plan, which envisaged the Czechoslovaks in Samara and Cheliabinsk 
relying on each other, was a complete miscalculation. The Czechoslovaks in Samara 
were well-fortified and self-sufficient. Splitting Red forces to attack from different 
areas, with no effective communications for coordination, simply meant the 
Czechoslovaks could handle them separately. ' 64 Therefore, the Red forces were easily 
encircled and wiped out. 165 
This offensive came too early for the Reds, which although on paper divided into 
I st, 2nd, 3rd and Osobaia Armies and occupying distinct areas by 28th June, 166 were 
still an amalgam of partisans, Red Guards and workers. Only the scattered Latvians 
were organised. In Simbirsk Province alone, Ist Army encapsulated 80 units, 
numbering between 20-250 bayonets each, spread out, not cooperating and still in 
their eshelony, 167 despite instructions from Murav'ev and Blagonravov on 24th June to 
find alternative transport. ' 68 This limited any military action. These problems are 
well-illustrated by the telegram sent by Northern-Ural- Siberian Front Commander 
Berzin on I st July reporting, "The Czechoslovaks are attacking along the whole front. 
Reserves and artillery are essential... I ask for the transfer to us of Moscow or Gomel' 
Regiment. Mobilisation is impossible here". 169 Lack of manpower and the poor 
standard of existing Red forces, combined with peasant support for the 
Czechoslovaks, meant the Reds struggled to hold them, far less counter-attack. 
However, Ist Army made some progress under Tukhachevsky before Murav'ev 
rebelled. On assuming command, Tukhachevsky received a detailed plan of Ist 
160 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pervaia anniia v 1918", p. 77. 
16 1 DkfKA, tom I, doc. 330, p. 388. 
162 Ibid, doc. 332, p. 389. 
163 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pervaia armiia v 1918", p. 77. 
164 Ibid. 
165 0. lu. KaInin, p. 38. 
166 DkfKA, Tom I, doc. 336, pp. 392-393. 
167 N. 1. Koritskii, "V dni voiny... ", p. 64. 
168 DkfKA Tom I, doc. 334, p. 390. 
169DkJKA, Tom I, doc. 337, pp. 392-393. 
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Arrny's role. He was to divide his 8,000 men into seven columns, which were to 
attack simultaneously along a front of 300 versty. The main attack was to be made by 
a column containing only 800 bayonets, starting from Melekess and Musorka and 
advancing through Stavropol' to Samara. 170 The other six columns would conduct 
diversionary attacks, whilst surrounding Samara at a radius of 150 versty. This was 
how Murav'ev proposed Tukhachevsky take a well-fortified town containing over 
5,000 Czechoslovaks. Red forces were to attack by rail from Syzran', which would 
have been costly, and overland across sandy, partially wooded steppeland, when no 
form of transport for this existed. Seeing the potential for disaster, Tukhachevsky 
radically altered the plan. 17 1 He decided to transport the main attacking force, 
Simbirsk Division, in boats up the Volga and up each river bank with both cavalry 
and armoured-cars, to attack the most advanced White group around Usol'e-Musorka- 
Stavropol' and then onto Samara. The smaller Inza and Penza Divisions were to cover 
the flanks with diversionary attacks on Syzran' and Bugul'ma. 172 Tukhachevsky 
calculated Ist Army would be operational by 15th July, 173 but was ordered to launch 
the offensive nine days earlier. Chistov suggests Murav'ev did this deliberately to 
inflict defeat upon the unorganised Red troops, even mixing up the operational 
maps, 174 but a Red counter-attack was essential at this point. A renewed attack by the 
Czechoslovaks from Samara towards Ufa and Cheliabinsk had witnessed their 
occupation of Sergievsk, Birsk, Sterlitamak, Bugul'ma and other towns, on their way 
to uniting with the Czechoslovak Siberian Group at Zlatoust. 175 This opened up I st 
Army's left flank and threatened the entire Red position. Therefore, Tukhachevsky 
was ordered on 6th July to retake Bugul'ma and attack Czechoslovak forces along the 
Volgo-Bugul'ma Railway. 176 
On the same day, Kalnins reported to the Eastern Front R VS Political Department 
(Politotdeo, 
170 B. 1. Chistov, "Partorganizatsiia... ", p. 60. 
171 1.1. Mints, p. 64; E. 1. Medvedev, p. 146. These sources suggest Tukhachevsky drew up the first 
plan of attack, which Murav'ev then altered, but Tukhachevsky's version is that he had to change the 
Murav'ev plan. 
172 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pervaia armila v 1918", pp. 78-79; B. 1. Chistov, "Partorganizatsiia... ", pp. 
60-61. 
173 BpPRA, doc. 10, p. 3 2. 
174 B. 1. Chistov, "Komandarm-Konu-nunist", p. 38. 
175N. E. Kakurin, Kak srazhalasrevoliuaiia, Tom 1,191 7-1918gg, (Moscow, 1990), p. 198. 
176 DkIKA. Tom I, doc. 340, p. 394. 
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Inza Division under the command of comrade Lacis has seized the left 
flank up to Syzran'-Zaborovka. Penza Division has occupied the right 
flank from Zaborovka to the Volga. Mood of the units, operating at 
Syzran', hearty. Everyone fully believes in victory over the enemy. "' 
Taking Syzran', the first Red victory, gave the opportunity to attack on a wider 
front than had been possible in June, with the Red line stretching some 30 versty. 
However, the undisciplined nature of the Red troops took over with drunkenness 
breaking out. In an effort to combat this, Kalnins and Lacis ordered an immediate 
attack to Batravka Station, from where the Whites were still able to shell Syzran'. 
However, Murav'ev at this point recalled the International Regiment, which was 
serving with Inza Division, to Simbirsk, leaving insufficient troops to hold the line. 
The Czechoslovaks counter-attacked at Zaborovka, forcing Inza Division back with 
the undisciplined Red troops panicking under shellfire. 1 78 Tukhachevsky sent two 
telegrams from I st Army HQ at Inza Station on 8th July, the first to Kuliabko stating, 
"Carefully prepared operation of lst Army has been completed brilliantly. The 
Czechoslovaks were beaten and Syzran' taken with a battle". 179 He also sent a 
congratulatory telegram to Ist Army Groups reporting, "Today, 8th July, at 8.00 in 
the morning, Syzran' was occupied by the brave revolutionary units of Inza and 
Penza Divisions after stubborn resistance from the Czechoslovaks and White Guards. 
The pursued enemy in a panic is fleeing to Samara". 180 
However, the success of the two supporting groups was limited by further 
treachery on Murav'ev's part, giving orders over Tukhachevsky's head, 
countermanding directions given by Tukhachevsky to his forces. The main attack 
group was to contain Ist Kursk Broneviki Armoured Division, but this had been 
withheld by Murav'ev since 9th- I Oth June, when it was ordered to travel from Kazan' 
via Ruzaevsk to Samara, to help retake the town from the Whites and Czechoslovaks. 
However, Murav'ev continually redirected it around the rear stations, keeping it out 
of the firing-line, for later use in his coup. In this way, the Broneviki, commanded by 
a Left SR Beretti, arrived in Simbirsk on 8th July to participate in the offensive, but 
was instructed by Klim Ivanov to remain in Simbirsk, under Murav'ev's direct 
command, contrary to Tukhachevsky's order for them to reinforce the offensive on 
177 BpPRA, doe. 5, p. 27. 
1780. lu. Kalnin, pp. 38-39. 
179 N. N. Kullabko, p. 29. 
180 BpPRA, doe. 6, pp. 27-28. 
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Usol'e and Stavropol 1.18 1 Therefore, on 9th July, even as Pravda printed news of Ist 
Army's success in taking Bugul'ma and Syzran' and their imminent capture of 
Stavropol', 182 Tukhachevsky had to leave Inza for Simbirsk to find out what was 
going on. The next morning, en route at Kindiakovka Station, he wrote a scathing 
report to be sent to Muravev. 
I am going to Inza-Syzran'. Syzran' is abandoned. I still wanted to begin 
an offensive yesterday, but the armoured division was forbidden to 
advance by you, and therefore our attack on Usol'e and Stavropol' was 
conducted only by sparse cavalry units. My independence is completely 
impossible with such interference as you give. 
It is visibly better for me on the spot, to see how things need to be done. 
Give me tasks and they will be fulfilled, but don't give me methods - this 
is impracticable... Armies are bound by regulations... they receive only 
tasks and directives of the most general character. Even to give orders to 
armies is avoided. You command for me and even for my divisional 
commanders. 
Perhaps, this was called for with previous inefficient commanders, but 
it seems to me, that until now I have not summoned your dissatisfaction in 
this respect ... 
1 83 
Murav'ev's order to the Broneviki to remain in Simbirsk was his final preparation and 
signalled the beginning of his revolt proper. 
Such subversive activity or conversely inactivity was commonplace amongst 
Murav'ev's appointees and was a major factor behind the Red defeats in late 
June/early July. Kharchenko was heavily criticised in the telegram sent to him at Inza 
on 26th June, the day he was replaced by Tukhachevsky. This stated, 
Penza Army Group is heroically attacking and driving the enemy out of 
Syzran'. It is a disgrace that Inza Group is not supporting their comrades. 
18 1 F. M. Ivanov, Pyrkov, M. P. & Seluianov, A. S., "Rol'Kurskogo bronedivisiona v likvidatsii 
avantiury Murav'eva", Simbirskaia guberniia, p. 14 1; B. 1. Chistov, "Partorganizatsiia... ", p. 62. 
182 BpPRA, doc. 7, pp. 28-29. 
183 TsGASA, f, 157, op. 3, d. 39,11.59-59, in A. P. Nenarokov, pp. 103-104; 1.1. Mints, pp. 64-65, 
these sources date this telegram as I st July. However, Chistov suggests I Oth July (with no archival 
reference given) as the date of this telegram, with Tukhachevsky writing it in his command train on his 
way to Simbirsk to meet Murav'ev. This date is echoed by various Soviet biographers. 10th July 
appears to be the date which fits in with events, with Tukhachevsky in Inza on 28th June and then 
travelling to Simbirsk and arriving there on 3rd July. There is no evidence he led an offensive between 
these dates and this seems unlikely, since I st Army at Inza was in disarray, in no fit state to attack and 
had no organised command staff. Hence Tukhachevsky went to Simbirsk to raise this. The order to 
attack Bugul'ma on 6th July was the first offensive order he received and therefore, it would appear the 
telegram criticising Murav'ev fits in with the offensive starting on 7th July, B. I. Chistov, 
"Komandarrn-Kommunist", pp. 40-4 1; 1918 god na rodine Lenina, p. 63; L. Rakovskii, Mikhail 
Tukhachci, Aý, - Povest, (Leningrad, 1967), pp. 169-170; Iu. A. Shchetinov & B. A. Starkov, pp. 71- 
72; V. M. Ivanov, p. 43. 
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I order: immediately, move forwards, to occupy Zaborovka Station, 
establishing links on the right with Penza Group through Rep'evka, and on 
the left with Simbirsk Group through Goriushka. 1 84 
That Murav'ev had to send this to his own trusted appointee shows the tricky 
position he and his cohorts occupied, planning the coup, whilst appearing to lead Red 
forces loyally, if incompetently. That this charade was successfully maintained has 
already been illustrated by the fact that Murav'ev secured Kharchenko the position of 
2nd Army Commander. The plot thickens further as Kharchenko replaced F. E. 
Makhin, a Right SR and another Murav'ev appointee, 
185 
who lasted barely a week, 
186 
before defecting to the Whites himself 187 Makhin had only become 2nd Army 
Commander after Murav'ev was forced to remove lakovlev from this post on 26th 
June for inaction and a general failure to organise Red troops or prepare defensive 
positions, 188 very similar "shortcomings" to those displayed by Kharchenko. 
However, Murav'ev again succeeded in retaining his accomplice, appointing him to 
the RVS Staff, then as 2nd Army Political Commissar on 3rd. July under 
Kharchenko. 1 89 lakovlev defected in early July, as did Mel'nikov and Voronov, 
commanders of Sengilei sector and Simbirsk Communist Detachment respectively. 190 
With such incompetence from his subordinates, Murav'ev himself did not escape 
suspicion. Tukhachevsky sent a telegram to Moscow at the end of June, complaining 
that Murav'ev was deliberately hindering, "essential work in organising First 
Army". 191 After the Left SR Revolt in Moscow, Mekhonoshin, by now in Eastern 
Front R VS, questioned Murav'ev over his loyalties, with the latter replying he had left 
the Left SRs. Upon receiving this news on 7th July, Lenin ordered Mekhonoshin to, 
"Record Murav'ev's report about his leaving the Left SR Party, maintain vigilant 
184 DkfK, 4, Tom I, doc. 335, p. 391. 
185B. 1. Chistov, "Kommandarm-Kommunist", p. 32, Murav'ev had appointed Makhin Head of the 
Defence of Ufa. He also led Ufa Military Detachment which combined with Orenburg Military 
Detachment, under lakovlev, to form 2nd Army. Chistov blames Makhin's and Kharchenko's 
treachery for the fall of Ufa on 5th July. 
186 DkfY, 4, Tom IV, p. 534. 
187 1.1. Mints, p. 63. 
188 E. 1. Medvedev, p. 9 1; This same lakovlev had failed to organise any Red resistance to the 
Czechoslovaks whilst Supreme Commander of Orenburg-Ural Front. He left Samara for Kinel' with 
lils staff and did nothing to prevent the Czechoslovak advances. Traitorous behaviour was also in 
evidence here in May at the start of the Czechoslovak Uprising, L 1. Mints, p. 40. 
189 1.1. Mints, p. 63. 
190 DkfK4, Toni I, p. 774 (note 95); B. 1. Chistov 1918 god na rodine Lenina, p. 60. 
"I TsGAK, 4, f. 157, op. 3, d. 26, pp. 174-175, in E. 1. Medvedev, p. 145. 
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control... The struggle with the Czechoslovaks and Cossacks must be conducted with 
threefold energy". 192 
A message from Sovnarkom Secretary N. P. Gorbunov to Eastern Front Staff 
followed, warning, "Comrade Lenin asks you to transmit the following: The Left SRs 
were bragging they are counting on Murav'ev... I instruct you to establish threefold 
control over Murav'ev". 193 
Therefore, Tukhachevsky's complaint was acted upon, displaying his rising 
stature. This was the first of several episodes during the Civil War involving 
Tukhachevsky appealling directly to Moscow about his commanding officers. Trust in 
Murav'ev was visibly waning from the end of June, but with no suitable replacement 
and fighting continuing, the Reds had to retain him and watch for signs of treachery, 
if they arose. Also retained were Murav'ev-appointed voenspetsy on I st Army Staff. 
As Kalnins recalled, "From a number of in all 60-70 staff, not including Kobozev and 
Blagonravov, there were four communists and 3 "Left" SRs. All the remainder were 
"specialists"', who were selected by Supreme Commander Murav'ev". 194 These were 
all men loyal to him. 
With such treacherous leadership, it is not surprising the Red counter-offensive 
failed and the Czechoslovaks continued to make ground on all fronts, with local 
uprisings provoked by SR, Menshevik and White agitators contributing. 195 This was 
exactly as Murav'ev had planned. Loyal Red forces were split into small, weak groups 
which could be easily defeated by the Czechoslovaks, leaving those formations 
headed by Left SRs or which Murav'ev felt he could control, in the rear and 
unharmed. 196 
On 9th July Murav'ev attempted to take control of Eastern Front RVS HQ in 
Kazan', but was arrested. Escaping, he secretly left the town aboard the steamship 
Mezhen. 1 97 He sailed to Simbirsk, arriving during the evening of 10th July, 198 with 
192 V. 1. Lenin, p. 64. 
193 E. N. Medvedev, p. 148. 
1940. Iu. Kalnin, p. 34. 
195 DkfK. 4, Tom I, doc. 341, pp. 394 & 774, note. 
1960. lu. Kalnin, p. 38; B. 1. Chistov, "Komandann-Kommunist", p. 38. 
197 The Mezhen was formerly the Tsarina's royal yacht. Murav'ev had earlier commandeered it as his 
mobile HQ, B. 1. Chistov, "Komandan-n-Komunist", p. 41. 
198 Vareikis gives the exact time of arrival as 7.00 pm in his memoirs of the affair, whilst Kuibyshev in 
his official report to Sovnarkom at the time gave the time as 9.00 pm, 1. M. Vareikis, "Ubiistvo 
Murav'eva", 1918 god, p. 5; TsAOR, f. 1235, d. 525, op. 52, in 1918 god, p. 330. 
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600 men comprising his Yugoslavian bodyguards and Ufa Detachment under 
Khlebnikov, to add to the International Regiment and Broneviki already there. 199 
Murav'ev summoned the Simbirsk Soviet Praesidium to the Mezhen and, with no 
warning rom Kazan' of the previous day's events, several members obeyed. 200 Those 
who arrived were arrested and imprisoned on the ship, including Chistov, S. A 
lzmailov and Cheka Chairman Levin. 201 Muravev despatched his adjutant 
Chudoshvili to fetch Tukhachevsky, who duly arrived at the yacht. 
The Supreme Commander's arrival worried Tukhachevsky as he feared Murav'ev 
was planning to direct the Red offensive himself and would discover Tukhachevsky 
had disobeyed his orders and completely altered the offensive plan. Worse though 
was the possibility Muravev would reinstate his original suicidal plan. 202 However, 
when Tukhachevsky boarded the Mezhen, he relayed his critical report of the previous 
day. Murav'ev listened, then informed Tukhachevsky it no longer mattered, as war 
had again broken out with Germany and they must ally with the Czechoslovaks who 
were fighting for the Anglo-French and Americans. Tukhachevsky disagreed, stating 
if war had started against Germany, Red forces must immediately strive to defeat the 
Czechoslovaks and Whites on the Volga to guarantee the Red Army's rear. 203 When 
Murav'ev then appealed to Tukhachevsky's "noble" roots, 204 asking him to counter- 
sign his order to the Czechoslovak Legion to turn their eshelony westwards to reopen 
the Great War Eastern Front, Tukhachevsky branded him a traitor and was arrested. 
Murav'ev did not imprison Tukhachevsky with the other Bolsheviks on the 
Mezhen, but took him to Simbirsk-I Station where the Broneviki were assembled. 
Murav'ev announced the outbreak of war with Germany to the Kursk Armoured 
Division, promised them 10,000 roubles apiece if they backed him and stated he had 
arrested Tukhachevsky who, with Simbirsk Soviet Deputies, had wanted to arrest and 
execute the Broneviki Commander Beretti. At this, some of the Broneviki demanded 
199 TsAOR, f, 1235, d. 525, op. 52, in 1918 god, p. 330; B. 1. Chistov, "Partorganizatsiia... ", p. 67. The 
Ufa Detachment had of course been under the leadership of Makhin and lakovlev and by this point, as 
part of the 2nd Army, was under Kharchenko. The counter-revolutionary agitation by these three 
towards the Bolsheviks perhaps explains why the troops followed Murav'ev initially. 
200 The sources in Simbirskaia guberniia attach a great deal of mystery to why no warning came from 
Kazan'. 
201 1. M. Vareikis, p. 6. 
202 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pervaia armiia v 1918 gody", p. 79. 
203 Tukhachevsky had outlined this plan of action to Vareikis only three days before, after leaming of 
the Left SR assassination of the German Ambassador Mirbach in Moscow and the possibility this 
could lead to a renewed war, B. 1. Chistov, "Komandarm-Komunist", p. 39. 
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Tukhachevsky's execution, but curiously Murav'ev refused. Instead Tukhachevsky 
was imprisoned in the Broneviki eshelon at Simbirsk-1, guarded by two Broneviki and 
several Red Army men. Possibly Murav'ev was attempting to get Tukhachevsky on 
side, reprieving him from execution, thereby winning him over through fear or 
gratitude, but entirely the opposite resulted. 
Murav'ev sent three telegrams at this point. 205 The first was to the Czechoslovak 
groups, stating the Soviets declared peace and wished to ally with them against 
Germany and detailing positions they should assume from the Urals through the 
Volga Region to Tsaritsyn. 206 The second was to loffe, Soviet Ambassador in Berlin, 
declaring war with Germany and the third was to Red forces in the East, instructing 
them to ally with the Czechslovaks against Gen-nany. 
Upon receiving the latter telegram at Kuzovatovo Station, 207 Kalnins telegraphed 
Kazan', inquiring what was going on. Kobozev relayed Murav'ev's treachery, reported 
Tukhachevsky was also in Simbirsk and therefore made Kalnins Ist Army 
Commander. 208 Blagonravov sent an extraordinary telegram stating, "Under pain of 
death, it is the most severe responsibility not to permit or disseminate the 
provocational telegrams signed by Murav'ev". 209 Penza and Inza Groups were by now 
in full retreat and it was not known whether or not Simbirsk Group were allied with 
Murav'ev. Kalnins attempted to stabilise the line and sent troops secretly to Simbirsk 
on I Ith July to assassinate Murav'ev. From Ruzaevsk Station, Kobozev ordered an 
attack on Simbirsk, but this was not possible with I st Army in such disarray. 210 
After sending the telegrams, Murav'ev left with 80 infantrymen and six annoured- 
cars for the Cadet Corps building, in the centre of Simbirsk, where Simbirsk Soviet 
met. Fedor Mikhailovich Ivanov, a Moscow Communist in the Broneviki, was left at 
204 See p. 94, note 152. 205 V. M. Kadyshev, p. 156. 206 1.1. Mints, p. 65. 
207 Other Red units, receiving this telegram, abandoned the front and returned to Simbirsk as ordered, 
leaving the way open for the Czechoslovaks, N. Ia. Gimel'shtein, "S bronepoezdom "Svoboda ili 
smert ...... Simbirskaia guberniia, pp. 191-192; Chistov found a telegram sent by Klim. Ivanov to Gai 
(who was a Left SR before the Murav'ev Revolt, but swore allegiance to the Communist Party after it), 
to return to Simbirsk with his Red Sengilei Group, B. 1. Chistov, 'T tiazhelye dni... ", p. 178. 
208 A telegram was sent at 2.05 am on II th July to all Eastern Front troops stating, "Revolutionary 
Military Soviet orders all armies, continuing the struggle with the Czechoslovaks, to fulfill earlier 
established orders, do not under any circumstances retreat back. Instead of Tukhachevsky, who has 
been arrested by the traitor Murav'ev, comrade Kalnin is appointed Commander of I st Army" - DkfK, 4, 
Tom I, doc. 343, p. 396. 
209 1918 god, p. 328. 
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Simbirsk-I as Murav'ev did not trust him, dressed in a black Communist Party state 
uniform. This was an error as Ivanov and Egorov, Commander of the Broneviki 
infantry detachment, learned from the Simbirsk-I telegraph operator about the Left 
SR Revolt in Moscow and of Murav'ev's telegrams. Realising Murav'ev was 
committing treason, Ivanov ordered Egorov to free Tukhachevsky. 211 
Tukhachevsky meanwhile had been persuading his guards of Murav'ev's 
treachery. He informed them of the Left SR uprising in Moscow, explaining Murav'ev 
was supporting it. Questioned as to why he had been arrested, he declared, "Because I 
am a Bolshevik". As Bolsheviks themselves, the guards sent a delegate to the town 
centre to find out exactly what was happening. 212 This, combined with the arrival of 
Egorov, resulted in Tukhachevsky's release. However, during his several hours of 
imprisonment, the revolt had already been suppressed. 
Fedor Ivanov had gone to the town square, in front of the Cadet Corps building, 
where the Broneviki, Latvians and International Regiment were assembled. He 
relayed the situation and entered the Cadet Corps building to discuss what to do, with 
the most important figure in quelling the Murav'ev Revolt, Vareikis. 
Vareikis had been waiting for a car to take him to the Mezhen, when he learned of 
sailors roaming the streets with machine-guns and heard bombs detonating. 
Therefore, he gathered the Latvians and Moscow Communist Detachmentý under 
Pavel Medved', in the Cadet Corps building. Chudoshvili arrived to arrest Vareikis, 
but the troops forced the former to leave. 
Vareikis then organised resistance against the revolt. Agitators from the 
Communist Detachment were sent to all troop formations in Simbirsk and to Gimov, 
Chain-nan of the Province Executive Committee and Simbirsk Soviet, to gain outside 
help. Meeting with Fedor Ivanov and discovering the Broneviki, Latvians and 
International Regiment in the Town Square had switched sides, Vareikis called a 
Soviet Executive Committee Extraordinary Meeting for 24.00 hours on 10th-Ilth 
July. Murav'ev was to be led to believe the troops were still loyal to him, invited to 
213 the meeting and arrested . 
2100. lu. Kalnin, pp. 39-40. 
21 1 B. 1. Chistov, "Komandan-n-Konimunist", pp. 43-44; F. M. Ivanov, Pyrkov, M. P. & Seluianov, A. 
S., pp. 142-144. 
'12 BpPRA, doc. 10, p. 3 2. 
213 F. M. Ivanov, Pyrkov, M. P. & Seluianov, A. S., pp. 144-146; 1. M. Vareikis, p. 9. 
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For this, Vareikis assembled an ambush force of some 120 men led by Medved', 
made up of Latvians, Broneviki and Moscow Communist Detachment. They waited in 
rooms three and five of the Cadet Corps building, setting up machine-guns behind the 
doors and surrounding room four where the Executive Committee meeting was held. 
The remainder of the troops guarded outside the Cadet Corps building, arresting 
Chudoshvili, who arrived with a detachment of 80 men whilst the meeting was in 
progress, and other detachments backing Murav'ev. 214 
When Murav'ev arrived, Klim Ivanov, smelling a rat, tried to have the meeting 
switched to another room, but Vareikis swiftly began the meeting. The meeting lasted 
several hours and began with a speech by Murav'ev, declaring his intentions and the 
necessity of the Executive Committee supporting him. The Left SR fraction supported 
Murav'ev in forming a new Volga Region Republic, 215 before the Bolshevik fraction, 
led by Vareikis, declared him a traitor and Ivanov declared Broneviki support for the 
Bolsheviks. The meeting was interrupted several times by noise from the ad*acent 
rooms as more soldiers arrived and Vareikis had to leave the room several times to 
keep things calm. 216 These disturbances evidently aroused Murav'ev's suspicions as, 
"by the end of the meeting, he was terribly pale, constantly looking at the door". 217 He 
declared, I will go and calm the detachment" and made for the door. At this, Vareikis 
gave the signal, Medved' flung open the door and Murav'ev was faced by the 
ambush. 
Vareikis had ordered Murav'ev to be taken alive, so he could be taken to Moscow 
to face a military tribunal, 218 but on seeing he was trapped, Murav'ev opened fire with 
his Mauser, wounding three Red Army men, 2 19 before Medved' grabbed his arm and 
Murav'ev was felled by seven bullets. 220 Izvestiia Simbirskogo Soveta wrongly 
reported on 12th July that Murav'ev had committed suicide with his last bullet, but 
this rather romanticised version was swiftly corrected by Vareikis who telegrammed 
Aralov and the VVS in Moscow with the correct details. 221 
214 1. M. Vareikis, p. 9; G. D. Kauchukovskii, p. 133; TsAOR, f 1235, d. 525, op. 52, in 1918 god, p. 
330. 
215 1. M. Vareikis, p. 10. 
216 F. Valkhar & Forst, L. "Organizatsiia voennoplennykh v Simbirske", Simbirskaia guberniia, p. 213; 
G. D. Kauchukovskil, p. 133. 
217 1. M. Vareikis, p. 10. 
218 S. M. Avvakumov, "Eto bylo 10 iulia", Simbirskaia guberniia, p. 152. 
219 Fond R VSR. TsAKA, d. 119-85 1, p. 14, in 1918 god, pp. 330-33 1. 
220 1. M. Variekis, p. 10. 
221 Fond R VSR. TsAKA, d. 119-85 1, p. 14, in 1918 god, pp. 330-33 1. 
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Kobozev reported on 12th July that a train commanded by a Tsigebeev carrying 
some Murav'ev accomplices, was halted at Ruzaevka, with 23 arrests made. 
Blagonravov's wife was found on the train, although it is not clear if she was held 
hostage or otherwise. 222 With Murav'ev dead and his units disarmed, the revolt was 
over. It lasted barely 8-10 hours, but the effect the revolt had on Eastern Front, 
leading to a general collapse, prolonged fighting for months. 
Tukhachevsky and Vareikis attempted to allay the confusion caused by the revolt. 
Tukhachevsky took command of Red troops in Simbirsk Province, and in Simbirsk, 
all Left SRs were removed, with Pugachevskii replacing Klim Ivanov as Head of 
Simbirsk Garrison and Ivanov replacing Beretti as Broneviki Commander. 223 
Tukhachevsky and Vareikis published an appeal in Izvestiia Simbirskogo Soveta to all 
Red forces on 12th July, outlining Murav'ev's betrayal, explaining the Soviets were 
not fighting Germany and calling for a renewal of the struggle with the 
Czechoslovaks. 224 On II th July, Lenin and Trotsky signed a "Government Report 
about the Betrayal of M. A. Murav'ev" before news of his death was known stating, 
"All honest citizens are instructed to shoot him [Murav'ev] on the spot... All orders 
for troops, acting against the Czechoslovaks, will, until newly instructed, be signed by 
Mekhonoshin and Blagonravov", 225 thus removing Murav'ev from the RVS and 
declaring him an outlaw. However, none of these measures prevented the 
Czechoslovak advance. 
The ultimate importance of the Muravev Revolt for Tukhachevsky on a personal 
career level was that he was now completely trusted by Moscow as Ist Army 
Commander. He had not been sent out to fill this position and had really fallen into it 
by chance. Doubts had remained over his trustworthiness. However, he stood aloof 
from Murav'ev's treachery and played his part in its suppression, thereby displaying 
his support for the Bolshevik regime and stating this wholeheartedly in the report he 
submitted on the Murav'ev Affair and its consequences, after the fall of Simbirsk later 
in jUly. 226 With Moscow's trust confirmed, he had to now show his ability and retain 
the faith of all those in the East, by turning the conglomeration of Red forces into an 
222 RTsKhIDNI, f 71, op. 35, d. 962, pp. 23-24. 
223 F. M. Ivanov, Pyrkov, M. P. & Seluianov, A. S., p. 149. 
224 Izvestiia simbirskogo soveta from 12th July, in 1918 god, p. 329. 
225DkJKA, Toin 1, doc. 342, p. 395. 
220 BpPRA, doc. 10, pp. 31-33. 
107 
organised, disciplined Ist Revolutionary Army, the task he had originally been 
despatched to do. 
Organiser and Commander of Ist Revolutionary Army 
When I arrived at Inza Station on 27th July to assume command of I st 
Army, the army staff consisted of only five men... In no way did an 
administrative apparatus exist; no one knew the army staff; units were 
equipped only thanks to the extraordinary energy and inventiveness of 
Shteingaus, who intercepted all loads, travelling across the army region, 
assessed them and always in time supplied the units. 
These units almost without exception, lived in eshelons and conducted 
so-called "eshelonnaia voina". 
These detachments presented themselves as extremely united, with 
military traditions, despite their short existence. And the commanders and 
Red Army men suffered from extreme egocentrism. 
They identified operations or battles only to the extent that detachments 
participating were guaranteed all possible advantages and security. There 
was not any kind of serious discipline to speak of. These detachments, 
disembarking from wagons, fought spontaneously and bravely in battle, 
but weak discipline and lack of self-control meant that under the slightest 
failure or even in one case of an envelopment, these detachments threw 
themselves in the eshelons and the entire eshelon "in file" made off 
sometimes as much as 100 versty (for example from Syzran' to Penza). 227 
Such was Tukhachevsky's early impression of I st Army. Like Eastern Front as a 
whole, it was completely unorganised or regulated, comprising workers' detachments, 
Red Guards, peasant bands from various settlements and other partisan-like 
formations. By the turn of the year however, I st Army was one of the major forces of 
a structured, uniform Eastern Front and a Southern Front had been formed copying 
this model. I shall now examine Tukhachevsky's Ist Army organisational and 
formational work carried out before and after the Murav'ev Revolt, with 
Tukhachevsky, Kuibyshev and Kalnins as I st Army R VS, to assess how this occurred. 
The Murav'ev Revolt had positive and negative aspects for Tukhachevsky's 
reorganisation. It finally confirmed beyond doubt the severity of the eastern situation. 
One man with a small force had completely destroyed the gains made by Eastern 
Front in June and July, showing starkly the precarious Red position and the threat to 
the very heart of the Soviet Republic this presented. in the longer term, Bolshevik 
diplomatic efforts, enforced by the Left SR assassination of Mirbach, to avoid further 
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German advances and almost certain destruction of the Soviet State, led in August to 
a Supplementary Treaty to Brest-Litovsk. This settled the Western situation, allowing 
the release of resources to reinforce Eastern Front to the levels required to defeat the 
228 Czechoslovaks and White officer battalions . However, 
before this, survival had to 
be eked out with local resources amid the rapidly deteriorating conditions of the post- 
Murav'ev Eastern Front. The fact that he inherited temporary control of Red forces on 
I Ith July, until Vacietis arrived eleven days later, provided Tukhachevsky with 
information on troop numbers and resources. However, reorganising these disparate 
forces was complicated by Eastern Front conditions both before and after the 
Murav'ev Revolt, with mass defections by commanders and men sympathetic to the 
Left SRs and other anti-Bolshevik groups. Fear of mistrust and betrayal seized the 
majority of the Red forces. 
This was exacerbated by the mid-July Komuch offensive, with accompanying 
anti-Bolshevik agitation further convincing commander and rank-and-file alike that 
treachery was in the air and wholesale defections imminent. Tukhachevsky recalled, 
This all made a colossal impression on the still incompletely-formed units. 
A panicky fear of treachery arose, developing into mistrust between units, 
Red Army men and command staff and so on. SRs, Mensheviks and other 
White-guardists further reinforced this feeling. Constant rumours began 
about envelopments, revolts and so on. Troops began to retreat without 
229 battle 
. 
On 6th-7th July, the Komuch troops captured the Tsarist gold reserve in the 
important communications town of Kazan' and gradually advanced through Bugul'ma 
(I 3th July), Melekes (I 6th July), Stavropol' and Syzran' (2 1 st July) before occupying 
Simbirsk, Lenin's birthplace, on 21st-22nd July. These were major gains along the 
Volga, pushing the Reds to the Western bank and threatening Moscow. These 
successes were matched in Siberia and the Urals, leaving Eastern Front near collapse. 
With no support from Moscow, Tukhachevsky had to reorganise his forces using 
only local resources. He had provided a blueprint for this in May, but conditions in 
Riazansk, Tambov, Voronezh and the Don, although bad in May, were nothing 
compared to the Volga in July. Therefore, did Tukhachevsky's suggestions stand up 
or was he forced to adapt them? 
227 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pervaia armiia v 1918 gody", pp. 73-74. 
228 E. Mawdsley, p. 39. 
229 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pervaia Arinmia v 1918 gody", p. 80. 
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To answer this , it 
is first useful to examine who exactly composed Ist Army in 
July 1918. Tracing its exact origins is not easy, with Koritskii, Ist Army Chief-of- 
Staff, himself declaring that the exact numbers of the original partisan detachments 
which formed Ist Army were unknown. 230 However, a rough picture can be drawn 
which illustrates Tukhachevsky's task, forming an army whilst surrounded by 
Komuch forces, but also infiltrated by those waiting for the moment to betray him and 
his small band of loyal staff. 
I st Army was officially created on 19th June, although detachments, groups and 
Fronts had already appeared in reply to the Czechoslovak Revolt. Kalnins listed 6 
regiments, 7 detachments, 2 batteries and the Polupanov annoured-train as the first 
components of 1 st Army, with Briansk Armoured-Car Detachment and other infantry 
detachments raised soon after. 
231 
Tukhachevsky had to reorganise these into a competent force to defeat the 
Czechoslovaks. The troops he achieved this with were found in Syzran', Simbirsk and 
Penza areas, but also in these zones by the end of July were forces originating 
elsewhere, but driven out by the Czechoslovaks. 
Red forces in Volga Region had clashed with the Czechoslovaks in late May and 
early June in Penza and Samara. Penza was taken by 5,000 Czechoslovaks under S. 
Chechek on 29th May, defeating 2,000 Red fighters. Penza Town Soviet and Province 
Committee had raised a machine-gun company, workers detachments and several 
batteries. These were joined by workers detachments from Simbirsk and Ruzaevka, 
200 rail guards with 3 machine-guns and I gun, 120 men sent by Saransk Uezd 
Soviet, Ist Czechoslovak Revolutionary Regiment, raised from Czechoslovaks who 
had defected to the Reds, and a Hungarian International Company. 232 This 
uncoordinated assortment of forces was defeated with heavy casualties and Penza 
Communist Party Committee evacuated to Ruzaevka. Upon reaching here, it created a 
Province Military Commissariat (gubvoenkomat) with S. 1. Ostrovskii and 1. N. 
Polokov as Military Commissars. In early June, this reformed Ist and 3rd Penza 
Infantry Battalions into Ist Soviet Infantry Regiment. 233 These joined detachments 
230 N. 1. Koritskii, "V dni voiny ---", p. 
64. 
231 0. lu. Kalnin, p. 36. 
232 E. 1. Medvedev, pp. 84-85. 
233 1.1. Mints, p. 43. 
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which had retreated to Kuznetsk from Syzran' after the Czechoslovak attack and 
formed the basis of Penza Division of Ist Army, under the command of 
Vosdvizhenskii, a voenspets mobilised in Penza. 234 
Valerian Vladimirovich Kuibyshev and M. S. Kadomtsev, the latter arriving with 
an Ufa Red Guard detachment, were instrumental in organising the Samara "Military 
Revolutionary Staff' on 30th May. This instructed the factory workers committees, 
unions of metalworkers, leatherworkers and others, to organise workers into military 
detachments. Meetings were held in Samara Communist Club and Communist Party 
leaders assumed the mantle of military leaders. The Samaro-Simbirsk District 
Commissariat of Labour and Samara Province Commissariat on Muslim Affairs 
appealed to Tatar workers, with ten detachments in Samara alone formed by workers 
of various nationalities. Training of militia in Samara was increased and numbers rose 
from 400 to 2,000 in early June. 235 
These forces were joined by further international detachments, Korsunsk and 
Buinsk workers detachments and Ivashchenko Red Guard detachment, possibly 
organised by Chapaev, who had taken over command of Nikolaevsk uezd Red forces 
in April . 
236 A 450-man detachment arrived from Simbirsk Province Executive 
Committee (gubispolkom), 237 now energised by Vareikis' arrival and instituting a 
course of general training for Simbirsk inhabitants. 
These efforts were in vain as the Czechoslovaks captured Samara after four days 
of fighting. Treachery aided the Czechoslovaks, with a Right SR, 1. M. Brushvit, 
defecting and revealing Red positions, 238 whilst a detachment from Syzran', intended 
for Samara, was led by a D. 1. Popov to Moscow, to become the main Left SR armed 
force in the July coup attempt. 239 The Reds had 5,000 men in 12 detachments between 
Samara and Syzran', 240 but the Red leaders' inexperience was exposed by positioning 
their main 4,000-strong force at Samara in front of the River Lipiagi, cutting their 
own path of retreat. Knowing these positions, the Czechoslovaks encircled the Reds at 
night and attacked on 4th June, killing 1,300 Reds. The other forces fought until 8th 
234 N. 1. Koritskii, "Sozdanie pervogo an-nii... ", p. 55. 
235 E. 1. Medvedev, pp. 88-89 
236 Ibid. p. 9 1, Ivashchenko was later renamed Chapaevka after Chapaev; 1.1. Mints, p. 35. VasiIii 
Ivanovich Chapaev (1887-1919), a Bolshevik from 1917. 
237 1.1. Mints, pp. 41 & 45. 
238 Ibid. p. 45, Brushvit later became a Komuch member. 
239 Ibid, pp. 44-45. Vladimir Oskarovich Kappel' (1883-1920), a former Tsarist Colonel. 
240 G. D. Gai, "Pobednyi put"', Simbirskaia guberniia, p. 3 1. 
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June, led by Gai and Pershin amongst others, but the efficiency and organisation of 
the Czechoslovaks, combined with their vast superiority in numbers, proved decisive. 
From Samara, Gai and Kuibyshev retreated up the Volga to Simbirsk by 
steamboat with the remainder of their forces. Here, Kuibyshev and Vareikis reformed 
Samara and Simbirsk detachments into Samaro-Simbirsk Combined Militia 
Detachment under Gai's command to defend Sengilei area. As Gai recalled, 
In the course of June and July 1918 we conducted bitter battles with 
Czechoslovaks and Kappelists, holding off their offensive to Sengilei and 
Simbirsk. With these battles, we gave comrades Kuibyshev and 
Tukhachevsky the possibility to organise I st Army Staff . 
241 
The remnants of the Samara forces combined with Simbirsk detachments to form the 
nucleus of Simbirsk Iron Division. 
As Simbirsk Division evolved around Gai, Inza Division evolved around Ia. Ia. 
Lacis, a Junior Officer in 4th Vidzem Latvian Rifle Regiment of the Tsarist Army, 
which he had commanded since the October Revolution. 242 The regiment was used by 
Murav'ev to attack Syzran' on 16th June 1918, but he prevented Lacis and Kalnins 
sending for reinforcements and the attack was repulsed. 243 However, the regiment 
remained involved in fighting between Syzran' and Inza into July. The fall of 
Simbirsk and Syzran' presented the Czechoslovaks with the opportunity to advance up 
the railway line to capture I st Army HQ at Inza. At one point the only obstacle 
preventing this was Lacis and 20 men, predominantly his staff, who had retreated 
from Syzran' to Bazarnaia Station, and an annoured-train. 244 This was the core around 
which Inza Division was built, 245 Latvians and newly-mobilised voenspetsy. 
These varied forces, which formed the core elements of the three Ist Army 
divisions, were supplemented by peasant partisan detachments. A Komuch 
mobilisation of 30th June in Kazan', Simbirsk and Samara Provinces, encouraged 
peasants to leave their villages and form partisan detachments in the forests, to avoid 
conscription. Detachments in Samara and Kazan' were brought within 4th and 5th 
Red Armies respectively, whilst those in Simbirsk came under Tukhachevsky's 
jurisdiction. One such detachment organised by a Bolshevik 1. S. Kosmovskii joined 
241 Ibid. p. 3 1. 
242 V. V. Shtein, p. 30. 
2430. lu. Kalnin, p. 35. 
24' N. 1. Koritskii, "Sozdanie pervogo annii... ", p. 55. 
245 V. V. Kuibyshev, p. 27. 
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Alatyr' Group, which Tukhachevsky received for the Simbirsk Operation in early 
September. 
Therefore, the forces Tukhachevsky inherited were predominantly a mixture of 
anned factory workers and peasants, who perhaps had a few weeks fighting 
experience against the Czechoslovaks, during which they had been constantly 
defeated and pushed back. Some would have been Great War veterans, but war- 
weariness or disinterest meant not many volunteered, with the majority of those 
joining the Reds doing so through political allegiance as Bolshevik Party members or 
sympathisers. The detachments they formed were partisan, guerilla-type outfits, with 
elected commanders who could as quickly lose their men's support, as gain it. No 
leadership cadre experienced in fighting on conventional terms against an organised 
force such as the Czechoslovak Legion, existed. A few Red Guards had six months or 
more fighting experience, some of which was against a conventional force in the 
Germans, but they had also tasted defeat here. Moreover, the majority of the 
experienced troops, including the Latvians, were employed on the Western screens 
against Germany, still perceived as the main threat. This remained the policy within 
the VVS until 26th July. Not until Simbirsk fell did Moscow eventually realise it 
mattered not how valiantly their forces fought. Without a properly organised army led 
by capable experienced leaders, they stood little chance of defeating the 
Czechoslovaks, a situation similar to the West six months previously. Retaining a 
screen in the East was no longer viable now the Czechoslovaks dominated the entire 
area and the formation of Eastern Front was the first step to redressing this. However, 
vehement protests by Vacietis, Tukhachevsky and others were required before the 
29th June decree declaring Eastern Front as the main operational theatre was in reality 
fulfilled. 246 Before this, Eastern Front was very much alone in organising forces 
against the Czechoslovaks with Tukhachevsky recalling, "... I st Army received 
.) 247 virtually nothing from the Centre' . Tukhachevsky, Kuibyshev and Kalnins had to 
work independently to create I st Army. 
246 1.1. Mints, p. 76. 
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Buildinj! a Command Cadre 
Tukhachevsky commenced reorganisational work as soon as he assumed 
command of I st Army at Inza. Penza, Simbirsk and Inza Divisions already existed on 
paper, but morale amongst the detachments was generally low, given the constant 
defeats they had suffered. To transform these from the disorderly amalgam described 
above into regular divisions required experienced army and divisional staffs to 
rejuvenate and inspire them. This was the first task in creating a regular Ist Anny. In 
early July, surmising Murav'ev was hindering reorganisation, Tukhachevsky 
proceeded without authorisation, again displaying his readiness to act independently 
and risk censure, if he did not agree with his superior officer. Given Ist Army Staff at 
Inza comprised only five men when Tukhachevsky arrived, 248 the urgency and 
enon-nity of this task was apparent to him. A firm basis for mobilisation and 
reorganisation was needed and Tukhachevsky created this on Ist July, establishing 
Military-Revolutionary Field Tribunals for Ist Army formations. 249 These were the 
first established in the RKKA and set the legal basis by which mobilisation on a vast 
scale could be conducted. Mass mobilisation had never previously been envisaged 
under voluntary recruitment, meaning tribunals were not required, but the escalation 
of Eastern Front demanded large numbers of recruits, so Tukhachevsky formed the 
tribunals with Kuibyshev and Kalnins. 
This was consistent with Tukhachevsky's May recommendations when he 
emphasised the need for strict revolutionary discipline and order in the Red Army. It 
is no surprise this was his first reorganisational measure, reintroducing the strict 
disciplinary system he had known in the Tsarist Army, if under the guise of 
"Revolutionary" Tribunals. The acceptance of this as necessity by Moscow was 
another significant step away from revolutionary ideals when faced with reality. The 
masses were not volunteering to fight for socialism as ideological belief had said they 
would, therefore this belief would have to be coerced. This was another decision 
taken by Trotsky and Lenin, against the wishes of the core Bolshevik Party, but 
necessary under Civil War conditions. Tukhachevsky was the man envisaged capable 
248 The only positions filled were Chief-of Staff Shimunich, Head of Operational Matters Shabich, 
Staff Commissar Mazo, Head of Supplies (Quartermaster) Shteingaus and Paymaster Razumov, M. N. 
Tukhachevsky, "Pervaia anniia v 1918", p. 73; BpPRA, p. 36. 
249 A. N. Nenarokov, p. 132. 
114 
of introducing the tribunals since he had written of their necessity. Not blinded by 
revolutionary beliefs, but with the practicality of a soldier, he knew this system was 
required to swiftly install discipline within I st Army and the Red Army as a whole. 
With tribunals created, Tukhachevsky proceeded with the mobilisations they 
empowered him to implement. He left for Simbirsk, the Province town, where the 
Party and Soviet organs to coordinate mobilisation were situated, arriving on 3rd July 
and meeting with Vareikis and Chistov, a member of the Bolshevik Military 
Commission . 
250 This meeting confirmed the lack of staff and line officers at all levels, 
with only four former officers having volunteered for Simbirsk Army Group. 251 
Vareikis informed Tukhachevsky the Province Cheka had discovered an underground 
White Officer Organisation, but it also contained very few former officers and these 
were the sons of landowners and merchants. Vareikis felt the majority were waiting to 
see what happened before committing themselves. Tukhachevsky apparently replied, 
"I know the officers' mood. There are inveterate White Guards amongst them. But 
there is a sincere love of their people; their Homeland. It is necessary to help them to 
go with the people, and not against them ...... 
252 
To do this, Tukhachevsky and Vareikis published their "Order For Ist Eastern 
Army" the next morning in Izvestiia simbirskogo soveta No. 128 demanding, 
The Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic is living through 
difficult days, surrounded from all sides by enemies, who are looking to 
profit at the expense of Russian citizens. Prepared and supported by them 
were various mercenary enemies of the counter-revolutionary 
Czechoslovak uprising. 
The duty of each Russian citizen - to take up arms and stand up for the 
government against enemies, who are bent on its destruction. 
For creating an efficient fighting army experienced leaders are essential, 
and therefore I order all former officers, living in Simbirsk Province, 
immediately to arise in the name of the Red Banner entrusted to me by the 
army. 
Today, 4th of July, officers, living in the town of Simbirsk are to come 
at 12.00 to the Cadet Corps building, to me. 
Non-appearance will result in a military-field court martial. 
Commander of I st Eastern Army Tukhachevsky. 
Comrade Chairman of Simbirsk Province Executive 
Committee losif VareikiS. 253 
250 B. 1. Chistov, "Komandan-n-Konimunist", p. 33. 
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The appeal to Russian "patriotism" is apparent. The labelling of the 
Czechoslovaks as Imperialist mercenaries is also crucial, as is the absence of any 
mention of the Whites. Voenspetsy had joined the Red Army to fight Germany in the 
West through patriotism, but were against fighting a civil war against fellow 
Russians. This was the case with voenspetsy in the East. As Tukhachevsky noted, they 
were patriotic, but had no wish for civil war. Therefore, the appeal to patriotism was 
used alongside intensive political propaganda, evidence that Tukhachevsky and 
Vareikis appreciated the importance of both methods at this early stage, but also 
hinting at the intertwining of Bolshevik ideals with Russian nationalism which 
occurred later. This twin approach was legally underpinned by the newly-formed 
Revolutionary Military Field Tribunals, allowing Tukhachevsky to adopt an amiable 
"softly-softly" approach during mobilisation interviews, secure in the knowledge the 
tribunals were there and more significantly, that the voenspetsy knew. The political 
commissars provided the "hard" element during mobilisation, encouraging voenspetsy 
to turn to Tukhachevsky and enlist. Voenspetsy would provide the military knowledge 
necessary for the new army and communists the political experience and control over 
voenspetsy. 
In January 1918, Tukhachevsky had been in a similar position to the majority of 
the former officers. He had taken the decision to join the Reds and now used this 
experience and knowledge of voenspetsy attitudes to attract them to the Reds. The use 
of patriotism (which would be repeated by Stalin 23 years later) worked. Pershin, 
Deputy Province Military Commander conducted the recruitment with Tukhachevsky 
on 4th July and related to Chistov, "Tukhachevsky used great tact in these talks. The 
new Commander made a great impression on his interlocutors, and several hundred 
254 
officers, thanks to him, crossed at that time to the side of the Soviet authorities" . 
The recruitment of voenspetsy in Simbirsk was as far as Tukhachevsky's 
reorganisational efforts proceeded before Murav'ev's Revolt, but after this, with 
sufficient calm restored to Simbirsk, Tukhachevsky took his next step, recruiting 
officers for Penza Division. 
Travelling west from Simbirsk, Tukhachevsky reached Penza on 15th or 16th 
July. As Vareikis and Kuibyshev played vital roles in the Simbirsk recruitment, 
254 B. 1. Chistov, "Komandarm-Kommunist", p. 35. 
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Province Soviet Chairman Minkin and Kalnins did so in Penza. The three men 
published an appeal in the Penza Province newspaper on 18th July, decreeing, 
For the creation of an efficient fighting Red Anny all former officer- 
specialists are summoned in the name of the Banner. 
Tomorrow, 19th July, all former artillerymen and artillery technicians, 
cavalry-officers and engineering officers must appear at the Province 
Military Commissariat at 16.00 hours. 
All former infantry officers must appear at the same place on 20th July 
at 12.00 hours. 
Officers from 20-50 years old are summoned. 
Non-appearance will result in a Military-Field Tribunal. 255 
The similarities to the Simbirsk appeal are apparent, although the development of 
separating infantry officers from technical officers emerged here, perhaps speeding up 
the reorganisation process. 
The recruitment panel comprised Tukhachevsky, Kalnins, Head of I st Army 
Administration Department Ustichev and Solov'ev, Commissar of Penza Military 
Commissariat Instruction Department, representing the Soviet and Province Party 
Committee. In the two days between the appeal and the recruitment, the latter had 
quelled unrest incited by counter-revolutionary elements in Penza, spreading rumours 
that the mobilisation was designed to capture and execute voenspetsy. This incitement 
was part of the wider agitation disseminated by anti-Soviets before the mid-July 
Komuch offensive, but Penza Party Organisation agitated intensively to dispel these 
rumours. Solov'ev apparently appealed, "Who are you Russian officers with? With the 
people or against the people? vt256 This patriotic plea again succeeded as voenspetsy 
appeared in great numbers. 
M. N. Tolstii, a former gimnasiia classmate of Tukhachevsky, worked in the 
Province Military Commissariat Instruction Department. He introduced Koritskii to 
Tukhachevsky, who recalled Tukhachevsky's actions at the recruitment similarly to 
257 Pershin at Simbirsk . 
During the recruitment most voens etsy initially addressed Ustichev, a former P 
Li eutenant-Co lone 1, who had been in line for a generalship, believing him to be the 
senior officer. Ustichev "tactfully" referred them to Tukhachevsky, introducing him as 
255 N. 1. Koritskii, "V dni voiny... ", p. 52. 
256 Ibid. pp. 52-53. 
257 Nikolai Ivanovich Koritskii, joined the Bolshevik Party in 1919 and served as I st Army Chief-of- 
Staff. 
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"comrade Commander Tukhachevsky", emphasising the word comrade, reiterating 
this was a new Bolshevik army, despite the appeal to patriotism. 
Tukhachevsky's youth surprised many who appeared for mobilisation, but his 
reassuring manner encouraged many to enlist. Many officers declared they wished to 
join the Red Army, but did not feel trusted by the regime. Tukhachevsky referred to 
his own experiences, apparently stating, 
To feel suspicion pointed to oneself is distressing. I experienced it. But the 
thing is, this trust itself does not spring up. It is necessary to earn it, to 
achieve it. And how can an officer achieve trust and authority over his 
soldiers? Firstly, by honesty, secondly, by excellent knowledge of their 
business, and, thirdly by kindness to the soldiers, earned by respect 
towards their human dignity. 258 
Tukhachevsky was possibly comparing the Red and Tsarist Armies. He received 
respect in both as an officer, but relations between the officer corps and lower ranks 
differed markedly now. 
Growing up in Penza, Tukhachevsky and many of the interviewees knew each 
other. Many voenspetsy, seeing the position a former noble had achieved and hearing 
that he experienced similar fears to them, would have been reassured and joined the 
Red Army. 
While loyalty was crucial in selecting voenspetsy for I st Anny, one voenspets 
recalled Tukhachevsky quizzing him about his background, education and 
qualifications . 
259AII voenspetsy were interviewed in this manner, allowing candidates 
to be posted by individual ability, placing recruits in positions in which they had 
previous experience and speeding up formation, with the separation of officers by 
branch of service in the Penza decree, possibly part of this. 
In 1919, Tukhachevsky recalled conducting the mobilisations and the impact 
voenspetsy had on I st Army formation. Writing of Penza, Simbirsk and Inza 
Divisions rapidly gaining discipline and comprising regular troops by mid-July, he 
asked, 
What explains these successes? I consider the main reason - the fortunate 
selection of command and commissar staff and the great quantity of 
volunteers, almost from the very moment of forming Ist Arrny. This 
successful combination was produced by the fact that those voenspetsy 
mobilised to responsible posts, were selected not by previous length of 
258 lbid, p. 54. 
259 L. Nikulin, Tukhachevsky, biograficheskii ocherk, (Moscow, 1964), p. 54. 
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service or rank, but by showing the ability for independent action, for self- 
initiative. A significant part of the responsible workers were appointed 
from young officers. We had absolutely no qualms about subordinating 
generals to 2nd Lieutenants or Captains, and in the rear the same was 
done... 
The basis of the work was reciprocal trust. The army staff, which wore 
a very trans i ent-gloomy outlook immediately after the voenspetsy 
mobilisations, very quickly got used to each other, pooled their resources 
into a harmonious family, sincerely devoted to the Soviet republic. 260 
Further to this, in Simbirsk, Klim Ivanov reftised to help with recruitment, stating 
his staff, the Province Military Committee and part of the garrison were already at full 
complement with voenspetsy. However, when Simbirsk fell on 21 st-22nd July, almost 
to a man, Ivanov's voenspetsy defected, whilst those recruited by Tukhachevsky and 
Pershin remained loyal. Amongst these were Ustichev, K. P. Dikov, a former captain 
who became Head of Operations Department, his assistant 1.1. Chemomontsev, and 
Assistant Head of Intelligence Department B. N. Arsen'ev. 261 
The Simbirsk and Penza mobilisations recruited over 1200 staff and line officers 
for Ist Army, 250 of these forming Ist Army Staff. 262 These and other voenspetsy, 
who were recruited as they were found or volunteered throughout July, allowed 
Tukhachevsky to organise and bring up to strength Ist Army HQ at Inza and 
Divisional Staffs for Simbirsk, Inza and Penza Divisions and a fourth Vol'sk Division, 
created on 19th July, in response to the Czechoslovak occupation of Vol'sk. 263 
Koritskii noted Tukhachevsky had already planned Ist Army on a 4-division basis 
before the Murav'ev Revolt. 264 This could only be put into practice after the Penza 
and Simbirsk mobilisations were completed on 19th July, suggesting if Vol'sk had not 
fallen, a fourth division would still have been formed, but possibly elsewhere. 
260 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "K lubileiu pervoi armii", Simbirskaia guberniia, pp. 23-24. 
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Remanisation in the Frontline from Partizanshchina to Regular Army 
Voenspetsy selected in Penza travelled by train with Tukhachevsky to Inza, 
arriving at I st Army HQ on 22nd July. 265 With Simbirsk lost, Inza came under threat. 
A defensive line had to be maintained whilst reorganisational work was carried out, 
with no breathing-space for Tukhachevsky to organise Ist Army for its forthcoming 
battles. This occurred simultaneously. 
The mobilisations facilitated the reorganisation of the disparate detachments, 
bands, groups and units into regular regiments and divisions, led by the newly- 
introduced line and staff officers. This was not easy with vast discrepancies in size 
and position of the scattered units. As shown already, the earliest formations were not 
coordinated from Moscow, but had sprung up in the localities to defend against anti- 
Bolshevik forces. The military commissariats which had the task of mobilising Soviet 
forces in the localities were undermanned in July 1918 and could only exist in 
Bolshevik-held areas. Therefore, the task of mobilising recruits for Ist Army also fell 
directly to the RVS of Tukhachevsky, Kuibyshev and Kalnins, aided by local Party 
Chairmen, Vareikis and Minkin. As numerous and varied Red fighting formations had 
appeared locally with no input from Moscow, apart from general appeals and 
addresses, the pulling together of these disparate forces was also directed in the 
localities, without any Moscow contribution. 
The composition of the varied detachments was reported on 21st July by 
Zakharov, Ist Army Chief-of-Staff, 266 giving Ist Army figures for 19th July. 
Pugachevskii's Simbirsk Group contained 6,975 infantry, 100 cavalry, 133 machine- 
guns, 130 guns and an armoured-train and Lacis' Inza Group comprised 1,516 
infantry, no cavalry, 38 machine-guns, 13 light and 2 heavy guns and an armoured 
train. Gailit's Penza Group contained 1,525 infantry, no cavalry, 8 machine-guns and 
8 guns with 164 crew-members. The latter also contained Mtsenskii, Smolensk, 
Moscow, Petrograd and Inza Regiments with a total of 2,951 infantry, 38 cavalry, 51 
machine-guns, 3 bomb-throwers, I mortar and 10 guns with 193 crew, but these 
regiments were described as unbattleworthy and in need of reformation. Zakharov 
265 Ibid. pp. 57-58; N. 1. Koritskii, "Sozdanie pervogo armii", p. 52. 
266 Zakharov soon after was evacuated to Moscow, suffering from tuberculosis and malaria. His post 
was taken up by N. 1. Koritskii who had deputised for him on several occasions previously during his 
illness, N. 1. Koritskii, "V dni voiny... ", pp. 59-60. 
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reported these figures were not exact as I st Army was in constant combat . Indeed, 
on 25th July, Vacietis submitted a report to the VVS on the fall of Simbirsk, in which 
he estimated Simbirsk Group numbers to have fallen to around 3,000.268 The other 
Groups probably fared little better. 
When these figures are compared to a report Tukhachevsky submitted to Vacietis 
on 23rd July, the glaring shortage of men and equipment within I st Army is clear. To 
match and defeat the Czechoslovaks, Tukhachevsky reported he required 2-3 infantry 
divisions (of up to 20,000 men each), 2-3 cavalry regiments of 2-3,000 cavalry, 2-3 
light artillery divisions of 24-36 guns, a heavy division of 42 guns, 48-72 line guns 
and 48-72 6-inch howitzers. Required to back these up were 2-3 sapper battalions, 2-3 
pontoon detachments, 4-6 cycle/motorcycle companies, 2-3 broneviki divisions, 200 
transport trucks and 4 fighter-plane squadrons. 269 
By his reckoning, Tukhachevsky was some 50,000 infantry and 6-9,000 cavalry 
short of the numbers required to defeat the Czechoslovaks, not to mention the back-up 
material and technical resources. This was typical of Eastern Front in July, as the 
Czechoslovaks advanced, amidst the post-Murav'ev chaos, threatening to completely 
rout Eastern Front. Mekhonoshin of Eastern Front RVS and Vacietis, newly-arrived 
from Moscow, despatched telegrams on 17th and 19th July respectively, requesting 
270 Latvian Regiments to reinforce Ekaterinburg and Simbirsk . Vacietis 
identified 
Simbirsk as the key to the whole Eastern Front position as its fall would result in the 
loss of the last oilfields held and the entire Central Volga Region . 
27 1 The transport 
route provided by the river would also be lost. 
Unfortunately for the Bolsheviks in Simbirsk, there was little time to act upon 
these requests. The Czechoslovaks swept into Simbirsk on 21st-22nd July, taking 
control of Volga Region up to Sviiazhsk, where the Reds stabilised the line. Hundreds 
of Bolsheviks were captured and deported east to their death. Lenin ordered Zinov'ev 
on 20th July to send eastwards from Petrograd, "... several dozen "leaders" (a la 
267BPpp 
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-estimated the Kaiurov) and thousands of "ranks' 5 but Moscow 
had grossly under 
Czechoslovaks. Trotsky tried to blame the local soviets saying, 
We did not receive even from those local Soviets that were closest to the 
events that had occurred over there, along the Trans-Siberian Railway and 
up to Cheliabinsk, the response that we had the right to expect. The local 
Soviets did not appreciate the full scope of the diabolical conspiracy. 273 
This was perhaps true in some cases, but in late May-early June, even if local 
Soviets appreciated the danger, they had no capable military forces. With Moscow 
treating the Czechoslovak Uprising as a local affair, isolated Bolshevik pockets could 
do little more than they did, hampered by Left SRs in the Soviets. Tukhachevsky 
explicitly said as much in his 23rd July report to Vacietis, outlining measures 
necessary for strengthening 1 st Army. He wrote, "We are now making great mistakes 
which can completely threaten socialism. These mistakes are an under-valuation of 
the strengths of the enemy, ignorance of their forces and a lack of attention given to 
what is necessary to save the position". Noting the Czechoslovaks had strengthened 
since beginning their uprising he continued, 
... until we prepare superior 
forces for its suppression, all forces and 
resources of the state must be used, even to the detriment of work planned 
for the state apparatuses. Only such efforts will correspond to the true 
significance of the Czechoslovak Uprising and only in such a case can the 
High Command be actively demanded to energetically fulfill the tasks laid 
down for it. 
The basic question in preparing success is the organisation of the armed 
forces. In this case, what must not be forgotten is that good infantry, after 
all the losses which have been sustained, cannot quickly be created. 
Therefore, as was even known already, it is necessary to rely on the 
technical side. But in this, finally it is essential to refrain from 
bureaucratic measures. It is necessary, finally, to possess revolutionary 
genius and create new methods, reacting to circumstances instead of 
overloading the already-obsolete system in existence. 274 
The numbers deemed necessary have already been given above. This report was a 
fulfillment of the work Tukhachevsky was originally despatched from Moscow on 
25th June to carry out, with suggestions on how reorganisational work on Eastern 
272 V. N. Kaiurov was Secretary of the Vyborg District Soviet in St. Petersburg. He arrived on Eastern 
Front with a workers' detachment, three days before Kazan' fell and the detachment was drawn into 
5th Army. This was typical of recruitment for all Eastern Front Armies, including I st Army, V. N. 
Kajurov, "Rabochie otriady", Simbirskaia guberniia, pp. 13-22; DGkKA, p. 103; V. I. Lenin, L-Vp, p. 
69. 
273 L. D. Trotsky, Hoiv The Revolution Armed, Vol. 1, p. 29 1. 
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Front should be conducted. It shows Tukhachevsky stressing the need to utilise 
available technical resources to compensate for the manpower shortfall, possibly a 
step towards his later theory of huge technical ly-based annies. All technical means 
available should be used, allowing civilians to go short if need be. The numbers of 
men necessary to transform a small technically-based force into a mass mechanised 
army were available once the Soviets had control in the 1930s to develop his theories. 
In July 1918 though, Tukhachevsky was already calling for a command economy to 
furnish the army with all its needs first, as this was the only way to defend Russia, 
making the army the most important section of the Communist state. This points 
towards the military-industrial complex Tukhachevsky played a major part in 
constructing in the 1930s. However, already in 1918, his point about the interests of 
the civilian state apparatuses being subverted to the armed forces was realised only 
six weeks later, with the introduction of "War Communism" and the transformation of 
the Soviet zone into one-armed camp. Did Tukhachevsky's suggestion have anything 
to do with this? 
This report also illustrates the self-confidence Tukhachevsky had, explicitly 
criticising the VVS and Moscow for under-estimating the Czechoslovaks and failing to 
reinforce Eastern Front. It was also a criticism of Vacietis' demands for an immediate 
counter-attack to retake Simbirsk. Tukhachevsky was asking for sense to be used in 
the handling of the Eastern Front situation, with well-laid plans replacing knee-jerk 
reactions to Czechoslovak gains. He had been forced to act independently as Ist 
Army Commander, altering Murav'ev's offensive plans, whilst the latter hampered 
his every move, betrayed Eastern Front and threatened to execute him. Now 
Tukhachevsky was being ordered by Vacietis to launch a second attack with forces he 
knew were not ready. The command cadre had been recruited, but the troops were 
still untrained and untrusting of these commanders. This had to be addressed before a 
successful attack could be made. Tukhachevsky had to attack Simbirsk, but the 
rabble, which Ist Army had become post-Murav"ev, was easily repelled. However, 
Tukhachevsky did not waste opportunities presented by the attack. 
Knowing there was little chance of success, Tukhachevsky used the attack to 
gather intelligence. Telegraph communications had been lost with Simbirsk since 21 st 
July as the Czechoslovaks cut the wire to Inza. 
275 Therefore, Tukhachevsky ordered 
275 D- 
DpPRA, p. 3 8. 
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Lacis to transfer 4th Latvian Rifle Regiment and 6th Mtsensk Infantry Regiment to 
Chufarovo Station, where Tolstii was ordered to lead these units to reconnoitre the 
Czechoslovak positions. Koritskii recalls this as the first operation conducted by the 
Red Army, utilising tactics other than eshelonnaia voina, with Tolstii, on orders from 
276 Tukhachevsky, despatching patrols on foot towards Simbirsk . Tukhachevsky 
praised Tolstii on 23rd July for this and on 25th July travelled in his command train 
from Inza to Chufarovo, the station for Veshkaima, to meet with Tolstil, Koritskii and 
Kuibyshev to assess the situation. 277 On 26th July, Tukhachevsky and Koritskii 
accompanied a reconnaissance patrol of the territory between Veshkaima and 
Simbirsk, discussing the position with the most advanced reconnaissance patrols. 
With this information, Tukhachevsky outlined to Tolstii defensive measures to be 
taken around Veshkaima and Chufarovo, but at the next Ist Army Staff meeting 
including Kuibyshev, Kalnins, Koritskii, Ustichev, Head of Artillery Gardner and 
Quartermaster Shevchuk, he began to outline the operation to retake Simbirsk. 278 This 
was an early demonstration of Tukhachevsky utilising temporary defensive measures 
to pave the way for an offensive operation, which would become a cornerstone of his 
military theories. Ist Army was in too weak a position to attack, forcing defensive 
measures, but only until sufficient organisation and numbers allowed an attack. To 
facilitate maximum speed, offensive plans had to be made inunediately. This was 
typical of Civil War fighting, with small numbers and fluidity of frontage, allowing 
defence to be transformed into attack very rapidly. 
Whilst planning attacks, reorganisation proceeded simultaneously. With the 
command cadre now formed to mobilise troops for the Simbirsk Operation, 
Tukhachevsky set up a Mobilisation Department under Ibragimov . 
279 Since war- 
weariness affected initial mobilisation, a Political Department was fori-ned under 
Kuibyshev with 100 staff for agitational-propaganda work, comprising voenspetsy, 
but mainly Bolsheviks. By early August, this contained 200 political workers, who 
toured the villages mobilising men for the army and helping their families. 
280 This 
was the first such political department set up in the Red Army. The Mobilisation 
276 N. 1. Koritskii, "Sozdanie pervogo armii... ", p. 56. 
217 BpPRA, p. 38; N. 1. Koritskii, "V dni voiny... ", p. 60. 
278 N. 1. Koritskii, "V dni voiny... ", pp. 62-63. 
279 lusuf Ikhsanovich lbragimov (1895-1961), joined the Communist Party in 1919. 
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Department assumed the role of the absent Military Commissariats and through it 
Tukhachevsky conducted the first mobilisations carried out in a Red Army 
operational area, another experimental step for 1 st Army. 
Before this department could make an impact, I st An-ny received a timely boost 
on 27th July. Tukhachevsky and Kuibyshev, back in Inza, received a call by Hughes 
Telegraph from Lesnoe Annenkovo, 281 close to Maina Station. This was Komuch- 
occupied territory and they initially suspected a ruse to locate their position. However, 
on questioning, the caller was identified as Gai, Commander of Sengilei-Syzran' 
Group, 282 which had been cut off from Simbirsk Army Group during the evacuation 
of Simbirsk on 22nd July. Gai had collected scattered Red units in Sengilei area, 
commandeered all local resources he could find and assimilated these into his own 
group. He successfully led this huge train of carts on a 3-day, 150 versty march 
through the Czechoslovak encirclement, without loss, 283 recruiting more people along 
the way. 284 Tukhachevsky instructed Gai to make for Veshkaima and with Kuibyshev, 
met Gai at Chufarovo Station on 28th jUly. 285 Gai was entrusted with reorganising the 
3,000 men of Sengilei and Stavropol' Groups and Tolstii's 1,000-man detachment to 
form Ist Simbirsk Combined Rifle Division. 286 On 9th August, for their valorous 
efforts in the battles around Simbirsk and Sengilei, the division was renamed 
Simbirsk Iron Division. On 18th November it became 24th Infantry Division, 287 
perhaps the first elite Soviet division. 
Gai's appearance was vital for Tukhachevsky. The Czechoslovaks still threatened 
along Simbirsk-Chufarovo and Syzran'-Inza rail lines and lack of numbers left Ist 
Army HQ vulnerable. Gai' covered Inza from the Simbirsk direction and as he had 
earlier provided time for the voenspetsy mobilisation to take place, so he held off the 
Czechoslovaks in July and August to allow Ist Army RVS to mobilise and organise 
the lower ranks. Gai's role in the successes of lst Army should not be under- 
estimated. Whilst Tukhachevsky, Kuibyshev and Kalnins provided the expertise 
necessary to reform the disparate Red detachments into organised divisions under 
280 N. I. Koritskii, "V dni voiny... ", p. 65; N. 1. Koritskii, "Sozdanie pervogo armii", pp. 53-54. 
28 1 K. M. Pavlova-Davydova, "Hezabyvaemoe", Marshal Tukhachevsky: Vospominaniia, p. 107. 
282 BPpRA, pp. 38-40. 
283 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pervaia anniia v 1918", p. 80. 
284 G. D. Gai, p. 3 1. 
285 BpppA, p. 40; K. M. Pavlova-Davydova, p. 107. 
286 V. V. Kuibyshev, pp. 28-29. 
2" DkfKA, Tom Pý p. 566. 
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political control, Gai supplied gritty, determined leadership necessary to hold together 
the still disorganised troops in a screen, allowing reorganisation to take place. 
Tukhachevsky would entrust Gai with the toughest tasks in forthcoming military 
operations and it is no surprise Gai became Ist Army Commander when 
288 Tukhachevsky was transferred in December 1918. The other candidate for this post, 
Lacis, was transferred with Inza Division at the same time. 
With the already under-equipped Ist Army increasing in number, the need for 
clothing, supplies and weapons was critical. Again Tukhachevsky had to solve this 
locally with the formation of a Department for Procurement of Supplies. This was 
headed by Shteingaus, who had been lst Army Chief-of- Supplies since its formation 
and now received a mandate to intercept and impound any loads or stores found 
within Ist Ari-ny's operational area. Stockpiles of Tsarist Army equipment lay in 
depots, warehouses and railway sidings, undisturbed since demobilisation. The 
Procurement Department systematically scoured Ist Army's operational area, 
uncovering a great wealth of resources. As Koritskii related, "What did our procurers 
not find in alleys and warehouses! There was everything, from textiles to machine- 
guns and even cannons. , 289 
Alongside supplies for the men, horses were urgently required, both for the 
formation of mounted infantry (korvolanty) as instructed by Vacietis on 23rd July, 290 
and for transportation. Vacietis identified the lack of cavalry as a major weakness in 
I st Army. In his 25th July report to the VVS and Trotsky about the fall of Simbirsk, he 
reported of White Cossack cavalry suddenly appearing in the flanks and rear of Ist 
Army forces retreating from Bugul'ma to Simbirsk. Encirclement and cutting of 
communications caused panic. The retreat became a rout as Reds "abandoned 
weapons, an armoured-train, military equipment, despite there being no danger, apart 
from the appearance of enemy cavalry in our flanks and rear" . 
29 1 The importance of 
cavalry was apparent from the first clashes in the East, but it was not immediately 
addressed by the Reds, due to the lack of trained cavalrymen and horses. Korvolanty 
were a stopgap measure, but "flankfear" was a ma or problem at this time which only i 
288 Voennye bumagi L. D. Trotskogo, 1918-1924, reel 2, RGVA, f 4, op. 3, d. 26, p. 311. 
289 N. 1. Koritskii, p. 65. 
290 Each anny was instructed to create a korvolanty group of 400 horses, DkfKA, Tom. 1, p. 403. 
291 0. lu. Kalnin, p. 4 1, This had come in the wake of the Murav'ev Revolt and was the beginning of 
the Czechoslovak general offensive. The Red troops, attacking from Bugul'ma and Melekess, confused 
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proper training, discipline and organisation could combat. Tukhachevsky, as 
instructed, began to form three cavalry detachments alongside the infantry divisions, 
but Red Cavalry did not come of age until the emergence of Budennyi's Ist Cavalry 
Army on Southern Front and Gai's 3rd Kavkor on Eastern Front in 19195 when 
cossacks sympathetic to the Reds were employed and trained further Red cavalrymen. 
In summer 1918, horses were more immediately needed for transport purposes, 
with the need to "de-train" the troops paramount. Lenin emphasised this on 22nd 
August, having Vacietis telegram Tukhachevsky to ask him to, "... report why Ist 
Army troops until now are living in wagons and not crossing to field warfare. Take 
-) 292 measures to evict the troops from the trains. Let the troops form strings of carts' . 
However, Tukhachevsky had taken these measures already. Vacietis replied to 
Lenin, Bonch-Bruevich and Trotsky on 24th August, 
Military Director Bonch-Bruevich, by assembling from unknown sources, 
data on the activities and state of morale of army units, places me in a 
false position. On the basis of his telegram No. 1255 of 21/8 1 issued a 
strong reprimand to Ist Army Commander and received the following 
answer: 
"First Army troops have long since been detrained and have taken up 
bivouac quarters. I do not know who it is your end that is putting out 
provocational reports". 
I ask that attention be given to the fact that official communications 
emanating from the highest organ of the War Department without any 
adequate check-up are unfounded and upset the army. I am reporting this 
to you in accordance with your instructions communicated to me by 
293 Bonch-Bruevich in his same telegram No. 1255 No. 13 . 
This episode displays several aspects of Tukhachevsky's command perfectly. He was 
far ahead of Moscow expectations in terms of reorganising I st Army and Moscow did 
not know which measures had been enacted, illustrating the true isolation and 
independence of action Tukhachevsky had on Eastern Front. It also displays his 
willingness to vehemently defend himself against false accusations, no matter from 
where they originated. 
by the conflicting orders sent out by Murav'ev, were routed and abandoned both towns, retreating to 
Simbirsk, leaving the railway line to the town unguarded and open; DkfK, 4, Tom I, pp. 405-406. 
292 Nikulin dates the telegram as I st August, but this appears to be the one sent by Bonch-Bruevich on 
21 st August, which Vacietis relayed to Tukhachevsky on Lenin's instructions, L. Nikulin, p. 5 7; J. 
Meijer, ed. The Trotsky Papers, Vol. I, pp. 108-111. 
293 j. Meijer, ed. The Trotsky Papers, Vol. I, pp. 108-111. 
127 
Similarly, Vacietis criticised Tukhachevsky on 21st July, ordering him, "... to stay 
in the Army HQ and lead the troops and do not bolt around the rear". 294 
Tukhachevsky strongly replied that he spent most of his time in the front areas, but 
had to travel to Penza to reform broken units and mobilise artillery and engineers. 
With no reply to this, Tukhachevsky sent a second telegram with Kuibyshev's 
backing, asking that restrictions on his movement be lifted. Vacietis replied, 
confirming this. Such incidents would recur throughout the Civil War. 
Despite the above dispute, a major step towards reorganisation and regularisation 
of I st Army was ceasing to fight by eshelonnaia voina tactics, removing troops from 
the trains. To defeat a mobile force with cavalry, mobility outwith the restrictions of 
the railway lines was required. Tukhachevsky had already advocated the use of the 
Volga, Kama and other waterways as alternative transport routes, more reliable than 
the wrecked railway system, but overland transport was required if Red forces were to 
push the Czechoslovaks back behind the Volga. 
The use of peasant carts, as suggested above by Lenin, was the solution and 
Tukhachevsky wrote about this later. 295 Carts were seized by Ist Army, but required 
horses to pull them. Acquiring these was entrusted to a Special Department of the 
Procurements Department. Tukhachevsky followed Vacietis' instructions to buy 
further horses and carts from the local population, authorising payment instead of 
296 seizures, which would have turned the peasantry further towards Komuch . 
However, Tukhachevsky recalled Red forces merely changed from "movement by 
rail" to "movement by wire" - telegraph communications. 
297 Hughes Telegraph was 
the most common form of communication used during the Civil War and difficulties 
associated with this would be significant in several of Tukhachevsky's operations. 
This had already been mentioned by Vacietis in his 25th July report. The use of 
cavalry to encircle and cut telegraph wires to destroy enemy communications was a 
tactic used by all sides during the Russian Civil War. Tukhachevsky used it to great 
effect, but was also on the receiving end. 
These reorganisational measures were all taken in the final week of July with Ist 
Army RVS envisaging Ist Army being capable of military action by the end of 
294 RTsKhIDNI, f. 71, op. 35, d. 962, p. 12. 
295 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Strateglia natsional'naia i klassovaia", Izbrannyeproizvedeniia, Tom I, pp. 
45-46. 
296 DkfK-I, Tom. 1, pp. 405-406. 
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. 
298 fect, events outwith August However, before they could take proper ef 
Tukhachevsky's control again hampered his efforts. 
The Czechoslovaks, regrouping after taking Simbirsk, captured Kazan' on 6th-7th 
August, and with it the Tsarist gold reserve, evacuated here from Samara by 
Kuibyshev and Gai, in June. Vacietis barely escaped when most of the voenspetsy in 
Kazan', whom he had suspected upon assuming command, but not had time to 
replace, defected to the Czechoslovaks. This left him with 120 of his Latvians to 
shoot their way out of Eastern Front HQ and flee Kazan'. He desperately despatched 
orders to Eastern Front Armies, urging a counter-offensive. Tukhachevsky received a 
flurry of orders from 3rd- II th August to make a second attack on Simbirsk. 299 Spahr 
mistakenly dates the first two attacks on Simbirsk as occurring on 3rd and 9th August, 
but all orders issued here related to only the second attack. The first attack, as has 
been demonstrated, occurred immediately after the Czechoslovak occupation, on 22nd 
July. Tukhachevsky's recollections and the documentary evidence confirm this. 300 
Moscow, not under-estimating the danger a second time, reacted swiftly. Lenin 
wrote to Eastern Front RVS, declaring, "Now the whole fate of the revolution stands 
on one map: swift victory over the Czechoslovaks on the Kazan'-Ural- Samara Front. 
Everything depends on thiS,,. 30 1 Trotsky himself left for Eastern Front the day after 
Kazan' fell, his command train packed with around fifty of the most fervent, effective 
Communist Party agitators, amongst them S. 1. Gusev. 302 Trotsky arrived at Sviiazhsk 
Station, met the retreating Vacietis and began work to stabilise the Red line. He 
appointed Slaven 5th Army Commander and started reorganisational work of the 
broken Red units into 5th Army. 303 
Trotsky's arrival at Sviiazhsk, where he remained until 30th August, when he 
returned to Moscow after the shooting of Lenin, 304 was a turning-point for Eastern 
Front. It witnessed a severe stiffening in methods used to organise and hold together 
297 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pervaia armila v 1918 gody", p. 82. 
298 N. 1. Koritskii, "Sozdanie pervogo anniia... ", p. 58. 
299DkfKA, Tom. I, pp. 419-426; DGkKA, pp. 107-108. 
300 W. j. Spahr, Stalin's Lieutenants: A Study of Command Under Duress, (Novato, CA, 1997), p. 67; 
M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pervaia armila v 1918 gody", p. 81. 
30 1 DGkKA, p. 106. 
302 L. D. Trotsky, My Life, an attempt at an autobiography, (Harrnondsworth, 1975), pp. 398-399. 
303 Ibid. p. 398. 
304 Lenin was shot and wounded by two bullets fired by a Left SR sympathiser Fania Kaplan whilst 
leaving the Mikhel'son Factory after giving a speech to workers there, Voennye bumagi L. D. 
Trotskogo, 1918-1924, reel 38, RGVA, f 4, op. 3, d. 201, pp. 4-5. 
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Red units. Tukhachevsky had set up tribunals on I st July and had used them in his 
mobilisations and almost certainly after the Murav'ev Revolt, when any collaborators 
would have been tried and executed. Also as Tukhachevsky himself relates of the 
fighting in the East, "For a long time prisoners were not taken by either side" . 
305 Civil 
War fighting was of an especially bitter, savage nature and Tukhachevsky acted no 
differently in this respect than any other leader during the conflict, a fact glossed over 
by Soviet sources. Trotsky's arrival in August, however, sparked an even more 
widespread employment of the tribunals' arbitrary powers, especially with regards to 
Red Army men. Tukhachevsky did not have the position or clout to carry out 
repressive discipline towards serving men, especially serving communists, still being 
regarded partly as a voenspetsy, despite his Communist Party membership. However, 
introducing repressive measures to ensure Red Army men fought, 306 Trotsky later 
recalled, 
The situation before Kazan' changed beyond recognition. Heterogeneous 
detachments became regular units, buttressed by worker-communists from 
Petrograd, Moscow and other places. The regiments stiffened up. Inside 
the units, the commissaries acquired the importance of revolutionary 
leaders, of direct representatives of the dictatorship. The tribunals 
demonstrated to everyone that revolution, when threatened by mortal 
danger, demands the highest sacrifice. Propaganda, organisation, 
revolutionary example and repression produced the necessary change in a 
few weeks. A vacillating, unreliable and crumbling mass was transformed 
into a real army. Our artillery had emphatically established its superiority. 
Our flotilla controlled the river. Our airmen dominated the air. No longer 
did I doubt that we would take Kazan'. 307 
Trotsky announced this hardening of method on 8th August, authorising, 
... the setting up at 
Murom, Arzamas and Sviiazhsk, of concentration 
camps for the imprisonment of suspicious agitators, counter-revolutionary 
officers, saboteurs, parasites and speculators, other than those who are to 
be shot at the scene of their crimes or else sentenced by the Military 
Revolutionary Tribunal to other punishments. I wam Soviet officials in all 
areas where military operations are in progress, and in the zone of military 
movements, that we shall be doubly exacting towards them. The Soviet 
Republic will punish its negligent and criminal servants no less severely 
than its enemies. The country's terrible situation obliges us to take terrible 
measures. 308 
305 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pen, aia armiia v 1918", p. 83. 
306 This was cast up against him in the 1920s by the Stalin faction during the intra-Party struggles, 
condemning Trotsky as traitorous in his behaviour, executing innocent and loyal communists. 
307 L. D. Trotsky, Aft Life, pp. 407-408. 
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Trotsky set new standards for revolutionary discipline, but his swift 
reorganisational work mirrored Tukhachevsky's achievements with Ist Army. Soviet 
sources do not record Tukhachevsky and Trotsky working closely at this time. 
However, it would seem likely that Tukhachevsky was at Sviiazhsk almost as soon as 
Trotsky arrived there, obviously summoned by him to report on the situation, discuss 
how best to proceed and receive new orders, including introducing repressive 
measures towards Red An-ny men. The evidence is not concrete, but centres around 
4th Latvian Regiment and the punishment of its Commander and Commissar. This 
incident turned out to be crucial for Eastern Front, with Trotsky and Tukhachevsky 
both in mortal danger from mutinous troops. 
4th Latvian Division had been fighting around Syzran' for two months with no 
respite . 
309 Trotsky described them, "Of all the regiments of the Latvian Division that 
had been pulled to pieces, this was the worst" .3 
10 This is confirmed by a series of 
telegrams sent from 20th-22nd June by Vacietis to 4th Latvian Regiment and 
Tukhachevsky, urging it to advance from Inza to Simbirsk as part of the first attack on 
Simbirsk, immediately after the Czechoslovak occupation. 4th Regiment refused to 
advance after holding a regimental meeting and Tukhachevsky was criticised by 
Vacietis on 22nd July for altering his order and instructing the Latvians to guard 
Ruzaevka, which was not under threat. Possibly Tukhachevsky was reluctant to 
commit the Latvians when he knew 1st Army was not ready to attack. Vacietis 
threatened 4th Latvian Regiment with Military Tribunals and reiterated the order to 
attack. However, with the attack on Simbirsk collapsing quickly into a rout, neither of 
these seems to have occurred, although Kobozev stressed the need to reform the 
Popov detachment of 4th Latvian Regiment. 311 
When the second attack on Simbirsk was launched on 8th-9th August, the 
Commander and Regimental Committee of 4th Latvian Regiment again demanded 
exemption from this stating, "unless the regiment is relieved at once "consequences 
f lloWmo. 312 for the revolution would 0 Trotsky summoned the Commander and 
Chairman of the Regimental Committee to his train and declared them under arrest for 
309 B. 1. Chistov, "Komandarm-Kommunist", p. 47. 
3 10 L. D. Trotsky, Aýv Life, p. 400. 
31 1R TsKhIDNI, f71, op. 3 5, d. 962, pp. 10- 18. 
312 L. D. Trotsky, My Life, p. 400. 
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this mutinous behaviour. 313 Chistov relates that the Commander and Commissar were 
"admonished". 314 Chairman of the Regimental Committee Ozol' and member of the 
Regimental Committee Saulut' were in fact sentenced on 20th August 1918 by 
Revolutionary Field Tribunal to five years exclusion from Soviet organisations and 
three years imprisonment. 315 Trotsky recalled that if the two arrestees or their men 
had resisted, Sviiazhsk and its bridge over the Volga would have had to be 
surrendered and his command train would have been captured by the enemy, resulting 
in the possible collapse of Eastern Front and a threat to Moscow. However, he 
recalled that, "... the arrest came off safely. I announced the commitment of the 
commander of the regiment to trial before the revolutionary tribunal. The regiment 
remained at its post. The commander was merely sentenced to prison". 316 
However, Chistov recalled the "admonishment" of the Commander and 
Commissar did not help the situation, 
But here amongst the Latvian Rifles appeared the Army Commander and 
in all their hearing he explained that if they would not advance, then he 
would go at the head of their commanders and lead them himself to help 
I st Latvian Regiment, fighting in Simbirsk in an enemy encirclement. The 
Riflemen wavered, began to hold a mass meeting. 170 men together with 
their commanders and political workers close up around Tukhachevsky. In 
this way it turned out that the detachment began without delay to load 
onto their eshelon. This decisively changed the mood of the rest. 4th 
Latvian Regiment again was battleworthy. 317 
Therefore, Tukhachevsky played a critical role in the survival of Eastern Front, 
preventing a Latvian mutiny which could have resulted in Trotsky's and 
Tukhachevsky's arrest or death either by the Latvians or Czechoslovaks and Whites. 
Chistov does not mention Trotsky because the latter was never rehabilitated and a 
non-person. Why Trotsky does not mention Tukhachevsky is a little less clear. 
Possibly he did not wish to admit Tukhachevsky saved him as it would detract from 
the overall sense which Trotsky purveys that he alone turned the tide in the East. To 
develop this further, it is possible the reorganisational work Trotsky carried out on 5th 
Army was based on that already achieved by Tukhachevsky with Ist Army. It would 
have been logical for Trotsky to ask the man he had despatched eastwards how he had 
313 Ibid. p. 400. 
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achieved success with I st Army, so this could be duplicated with 5th Army. However, 
to admit this would take even more from Trotsky's claim to have reorganised 5th 
Army before it took Kazan'. It is also possible Trotsky did not mention Tukhachevsky 
because at the time of writing My Life (1930), he did not wish to discredit 
Tukhachevsky by saying they had been so close, as Trotsky hoped Tukhachevsky 
would lead a coup to overthrow Stalin, with or without Trotsky's knowledge and 
collaboration. However, if Trotsky did not mention Tukhachevsky later, Gul' suggests 
that in 1918 Trotsky criticised Eastern Front commanders and commissars such as 
Lacis, Lashevich and Smilga of inaction but set one example, the "glorious name of 
Tukhachevsky". 318 Smirnov produces a personal letter from Trotsky to Tukhachevsky 
as further evidence of their closeness. 319 Whether this occurred or not, Tukhachevsky 
and Trotsky worked closely on Eastern Front. Tukhachevsky took more severe 
actions with Trotsky to back him up. Trotsky had summoned Tukhachevsky to 
discuss how they should deal with the worsening Czechoslovak menace. Whilst here, 
Tukhachevsky had risked his own life and had saved Trotsky's. Trotsky would have 
expected no less from a loyal communist, but Tukhachevsky was not essentially so. 
This display of loyalty, coming so soon after the Murav'ev Affair, must have truly 
cemented Tukhachevsky's position vis-a-vis the top Communist Party leadership. 
As a result of the 4th Latvian Regiment episode, Trotsky commanded, 
I give warning that if any unit retreats without orders, the first to be shot 
down will be the commissary of the unit, the next the commander. Brave 
and gallant soldiers will be appointed in their places. Cowards, dastards 
and traitors will not escape the bullet. This I solemnly promise in the 
presence of the entire Red Army. 320 
For this, Trotsky introduced zagraditel'nye otriady (blocking battalions). 
Volkogonov claimed Tukhachevsky used these first in August 1918,32 1 but the 
archival source he cited does not specifically say this, with Trotsky referring in 1921 
to previous use of "blocking detachments", but no more. 322 Volkogonov possibly had 
another source to back this up, but he did not cite it. However, if this did occur in 
summer 1918, Tukhachevsky probably first used "blocking detachments" in the 
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second or third attack on Simbirsk. Severe measures were now employed with 
Tukhachevsky again the one to experiment. 
Whilst employing these measures, Tukhachevsky still used more conventional 
methods of persuasion, cajoling troops personally as with 4th Latvian Division. 
Chistov related a similar incident occurring with Ufa Engineering Detachment, which 
had retreated from Ufa to Simbirsk and wished to retreat further, with morale at a 
very low ebb. The detachment commander complained to Tukhachevsky about his 
men, technical troops, being employed as infantry, and demanded they be sent to 
Kazan' for re-equipping. 323 
This situation must have struck Tukhachevsky with a certain irony. He had just 
stressed the need to develop the technical ability of the Red Army to compensate for 
troop shortages, but here was an engineering unit used as infantry because of this 
shortage. However, he apparently explained the desperation of the position to the unit 
declaring, 
As Army Commander and communist, I consider that the reasons you give 
do not free you from your duty to defend Soviet power in Simbirsk at this 
very critical moment. Until now I have never heard members of our Party 
refusing to fight for the Soviets. 
And so forwards! I shall go together with you! " 
This speech worked and the Ufa Engineering Detachment did indeed 
fight on the approaches to Simbirsk. 324 
However, this mixture of persuasive and repressive measures was not enough to 
overcome Ist Army's lack of preparation and discipline. The second attack on 
Simbirsk, launched on 8th August, fared little better than the first, collapsing into 
another chaotic rout, although Velikanov's 2nd Simbirsk Regiment did retain its 
discipline during the retreat, possibly indicating some reorganisational progress. 
Tukhachevsky ordered Simbirsk Division to break off the attack and withdraw to its 
starting positions around Chufarovo Station, which it did by 16th August, 
325 but this 
order produced an extraordinary response from Tukhachevsky's superiors. 
Eastern Front RVS member Kobozev hurried to Tukhachevsky's command train 
and, with the support of Kalnins, demanded he launch the attack once more. Upon 
refusing to do so, Tukhachevsky was threatened with one of the tribunals he had been 
instrumental in forming. Kobozev accused him of treachery similar to that of 
323 B. 1. Chistov, "V tiazhelyi dni... ", p. 46. 
3224 lbid, p. 47. 
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Murav'ev at Simbirsk, hampering the Red attack and withdrawing units during battle. 
With Kalnins, he telegrammed Trotsky and Vacietis. The matter was temporarily 
resolved by Kuibyshev backing Tukhachevsky against the two other commissars and 
explaining retreat was necessary, with the troops in disarray and no state to fight. 
Koritskii suggests however, that Trotsky and Vacietis supported Kobozev and 
Kalnins and again threatened Tukhachevsky with a tribunal if he did not attack. At 
this point, Kuibyshev contacted Lenin via Aralov of the MR, explaining the 
hopeless position of Ist Army and the wisdom of Tukhachevsky's decision. Aralov 
replied, with Lenin's direct backing, for Tukhachevsky to complete the 
reorganisational work he had been despatched to do, before committing Ist Army to 
direct military action again. 326 
This extraordinary sequence of events displays vividly the tension, panic and 
mistrust which gripped the Red military leadership in the East. Tukhachevsky, who 
had reported Murav'ev for hampering reorganisational efforts, refused to join his 
revolt and had nearly been executed for it, was now accused of similarly treacherous 
behaviour. Not only was he accused by Kobozev, who perhaps did not know him that 
well and Vacietis, with whom Tukhachevsky did not have the best of working 
relationships, 327 but also by Kalnins, with whom he had worked closely for the past 
six weeks, and Trotsky, whose life he had just saved. Such were the conditions on 
Eastern Front in summer 1918. Noone was truly trusted and everyone was judged 
only by their last act. This was a moment of acute danger for Tukhachevsky. Trotsky 
had Blagonravov removed for merely talking of desertion (although he escaped a 
tribunal) and had ordered the execution of Red Commanders and Commissars by this 
time. 328 If Tukhachevsky had not been backed by Kuibyshev and Lenin, he may well 
have been committed to a tribunal, which could have meant death or imprisonment 
and an end to his career. The backing Tukhachevsky received from Lenin further 
supports the suggestion the two had met before Tukhachevsky travelled eastwards. It 
is doubtful whether Lenin would have intervened on Tukhachevsky's behalf 
325 N. 1. Koritskii, "V dni voiny... ", pp. 59-62 ; M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pervaia armiia v 1918", p. 81. 
326 N. 1. Koritskii, "V dni voiny... ", pp. 70-71. 
327 See Chapter IV for a fuller treatment of the Tukhachevsky-Vacietis relationship. 
328 On 14th August 1918, Trotsky authonsed a commission of inquiry headed by Rozengol'ts into the 
conduct of the Communist Political Commissar Panteleev during the battle for Kazan' on 6th-7th 
August and authorised Panteleev's execution. He had stolen a ship and tried to desert with his men 
down the Volga, J. Meijer, ed. The Trotsky Papers, vol. I, pp. 154-157,252-253 & 362-365; L. D. 
Trotsky, How the Revolution Armed, Vol. 1, p. 313; Rozengol'ts, Bor'ba za Ural i Sibir', p. 22. 
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otherwise, overruling staunch Bolshevik commissars Kobozev and Kalnins, Supreme 
Commander Vacietis and Trotsky. This also illustrates Trotsky's ruthlessness and 
motivation to make the Red Army succeed, with its progression and success 
outweighing the life of the man who had just saved him from the Latvian mutiny. The 
reaction to Tukhachevsky's decision from the political conunissars, a purely military 
decision to pull forces back from Simbirsk, would have certainly contributed to his 
conviction that unified command was urgently required for the Red forces, replacing 
collegial command involving one voenspets and two political commissars. 
Tukhachevsky would suggest this in his December 1918 letter to lurenev and was 
very vocal on this subject throughout the Civil War, which undoubtedly hampered his 
acceptance by many hard-line communists such as Voroshilov and Stalin, who 
viewed such suggestions as reactionary and "Napoleonistic". 
The tribunal episode was another escape for Tukhachevsky, but like those before, 
it did have positive results. The way was now clear to complete the reorganisational 
work required on I st Army. Whilst being freed from attacking the Czechoslovaks and 
Whites directly, Tukhachevsky still had to aid 5th Army, which was even less 
organised than Ist Army, in stalling the Czechoslovak's advance from Kazan'. This 
was a far more realistic objective for August 1918 and matched the plans he had 
already laid out for Simbirsk Division at Veshkaima and Chufarovo. It meant that by 
the following month, Ist Army would be in a position to switch from the defensive 
and finally attack effectively to retake Simbirsk, supporting the main Red thrust by 
5th Army to Kazan', launching Tukhachevsky on his Civil War campaign career. 
Taking Simbirsk, was only a supplementary operation to the main object of capturing 
Kazan', but this turned out to be another stroke of luck for Tukhachevsky. Simbirsk 
was Lenin's birthplace and the prestige Tukhachevsky gained for capturing it added 
further to the trust he had built up with the Bolshevik leadership, but also enhanced 
his reputation throughout Russia as a Red Commander of note. Trotsky described it as 
a "... historic page in the history of the socialist revolution" . 
329 
329 Voennye bumagi L. D. Trotskogo, 1918-1924, reel 38, RGVA, f 4, op. 3, d. 200, pp. 4-5. 
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Conclusion: Who Was Tukhachevsky by September 1918? 
By September 1918, Tukhachevsky was firmly embedded as I st Army 
Commander of Eastern Front, or as firmly embedded as one could be in the tense, 
paranoid atmosphere of the escalating Civil War. He had achieved this position 
through a variety of reasons, circumstance and luck. The assertion that he achieved 
his position because he was a rare "commander-communist" and had Trotsky's 
backing is only partially true. Joining the Communist Party was a crucial step, but the 
opportunities this offered had to be maintained by gaining the trust of the Bolshevik 
Party and Red Army hierarchies. The only way to achieve this was to perform well in 
the tasks allocated to him. 
Tukhachevsky did this as Military Inspector with the Military Department and as 
Military Commissar on the Western Screens, so much so that the written work he 
produced was used to help fonTiulate official state military policy. Having proved 
himself in the administrative background, albeit involving a tour of frontline areas, 
and personally meeting Trotsky, Lenin and many other Bolshevik and military 
luminaries, Tukhachevsky was deemed the man to reorganise the ailing Eastern Front 
in face of the Komuch offensives. He was sent to implement his recommendations on 
the frontline, an extraordinary situation. He would later write "Armies could only be 
raised in areas where uprisings had already occurred. 030 This was exactly what 
Tukhachevsky had to do on the Eastern Front in 1918. No help was received from 
Moscow and he had to reorganise completely disparate partisan, guerilla detachments 
into a regular army. Tukhachevsky readily acknowledged the help he received from 
his Eastern Front colleagues - Kuibyshev, Kalnins, Gai and Vareikis - and emphasised 
the pivotal role played by Communists in creating the disciplined Ist Revolutionary 
Army. However, these were local efforts, not coordinated from Moscow. Once Red 
Army organisers were despatched to Eastern Front, they were isolated, having to 
build a team to survive and create Red armed forces using only local men and 
resources. The military commissariats did not exist in practical terms and no 
apparatus for mobilisation was in place. Tukhachevsky had to create Revolutionary 
Military Field Tribunals, mobilisation panels and departments for gathering supplies, 
horses and resources for his army within their operational area. Creation of the Red 
330 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Strategiia Natsional'naia i Klassovaia", pp. 33-34. 
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Army was not actually directed from Moscow by Trotsky as previous accounts claim. 
The Bolshevik Party and military leadership had vacillated and argued over how to 
build a new army and where to do so, in the rear or at the front. The point was 
eventually reached where the Czechoslovak Revolt led to people like Tukhachevsky 
having to do this on-the-spot, whilst waging the Civil War simultaneously, a situation 
of extreme danger and isolation. Trotsky's biggest contribution was also made as a 
local organiser at Sviiazhsk in August 1918, but although intensifying discipline, the 
organisational methods he used were probably those Tukhachevsky had experimented 
with in July. 
Tukhachevsky's contribution with the other original organisers of I st Army, to the 
overall formation of the Red Army was immense. Personally he produced his May 
recommendations, and with his Ist Army colleagues, showed these to be correct 
evaluations of how the Red Army should be set up in frontline areas. The structure 
which emerged for Eastern Front was copied for Southern Front and indeed for the 
whole Civil War arena. Tukhachevsky played a crucial role in this from the 
beginning, laying the foundations upon which the Red Army was built. This was the 
reason for his joining the Bolshevik Party in April, to play a major role in building a 
powerful new arrny to defend Russia and take on the world. He had achieved this in 
the most dangerous of areas on the 1918 Eastern Front and had proved himself 
amongst the most capable commanders the Red Army possessed. He had successfully 
shown the way in organisational terms, but had only limited combat opportunities to 
date. To prove himself a capable Red Army Commander, a better candidate for 
promotion than the other Eastern Front Army Commanders, he would have to be 
successful in combat. 
In chapters III and IV, I shall examine Tukhachevsky's command performance in 
the Russian Civil War from September 1918-April 1920 and assess his and others' 
evaluations to see if patterns of command emerged and if he displayed further 
evidence, as he had already in summer 1918, of his military career and theories to 
come. 
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Chapter III: Conventional Commander in the Class War - 1: Analysis and Early 
Command Experience: August 1918-March 1919 
The Seeds of "Deep Battle" 
On 26th January 1926, Tukhachevsky, as Red Army Chief-of-Staff, 
commissioned members of the Red Army Staff to compile a work to which he 
contributed and edited, Budushchaia voina, (Future War). This was completed by the 
Staffs Intelligence Directorate and assessed the Soviet Union's position in the late 
1920s viv-a-vis the capitalist world. Possible threats and likely scenarios of how a 
future conflict might begin and develop were outlined in detail. ' 
In the preface, citations from Tukhachevsky's 1926 commissioning directive were 
included. He wrote, 
From the time of the Civil War many statements have arisen about a future 
revolutionary war, how that is fashionable, based on revolutionary spirit 
etc. Of course, not many now indulge in such sins. In essence, on such 
positions of manifested revolutionary idealism, nothing general in 
Marxism exists. However, some preconditions for such conclusions all the 
same existed in the period of ruined industry during the civil war, but 
now, as the growth and reestablishment of our economy reaches pre-war 
levels in productive forces, we stand before another task. 
Industrial development meant the Soviets would have to fight a "cultured war" 
with "massed artillery, asphyxiating gas etc - with all the ensuing strategic, 
organisational and mobilisation consequences". 2 
From this it could appear Tukhachevsky believed any lessons learned during the 
Civil War were obsolete next to the industrially-based total warfare of the Great War. 
In their studies on Tukhachevsky's involvement in the build-up of the Soviet Union 
military-industrial complex from the late 1920s to his execution in 1937, Lennart 
Samuelson and Sally Stoecker suggest Tukhachevsky looked to the Great War, rather 
than the Russian Civil War for the answers. 3 Samuelson emphasises the final years, 
' Budushchaia voina was printed in only 80 copies, which were restricted to the military and Party 
hierarchy, but these were destroyed after Tukhachevsky's execution, the only surviving copy held by 
Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voennyi Arkhiv (hereafter RGVA), M. N. Tukhachevsky, Budushchaia 
voina, (Moscow, 1928), (from publishers note). 
2 M. N. Tukhachevsky, Budushchaia voina, pp. 12-13, 
3 L. Samuelson, Plans For Stalin's War Machine: Tukhachevskii and military-economic planning, 
1925-1941. (London, 2000), p. 24; S. Stoecker, Forging Stalin's Army: Marshal Tukhachevsky and the 
Politics of Innovation. (Oxford, 1998), pp. 18-19 & 168-169. 
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stressing the line suggested by Tukhachevsky In the above quote, whilst Stoecker 
points to Tukhachevsky writing in Budushchaia voina that the early years of the Great 
War were more important than the Civil War for manoeuvre warfare. 
In a secret Doklad ob oborone SSSR (Report about the defence of the USSR), 
completed in August 1926, Tukhachevsky echoed an RVSR suggestion to begin a 
Four-Year Plan of military construction, as he felt "At the present time neither the 
USSR, nor Red Army are ready for war". 4 However, he emphasised that this 
weakness came not only from the need to modernise the army technically, but also 
because the ma ority of the Red Army had not fought in the Civil War and 90-95% of i 
soldiers were peasants, excepting the fleet and specialists, of whom 20-40% were 
workers. He insisted, 
With discipline ensured - it is possible to consider the mass of troops as 
wholly Soviet. However, under present conditions, there is a serious 
danger that in the occurrence of war, as a whole the common masses are 
not instilled from the political side. The basis for this is as follows: 
... Need for strict discipline in the anny/correct 
internal interrelations, 
successful political training and absence of any kind of negative 
phenomena. 
Presence of strong politically-conscious Red Army activists... Most 
committed Party members should compose 25-30% of all Red Army 
staff. 5 
Tukhachevsky based this on his Civil War experiences of how the army had 
functioned well under battle and probably how its political core had deteriorated 
6 
under the New Economic Policy years, without the activist drive of the war years . He 
felt the Civil War mentality of politically-driven discipline should be restored by 
reintroducing the idea of a politically- inculcated activist core. I would argue that 
Tukhachevsky combined this and other aspects of his Civil War experience with 
knowledge of the Great War, military history, industrialisation and weapons 
development, to formulate his theories during the 1920s which led to Glubokoi boi 
("Deep Battle"). 
"Deep Battle" was developed to provide the answer to creating and exploiting a 
breakthrough in depth of enemy defensive lines, thereby avoiding another static 
RGVA, f. 33988, op. 2, d. 67 1, pp. 58 & 140. This report did not go down well with Stalin and was 
restricted. For more on the evolution of the Four Year Plan, see D. R. Stone, Hammer and Rifle: The 
Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926-1933. (Kansas, 2000). 
5 RGVA, f. 33988, op. 2, d. 671, p. 132. 
6 The Soviet Union operated under the New Economic Policy from 1921-1928. 
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positional war like the Great War. Tactics and weaponry utilised during the Great 
War such as machine-gun and artillery use were studied, as were developments to 
combat these in the closing years of the War, especially tanks. These were intertwined 
with later developments in aviation and innovation, such as the use of paratroopers, to 
produce "Deep Battle". However, Tukhachevsky's Civil War experiences were also 
important and played a crucial part in his operational formulation for "Deep Battle". 
The importance he attached to these and the value of the lessons learned are evident 
by the frequent reference to them in his writings during the 1920s. His involvement in 
the manoeuvre warfare of the Great War Eastern Front in 1914-15 was crucial, but he 
was only a 2nd Lieutenant at that time. The command experience of the Civil War, 
when he was able to put his theoretical ideas of warfare into practice, was possibly the 
vital link in his military development, and it would be rash to discount these years. 
In 1926, the same year he commissioned Budushchaia voina, Tukhachevsky 
published an essay entitled Voprosy sovremennoi strategii (Questions of 
Contemporary Strategy). In this he explained, 
Campaigns have lost the characteristic appearance they formerly had. 
They may characterise the entire period of the war, a part of it, or they 
may coincide with a series of successive operations. 
Special attention must be directed to operations. Whereas 
contemporary wars are waged with large numbers of troops and are 
dragged out over long periods of time, it does not in the least signify... that 
we must disregard the art of destroying the enemy's armed forces. 
This is one of the basic skills to which our military art and our strategy 
must direct attention... It must be repeated that the imperialist war with its 
catastrophic consequences to capitalism has brought great instability to the 
question. Now we often meet with uncertainties: Is it possible at the 
present time to annihilate an armed force, is it necessary to concern 
ourselves with such tasks, is this essential, isn't this frivolous? Of course 
not. War would be senseless, it would be impossible to wage war if there 
were no armed forces... prepared to crush the enemy. These armed forces 
are essential for defending every state even in that case when war is 
waged by all the people. The absence of determined armed forces may 
prove fatal for any state. The more skilled troops are in the business of 
annihilating enemy armed forces, the more economical it will be to wage 
war. This is the basic principle of military training. And we should train 
our Red Army and nurture it on these principles and impregnate it 
thoroughly with these ideas. From the experience of the Civil War we 
greit, accustomed to active operations, but we must continue the work, 
deepen it, perfect ourselves in the art of annihilating the enemy. And this 
art, I repeat, is embodied in the operation or in a series of successive 
operations. [My italics] 
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Operations must not be conducted anarchically without ideological 
ideals. We must all be imbued with a single general method. Our assertion 
is not a fruitless cry about the necessity of creating a unified military 
doctrine. Such a doctrine from year to year percolates more and more to 
the depth of our Red Army. We have service regulations, in which are 
presented in black and white the completely defined methods of both 
operational and tactical art. However, we are preparing ourselves, we are 
perfecting ourselves and must continue in this work and further. 
It is necessary to bear in mind that under contemporary conditions of 
waging war it may not be possible to annihilate the enemy in a single 
operation. The enemyfrequently will slip awayfrom an attack. Therefore, 
it will be necessary to conduct operations one after the other, until the 
enemy is destroyed, even if it is at his last line of resistance. And this line 
is located where areas providing direct support to the war begin. We must 
perfect ourselves in this art of conducting operations, continuously 
practice and learn the process of conducting them sequentially... [My 
italics] 
We must recognise that we are confronted with difficult, prolonged 
wars; we must be able to distinguish the different periods of a war, to be 
able to successively, systematically liquidate a capitalist coalition... 
It must be remembered that the art of annihilating enemy armed forces 
is the basic condition of the economical and successful conduct of war, 
and we must constantly perfect ourselves both in this art, and in all the arts 
of strategy. 7 
Tukhachevsky, whilst stressing the need to develop and deepen a unified military 
theory in light of the evolution of total warfare, still emphasised the overriding need 
to annihilate enemy armies. He wrote of this in another 1926 article Voina (War) in 
which he compared contemporary tactics with those of Napoleon's, writing that these 
had extended from the "tactics of the theatre of operations". He continued, 
The contemporary operation consists in concentrating the necessary 
manpower for delivering an attack and launching continuous, 
uninterrupted attacks by these forces in great depth. The nature of 
contemporary weapons, modem battles is such that it is impossible to 
destroy an enemy force by a single blow in a single day's encounter. The 
engagement in a modem operation is expanded into a series of battles not 
only frontally, but also in depth until the enemy is dealt a final, destructive 
blow or the advancing troops have exhausted themselves. 8 
This was Tukhachevsky's advocacy of the strategy of annihilation as compared to 
the strategy of attrition. This debate waged within the Soviet military hierarchy 
througout the 1920s and only by the end of the decade did Tukhachevsky gain the 
7 M. N. Tukhachesvky, "Voprosy sovremennol strategli", Izbrannye proizvedeniia, Tom 1,1919-192 7. 
(Moscow, 1964), pp. 260-261. 
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upper hand in promoting the goal of the complete destruction of the enemy force. 
Tukhachevsky, Triandafillov, Uborevich and others developed "Deep Battle" to do so. 
Therefore, whilst commissioning Budushchaia voina to appraise the most likely war 
scenarios and ways to emerge victorious from a war on the scale of the Great War, 
Tukhachevsky was striving to develop the operational side of "Deep Battle" and 
specifically the use of successive operations, to enable this victory to be 
accomplished. This would not be by an "attrition" strategy similar to the Great War. 
In Voprosy sovremennoi strategii, he stated the operational roots were to be found in 
the Civil War, during which the Red Army had grown "... accustomed to active 
operations", but this had to be developed and "deepened" in light of technological 
advances. The Civil War contained the roots of his military thinking and was clearly 
still important to him in 1926. 
Also published in 1926 was Armeiskaia operatsiia: Rabota komandovaniia i 
polevogo upravleniia (Army Operations: Work of Command and Field Control), 
which Tukhachevsky edited and wrote with Varfolomeev and Shilovskii. 9 This was 
compiled from work conducted within the Red Army Military Academy in 1924-25 
on a course entitled Vedenie operatsii (Conduct of operations). Tukhachevsky 
lectured on this course and contributed his work Voprosy vysshego komandovaniia 
(Questions of Higher Command). 10 This covered tasks on the strategical and tactical 
level, but also included operational art, which was evolving to link the two. 
Tukhachevsky wrote of the need to develop successive operations over distances of 
180-350 kms to fully rout enemy armies. However, he warned of the dangers of 
strategic overstretch and the need to fully develop the rear to avoid the transport and 
supply problems experienced by Napoleon in 1812 at Moscow and the Red Army in 
1920 at Warsaw. Tactically, he mentioned glubokie reidy (deep raids) by cavalry, 
referring to actions of 3rd Cavalry Corps during the Polish-Soviet War of 1920 and 
8 Mikhail Tukhachevsky. - A Collection ofArticles by the Red Army's Leading Military Theoretician. 
(May, 1983), p. 64. 
9 Evgenii Aleksandrovich Shilovskii (1889-1952) served on Western Front with Tukhachevsky during 
the Polish-Soviet War. 
10 M, N. Tukhachevsky, Armeiskaia operatsiia. - Rabota komandovaniia ipolevogo upravleniia. 
(Moscow, 1926), pp. 7-12. Voprosy vysshego komandovaniia was published in 1924 and is included in 
M. N. Tukhachevsky, Izbrannyeproizvedeniia, Tom I, pp. 185-197; A translation is provided in R. 
Simpkin & Erickson, J., Deep Battle: The Brainchild ofMarshal Tukhachevskii. (London; 
Washington, 1987), pp. 88-101; The 1926 publication was the series of lectures Tukhachevsky 
delivered at the Academy, V. 0. Daines, "Istoricheskie portrety: Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky", 
Voprosy Istorii. No. 10, (Oct. 1989), p. 53. 
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the use of concentric offensives, as employed by Germany in 1914 to surround and 
defeat Samsonov's and Rennenkampfs Russian Armies. 11 Although the lectures and 
book were prepared in 1924, before the Soviet economy had reached sufficient levels 
to allow expansive military development, Tukhachevsky believed the ideas in them 
were still important to study and learn from in 1926 and beyond, as the military- 
industrial complex emerged. Technology and industry may have evolved to alter the 
face of warfare, but the ideas behind the operational side of "Deep Battle" originated 
from past military campaigns including, prominently, the Civil War. 
The continuities from the Civil War to "Deep Battle" are apparent in 
Tukhachevsky's 1929 article on the new Red Army Field Regulations, which outlined 
for the first time the objects of "Deep Battle". This also demonstrated further that he 
still looked back to the revolutionary fervour engendered in the Red Army during the 
Civil War in some respects, despite his 1926 directive. In 1929 he wrote, 
The class nature of the Red Army is reflected in its structure and content. 
The tactical art of our troop units is developed around a lofty moral and 
political core, and is based on mobility, boldness, and constant pressure. 
The force inherent in the class nature of the training conducted by our 
party is all-powerful and is the strength of the Red Army: "Teamwork in 
action and political stability in our units, disorganisation (demoralisation) 
of the enemy's fighting power, and calling upon his army and working 
population in the theatre of operations to join the proletarian revolution of 
the workers and peasants - all these are very important conditions for 
beating the enemy. 
The spiritual strength of the Red Army is a very powerful weapon in 
organising a modem battle. The complexity, high degree of mechanisation 
and intensity of the action demand the highest degree of intiative and the 
manifestation of heroism on the part of individual troopers and the 
smallest units. Unless these elements prevail even the most carefully 
prepared attack can fail. 12 
Later in the article Tukhachevsky echoed Lenin, saying that in a future war 
against capitalism, "the imperialist war will develop into a civil war", although 
continuity from his Tsarist Army days is evident when he wrote of the infantry 
following up artillery preparation to "... destroy the enemy quickly with bayonet and 
grenade attacks ...... 
13 
These could be dismissed as mere window dressing for the military regulations, 
applying the necessary Marxism-Leninism, as we have already seen Tukhachevsky do 
" M. N. Tukhachevsky, Armeiskaia operatsiia. pp. 68-70 & 79-92. 
12 Mikhail TukhachevsAy: A Collection ofArticles. p. 65. 
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in 1918. However, in chapters III and IV, I shall examine his Civil War commands to 
show that by the end of the conflict, he was convinced of the efficacy of a 
revolutionary doctrine to create and bind a strong internationalist Red Army. He 
retained this belief, as shown in the above quote, throughout the 1920s, during his 
"Deep Battle" formulations. 
In chapters III and IV, I shall examine Tukhachevsky's Civil War career on 
several levels. The chronology in Appendix A provides an outline of Tukhachevsky's 
life and a detailed list of operations he conducted during the Civil War. With 
reference to this, I shall provide a biographical account of Tukhachevsky's 
progression during the conflict. To examine his commands I shall use his works, 
especially Voina klassov (War of the Classes), a collection of essays, lectures, letters 
and polemics published in 1921, but written sporadically from 1919-21 during 
breathing- spaces in the fighting. Voina klassov launched Tukhachevsky's career as a 
prodigious and much-read military writer. It was an on-the-spot evaluation by the 
raw, but developing soldier, attempting to understand and evaluate his Civil War 
experiences in order to improve his own abilities and influence the Red Army as a 
whole. The fact that it was written at different stages of the Civil War is significant. 
When a piece was written influenced the subject matter addressed and views 
expressed. Tukhachevsky analysed various parts of army operations within the Civil 
War as they emerged during his commands and suggested ways of coping with 
conditions prevalent to the conflict. In examining Tukhachevsky's Civil War 
commands chronologically from September 1918-April 1920, a period in which he 
rose from Ist Army Commander to Acting Caucasian Front Commander, I shall 
analyse components of Voina klassov, when they were written, alongside archival, 
documentary and memoir sources, to illustrate why he wrote about certain topics at a 
given time and how accurately he did so. In this way mitigating factors which 
influenced his performance will be examined: troop numbers; weaponry and 
resources available; supply and reinforcement; geography and topography; opponents 
faced; relations with Red Army personnel. 
By examining Tukhachevsky's postings in different ways I shall demonstrate the 
strands which came together to form his overall outlook by the end of the conflict. 
13 Ibid. pp. 66 & 68. 
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Initially, I shall concentrate on two operations he conducted whilst Eastern Front I st 
Army Commander in autumn 1918. This detailed study of civil warfare at the tactical 
battlefield level will provide an insight into the type of fighting involved in the 
Russian Civil War, show Tukhachevsky's adaptability and suitability to command and 
the early lessons he learned. It will also serve as a template for a broader study of his 
1919 5th Army Eastern Front command in chapter IV, when I shall demonstrate how 
the overall strategy employed to defeat Kolchak, and Tukhachevsky's role in it, was 
vital in shaping his operational theory. Between these postings, I shall examine intra- 
Red Army and Bolshevik Party relations and how these affected Tukhachevsky's 
career in late 1918-early 1919, when he was posted to Southern Front. Events before 
and after his 8th Army Command posting are more important than the actual combat 
itself, as disagreements with other personnel predominated, but these are as crucial in 
determining the evolution of Tukhachevsky's military belief, as the operational 
experience of 1918 and 1919. The final section of chapter IV will study 
Tukhachevsky as Acting Caucasian Front Commander in 1920 when he defeated 
Denikin and directed probably the archetypal Civil War operation. 
A natural break between chapters III and IV is provided by Tukhachevsky moving 
from 8th to 5th Army command in March 1919. His command experiences before this 
were formative and introduced him to the varied strands involved in fighting the 
Russian Civil War. After March 1919, Tukhachevsky's command career accelerated 
and witnessed his rise and development into perhaps the prime example of a former 
voenspetsy Red Commander. Although this natural chapter break occurs, conclusions 
on Tukhachevsky's frontline command career are reserved until the end of chapter IV, 
analysing this period of his life as a whole. 
In studying Tukhachevsky's Civil War commands in such a manner, I shall assess 
the evolution of his operational command on a tactical and strategical level, how his 
earlier commands prepared him for the North Caucasus, and fonned the operational 
basis for his Western Front Command during the Soviet-Polish War and the 
development of "Deep Battle" later. 
In doing so, I shall demonstrate how Tukhachevsky's postings matched Moscow's 
strategy of threat-identification and resource allocation, which saw the best 
commanders and majority of resources sent to the front prioritised. To set the scene, I 
shall outline Tukhachevsky's earliest assessments of the Civil War, fon-nulated 
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throughout 1919 into a cogent argument by December. Whilst examining his 
commands, Tukhachevsky's observations will be compared to his experiences before 
December to discuss the roots of his analysis and to decide whether these played a 
role in his conduct of the 1920 Caucasus campaign. 
Tukhachevsky's analysis of the Civil War 
On 17th November 1919, Efraim Sklianskii commissioned Tukhachevsky to 
prepare a report for Lenin and the Communist Party Central Committee, evaluating 
voenspetsy in the Red Army and the likelihood in the near future of raising a 
Communist Command Staff. Tukhachevsky had just been relieved as 5th Army 
Commander and the report, which he submitted on 19th November, was based on this 
command. 14 It contains conclusions drawn from Civil War combat experience, but 
also hints at clashes with Red Army personnel. These will be examined later, but the 
report displays how these had become intertwined for Tukhachevsky and how he was 
prepared to further his views on Red Army organisation through political argument. 
Referring to the employment of Tsarist voenspetsy at the inception of the Red 
Army, he wrote that it would be correct to continue this policy if voenspetsy were 
military experts. However, Tukhachevsky dismissed the majority as receiving a 
limited military education and possessing the cowed lack of initiative typical of 
Tsarist officers. The only capable voenspetsy were those educated after the reshaping 
of military academies after the Russo-Japanese War and specifically after 1908-10, 
when foreign (especially German) works were translated and taught. However, most 
of these young officers had perished in the Imperialist War and the majority of 
survivors now served Denikin. Some officers had completed shorter command 
courses during the Great War and although this provided a limited education, 
Tukhachevsky noted that more good commanders were emerging from this group 
than older voenspetsy. He continued his attack on the latter, noting, "Our old officers 
are completely ignorant of the bases of Marxism and in no way can or want to 
understand the class struggle and the need and inevitability of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat". This ignorance of Marxism prevented older voenspetsy understanding the 
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concepts underpinning the new class-based army and new forms of warfare involved 
in the Civil War, necessitating their replacement. However, "Amongst military 
commissars and junior command staff, many suitable for commanders and other posts 
exist". Promotion opportunities had to be created for them with only short theoretical 
courses needed to create unified commanders. The proof of this was provided by 5th 
Army where, 
... already for a long time this slogan was raised [unified Red Conu-nander] 
and the command staff are all communists, and the military conditions 
demonstrate its superiority over the generals and old officers. 
The great number of untalented voenspetsy must be pushed aside. 
Young and talented revolutionary commanders must occupy their places. ' 5 
Attacking older voenspetsy, but recommending younger ex-Tsarist officers such 
as himself, most of whom had perished during the Great War, could appear to be an 
attempt to solidify his own position. Promoting young military commissars and NCOs 
who had proved themselves in Civil War combat at the expense of former senior 
Tsarist officers would also help Tukhachevsky move to the top of the pile. Therefore, 
was this a ploy to ensure further personal promotion? Citing ignorance of Marxism 
against older voenspetsy suggests this, distancing himself, a Communist Party 
member, from them. However, Tukhachevsky was also now beginning to relate the 
idea of strategic concepts existing specific to Civil War, which would be applicable in 
the wider class struggle to come. In this way, his use of Marxism now intertwined 
with his assessment of how military doctrine had developed during the Civil War. He 
wrote, 
In short, in civil war, not only ours, but in other countries, because of the 
circumstances accompanying the struggle of the classes, there will 
inevitably be one and the same characteristics to the strategic forms, 
which are: huge extension of frontage, small-numbered annies, conditions 
of reinforcement, organisation of defence and securing the flanks and rear 
by way of using the allied classes, lowering of technology, and this will all 
result in... distinct operational forms. All these distinctions are proposed in 
comparison with forms of national and imperial war. 16 
With belief in the impending class struggle growing in late 1919 as revolutionary 
movements appeared in Europe and uprisings had occurred in some countries, the 
14 A N. Tukhachevsky, "Doklad, napisannyi porucheniiu V. I. Lenina, ob ispol'zovanii voennykh 
spetsialistov i vydvizhenn konu-nunisticheskogo komandnogo sostava (po opytu 5-i annii)", Izbrannye 
prol'Zvedeniia, Toni. I, pp. 27-30. 
l-' M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Doklad, napisannyi porucheniiu V. 1. Lenina", pp. 27-28 & 30. 
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possibility of spreading Civil War abroad was growing. With post-War East and 
Central Europe in a similarly ravaged state as Russia, conditions experienced during 
the Russian Civil War would be prevalent there. Therefore, an army trained and ready 
to fight under these conditions was vital. Tukhachevsky did not criticise senior 
voenspetsy to get ahead, but suggested they were incapable of adapting to the new 
conditions of the class struggle in civil war. Therefore, a new command staff 
composed of younger people who could assimilate new methods was needed. This 
vision of youth echoed Lenin's earlier calls and moves to set up the Communist Youth 
League (Komsomoo and indeed Trotsky's speech to the Ist All-Russian Congress of 
Military Commissars in June 1918.17 The young were to be educated and inculcated 
as the future of the Soviet regime. Using the naivety and radicalism of youth as 
opposed to the conservatism which often comes with age was viewed as the way 
forward and was successful in the early years of the Soviet Union. Tukhachevsky was 
making a similar argument because younger, more zealous military commanders were 
more likely to adapt to new forins of warfare, whilst the older generation would look 
back to methods in which they had been educated and, not being Marxists, would not 
want to change. 
Tukhachevsky wanted the Red Army to develop on the basis of his ideals with 
unified command prominent. In July 1919, he wrote that the use of dual command 
with political commissars watching over Tsarist voenspetsy was, 
... harmful to the quality of the army and the uprising proletariat must immediately look to create its own command cadre and in the shortest 
time possible produce unified command. 
It is possible to boldly emphasise that a completely built and 
disciplined army will only be created by introducing the principle of 
unified command. 18 
The suggestion that he had employed this within 5th Army was a bid to show that 
he was at the forefront of Red Army development, as he had been with I st Army 
previously. In late 1919 he did appear to be, because at Lenin's request, and possibly 
because of his report, Tukhachevsky delivered a lecture to the Red General Staff 
16 Ibid. p. 29. 
17 See pp 81-82. 
18 RGVA, f 37605, op. 1, d. 1, p. 59. 
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Academy on 24th December entitled Strategiia natsional'naia i klassovaia (National 
and Class Strategy), " assessing the Civil War and comparing it with the Great War. 
It appears that this may have been delivered at a conference of some kind and he 
probably met the man with whom he would work most closely on "Deep Battle" on 
this day, Vladimir Kiriakovich Triandafillov. The latter also delivered a paper to the 
General Staff on 24th December on Southern Front offensive operations against 
Denikin. 20 Tukhachevsky and Triandafillov had not fought together before this date, 
but would against Denikin in 1920 and in Tambov in 1921. As two speakers at this 
conference, it seems likely they would have exchanged ideas and their collaboration 
could possibly be dated from this point. 
Tukhachevsky had outlined the basis of his lecture and the military doctrinal side 
of his report in two works completed on 4th and I lth July 1919, Vozniknovenie 
grazhdanskoi voiny (Rise of civil war) and Sootnoshenie sil v grazhdanskoi voine 
(Corellation of forces in civil war), the former of which was included in Voina klassov 
in a slightly altered form. 21 
The differences Tukhachevsky outlined between "national" (The Great War) and 
"class" (Russian Civil War) strategy were taken from his command experience. 
Whilst this could be taken as an early display of his belief in and support for the 
development of a "new, unique" Soviet Revolutionary Military Doctrine, with which 
he is often associated, an early paragraph in his lecture is significant. Speaking of the 
peculiarities of waging civil war he said, "To research these peculiarities is our task. 
Old strategy has not died out, it is not unnecessary for us, but simply does not contain 
several essential chapters about civil war. To write these chapters is the task of the 
moment". 22 Tukhachevsky was not advocating a new revolutionary doctrine. He 
appreciated the importance of military history and the difference conditions make to 
warfare. This was the point of his lecture - to show that civil war had these 
peculiarities, but that other forms still existed. He would do this later in "Deep 
Battle", using methods he had successfully utilised in the Civil War to answer 
19 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Strategiia natsional'naia i klassovaia", Voina klassov. Stati 1919-1920gg. 
(Moscow, 192 1), pp. 5-3 1; Izbrannye proizvedeniia, Tom. I, (Moscow, 1964) pp. 31-5 1. 
20 V. K. Triandafillov, Kharakter operatsd sovremennykh armii. (trans. W. A. Burhans; ed. and 
foreword J. W. Kipp; intro. J. J. Schneider), (Portland, Or., 1994), p. 11. 
21 RG VA, f 37605, d. 1, op. 1, pp. 54-68 & 100- 10 1. M. N. Tukhachevsky, Vosniknovenie 
grazhdanskoi voiny and Sootnoshenie sil v grazhdanskoi voine; M. N. Tukhachevsky, Voina klassov. 
pp. 37-49. 
22 A N. Tukhachevsky, "Strategiia natsional'naia i klassovaia", p. 32. 
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problems brought to military questions by industrialisation and technology, to avoid a 
repetition of the Great War. Tukhachevsky existed somewhere between the two poles 
in the military debates of the early 1920s Soviet Union, about the efficacy of a new 
revolutionary doctrine, against the use of eternally lasting strategic truths. 
Tukhachevsky accepted that some methods from the past remained valid, but tried to 
answer evolving questions with what he had found in the Civil War. This led to his 
continued advocacy of "annihilation" strategy over "attrition", retaining the 
destruction of the enemy force as the primary aim in warfare. 
The first difference between national and class war was the build-up. Before a 
national war, preparations could be made and armies created and trained in readiness, 
but in class war, it could not be predicted where conflict would arise. Armies could 
only be created once an uprising had occurred and it was known where population 
supportive of the uprising was situated. As an example, Tukhachevsky noted, 
... we were not able to predict the Czechoslovak uprising... in Penza... that 
they would advance to Samara, create the Constituent Assembly there, 
that they would move further into Siberia and create an uprising in 
Cheliabinsk. We were not able to predict the counter-revolutionary Centre 
would subsequently unite and eventually the Constituent Assembly would 
convert to Kolchak's Imperialism, which would stretch from the Great 
Ocean to the Volga. 23 
It was only after the Czechoslovak uprising occurred that Tukhachevsky had been 
able to create lst Army. Earlier, there was no need for an army in the Volga, leading 
to a point he made elsewhere that civil war operational theatres appeared in areas in 
which fighting normally would not occur. 24 Initially annies would be formed along 
partisan lines, but reorganisation and regularisation was essential to form a uniform 
capable army. 
Another distinction between national and class war was the absence of recognised 
borders in the latter. These appeared between rival groups only when fighting broke 
out and formed front lines in the conflict. Where these occurred depended on 
population spread with "living centres" occurring in areas sympathetic to the 
revolution (Moscow, Petrograd, the industrialised Donbass Region) and "dying 
centres" where anti -revolutionary elements existed (the Don). Crucial to operational 
23 Ibid. pp. 33-34. 
24 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Statistika v grazhdanskoi voine", p. 84. 
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success was routing actions through "living centres" to provide a secure rear and 
operational area. 
Instability of borders combined with lower troop numbers and lower military 
technology in class war than in "national wars of mass armies", to lead to extreme 
fluidity in civil war fighting, with entrenchments replaced by manoeuvre and 
mobility. Low troop numbers meant large fronts could not be defended, with troops 
too loosely strung along the line, ruling out a defensive strategy. However, the 
retention of territory was essential in civil war because if it was lost, troops to be 
raised were also lost. Therefore, defence sometimes had to be used, but only to 
prepare for attack. Screens were required in some front sections to hold these, whilst 
concentrating troops in sectors allocated for offensive action, striking at the enemy's 
weak point to achieve a breakthrough and win more territory. Feigned attacks in other 
sectors should be used to spread enemy forces and by these methods, victory could be 
achieved in a front sector, even if an army was outnumbered along the whole line. 
This introduced one of the fundamental differences Tukhachevsky saw between 
national and class war. In the former, reinforcements had to be sent from the rear to 
replace casualties and maintain offensive momentum. However, in class war, recruits 
could be mobilised by an attacking army as it advanced because classes sympathetic 
to the revolution would willingly join the revolutionary army as it liberated them. 
Therefore, continuous offensives could be conducted, allowing pursuit of the enemy 
until its final defeat. Continually recruiting liberated class sympathisers would enable 
this. Swift pursuit was a vital part of operations and smaller troop numbers facilitated 
this as less supplies were required, allowing "... an extremely quick development of 
operations and to one operation almost uninterruptedly following another". 
Pursuit in civil war was the opposite of that employed in national war. In the 
latter, tactical pursuit was effective as retreating forces took time to form and turn into 
marching columns, which had great depth due to vast troop numbers. These troops 
could be overtaken, encircled and taken prisoner. However, strategical pursuit was 
ineffective, as a rearguard would be mounted by the retreating force, using few 
troops, to remove the main body to the rear for reorganisation and reintroduction 
later. However, in civil war, with sparse numbers, tactical pursuit showed little profit 
as retreating columns had little depth, organised quickly and could not be surrounded 
before retreating. Strategic pursuit however, was highly effective. Small troop 
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numbers meant rearguard actions could not be effectively conducted as the main 
forces themselves were often smaller than the force necessary for an effective 
rearguard. With forces scattered over the wide expanses prevalent in civil war, 
continual strategic pursuit of the whole enemy force was highly effective. This 
allowed the enemy no time for reorganisation with reconnaissance, a crucial part of 
operations, on foot and in carts, providing knowledge of enemy positions and 
allowing pursuit to be maintained. Operations against Ataman Dutov were cited as an 
example. 25 
During pursuit actions, utilisation of friendly class elements could secure the 
flanks and rear of the offensive, if attacking through "living centres". This required 
organisation and the set-up of military and political organs for coordination. 
Another possibility this particular nuance of class warfare introduced was 
uprisings by sympathisers in the enemy rear, causing disruption and allowing 
encirclements. Partisan, guerilla activity was a crucial part of class warfare and one 
which Tukhachevsky criticised many within the Red Army for not understanding, as 
they dismissed partisan use through fear of the disorganisation of partizanshchina of 
the early Red Army. This was a mistake because partisans, upon linking with the Red 
Army, provided reinforcements. A difference had to be drawn between class and 
national partisans, with the former evident within Eastern Front in Siberia in 1919, 
but the latter disrupting Southern and Ukrainian Fronts. 
Connected to this is a small section of Strategiia natsional'naia i klassovaia which 
is omitted ftom Izbrannye proizvedeniia. This points to the use of espionage and 
organising agents for class warfare, which although highly useful, was not employed 
in the Civil War. Why this was omitted from the 1964 collection is unclear. 
However, problems existed which limited operational speed. With such fluidity of 
frontage, the use of railways, (as shown in chapter 11), lost its effectiveness after the 
eshelonnaia voina of early 1918. Mobility in the field required transport, but a severe 
shortage of military transport was evident under civil war conditions. As also 
demonstrated in chapter II, Tukhachevsky's answer was to mobilise local transport 
resources, peasant carts, and where possible waterways. Tukhachevsky listed cartage 
necessary for transport. He later produced a detailed plan of cart numbers required 
25 General Aleksandr Il'ich Dutov (1879-192 1), a fon-ner Tsarist colonel, led the Orenburg Cossack 
host and fought under Kolchak in the Civil War. 
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and a system of linked depots for supply by division, to enable continuous supply and 
operations, whilst ensuring that the local population had their carts returned. He 
emphasised this should be employed to prevent troops commandeering local transport 
and antagonising the peasantry. 26 
Communications and control in the field were other problems in mobile 
operations. Army staff were often restricted to the railways and could not maintain 
contact with their forces conducting pursuit operations. Field staffs were therefore 
necessary, but communications were generally bad, (with "movement by wire" as 
indicated in chapter 11, usually the limit). 
As to initial operational forms, the use of strategic reserves was not possible, as 
poor transport and communications prevented them reaching the front in time to 
influence the battle, effectively wasting troops. Tukhachevsky included an extra 
section in the Voina klassov version of Vozniknovenie grazhdanskoi voine, which was 
not in the original essay of July 1919, and appears to have been a defence of his non- 
employment of reserve forces during the Civil War. This will be investigated further 
when examining his commands. 
The above conditions meant offensives were often launched along wider frontages 
than would normally be the case, to allow all troops to participate in battle. 
Consequently, concentric offensives were viable in that troops could be positioned 
along an initially wide front, with the flank formations closing in tighter to the centre 
as the offensive approached the target. In this way, all troops could be utilised and 
provide the necessary concentration of troops at the vital sector at the same time, 
allowing an envelopment of one or both flanks and a possible encirclement, leading to 
the annihilation of the enemy group, the ultimate objective of warfare. This required 
great coordination and the correct location for success, ensuring all forces arrived at 
the optimum time and ensured superiority of numbers, but in the Civil War this did 
not always occur. Speed and surprise were key factors in civil war to enable 
envelopment and encirclement, with intelligence and reconnaissance crucial in 
determining enemy location. The possibility of breakthrough operations in civil war 
was again very high, with troop numbers low, but again this required bold and 
decisive command which was not always forthcoming during the Civil War. 
26 A N. Tukhachevsky, "Marsh-manevr i organizatsiia transporta v grazhdanskoi voine", Voina 
klassov, pp. 10 1- 102. 
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Offensive was therefore preferable to defensive strategy. Tukhachevsky 
surnmarised the conditions under which victory could be achieved in Soomoshenie sil 
v grazhdanskoi voine, 
Thus a correlation of forces advantageous for us is achieved: 
1. a) By increasing the number of our troops in the sector of the decisive 
attack. 
b) Distracting enemy forces from this sector. 
2. By increasing the quality of troops in the decisive sector. 
The first is achieved by: 
a) Transfers, 
b) Offensive, mobilisation of loyal elements and reinforcement or in 
permitting a percentage of our units, if only those manning and guarding 
the rear, 
c) Demonstrations [feints - NC], 
d) Concentric movement and 
e) Organisation of uprisings in the rear of the enemy. 
The second is achieved by concentrating in the place of attack our most 
disciplined troops and concentrating in the appointed sector natives from 
other fronts. [loyal class elements from elsewhere - NC]. 27 
The role of strict revolutionary discipline - tribunals, Cheka and blocking 
detachments - would have been envisaged in the latter point. This was one role 
Tukhachevsky saw political agitation playing, but he would also connect his idea of 
the bold offensive as the primary aim of all military actions to Marxism, with the 
continuous offensive matching the need to maintain the continuous Marxist offensive 
against capitalism. The offensive "annihilation" doctrine was an aggressive, 
revolutionary doctrine and a method to conduct class struggle. Older voenspetsy did 
not understand this and therefore had to be replaced by younger communist- 
commanders. 
This was Tukhachevsky's assessment of civil war, formulated and written during 
1919. However, before examining his commands in 1918 and 1919 to identify the 
origins of his ideas, their accuracy, and his 1920 command, to see if he followed his 
prescribed methods, it is useful to compare the Red view of Civil War in class terms, 
with the White Command's assessment of the conflict at the same time. 
'RGVA, f 37605, op. 1, d. 1, pp. 100a-101. 
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A White Analysis 
On 7th December 1919, Lieutenant-Colonel Ovchinnikov, Head of Intelligence 
Department of Main Command Staff of Eastern Front, and Head of I st Department of 
Intelligence Department, Lieutenant-Colonel Lovchitskii, prepared a report entitled 
Opyt' issledovaniia strategicheskikh i takticheskikh uslovie grazhdanskoi voiny 
(Experience of research of strategic and tactical conditions of civil war). 28 These were 
evidently two figures within the Kolchak establishment and possibly prepared this 
report at his request. It was based on the same battlefields at the same time as 
Tukhachevsky had recorded his Civil War observations and makes a telling 
comparison. How did the other side view the conflict? 
Some obvious similarities exist between the two accounts, describing the old army 
disintegrating at the start of the Civil War and the necessity for a new one to be 
created, initially along voluntary lines, but eventually by mobilisation, preferably in 
areas containing a sympathetic population. Agitation and espionage, and punitive 
expeditions conducting raids into enemy areas were necessary to attract recruits and 
promote unrest respectively. 
The main plan of civil war was to hold occupied territory and try to increase 
influence, whilst thwarting aggressive military and political enemy moves. Internal 
order should be maintained by punitive detachments and enemy forces annihilated. 
Towns and rail and road junctions were recognised as the main points of defence with 
fortified depots necessary. Offensives were carried out mainly along rail lines, 
highways and waterways. 
Small troop numbers and insufficient military equipment and weaponry meant 
swift, almost partisan actions were required and troops had to be organised in lighter, 
more mobile formations than a regular army. Lack of troops should be compensated 
for by swift action and the use of modem military technique, eg. flame-throwers for 
street- fighting. Offensives must be decisive, with the basic principle of operations, 
".. to defeat the enemy by sectors and to be always stronger in the decisive moment in 
28 Rossiiskii tsentr khraneniia i izucheniia dokumentov noveishei istorii (hereafter RTsKhIDNI), f71, 
op. 35, d. 113 1, pp. 22-29. 
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the decisive sectorit. 29Defence was only to be used to win time and, when attacking, 
attempts had always to be made to move into the flanks and rear of the enemy. These 
were precisely the same tactics Tukhachevsky advocated. 
Supply could be easily obtained from local populations. Interestingly, no 
organised mechanism was proposed for this process and a key factor in the collapse of 
Kolchak's rear in 1919 were his forces' requisitions and depredations. In contrast, 
Tukhachevsky suggested organised use of local resources to prevent antagonism of 
the local population. 
The report continued that armed forces were organised into fortress troops for 
garrisoning depots and field troops for fighting along a) railways; b) main and dirt 
roads. Those acting outwith railways should have automobiles, bicycles, cavalry and 
horse artillery and all forces could conduct combined actions if necessary. 
However, with so few troops, field actions were not always possible, meaning 
partisan-type warfare was the most common form of engagement, and clashes 
occurred predominantly along rail lines, roads and in towns. This was an accurate 
portrayal of Kolchak's forces on the Eastern Front. 
Under these conditions, unit commanders had to be able to independently carry 
out tasks and troop units capable of operating independently, moving swiftly, having 
flexibility in organisation and operating in the absence of a secure rear, without 
communications lines. These were all similar assessments to Tukhachevsky's as was 
the point that, "The link of politics with strategy has never been so close as in the 
Civil War" and centralisation of Supreme Command was essential to direct 
operations. 30 Tukhachevsky wrote an essay entitled Politika i strategiia v 
grazhdanskoi voine (Politics and strategy in civil war) in January 1920 in which he 
made similar conclusions. 31 However, with the above conditions, only directives 
could be given from the top and individual commanders had to translate these into 
action determined by local conditions. This was another point appreciated by 
Tukhachevsky and reminiscent of his criticism of Murav'ev. 
A final similarity is supplied in the statement, "Executions of enemies rendering 
armed resistance must be mercilessly carried out - sentimentality will destroy 
29 R TsKhIDNI, f71, op. 3 5, d. 113 1, p. 24. 
30 Ibid. p. 25. 
31 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Politika i strategiia v grazhdanskoi volne" Voina klassov, pp. 31-36. 
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everything". 32 At the same time, non-Party troops were to be attracted to join the 
White forces. This reflected the idea of recruiting whilst attacking, but also the 
bitterness and savagery brought to the fighting by both sides. While the Cheka 
arrested, imprisoned and executed anti-Soviets, so anti-Communists executed any 
Party members, workers or sympathisers captured. 
It is interesting to see the similarities in tactics and strategy between the Whites 
and Reds proposed by these reports. However, differences have been discerned which 
did make an impact on the outcome and a major one worth stressing is the difference 
in organisation envisaged as Tukhachevsky urged a regular army on the Reds, while 
the Whites had to resort to partisan-like actions through lack of numbers. This 
restricted White action to main transport routes and allowed the Reds greater freedom 
of action in attempting envelopments through terrain around these. However, White 
forces did manage several offensives of a wider nature and were successful to an 
extent. Troop shortages limited the impact of these offensives and was a factor in the 
outcome of the Civil War. The viability Tukhachevsky saw in Marxism as a tool to 
attract recruits to the Red Army was based on experience, with Red mobilisations 
more successful than White, although desertion levels remained as high. The belief in 
the efficacy of Marxism would affect Tukhachevsky's development as a person and a 
military commander during the conflict and influenced his theories. 
lst Army Commander - Eastern Front: September-December 1918 
In the second half of August 1918, Tukhachevsky mobilised new recruits for Ist 
Army at the front and completed reorganisational work, whilst aiding 5th Army 
before Kazan. After the wounding of Lenin and murder of Cheka Deputy Head 
Uritskii in Petrograd, the Bolsheviks introduced the Red Terror coordinated by Feliks 
Dzierzyn'ski, a figure with whom Tukhachevsky would later work. This drive against 
anti-Soviet elements resulted in 6-7,000 executions over the next three months and 
accompanied the launch of an Eastern Front Volga offensive. 
Volga Region's communications hub Kazan' was the main target for 5th and 2nd 
Armies. 3rd Army was to attack in Ekaterinburg sector, whilst 4th Army was to 
occupy Khvalinsk, close to Syzran' and Samara. Ist An-ny was to take Simbirsk, a 
32 R TsKhIDNI, f. 7 1, op. 3 5, d. 113 1, p. 2 8. 
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supporting operation for 5th Army, but more important than this for Tukhachevsky, as 
he became the liberator of the wounded Lenin's hometown. 33 
On 8th September, Komuch met with the Siberian Regional Government and other 
anti-Soviet organisations at Ufa, creating a social democrat-conservative coalition, 
headed by a 5-man Directory. However, the Directory never enjoyed the peasant 
support of the SR Komuch Government. By 10th September, it was on the back foot, 
abandoning Kazan' to 5th Army and Simbirsk to I st Army two days later. 34 This was 
Tukhachevsky's first operation as a Red Army Commander with troops sufficiently 
organised for the task. It provides an example of Civil War combat and illustrates 
Tukhachevsky's development and ability to lead and coordinate an army in the field. 
Tukhachevsky wrote about the Simbirsk Operation in early January 1919, probably 
whilst waiting to be posted on Southern Front. The essay, Obkhody i 
kontsentricheskie dvizheniia (Envelopments and concentric movement), was his 
earliest written work on the Civil War. 35 As can be sun-nised from the title, 
Tukhachevsky used a concentric offensive to take Simbirsk, as he did with the Syzran' 
Operation to follow. From where did the idea for a concentric offensive arise? 
Tukhachevsky provides a clue by citing the German General Sigismund von 
Schlichting, a critic of Schlieffen. 36 Koritskii recalls Tukhachevsky having to explain 
what a concentric offensive was to his staff before the Simbirsk Operation because it 
was not in Russian Army regulations. 37 Therefore, it appears the use of the concentric 
offensive came from Tukhachevsky's Tsarist military academy days, but from reading 
he did in his own time. His German language skills had proved worthwhile. However, 
another Koritskii recollection demonstrates Tukhachevsky was influenced by his 
Tsarist training. Tukhachevsky apparently said, "In the present-day stage of war... it is 
necessary to strive to seize bayonet clashes. As long as moral superiority is on our 
side, success is guaranteed in our hands". 38 Tukhachevsky later wrote of the 
concentric offensive carried out by Hindenburg and Ludendorf to defeat Samsonov 
33 Direktiyjý komandovaniiafrontov Krasnoi Armii, (1917-1922gg. ). Sbornik dokumentov v 4-kh 
tomakh, (Moscow, 1971-1978), (hereafter DkfKA), Tom I, docs. 393-411, pp. 428-436. 
34 DkfKA, Tom I, p. 437, note. 
35 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Obkhody i kontsentricheskie dvizheniia" Voina klassov, pp. 105-115. 
36 H. Strachan, The First World War, Volume I, To Arms, (Oxford, 200 1), p. 178; For a discussion of 
Schlichting's theories see D. J. Hughes, "Schlichting, Schlieffen, and the Prussian Theory of War in 
1914", Journal of Military History, 59, (April 1995), pp. 257-277. 
37 N. 1. Koritskii, "V dni voiny i N, dni mira" Mikhail Tukhachevsky: Vospominaniia druzei i soratnikov, 
(Moscow, 1965), p. 69. 
38 N. 1. Koritskii, p. 69. 
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and Rennenkampf in 1914, so he knew of its effectiveness in 1918 . 
39How did he 
employ it at Simbirsk? 
Preparatory Operations 
The Czechoslovaks had a strong defensive position in Syzran-Samara-Simbirsk, 
in terms of communications and transport for transferring troops and reserves, with 
railway lines linked to their rear and Ufa. The Volga linked the three towns, allowing 
troop transfers between flanks. Simbirsk was also linked by the Volga to Kazan' 
further north. 
I st Arrny troop numbers fluctuated greatly, since Zakharov had listed 11,451 on 
21 st July, as mobilisations were countered by constant combat. Varying figures are 
available. A figure of 7,072 infantry and 325 cavalry, with 194 machine-guns, 40 
guns and 2 armoured-trains for Ist Army on 15th September, roughly matches an 
archival estimate of 10,000 and Tukhachevsky's figure of 9-10,000 for early 
September, allowing for casualties and mobilisations . 
40 During the main attack from 
9th-12th September, the Czechoslovaks in Simbirsk were outnumbered roughly 2: 1, 
but Tukhachevsky only achieved this numerical superiority, a vital prerequisite for a 
concentric offensive, by carrying out preliminary operations from 25th-28th August, 
and regrouping to improve I st Army's starting positions. 
On the right flank, Inza Division had been pressed back by a slightly larger 
Czechoslovak force (1,000: 1,200), but counter-attacked at Kuzovatovo Station, whilst 
Vitebsk Regiment of Simbirsk Division swept into the Czechoslovaks' rear, forcing 
them to retreat. On 20th August, Vareikis informed Tukhachevsky that 
reconnaissance had detected Czechoslovak movement from Buinsk towards Alatyr'- 
Ibresi Station .41 The 
latter two were stations on the Saransk-Kazan' Railway, whilst 
Buinsk lay on the Kazan'-Simbirsk road. This threatened I st Army's left flank for the 
Simbirsk Operation. Subordinated to Tukhachevsky for his offensive, Alatyr' Group 
screened Alatyr' then attacked from Ibresi to outflank the Czechoslovaks at Belyi 
39 M. N. Tukhachevsky, ed., Armeiskaia operatsiia, p. 70. 
40 DkJKA, Tom IV, pp. 36-37; M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pervaia armiia v 1918 godu", Izbrannye 
proizvedeniia, Tom I, p. 87; RTsKhIDNI, f. 71, op. 35, d. 24, p. 6. 
" 1918 god na rodine Lenina, (Kuibyshev, 1936), appendix of documents, p. 334. 
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Batyrevo and drive them back to Buinsk. This cleared the way for the Simbirsk 
Operation. 42 
In early September, Vacietis informed Tukhachevsky that reinforcements, 
promised on 25th August, had been delayed. This prevented Tukhachevsky using 
Simbirsk and Inza Divisions in a two-pronged attack as he had planned, with the 
former now given the central attacking role and the latter guarding the right flank with 
Penza Division. Regiments from Penza and Inza Divisions were transferred to 
Simbirsk Division, giving it around 8,000 men for the main attack and the other two 
1,000 apiece. The left flank was screened by Alatyr' Group with 367 men and 1,237 
43 troops further north at Shikransk screened the juncture between I st and 5th Armies . 
Therefore, Tukhachevsky concentrated the bulk of his troops in the main sector attack 
force, which would become typical of Civil War operations. Barely-covered screens 
on the flanks shielded the majority of troops in the decisive central sector, but the 
former advanced under the concentric offensive, feigning offensive action to pull 
some of the defenders away from Simbirsk. 
Tukhachevsky appears to have decided on a concentric attack only after 
discovering that the reinforcements were not coming. He could maximise the troops 
he had by this tactic, but it required the employment of all troops to extend I st Army's 
front wide enough to enable the double envelopment. Only the small International 
Regiment was retained in reserve, but even it was flung into the final assault on 
Simbirsk. To coordinate, Tukhachevsky moved Ist Army HQ forward from Inza to 
Paigarm. Monastery and formed a field staff, including Kalnins, to advance with 
Simbirsk Division from Chufarovo Station. 44 Therefore, no strategic reserves were 
retained and a field staff was used to alleviate communications difficulties. 
On 5th September, 5th Army attacked towards Kazan'. The following day, 
Vacietis ordered Tukhachevsky, 
... It 
is essential to draw off enemy reserves, so they cannot be transferred 
to Kazan'. 
42 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pervaia armna v 1918 godu", p. 86. 
43 R TsKhIDNI, f71, op. 35, d. 24, p. 6; M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pervaia ariniia v 1918 godu", pp. 86- 
87. 
44 N. 1. Koritskii, "Sozdanie I st armii I osvobozhdenie Simbirska", Simbirskaia guberniia v 1918-1920 
gg. Sbornik vospominanii. (Ul'ianovsk, 1958), (hereafter Simbirskaia guberniia) p. 65. 
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... 7th September, at dawn... launch a 
decisive offensive to Simbirsk 
and take this town. 5th Army's success is much dependent on the 
45 decisiveness of your offensive . 
Tukhachevsky discussed final preparations with Eastern Front R VS on 7th 
September, apparently concluding, "I think the attack on Simbirsk will take three 
days... from the morning of 8th September. 46 
Main Concentric Offensive 
On 8th September, Ist Army was positioned along an arc 100 versty in length, 
with Simbirsk Division in the centre, spread out from Prislonika on its left flank 
through Chufarovo Station-Annenkovo to Popovka on its right. Gai moved his forces 
to their starting positions at 20.00 hours and advanced the next morning, a day later 
than planned, along the Prislonika-lushansk-Tetiushkoe-Barataevka highway on the 
left flank, the Chufarovo-Simbirsk Railway in the centre and the Popovka-Elshanka- 
Kliuchishche-Belyi Much dirt-road on the right. To maintain an equal momentum 
along the whole front and enable envelopment of the Czechoslovak right flank to 
occur simultaneously to the central railway group arriving, 5th Kursk Regiment 
advanced up the left flank main road in motorised trucks. A cavalry group under 
Borevich, kept pace with the motorised columns, advancing along the dirt road on the 
right flank. 
47 lst Brigade of Simbirsk Division (Ist and 2nd Simbirsk Regiments) 
under Pavlovskii, formed the main body of the central and right flank groups, with the 
48 
central group advancing behind armoured-trains. Reconnaissance detected the first 
enemy defensive line at lushansk-Kliuchishche, the latter on Simbirsk Division's right 
flank. Advancing as outlined above, Alatyr' Group reached Nagatkino on the left 
flank and Inza and Penza Divisions reached Belyi-Gremiachi-Kliuch on the right, to 
tighten the arc to 60 versty by the end of the first day, without any fighting. 
The advance continued the next day amid bitter fighting with the well-fortified 
Czechoslovaks. Tukhachevsky had attached an artillery battery to each infantry 
regiment. The artillery division's political commissar Samoilov recalled this as the 
45DkfKA, Tom I, doc. 409, pp. 435-6. 
46 1.1. Mints, Grazhdanskaia voina vpovoIzhe, (Kazan', 1974), p. 93. 
47 Petr Mikhailovich Borevich (1890-192 1) was Polish and a foriner Tsarist staff-captain. 
48 N. G. Samoilov, "Kak my uchilis'voevat"', Simbirskaia guberniia, p. 237, Tukhachevsky had 
reorganised 2nd Ukrainian Artillery Division which had arrived in early August. 
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first occasion combined operations between artillery and infantry had been applied 
correctly on Eastern Front. 49 The combination proved very effective in the battles 
before Simbirsk. 
The heaviest fighting on 10th September was in the centre around Okhotnich'ia 
Station-1vanovka, where the Czechoslovaks moved up reserves overnight and were 
entrenched behind three rows of barbed wire entanglements. With 2nd Simbirsk 
Regiment pinned down by machine-gun and artillery fire, 3rd Artillery Battery was 
moved forward and directly bombarded the entrenchments. Simultaneously, Gai 
ordered 3rd Moscow and International Regiments to envelop the Czechoslovaks left 
flank, leaving only Ist and 2nd Simbirsk Regiments holding the railway. The 
envelopment was successful with grenade and bayonet attacks wiping out most of the 
Czechoslovaks and forcing a retreat. Gai employed similar tactics on the right at 
Kubshinovka, as direct artillery fire on Czechoslovak entrenchments forced them 
back to Simbirsk. This was also successful on the left flank at the second heaviest 
area of fighting where Orlovskii and Ist Kursk Regiments were pinned down around 
Tetiushkoe, Pogreba and Otrad. 4th and 6th Artilley Batteries advanced and took out 
Czechoslovak gun emplacements in turn, allowing 5th Kursk Brigade to break 
through to Lashaevka by the evening and prepare to attack Simbirsk from the north. 50 
By evening of 10th September, Ist Army had advanced 30-40 versty in two days, 
tightened the arc to under 50 versty, occupied the line Laishevka-Kliuchishchi- 
Kremenka, and was positioned for the final assault on Simbirsk .51 
Tukhachevsky 
conducted reconnaissance of the Simbirsk approaches on horseback with Kalnins and 
Gai, selecting artillery positions for supporting the infantry assault the following 
day. 52 
The advance continued on 11 th September amid steady fighting. In the centre, 1 st 
Simbirsk Regiment again utilised close-range artillery fire, to force a Czechoslovak 
armoured-train back to the Simbirsk suburbs. Villages were occupied on both flanks 
to encircle Simbirsk completely from three sides. The only open side was the Volga 
bank to the east. 53 
" Ibid. p. 237. 
50 Ibid. pp. 238-239; N. 1. Koritskii, "Sozdanie pervogo annii... ", p. 66. 
51 RTsKhIDNI, f71, op. 35, d. 24, p. 8; 0. lu. KaInin, "Bor'ba na vostochnom fronte" Simbirskaia 
guberniia, p. 46. 
52 N. 1. Koritskii, "Sozdanie pervogo armii... ", p. 67. 
53 P. A. Shuvatov, "V riadakh zheleznoi divizii", Simbirskaia guberniia, p. 28 1. 
163 
The final assault was launched at dawn on 12th September. After outflanking the 
final Czechoslovak trenches beside the River Sviiagi south-west of Simbirsk and a 
clash with White cavalry, Simbirsk Division advanced into Simbirsk. A short street 
battle ensued and a Czechoslovak annoured-train positioned on the Volga bridge 
bombarded the town as the Reds progressed, but by 12.00pm, the west bank of the 
town had been cleared. 54 Tukhachevsky informed Lenin by telegram that his 
hometown had been retaken. 55 Simbirsk factory workers had prepared an uprising in 
the Czechoslovak rear, but the swiftness of the Red attack meant it was not 
56 necessary. Indeed, Tukhachevsky informed Kuibyshev on I Ith September, "Swift 
movement of our units and constant envelopments brought them [the Czechoslovaks] 
to a state of panic, weakening its resistance. 157 
Tukhachevsky later recalled, 
This success was so unexpected for the enemy, that when we arrived in 
Simbirsk, and located Simbirsk Division HQ there, to comrade Gai 
suddenly appeared an ensign with a dispatch, sent from Sengilei to the 
Whiteguard Divisional Commander. Arriving in the evening and asking 
where the divisional HQ was, this ensign was directed straight to the 
Divisional Commander and completely unexpectedly for him, presented 
himself before comrade Gai. 58 
Peasants who had been forcibly mobilised by the Czechoslovaks willingly joined 
I st Army upon being captured, an early instance of mobilising whilst advancing. 59 
If the operation seemed to have proceeded smoothly, there were signs of problems 
which would crop up througout the Civil War. Tukhachevsky informed Kuibyshev on 
II th September that I st Army troops were approaching Simbirsk, but he did not know 
exact positions because of communications difficulties . 
60 A more pressing concern, 
but also recurrent throughout the Civil War, was a breakdown in troop discipline upon 
51 P. F. Ustinov, "Osvobozhdenie Simbirska", Simbirskaia guberniia, pp. 262-264; N. 1. Koritskii, 
"Sozdanie pervogo an-rin... ", pp. 67-68. 
55RGVA, f. 37605, op. 1, kniga 3, p. 10. 
56 D. E. Perkin, "Bor'ba za Simbirsk", Simbirskaia guberniia, p. 273. 
57 Boevoiput'Pervoi RevoliutsionnoiArmii Vostochnogo i Turkestanogo Frontov, RuW-fevral'1921gg. 
(hereafter BpPRA), doc. 27, pp. 52-53. 
58 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pervaia anniia v 1918 godu", p. 89; Upon taking Simbirsk on 12th 
September, Gai sent a telegram to Lenin saying, "Dear Vladimir Ilich! Have taken your hometown of 
Simbirsk - this is the reply to your first wound, and for the second - will be Samara", G. D. Gai, 
"Pobednyi put"', Simbirskaia guberniia, p. 32; Gai accepted an Order of the Red Banner for Simbirsk 
Division on 28th September and the division was renamed Iron Division in recognition of its 
performance, RTsKhIDNI, f. 7 1, op. 35, d. 962, p. 55; BpPRA, doc. 40, p. 63. 
59 N. 1. Koritskii, "Sozdanie pervogo armii... ", p. 67. 
'0 BpPRA, doc. 27, pp. 52-53. 
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liberating Simbirsk. 1,500 prisoners were released by the Red troops and a great deal 
of cartage and artillery captured, but instead of pressing on after the retreating 
Czechoslovaks, episodes of looting and drunkenness broke out. 61 This encouraged the 
Czechoslovaks, who had rallied, to push Red units back over the Volga bridge, dig in 
on the left bank of the Volga and begin shelling the right bank side of Simbirsk. 
Tukhachevsky saw the need to act swiftly to restore order and retain the initiative. 
He drew up plans for storming the bridge at 01.00 hours on 14th September. Gai led 
the attack again. An empty locomotive was released at full steam across the bridge to 
test its safety and tackle any Czechoslovak annoured-trains. A Red armoured-train 
and two brigades of Simbirsk Division advanced behind it under an artillery barrage, 
which had been adjusted during the day, onto the Czechoslovak positions. The bridge 
measured a verst in length and was illuminated by barges of burning oil from the far 
side, but Simbirsk Division successfully crossed in the face of machine-gun and 
artillery fire, capturing the bridge intact and forcing the Czechoslovaks to flee 
Simbirsk . 
62 Ist Arrny now had an operational rail crossing over the Volga, but this 
success was short-lived. 
Pursuing the retreating Czechoslovaks to Cherdakly, east of Simbirsk, Ist Army 
ran into a counter-attack on 15th September by Kappel's White Officer Battalion, 
which was retreating from Kazan' down the Volga left bank. Although only 
numbering 2-3,000, this was enough to push the 1,500 Ist Army pursuit troops back 
to Simbirsk. The Whites blew up the rail crossing and the intervention of the 
International Regiment was necessary to prevent Kappel' routing Ist Army from 
63 Simbirsk. This swinging to and fro of battle was typical in the Civil War, both on 
this scale of several thousand troops per side and also on a larger scale. With numbers 
limited and the terrain covered so extensive, forces would breakthrough or envelop 
the enemy, force it to flee and pursue. However, with no reserves to bolster the attack, 
a tactical overreach would occur, or in the case of Denikin in his 1919 drive on 
Moscow, a strategical overreach. The intervention of only a small force at this point 
would send the erstwhile victorious force back to its starting point and sometimes 
61 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pervaia armila v 1918 godu", p. 89. RTsKhIDNI, f 71, op. 35, d. 24, pp. 10- 
62 RTsKhIDNI, f 71, op. 35, d. 962, pp. 56-57; BpPRA, doc. 32, p. 58; M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pervaia 
an-niia Nf 1918 godu", pp. 89-90. 
63 The railNvay bridge was rebuilt by late October 1918, RTsKhIDNI, f. 7 1, op. 35, d. 962, pp. II- 12 & 
58-59. 
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further, before the same phenomenon would occur to swing the battle again. This 
pattern continued until both sides were exhausted. Simbirsk, an early clash, sets the 
pattern and shows the effect such small-numbered formations had on military action. 
However, strategical pursuit was effective, as Tukhachevsky later noted. 64 
The tide swung in I st Army's favour again with the arrival from Kazan' of 5th 
Army elements. Vacietis ordered 5th Army Commander Slaven to move his troops 
down the Volga banks and in boats to Simbirsk, where they were subordinated to 
Tukhachevsky. 65 The latter directed the operation of 5th and 1 st Army elements, 
ordering the right and left bank groups of 5th Army which numbered 10,500 troops in 
total, 66 to disembark above and below Simbirsk and outflank Kappel', whilst Simbirsk 
Division launched a costly frontal attack to pin down the Komuch troops in the town. 
This operation, another double envelopment manoeuvre, succeeded in pushing the 
Komuch forces back and cleared Simbirsk completely, with envelopments at 
Cherdakly and Briandino, but the intended encirclement was not completed. 
Tukhachevsky later criticised the commander of the group which landed below 
Simbirsk for not understanding manoeuvre warfare. The commander had successfully 
disembarked his troops and occupied Petrovskoe and Krasnyi Iar, but instead of 
advancing had wanted to dig in. The troops did not receive the order and continued 
advancing, but the Czechoslovaks escaped on a train waiting three versty behind 
them. Tukhachevsky emphasised speed, decisiveness and initiative as essential for 
effective manoeuvre. 67 Another possible reason for failure to complete the 
encirclements was again shortage of numbers. Enough troops did not exist to carry 
out deep envelopments and encirclements, but Tukhachevsky still attempted it. He did 
so in the next Syzran'-Samara Operation. 
64 See pp. 151-152. 
65 DkfKA, Tom I, doc. 417, p. 442. 
66 V boiakh rozhdennia, 1918-1920: boevoi put'5 armii. Sbornik dokumentov, (hereafter Vbr), (Irkutsk, 
1985), p. 386. 
67 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Obkhody kontsentricheskie dvizhenie", Voina klassov, pp. 112-113. 
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Continuous Mobile Offensive 
On 12th September, Vacietis, evidently not aware of events in Simbirsk, ordered, 
"Ist Army energetically develop its success in direction of Syzran' and on the left 
iM bank of the Volga... 
Two days later, he directed Tukhachevsky to assume command of all Red forces in 
Simbirsk-Syzran'-Samara area and pursue the fleeing Komuch forces, occupying 
Khvalinsk and Syzran'. 4th Army Commander Khvesin was to ensure sufficient troops 
were transferred to Ist Arrny for this and attack Samara with his remaining forces. 
Vacietis emphasised, 
... remember the enemy 
is stunned by our powerful attacks and only quick 
and combined action of all units will give us complete victory... The 
flotilla must render its utmost aid, giving continuous energetic pursuit into 
the depth of the hostile positions and allowing disembarking of loyal 
troops in the rear of the enemy. 69 
The offensive was to be maintained without respite to knock out the remaining 
Czechoslovak positions before they could reorganise. Therefore, mobile operations 
followed by pursuit were used immediately. 
Whilst Ist and 5th Armies fought around Simbirsk, 4th Army, including Vol'sk 
Division, occupied Khvalinsk on 16th September, 
70 
enabling Khvesin to split his 
forces according to Vacietis' plan. Vacietis flooded Ist, 4th and 5th Armies with 
further orders and directives whilst the struggle for Simbirsk continued, also 
instructing 2nd and 3rd Armies to prepare offensives on Ufa, Ekaterinburg and 
71 Cheliabinsk. 
While the latter two armies prevented Czechoslovak reinforcements reaching the 
Volga, on 28th September, immediately after defeating Kappel's group, 
Tukhachevsky informed Vacietis that he was beginning the Syzran'-Samara offensive. 
He reported, "In Melekess sector enemy enveloped on both flanks, defeated and 
68DkfY, 4, Tom I, doc. 412, p. 438. 
69 Ibid. doc. 413, p. 439. 
70 Ibid. p. 44 1. 
71 Ibid. docs. 415-429, pp. 441-450. 
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retreated in panic through Cherdakly. Right-bank Group took its preappointed sector. 
Simbirsk Division will concentrate in preappointed sector. " 72 
Probably because of the Simbirsk success, Tukhachevsky launched a second 
concentric offensive for Syzran'. Vol'sk Division, a brigade of Samara Division of 4th 
Army and the Volga Flotilla occupied the right flank at Khvalinsk-Fedorovka; 
Simbirsk Division occupied the left flank, facing Komuch emplacements at 
Goriushki-Masa; and Inza and Penza Divisions advanced in the centre from 
Kuzovatovo and Novospasskoe Stations. 73 Therefore, the flanks again advanced by 
road, although Vol'sk Division's Group advanced up both Volga banks with only dirt 
roads on the left bank, whilst the centre advanced along and beside the railway behind 
armoured trains, an initial frontage of 100-120 versty. Simbirsk Division was again 
given the main task to take the Aleksandrovskii Most Volga bridge behind Syzran', 
cutting the Komuch forces'path of retreat. Tukhachevsky gave command of the other 
three divisions to Engel'hardt to ease coordination, but also because he was forced by 
Vacietis' stream of directives, to move on Syzran' with these Divisions on 22nd 
September. Therefore, a numerical superiority of 2: 1 was only gained after Simbirsk 
Division was freed from the Kappel' battle. This was probably another reason for the 
concentric offensive as Simbirsk Division could slot into place on the left flank, 
despite Engel'hardt's group attacking earlier, allowing the continuous offensive to 
proceed. 
From 28th September, the attack group numbered around 20,000 infantry, 1,000 
cavalry, 140 guns, 400 machine-guns and 10 armed steamboats against a Komuch 
force of 6,480 infantry, 3,300 cavalry, 25-35 guns, 100-150 machine-guns and 8-12 
armed steamboats, defending along internal lines and switching men between flanks. 
Tukhachevsky concentrated 9,000 men under Gai for the vital sector, Inza and 
Penza Divisions numbered 2,000 apiece and the right flank 7,000. Vol'sk Division had 
just been formed from partisan detachments by Kuibyshev and 4th Army's formations 
were not much better organised, which was probably a factor in Tukhachevsky 
retaining larger numbers here, although the twin-bank advance did need more bodies 
and the rapid offensive development left no time for regrouping. 
72 D_ 
73 DPPRA, 
doc. 4 1, P. 64. 
R TsKhIDNI, f. 7 1, op. 35, d. 77, p. 3 -, M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Obkhody i kontsentricheskie 
dvizheniia", pp. 108-110. 
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From 22nd September-Ist October, Vol'sk Division's group advanced 60 versty 
northwards, whilst Inza and Penza Divisions battled along the railway lines, with the 
Czechoslovaks blowing up bridges and burning down railway stations and villages as 
they retreated, to slow the Reds. Railway engineers worked ahead of the Red forces 
and local inhabitants were mobilised as the advance continued. After heavy fighting at 
Balasheika Station, Inza Division captured four armoured-trains and weaponry, but on 
27th September, the Czechoslovaks counter-attacked against Vol'sk Division, driving 
it back to Khvalinsk and threatening to open up Penza Division's right flank. 
Czechoslovaks advanced into this gap to exploit the breakthrough, but Penza 
Division's right flank battalion and Smolensk Regiment held firm, almost wholly 
wiping out the Czechoslovaks. As the advance continued, Kappel's 2nd White 
Volunteer Division was routed and retreated. At this point, Simbirsk Division joined 
the fray, crossing the Volga by steamboat to capture Sengilei and Novodeviche on the 
right bank on 30th September. 74 
On the same day K. Kozlov, Deputy Head of Ist Army Political Department, 
reported, 
On the front of Simbirsk Division organisational work is continuing. 
Pursuing enemy very successfully, occupying Sengilei without battle. 
Have started evacuating... valuable materials, metals etc. Masses of 
mobilised whiteguards defected to us with weapons in hand. Workers of 
the cartridge factory passed a grateful resolution, proposing a mobilisation 
75 of workers. They sense the need for energetic work... 
This illustrates perfectly the methods used not only in 1918, but throughout the 
Civil War. A breakthrough was followed by swift pursuit, mobilising not only 
liberated civilians on the way, but also defectors or prisoners from anti-Soviet forces. 
Supplies were captured or acquired and new recruits meant that the "organisational 
work" mentioned by Kozlov continued, to retain regular formations and prevent a 
reversion to partizanshchina. Therefore, at this early stage, Tukhachevsky witnessed 
the possibility of mobilising liberated workers and captured troops alike, allowing 
offensives to proceed continuously without respite, pursuing the enemy relentlessly 
and retaining momentum, which he outlined in Strategiia natsional'naia i klassovaia. 
This reinforced the need for a communist hardcore to politicise new recruits and 
retain discipline, as proper induction and training were not possible under battle 
14 R TsKhIDNI, f71, op. 3 5, d. 7 7, pp. 3-7. 
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conditions. In many respects, this was a continuation of the summer formation period, 
mobilising recruits and sending them straight into action with virtually no training. 
The capture of Sengilei exposed Syzran' and Samara. On 2nd October, Vacietis 
directed I st and 4th Armies to attack the two towns, 
Received reports that Samara is being evacuated amid panic. 
I order all forces to move energetically to Syzran' and Samara, not 
allowing the enemy the possibility to create a planned evacuation of these 
towns. The attack must be as decisive as possible. 76 
The pursuit was to continue and gain its ultimate objective, the encirclement and 
defeat of the enemy forces. However, reports of evacuations were premature as 
Komuch forces still defended Syzran'and Samara. 
With Simbirsk Division advancing southwards down the Volga and Vol'sk 
Division's group moving northwards again, the Komuch forces, pinned down frontally 
by Inza and Penza Divisions, were in danger of encirclement. In bitter defensive 
battles, Komuch lost over 3,000 men. As I st Arrny closed the ring, a workers' uprising 
occurred at Ivashchenko Factory, between Syzran' and Samara, throwing the 
defenders rear into disarray and forcing retreat to Samara. 77 Inza and Simbirsk 
Divisions occupied Syzran' at midday on 3rd October, only a day behind 
Tukhachevsky's schedule. 78 
Again encirclement had not been completed, but the delay in employing Simbirsk 
Division counted against this, as did the tenacity of the Komuch defending, with two 
efforts required by Simbirsk Division to take Aleksandrovskii Most under intense 
artillery and machine-gun fire. Vitebsk Regiment blocked the Czechoslovaks' retreat 
over the bridge, forcing the latter to cross the river by boat or swimming. 79 
Engel'hardt may also have influenced the failure. After the operation, he defected 
southwards to Denikin and during the fighting lost contact with his staff and gave 
contradictory reports to those received from the front. Ist An-ny staff were forced to 
communicate directly with divisional staffs to direct the operation. 80 
75BpPRA, doc. 43, p. 65. 
76 BpPRA, doc. 44, pp. 65-6; DkfKA, Tom I, doc. 43 1, p. 45 1. 
77 RTsKhIDNI, f 71, op. 35, d. 77, pp. 8-11. 
78 BpPRA, doc. 45, p. 66; M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pervaia armfia v 1918 godu", p. 92. 
79RGVA, f 37605, op. 1, kniga 3, p. 11; RTsKhIDNI, f 71, op. 35, d. 77, pp. 13-14. 
80 N. 1. Koritskii, "V dni voiny i dni mira", Mikhail Tukhachevsky: Vospominaniia druzei i soratnikov, 
(Moscow, 1965), pp. 75-76. 
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On 6th October, the new Eastern Front Commander S. S. Karnenev, ordered 
Tukhachevsky and Khvesin to regroup and attack Stavropol' and Samara 
respectively. 81 However, fierce pursuit battles had been raging for the previous three 
days and the Samara Czechoslovak Group advanced to reinforce those retreating from 
Syzran', brutally suppressing the Ivashchenko workers' rising. 4th Army units under 
Chapaev advanced from the south and Vol'sk Division linked with Inza and Penza 
Divisions to maintain pursuit. Further armoured-trains, artillery and equipment 
abandoned by the retreating Komuch forces were captured. Simbirsk Division, 
advancing along the left bank above the Volga's vast curve before Samara, captured 
Stavropol' on 6th October, exposing Samara from the right for the final assault. 82 
However, this was not needed as on 8th October, Tukhachevsky telegraphed 
Vacietis, "7th October workers of Samara expelled the Whiteguards at 14.00 hours. 
At 17.00 hours units of 4th Army entered, and at 20.00 hours units of my army 
entered. Samara is in our hands. , 83 
This introduced another vital component of class warfare to Tukhachevsky - 
uprisings in the enemy rear. It had occurred at Ivashchenko and proved crucial at 
Samara when Komuch troops evacuated the town after the rising. Dependent upon 
scale, risings could disrupt enemy communications or contribute to an encirclement 
and would impact further in 1919. 
From 10th-17th October, a further 1,000 troops were mobilised to Ist Army from 
those liberated in Samara, another case of mobilising on the move. 
84 
Kappel' later assessed the Syzran'-Samara Operation, 
Upon abandoning Syzran' and Samara after a long productive march in 
difficult conditions from Syzran' to Kinel' (with our left flank and rear 
constantly threatened with Red units intersecting our path of retreat) 2nd 
Division had completely fallen apart, both morally and in number. The 
final result was those mobilised almost to a man fled from the ranks of the 
units... Almost exclusively volunteers remained... 
The condition of the troops was such that military tasks, although of a 
defensive character, could not be fulfilled successfully, since 2nd Division 
no longer functioned as a fighting unit .... 
85 
" DkfKA, Toin I, doc. 433, pp. 452-453. Sergei Sergeevich Kamenev (1881-1936), a former Tsarist 
Colonel. 
S2 BpPRA, doc. 47, p. 70, DkJKA, Toin I, p. 453. 
83 BpPRA, doc. 48, p. 70. 
84 R TsKhIDNI, f71, op. 3 5, d. 77, p. 16. 
" Ibid. p. 17. 
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Tukhachevsky had proven adaptable to civil war conditions. This was fighting 
quite different to that encountered during the Great War, which had also involved 
manoeuvre, but on a larger scale than the Volga battles. Less troops demanded the 
utilisation of whatever technology or weaponry was available and Tukhachevsky had 
shown great imagination in his planning of both Simbirsk and Syzran'-Samara 
Operations, employing motorised vehicles alongside armoured-trains and cavalry to 
give each of his divisions mobility and coordinate their movement, to enable the 
application of concentric offensives. He later wrote of the need for speed and 
initiative in conducting concentric offensives and had shown here that he possessed 
the latter which enabled him to maintain the former. Launching continuous 
manoeuvre envelopment operations alongside sustained rapid pursuit battles cleared 
the Volga within a month, a remarkable feat considering the previous faltering 
performances of Eastern Front. Tukhachevsky had played the decisive role with Ist 
Anny, spearheading the Simbirsk and Syzran-Samara Operations, which involved the 
heaviest fighting of the 1918 Eastern campaign. He had been well-served by his 
divisional commanders, notably Gai, but also Lacis with Inza Division, and he readily 
acknowledged their roles and called upon them in later campaigns as trusted 
comrades. 
This detailed look at the Volga battles illustrates the type of warfare involved in 
the Civil War. Although the numbers of some forces increased in 1919, the tactics 
utilised above remained valid as the level of weaponry barely increased. Mobility and 
manoeuvre were the order of the day and although Tukhachevsky did not have great 
cavalry numbers in his forces, he compensated for their absence by motorising his 
infantry, giving him an early appreciation of the advantages this proffered and 
perhaps influencing his preference for the motor over the horse. 
Pursuit Operations 
I st and 4th Armies had covered 200 kms in nine days, whilst 5th Army had 
advanced eastwards from Simbirsk along the railway towards Bugul'ma. However, no 
respite was allowed and on 8th October, Eastern Front R VS directed further tasks. 
I st Army develop energetic actions for pursuing the retreating enemy to 
Buguruslan-Belebei sector, having final aim of taking Ufa. 
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4th Army develop actions with right flank in Ural'sk sector, with main 
forces - in Buzuluk-Orenburg sector. 
5th An-ny to continue movement in general direction of Bugul'ma, 
having final aim of taking Ufa. 86 
This was the initial order for the Ufa Operation to capture the Directory HQ. For 
Tukhachevsky, this involved the Buguruslan, Bugul'ma, Buzuluk and Belebei 
Operations in October and November and the final combined assault with 4th Army 
on Orenburg, in support of 5th Army's December attack on Ufa. 
The rise in 1 st Army numbers during the capture of the Volga areas and the 
mobilisation of local inhabitants and ex-Komuch soldiers is apparent, with the army 
doubling in size from 7,072 in mid-September to 14,774 infantry and 627 cavalry 
with 368 machine-guns, 72 guns and 2 armoured-trains on 7th October. Evidently, 
Tukhachevsky's later theory about increasing the size of the army by attacking during 
civil war was working in terms of captured military hardware and personnel. 87 
The October-November operations did not involve the bitter fighting of Simbirsk 
or Syzran', but by the end of the year, I st Army and Eastern Front as a whole, had 
been fighting continuously for four months. They had been engaged in battle or 
pursuit, unable to stop for reorganisation, mobilising on the move, trying to catch, 
encircle and destroy retreating anti-Soviet forces, whilst holding their own stretched 
forces together. However, by late 1918, Eastern Front was nearing its strategic reach. 
This can be surmised by I st Army containing 14,070 infantry and 600 cavalry with 
315 machine-guns and 54 guns by Ist December. 88 With no great combat ensuing as 
the remaining Komuch forces continued to retreat, inhabitants of areas Ist Army 
travelled through had little compulsion to join the Reds. They had not been forcibly 
mobilised by Komuch and had experienced no fighting around their home areas. 
Therefore, the numbers gained on the Volga were not matched further east. Desertion 
was also a huge problem for all sides during the Civil War as troops left armed 
service to remain in their home areas. The Russian word mir translates as both peace 
and world. The mir system was still strong in the villages and for many their village 
was their world. Peasants saw no reason to travel anywhere else when they had their 
land at home, far less fight elsewhere. Therefore, Ist Army figures remained fairly 
86 DkJKA, Tom I, doc. 435, pp. 453-454. 
87 DkJKA Tom Il', p. 47. 
88 Ibid. p. 5 1. 
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constant for the rest of Tukhachevsky's command, dropping slightly if anything 
towards the end of the year. 
This pattern is clear for Eastern Front as a whole, numberIng 52,799 infantry and 
3,394 cavalry on 15th September, but ballooning to 106,000 infantry and 7,000 
cavalry (minus 2nd Army) by 7th October. The potential for problems emerging by 
the end of the year is demonstrated by numbers plummeting again to 75,820 infantry 
and 10,030 cavalry by Ist December, as Moscow prioritised Southern Front. 
Hardware captured and acquired saw machine-guns rise from 916 to 1,717 and guns 
from 215 to 376 from September to December, but again the biggest rise occurred on 
the Volga. 89 
During the drive East, Ufa was targeted to the neglect of 2nd, but especially 3rd 
Army in Perm'. The installation of Kolchak as Supreme Ruler of Russia by an 
officers' coup in Omsk on 18th November, overthrowing and arresting the Directory, 
and the appearance of Denikin with the Armed Forces of Russia, meant something 
had to give. This occurred on 24th December, as Kolchak captured Penn' during his 
first offensive. 
Moscow, believing the Eastern situation was well in hand, had prioritised the new 
Southern Front forming against Denikin, transferring troops from Eastern Front. 
Tukhachevsky received a directive on 10th November from Eastern Front RVS 
concerning this. Whilst 4th and 5th Armies were instructed to attack Ural'sk and Ufa 
respectively, "Supreme Commander has nominated the whole of Ist Army for 
despatch to the other front". 90 However, worsening conditions on Eastern Front under 
Kolchak's offensive led to only Inza Division transferring in early December. 
Tukhachevsky remained with Penza and Simbirsk Divisions, to act in Orenburg and 
Ufa sectors, as 4th and 5th Armies had insufficient forces to hold the line without 
them. 91 This had left the Ufa attack force understrength, far less 3rd Army. 2nd Army 
was belatedly sent to reinforce the line and stall Kolchak's offensive, whilst Stalin and 
Dzierzyn'ski were despatched to investigate the "Red Marne". 92 
89 Ibid. pp. 38,49 &51. On 7th October, Eastern Front possessed 1,627 machine-guns and 404 guns. 
From 15th September-7th October, the number of annoured-trains increased from 6 to 8, but no figure 
is given for December. 
90 DkfKA, Toni I, doc. 664, p. 708. 
91 Ibid. p. 782, endnote 167. 
92 This was the name given to the "Perm' catastrophe". 
174 
Despite the loss of Perm', transfer of resources southwards and Ufa falling, the 
push eastwards continued, aiming for Kolchak further east in Omsk. Ist Army 
captured Sterlitamak on 29th December and 5th Army occupied Ufa two days later, 
but were ordered to maintain the offensive the next day, although the need to halt 
temporarily was acknowledged on 3rd January when Eastern Front RVS instructed 
regrouping to be conducted before moving on Orenburg. 93 
This signalled the end of campaigning on Eastern Front for Tukhachevsky. On 4th 
January, he handed over command to Gai and departed for Southern Front. 94 
In 1919, Tukhachevsky recalled Ist Army's contribution to Eastern Front in 1918, 
writing, 
From the start of the Simbirsk offensive until the taking of Buguruslan 
was six weeks (from 9th September-28th October), and in this time units 
of Ist Army covered in battles 800 versty. This is a rare example in 
military history. 
For these six weeks on Eastern Front the white guards lost around 
150,000 square versty. Of these the portion of Ist Army alone (of five 
[Eastern Front Armies]) was around 70,000 square versty. 
During these six weeks on Eastern Front 19 towns were taken. 
Of these: a) alone the troops of Ist Army took nine towns (Buinsk, 
Tetiushi, Simbirsk, Melekess, Sengilei, Stavropol', Syzran', Buguruslan 
and Buzuluk) and b) under cooperation I st Army took three towns 
(Khvalinsk, Samara, Sergievsk). 
It is possible to say without exaggeration that last autumn I st Army 
decided the fate of Eastern Front. 95 
Murky Transfers? 
If Tukhachevsky's service as I st Army Commander had been successful, it 
apparently ended under a cloud. S. P. Medvedev, who had replaced Kuibyshev as 
political commissar in October 1918, complained to Trotsky about Tukhachevsky 
ordering provisions to celebrate New Year. Tukhachevsky retaliated by describing 
Medvedev as "provocational" and undermining his command. Daines suggests 
93 BpPRA, doc. 63, p. 88; DkfK, 4, Tom I, docs. 687 & 689, pp. 723-724 & 725-726; Orenburg was 
eventually taken by I st and 4th Armies on 22nd January, meeting at this point with Turkestan Amy, 
advancing from the south, linking Central Russia with Turkestan. I st and Turkestan Armies were 
united under Gai's command and captured Ural'sk on 22nd January, with 4th Anny coming under the 
command of Frunze on 31 st January, MIKA Tom. IV, p. 536; RTsKhIDNI, f. 7 1, op. 35, 
d. 962, pp. 
64-64 & 68. 
94 BpPRA, doc. 64, pp. 88-89. 
95 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "K iubileiu pervoi annii", Simbirskaia guberniia, p. 25. 
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Trotsky demanded that Tukhachevsky be called to order and posted him away. 96 
Tukhachevsky was appointed Deputy Commander of Southern Front on 26th 
December 1918, which, although on paper a promotion, could have been punishment 
for his indiscretion. He apparently languished in this post for three weeks. 97 SMiMOV 
simply remarks Tukhachevsky and Medvedev had a "serious dispute", 98 but Sokolov 
points to deeper issues and to the two men being complete opposites. 
Medvedev was part of the "Workers' Opposition" at the 1921 1 Oth Party Congress, 
a hardline leftist, very likely against the use of voenspetsy. (The two men were 
certainly at opposite poles of the communist spectrum in March 1921 as 
Tukhachevsky was suppressing Kronstadt at this time, an action condemned by the 
Bolshevik hard-left). As has already been shown, Tukhachevsky firmly believed in 
unified command by communist-commanders. Possibly related to the dispute, he 
wrote to Vacietis on 22nd December, emphasising that he was a loyal communist and 
did not require political commissars to watch over him. 
Sokolov suggests Medvedev's complaint was also related to Tukhachevsky having 
his wife, family members and others staying in his command train, using army stores 
for them and amassing a swollen Ist Army staff with no apparent qualitative gain. 
However, as Sokolov also notes and as has already been shown in chapter 11, hardly 
any Tukhachevsky-appointed staff defected. His two brothers, Nikolai and Aleksandr, 
apparently worked in his staff on the command train, but they were trained soldiers. 99 
However, Tukhachevsky did invite the female members of his family to stay in his 
train during the Civil War. His mother was at Inza en route to Simbirsk when the 
Murav'ev uprising occurred and his sisters visited him - Sonia with 5th Army; 01'ga 
and Elizabeth on Western Front; Maria at Tambov, although no mention of visitors to 
Eastern Front after his mother is made. 100 His wife was a regular visitor, but this was 
possibly regular practice within the Red Army. 101 All this could have antagonised 
Medvedev. Sokolov refers to Koritskii who described Tukhachevsky as maintaining 
96 V. 0. Daines, p. 44. 
97 Voennye bumagi L. D. Trotskogo, Reel 5, f 4, op. 3, d. 26, p. 34. Frunze was appointed 4th Army 
Commander and Novitskii as 4th Army Chief-of-Staff in the same order. 
98 G. V. Smimov, Krovaiývi marshal: Mikahil Tukhachesvky, 1893-1937, (St. Petersburg, 1997), pp. 
251-252. 
99 S. T. Minakov, Sovelskaia voennaia elita 20-kh godov, (Orel, 2000), p. 130. 
100 RGVý-I, f 37605, op. 1, d. 3, p. 42. 
'01 See p. 106, Blagonravov's wife is mentioned as being in the train in which Murav'ev's accomplices 
fled from Simbirsk, indicating she was present at the front. 
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his command-train in a professional condition for work and studying most nights, 
barely sleeping. This was echoed by Elizabeth who recalled that Tukhachevsky hardly 
slept during offensives, sometimes for only half an hour at his desk in two weeks. 102 
As has been shown, Ist Army was continuously attacking througout 1918, giving 
little time for Tukhachevsky to indulge a large entourage, although "hangers-on" may 
still have been in the train. 
Kalnins, with whom Tukhachevsky had already clashed, backed Medvedev, 
criticising Tukhachevsky for taking decisions and making alterations with which the 
commissars did not agree. He urged Moscow to back a loyal Bolshevik over someone 
who had only joined the Party in August- September 1918. Although Kalnins was 
inaccurate with his dates, this demonstrated how Tukhachevsky was still viewed by 
some of his fellow command staff and vividly illustrates the precarious relationships 
generated within the RVS command structure. Samsonovich, Penza Division's 
political commissar also backed Medvedev. However, Sokolov suggests 
Tukhachevsky only complained about Medvedev once he had secured the transfer to 
Southern Front. 1 03 This suggests Tukhachevsky's transfer was not a punishment and 
that Trotsky backed him, transferring Medvedev instead. 
A clash over the dual command structure, a common occurrence within the Red 
Army, is feasible with such diametrically opposed viewpoints within I st Army R VS. 
It is also likely that Trotsky supported Tukhachevsky against the commissars, given 
the connections between the two. Trotsky had previously backed voenspetsy against 
political commissars, knowing the conditions they were fighting under and that the 
voenspetsy were the military experts who could get the job done. 
Soviet biographies unsurprisingly fail to mention the dispute, but more 
surprisingly, neither do Western accounts. 104 The latter stick with the formers' version 
that Tukhachevsky was transferred because Komuch was defeated and Kolchak was 
just emerging, leaving Southern Front as the greatest threat and prioritised by 
Moscow. Therefore, Tukhachevsky was transferred because he had accomplished his 
task on Eastern Front so well and was now needed to sort out the next trouble-spot. 
102 N. 1. Koritskii, "V dni voiny... ", pp. 61 & 65-66; RGVA, f 37605, op. 1, d. 3, p. 1. 
103 B. Sokolov, Mikhail Tukhachevský,: zhizn'i smert'"Krasnogo marshala", (Smolensk, 1999), pp. 81- 
85. 
104Spahr, Butson and Kaufmann all fail to mention the dispute. 
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This version is also possible as will become clearer once Tukhachevsky's path 
through the whole Civil War is shown. 
However, the truth perhaps lies somewhere in between. It is very likely that the 
disputes between Tukhachevsky and the commissars had festered away for weeks or 
even months and had finally escalated to a level that necessitated change. Possibly 
Tukhachevsky and Medvedev were both transferred to demonstrate that this type of 
bickering was not acceptable. However, the transfers would not have occurred if 
Eastern Front was still prioritised. Only the rise of Krasnov and Denikin in the South 
and the relative calm of the East spurred Trotsky to take action, killing two birds with 
one stone. He relieved the tension, but in doing so, moved his most successful 
commander to the trouble-spot. It is very likely Tukhachevsky was appointed Deputy 
Southern Front Commander and then 8th Army Commander to carry out the 
reorganisational work he had conducted so adeptly already, initially on a front level, 
but then with an army which required rebuilding. 
Moscow was desperately trying to pull Southern Front together at this time. In 
January 1919 Vacietis remarked that Southern Front troops fled the field of battle at 
the slightest reverse. This was a situation comparable to Eastern Front in June 1918, 
as partisan Red Guard forces were shown to be no match for slightly organised troops. 
However, following the example of Eastern Front's installation of strict discipline by 
revolutionary tribunal, initiated by Tukhachevsky, this was carried to new lengths on 
Southern Front, brutally punishing desertion and refusal to fight. In late 1918,2,000 
8th Army troops had been sentenced to death. However, Vacietis criticised the fact 
that only 150 of these sentences had been fulfilled, leaving a shortfall of 1,850 which 
"... does not achieve any kind of military work". He noted, "That discipline which we 
have to practise on the fronts, will be discernible only by the heroic measures of 
bringing to heel the military mob we have on the fronts to form regiments, divisions, 
t, 105 an-nies . 
Who better to carry out this brutal reorganisational work than the man who had 
inaugurated the practice on Eastern Front. Tukhachevsky had moulded a partisan 
rabble into the best army on Eastern Front, therefore Trotsky and Vacietis now 
wanted him to do the same in the South. I would argue that this is the most likely 
'0' J. Vacietis, "Grazhdanskaia voina, 1918 god", Pamiat'. Istoricheskii sbornik, No. 2, (Moscow, 
1977), pp. 72-73. 
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reason for Tukhachevsky's transfer South and possibly the truth behind the dispute 
with Medvedev also lies in Tukhachevsky's readiness to utilise these methods, which 
was entirely contrary to the views of the hard-left Bolsheviks. 
However, Tukhachevsky apparently either did not enjoy or did not fit into the post 
of Deputy Front Commander. An ex-Tsarist Colonel P. A. Slaven was Front 
Commander and his staff comprised 17 ex-Tsarist voenspetsy, six generals, seven 
colonels and 3 lieutenant-colonels. Ivanov suggests a great enmity emitted from these 
and other former general staff officers towards former 2nd-Lieutenant Tukhachevsky 
and the official registering of his new post was delayed by one and a half months. ' 06 
There are also suggestions that Stalin did not like or trust Tukhachevsky either, 
which would be plausible after the Medvedev episode, and kept him at the rear where 
he could not interfere. Stalin had already clashed with Trotsky after taking it upon 
himself to become involved with Southern Front R VS. He had initially been posted as 
Special Plenipotentiary for Grain Requisitioning, but had manoeuvred himself and 
Sergei Minin into the RVS as political commissars and tried to replace an ex-Tsarist 
Colonel Sytin with Voroshilov as military commissar in October 1918. Trotsky had 
Stalin and Co. recalled and removed and Stalin did not rejoin Southern Front RVS 
until 3rd October 1919.107 It is very possible he would have not taken kindly to 
Tukhachevsky, another ex-voenspetsy appointed by Trotsky, arriving, but it is 
difficult to see what influence he could have had on R VS affairs when he was not a 
member. Whether any of this unsettled Tukhachevsky or he missed commanding in 
the field, it is suggested he applied for the first frontline command to become 
available, which was 8th Army. ' 08 
V. M. Gittis had commanded 8th Army since Ist July 1918, but on 15th January 
Slaven removed him for not fulfilling orders and referred him to a revolutionary 
tribunal. 109 Evidently appalled at Slaven taking such an unauthorised decision, 
Trotsky contacted Southern Front R VS on 19th January, 
I utterly and completely share Supreme Commander's opinion about the 
intolerable removal of Army Commander Gittis. It is forbidden to throw 
away people, who conscientiously conduct good work. Regarding 
106 V. M. lvanov, Marshal M. N. Tukhachevsky, 2nd edition, (Moscow, 1990), p. 87. 
107 DkfKA, Tom IV, p. 533; For the "Tsaritsyn Affair" and the beginnings of the Trotsky-Stalin feud see 
E. Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War, (Edinburgh, 2000), pp. 88-91. 
108 V. M. lvanov, Marshal M. N. Tukhachevsky, p. 88. 
109 DkJKA, Toni IV, p. 538; DkJKA, Tom I, doc. 591, pp. 626-627; Vladimir Mikhailovich Gittis (1881- 
1938), a former Tsarist colonel. 
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Iskratsy, he has declared himself ill and there is visibly no hope of his 
quick return to Southern Front. The question about a temporary 
replacement becomes more significant. I am afraid Tukhachevsky may not 
prove to be for this post. Is it not better to appoint Tukhachevsky to 8th 
Army, and Gittis to the front? I ask for a report on the front position at the 
present mornent. ' 10 
Evidently Trotsky had removed Slaven for his actions, but it appears 
Tukhachevsky was recommended to replace him, which would belie any notion he 
was treated shoddily by Southern Front staff. However, Trotsky intervened personally 
to prevent this, suggesting Gittis for the post and Tukhachevsky to replace him. It is 
possible Trotsky felt Tukhachevsky did not have the experience of Gittis for the Front 
Command post, which was probably correct. He had only been I st Army Commander 
for six months. However, Trotsky also possibly felt Tukhachevsky's talents should be 
utillsed to bring 8th Army back into line. Gittis was perhaps a capable commander, 
but had obviously not been prepared to conduct mass repression against his own 
troops to instill iron discipline, with the earlier executions unfulfilled. Tukhachevsky 
had done this with I st Army and would do so again with 8th Army. Trotsky's 
recommendations were confirmed on 20th January and Tukhachevsky served as 8th 
Army Commander until 15th March. "' 
However, this was not the end of Southern Front squabbling. The actual combat 
on Southern Front, in which Tukhachevsky successfully led 8th Army for two months 
against Krasnov, is not as important in assessing him overall as the complete 
breakdown in working relations he had with Gittis. A suspicion clouds this episode. It 
is possible that the vehemence with which Tukhachevsky complained about Gittis' 
command was simply fuelled by a resentment over Trotsky's decision. Tukhachevsky 
felt he should have been appointed Front Commander and was determined to 
undermine and destroy Gittis for receiving the post. However, this was not necessarily 
the case. A brief summary of the conduct of the Southern Front fighting sets the scene 
and this, combined with Tukhachevsky's evolving theories of civil warfare, set him on 
the way to his July and December 1919 analysis of the conflict. 
110 RTsKhIDNI, f, 325, op. 1, d. 479, p. 2; translation of document contained in A. B. Murphy, The 
Russian Civil War: Primary Sources, (New York, 2000), p. 69. 
111 RGV, 4, f. 37605, op. 1, kniga 1, p. 9; DkJKA, Tom IV, pp. 533 & 538. Khvesin became 8th Army 
Commander and Gittis retained his post until 13th July 1919. 
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8th Army Commander - Southern Front: January-March 1919 
Combat in the Don 
The withdrawal of the Central Powers from November 1918 had opened up 
European Russia down to the Donbass and Don Regions. In the Don, General 
Krasnov commanded the Don Cossack Army and used this opportunity to secure his 
grip on the region, although he had to fight continuously with Red forces to hold onto 
his home territory. However, further south in the Kuban, Denikin had used the barrier 
afforded by German occupation during 1918 to secure the region. He built up the 
Armed Forces of South Russia with capable commanders, Generals Mai-Maevskii 
and Wrangel, serving under him. ' 12 In early 1919, Denikin launched an offensive 
against the Red Caucasus-Caspian Front. This was a disorganised mass of around 
150,000 troops riddled with typhus and Denikin routed it completely by early 
February with only 25,000 men. 113 The timing was crucial for the Don theatre as 
Denikin was able to despatch forces here as Southern Front was attacking, greatly 
influencing the outcome. 
Southern Front comprised from east to west, 10th Army at Tsaritsyn, 9th Army at 
Balashov, 8th Army at Voronezh and Donets Group under Kozhevnikov, which 
became 13th Army on 5th March-' 14 On its right flank operated Ist-3rd Ukrainian 
Partisan Divisions under Nestor Makhno, fighting for the Reds at this point. 
Therefore, in Southern Front's offensive, 8th Army acted with 9th Army on its left 
flank and Donets Group on its right. 
On 15th February 1919, midway through Tukhachevsky's command, 8th Army 
contained 22,700 infantry and 1,250 cavalry with 152 guns and 730 machine-guns. 
11 5 
He was commanding slightly more troops, but with less weaponry than on Eastern 
Front. Inza Division under Lacis was within 8th An-ny's complement and 
Tukhachevsky apparently appointed it his main operational force, putting his trust in 
his former Eastern Front colleague. ' 16 
112 Vladimir Zenonovich (Zinov'evich) Mai-Maevskii (1867-1920), a former Tsarist Lieutenant- 
General, Baron Petr Nikolaevich Wrangel (1878-1928), a former Tsarist Major-General. 
113 E. Mawdsley, pp. 161-163. 
'" DkJKA, Toin IV, p. 542. 
115 Ibid. p. 56. 
'" V. M. lvanov, p. 88. 
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Altogether on 15th February, Southern Front lined up 99,400 infantry, 17,650 
cavalry, 460 guns and 2,040 machine-guns, 16 armoured-trains and 68 planes, whilst 
neighbouring Ukrainian Front fielded 43,600 infantry, 3,520 cavalry, 124 guns and 
606 machine-guns, giving around 163,000 men in total. Against this were arrayed 
199,800 anti-Soviet troops, 72,800 and 45,000 of whom were in the Don and Kuban 
Cossack hosts respectively, against Southern Front. 117 
Heavy snow during January made transport by cartage impossible and skis had to 
be attached to facilitate movement. February saw heavy rain and the onset of the 
spring thaw, making roads impassable, muddy morasses. The Rivers Don and Donets 
flowed in full spate by the end of the month making crossing perilous, if not 
impossible. Temperatures averaged minus 10 degrees. ' 18 
Tukhachevsky assumed command of 8th Army just after Slaven had ordered 
pursuit of the retreating Don Army. 8th Army was to advance south-east down both 
banks of the River Don, but with most troops on the left bank, acting with 9th Anny 
to secure the Povorino-Tsaritsyn Railway and aid 10th Army's struggle to hold the 
latter town. Donets Group was to leave one division at Lugansk Station, but advance 
towards Kantemirovka Station with a view to attacking Millerovo. 119 The latter two 
were stations on the Voronezh-Novocherkassk-Rostov Railway. 
The Don Army at Tsaritsyn continued to fall back under the Red offensive, 
leading Vacietis to send directives on lst and 3rd February for Southern Front to take 
Novocherkassk and Rostov on the Azov Sea coast, with the ultimate aim of pushing 
the Whites over to the right bank of the Don. 120 He criticised Gittis in the latter 
directive for not giving 8th Army correct tasks under pursuit operations, demanding 
Gittis amend this. 
To fulfill the general directives, Gittis proposed 10th Army advance along the 
lateral Tsaritsyn-Likhaia Railway on the left flank and Kozhevnikov advance further 
down the radial Voronezh-Novocherkassk-Rostov Railway to take Likhaia Station, 
the junction of the two lines. 8th and 9th Armies in the centre were to advance across 
the Don steppes to the line Kashary-Ust'-Medveditskaia-Kremenskaia by 6th 
'" DkfKA, Toni IV, pp. 55-56 & 476-477. 
118 M. Brawer, Atlas of Russia and the Independent Republics, (New York, 1994), p. 13. 
119 DkfKA Tom I, docs. 592-596, pp. 627-633. 
120 DGkK, 4, docs. 231 & 232, pp. 260-262. 
182 
February. 12 1 Tukhachevsky was to proceed across open grasslands, frozen with 
midwinter snow and ice, with the transport and climactic difficulties mentioned 
above. Marching on foot was the only feasible option, but attacking through Don 
Region's heartland gave Tukhachevsky no secure rear. Constant harassment from 
cossack bands disrupted communications and supply. Attacking under these 
conditions, Gittis hoped to encircle the retreating Don Army forces in the Don. 
Southern Front initially found some success on the left flank as 10th An-ny 
advanced and captured 7,000 prisoners from 23rd January-10th February. 122 
However, with conditions so bad in the centre, Tukhachevsky independently decided 
to advance towards Millerovo, acting outwith Gittis' demarcation lines. 123 This was a 
more direct route towards the Donbass, cutting the distance 8th Army had to travel in 
the hostile open grasslands and taking them back to the railway lines of the Donbass 
area to ease movement. 
Possibly because of this, Gittis demanded that Tukhachevsky attack with his right 
flank to help Kozhevnikov and with his left flank to aid 9th Army's right flank and 
centre, which were under threat. Gittis complained the Front Staff had not received 
Inza Division's position for six days. 124 
Kakurin suggests 8th Army's right flank did not advance quickly enough from 
5th- I Oth February, losing the opportunity to encircle Volunteer Army divisions facing 
Kozhevnikov's Group and failing to prevent the arrival of further reinforcements. 125 
However, the difficult conditions perhaps delayed 8th Army's movement and Vacietis 
had already criticised Gittis for giving out incorrect pursuit orders to 8th Army, which 
would have further delayed it. 
With Inza Division, Lacis had actually performed a spectacular cavalry raid into 
the White rear to cut the Tsaritsyn-Likhaia Railway at Morozovsk Station, blowing up 
the line in five places and cutting the telegraph wires. This prevented 5 White 
eshelons, retreating from Tsaritsyn, reaching Likhaia, 8th Army's target, and probably 
contributed to 10th Army's prisoner haul. Tukhachevsky sent Lacis a congratulatory 
telegram on I Ith February, 
12 1 DkfKA Tom I, doc. 604, pp. 639-640. 
122 N. E. Kakurin, Kak srazhalasrevoliutsiia, Tom II, (Moscow, 1926), p. 59. 
123 A. S. Bubnov et al, eds., Grazhdanskaia voina 1918-192]gg., Tom III, (Moscow, 193 1), p. 227. 
124 DkfKA Toni I, doc. 609, p. 646. 
125 N. E. Kakurin, Kak srazhalas'revoliutsiia, Toni II, pp. 60-6 1. 
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Congratulations on your unexpected high successes. By order No. 5 you 
were given the task which decides the fate of the whole front, - cutting of 
the railway and telegraph. I recall the rules of cavalry raids: 1) unlimited 
bravery of commanders and subordinates, 2) mobile and not too big 
detachments. Fulfill decisively. ' 26 
The terrain Tukhachevsky had to advance through was completely different from 
Eastern Front and with a hostile local population, recruitment on the move was not 
possible. Frontline troops had to be used to secure the rear, weakening offensive 
strength further. By his independent manoeuvre, he was attempting to utilise the 
railway more, as Ist Army had successfully done previously. However, whilst Ist 
Army had also used alternative transport resources to retain speed of movement, this 
was not possible in the Don, as bitter winter conditions made travel much more 
difficult. The use of cavalry for reconnaissance and raids was still valid though and 
Tukhachevsky had used it well again to aid the operation. 
With the pursuit stalling, Vacietis intervened on I Ith February and instructed 
Gittis to redirect the attack towards the Donbass sector, demanding a regrouping of 
Southern Front forces to concentrate its main forces for taking the area. 127 Gittis 
envisaged regrouping in eight days, but it took eighteen. 128 Travel difficulties 
combined with an inadequate rail network and the Whites' and local population's 
destruction of six bridges. However, further complications resulted, with General 
Mai-Maevskii's forces reaching the Donbass at this point, to reinforce Krasnov's 
faltering army. A White counter-attack in mid-February forced Kozhevnikov back, 
threatening 8th Army's right flank, but fierce defensive battles, with the aid of 9th 
Army and Donets Group, prevented this setback becoming a rout. 129 Southern Front 
attempted a counter-offensive at the end of February into the Donbass, pitting 
Tukhachevsky against Mai-Maevskii's forces. However, further White reinforcements 
arrived from the Caucasus and the onset of the thaw, exacerbated by heavy rain, saw 
the previously ice-bound River Donets flowing in full spate. Destruction of river 
crossings by the Whites created a natural barrier to defend, but also prevented any 
quick counters by them and the fighting became bogged down with neither side 
making any headway. 
126RGT"4, f 37605, op. 1, d. 11, p. 1; A. S. Popov, Trud. Talant. Doblest', (Moscow, 1972), p. 35. 
127 DGkKA, doc 234, p. 263. 
128 A. S. Bubnov et al, Tom III, p. 232. 
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Vacietis complained to Gittis on 12th March that the latter had not correctly 
followed his directive to pursue the Whites over the River Don and take 
Novocherkassk and Rostov, and had been unclear in his orders to Front armies. 
Vacietis also later complained about Gittis' fulfillment of set tasks, accusing him of 
being "phlegmatic" in his responses to his orders. ' 30 Gittis had reported on 4th March 
that weather conditions and White reinforcements were holding up the offensive and 
repeated this on 15th March. 13 1 However, he also reported on 5th March that Southern 
Front had been attacking continuously, fighting increasingly heavy battles and had 
suffered heavy losses. These were increasingly difficult to replace as reinforcements 
had to march up to 250 versty to reach the front and transfers and communications 
were made increasingly difficult under manoeuvre operations because of the river 
crossings. 1 32 Retaining telegraph cable connections would have been increasingly 
difficult. Southern Front was overstretched by early March as the continuous 
offensive through extremely harsh territory and weather conditions left its supply 
bases behind. However, although Gittis used these difficulties to explain the offensive 
stalling, he was to be blamed for putting Southern Front in the position to suffer them, 
as well as a Don Cossack uprising which occurred in the Red rear, adding some 
30,000 to the White ranks. This erupted on I Ith March, but spread and became a 
major factor in Southern Front's difficulties in the months to come. 133 
Tukhachevsky and Gittis 
It appears that Vacietis' criticism in early March was incited by Tukhachevsky, 
who apparently applied for another posting away from Gittis, complaining that he 
could no longer work under him. ' 34 Tukhachevsky had appealed directly to Vacietis 
and the R VSR over Gittis' head, 
I appeal to you in this report as a communist, sending it not as a 
commander, events on Southern Front have forced me to speak out not as 
one of the commanders of the Red Army, as I would usually do, but as a 
communist, fearful for the whole failure of the revolution... 
130 DGkKA, docs. 367-368 & 370 pp. 407-408 & 409-410. The latter complaint came on 22nd March. 
13 1 DýIKA, Toni II, docs. 203 & 208, pp. 212-217 & 224-226. 
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133 Grazlidanskaia voina i voennaia interventsiia v SSSR. Entsiklopediia, (Moscow, 1983), p. 91. 
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Being well-acquainted with Gittis' orders, with his understanding of 
war, I attest completely determinedly that Gittis does not know how to 
lead by the basic laws of strategy... 
From the very beginning, Southern Front Commander comrade Gittis 
was mistaken in his choice of direction, selecting not Rostov, but 
Tsaritsyn... 
If the main forces had attacked through Donets Basin to Rostov (by the 
shortest route)... they would have had a secure Soviet rear. But the main 
forces went through Don Region and the forward line is weakened 
because of the suppression of the cossack uprising... 
To replace Gittis at this dangerous moment would give more than 
sending three divisions... 
Of course amongst the old spetsy it is difficult to find good 
commanders. Already it is time to replace them with communists. For 
example, Eastern Front Southern Group Commander comrade Frunze is an 
exceptionally talented man and under his command the position on the 
front would quickly change. ' 35 
This report displays the development of Tukhachevsky's intertwining of military 
practice and theory with class warfare. He was complaining about a strategical error, 
a military matter, but by relating it to Gittis failing to understand class warfare, 
Tukhachevsky was casting doubt upon Gittis' ability to command in the Red Army at 
all. However, although criticising old voenspetsy in his telegram and possibly 
carrying a grudge against Gittis for obtaining the Front Command position, 
Tukhachevsky was complaining from military necessity and a genuine belief in their 
inability to do the job. He was in the midst of desperate fighting, trying to prevent a 
White breakthrough, making it unlikely he was thinking in career terms, trying to get 
ahead of senior voenspetsy. Besides, with clashes with authority still fresh from 
Eastern Front, he had no reason to court controversy again. The link between the 
military shortcomings of the old voenspetsy and the evolution of class warfare was 
made in action. 
Tukhachevsky had commanded very successfully on Eastern Front, leading a 
continuous offensive under both Vacietis and Kamenev, because the offensive was 
carried out in the correct manner. The offensive passed through regions with a 
sympathetic population, allowing mobilisation whilst advancing, to maintain 
momentum. This was supplemented by uprisings in the enemy rear, which created 
disruption and possible encirclments and ensured a secure Red rear, preventing hostile 
partisan activity or overstretched communication and supply lines. Tukhachevsky 
135 A. S. Popov, pp. 36-37. 
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knew this worked and had wanted to employ the same strategy on Southern Front. He 
apparently assessed the Southern Front situation in January 1919, probably whilst 
Deputy Front Commander, before Gittis ordered the attack through the Don. 
Tukhachevsky advised against it, but was overruled. 136 Having carried out the tour of 
Don Region the previous year and fought cossacks here, he had an idea of the 
situation and was proven to be correct the following year in Southern Front's 
offensive against Denikin. This was routed through the Donbass, following 
Tukhachevsky's 1919 recommendation. The credit for the original idea of this 
successful offensive must go to Tukhachevsky, although Stalin would apparently later 
claim to have planned the strategy. ' 37 Perhaps Tukhachevsky even envisaged a 
workers'rising in Rostov. 
However, Gittis directed Southern Front through the hostile Don region instead of 
the sympathetic Donbass Region which would have secured the rear, provided fresh 
troops and allowed communications and supply lines to remain open. Gittis'refusal to 
contemplate the offensive through the Donbass on class warfare grounds convinced 
Tukhachevsky that the former was not capable of commanding under new conditions 
of warfare. Tukhachevsky knew old strategic principles still remained valid, but he 
believed new strategic forms were being created in the Civil War and these had to be 
utilised immediately to win the conflict. Failure to do so would be catastrophic. 
Tukhachevsky was not just criticising older voenspetsy for career advancement in the 
Red Army as has been suggested he did in his later career. ' 38 He truly believed they 
could not adapt and do the job. The need therefore arose to rush Red Commanders 
through the courses. 
Tukhachevsky believed in early 1919 that the old voenspetsy were inadequately 
trained and unable to adapt to civil warfare, and he wrote this in his report to Lenin in 
December. However, his report was not compiled from purely 5th Army experience 
as stated in the title. He was calling for the replacement of old voenspetsy already in 
February 1919 and probably hoped that those undergoing the training courses he had 
drawn up in June 1918 would be able to take command soon. Tukhachevsky recorded 
further criticism of Gittis in July 1919 in Vozniknovenie grazhdanskoi voiny, when 
136 ]bid. p. 36. 
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first formulating the necessity to utilise "living centres" and avoid "dying centres" in 
Civil War, routing offensives through friendly regions. He wrote, 
... in certain localities with hostile class population it is impossible not only 
to create an organised rear, but this also distracts troops from the front. 
Such rears must be avoided. 
Our Southern Front scorned these considerations in their offensive and 
now are severely paying for these errors. ' 39 
This was a direct reference to the Don Cossack uprising which occurred in the 
Red rear in February 1919 and helped wreck the offensive. The consequence was that 
by July 1919, Denikin reached Orel, only 250 miles from Moscow. Tukhachevsky 
intimated this could have been avoided if the correct strategic planning, his own, had 
been used in January. 
Tukhachevsky returned to this in Strategiia natsional'naia i klassovaia in 
December 1919, noting the Don as a prime example of a "dying centre", where an 
offensive would have to fight not only the enemy army, but also opposing "enemy 
centres", (towns), requiring troops to hold the rear in check. He later developed this 
point by noting lower troop numbers and wider expanses in civil war meant "dying 
centres" should be avoided as protecting the rear would sap the strength and 
momentum of offensive action, remarking, 
The main reason for our failure on Southern Front in spring of this year 
consisted of the fact that the main forces of the front were moved not to 
where we would have had a Soviet living rear in Donets Basin, but to 
where we had a "dying" rear, which demanded the detailing of large 
garrisons for holding for us the wide Don steppes. The question of the 
relation of numbers to spaces was not considered and our army was 
beaten. 1 40 
Tukhachevsky saw this as a replication of national war conditions, a complete 
misunderstanding of fighting a class war and another reason for senior voenspetsy to 
be replaced. He mentioned Gittis' shortcomings once more in his lecture, when 
describing concentric offensives, saying, 
This spring, on Southern Front our army launched a concentric offensive, 
but the tactical strength we had was minimal. It appeared as if the point of 
concentration appointed for the armies was in the enemy rear. Denikin 
very easily tore to pieces this intricate wisdom. 141 
139 RGV-1, f 37605, op. 1, d. 1, pp. 61-62. 
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Therefore, Tukhachevsky criticised Gittis for shortcomings in military planning 
and misunderstanding the different nature of class warfare, introducing cutting 
sarcasm to the argument. Tukhachevsky evidently derided Gittis, which may have 
been sparked by jealousy at the latter gaining the Front Command ahead of him. 
However, this displays the evolution in Tukhachevsky's character and thought process 
which was taking place during the Civil War. He had witnessed the positive effects 
Marxism had on capabilities to wage civil warfare: mobilising recruits whilst 
attacking; agitating to weaken the enemy; and uprisings in the enemy rear to help the 
frontal attack. These would all be included in "Deep Battle" in altered, but similar 
forms. Combining military theory with Marxism would also be repeated in further 
debates against various targets throughout his life as he strove to have his ideas 
accepted. 
This chain of thought would develop during the 1920s as Tukhachevsky 
advocated his offensive strategy of "annihilation" over "attrition". He saw older 
voenspetsy still advocating the methods and positional warfare of the Great War. 
Tukhachevsky did not want to fight such a war so he created "Deep Battle" to avoid it 
and ensure Red Commanders could correctly conduct manoeuvre operations to 
completely defeat the enemy. Gittis' incorrect application of manoeuvre further 
convinced Tukhachevsky that people like him must be replaced. This demonstrates 
how Tukhachevsky's advocacy of manoeuvre warfare in civil war and subsequent 
calls for new ideas to be adopted brought him into conflict with older voenspetsy. 
Gaining military reform and arguing against those of different views became the same 
process and would remain so throughout his life. He believed it was a matter of life 
and death during the Civil War and as Stalin rose to power, the debates over military 
strategy and which type of army to build, eventually became a matter of life and death 
for those involved, as imprisonment and ultimately death followed for 
Tukhachevsky's opponents in the debates of the late 1920s/early 1930s and himself in 
1937. These debates were all part of the same process for Tukhachevsky. He had a 
vision very early in his Civil War career of how the Red Army should develop. He 
had come to his vision through command experience, knew that the methods 
envisaged had worked and was determined to push them through. As the 1920s wore 
on, the military question evolved within the Soviet state, but Tukhachevsky evolved 
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with it and the need to vehemently argue for his vision of the Red Army remained. 
This process started in the Civil War and carried on throughout his lifetime, with his 
belief in the underlying Marxist principles emerging during his Civil War career. 
The ultimate evolution of this and an insight into Tukhachevsky's character and 
how he manipulated the system throughout his career is demonstrated by the account 
of the 1919 Don Operation given in Grazhdanskaia voina v 1918-192]gg, which 
Tukhachevsky edited with Bubnov, S. S. Kamenev and Eideman in 1930. Eideman 
also fought in the Don Operation with 9th Army. This was the official history of the 
Civil War and it related the, 
... 
independent movement of 8th Army to Millerovo sector, instead of 
movement into the depth of Don oblast, without considering demarcation 
lines, that showed the correct evaluation of the strategic position, in the 
end exposed to red command the circumstances and they ordered Southern 
Front Commander comrade Gittis to refrain from his unreal plan of 
encircling the enemy in Donbass steppes and unfortunately were very late 
to evaluate the significance of Rostov sector and Donets Basin, as the vital 
political and economic areas for the proletarian revolution. 142 
Therefore, by 1930 Tukhachevsky's version was "the truth", appearing as it did in 
the official Civil War history. In the evolution of the Stalinist regime, this was the 
vital link in making ideas become reality and defeating those who argued against 
them. Gorelik suggests Tukhachevsky did not want to co-edit Grazhdanskaia voina 
because it was not being objective about Civil War history. 143 However, he did co- 
edit the third volume and it does paint a flattering picture of him. 
Tukhachevsky's first two commands introduced him to the type of fighting 
involved in the Russian Civil War and also brought to his attention the need to 
employ people in the Red Army who could adapt to and utilise the necessary 
methods. In chapter IV, I shall examine how he used these early experiences to 
command successfully in the main theatres of the Civil War until April 1920, by 
which time he had evolved into, perhaps, the archetypal Red Commander. 
142 A. S. Bubnov et al, eds., Grazhdanskaia voina v SSSR, 1918-1921gg., Tom Iff, pp. 227-228. 
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Chapter IV: Conventional Commander in the Class War - 11: Development of 
the Red Commander: April 1919-April 1920. 
5th Army Commander - Eastern Front: April-December 1919 
Transfer From Southern Front 
Whether Tukhachevsky requested a transfer because of irreconcilable differences 
with Gittis or was summoned to Moscow for reassignment because of the dispute 
remains unclear. Both alternatives are suggested, but it is most likely that events 
elsewhere were the major reason behind his move. Whilst Southern Front had reached 
an impasse, with the thaw ending the Red offensive and both sides jostling for 
supremacy on an equal footing, Kolchak had launched a general offensive on 4th 
March against Red Eastern Front, which was falling back in disarray, surrendering the 
territory won by Tukhachevsky et al in 1918. 
Tukhachevsky was the perfect man to command on Eastern Front. He had 
previously been the most successful commander there and had been fighting in the 
same theatre of operations only three months previously. The troops knew and 
respected his leadership and with Red forces disintegrating, his reorganisational 
abilities were required before any counter-offensive could be envisaged. He had 
ftilfilled Moscow's expectations in the East in 1918 and although courting dispute 
around the end of the year and again on Southern Front, his assessment of the Don 
offensive did meet with approval, as its utilisation to win there later in the year 
proves. He was the best organiser and motivator the Red Army possessed and was 
needed on the prioritised front. 
Eastern Front was officially declared the main operational area on I Ith April, ' but 
intense work had been conducted from Moscow during the preceding weeks to send 
all available forces, resources and political workers East. The troubleshooter was 
needed in the next trouble-spot and even if Tukhachevsky had not criticised Gittis, he 
would have been transferred. 
'Lenin announced this in his Tezisy TsKRKP(b) vcvia,: j, spolozheniem Vostochnogofronta, RGVA, f. 
37605, op. 1, kniga 5, p. 27; Vbr, doc. 37, pp. 68. 
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5th Army was the worst hit Eastern Front force and it is no surprise that 
Tukhachevsky received this most difficult of postings. He travelled to Moscow on 
15th March, received his new post on 23rd March and reached 5th Army HQ at 
Krotovka Station on 4th April, replacing the beleaguered Zh. K. Bliumberg. 2 
It has been shown that Tukhachevsky had already formulated definite ideas 
concerning civil warfare and how these compared to previous war, based on his 
command experience with I st and 8th Armies. He knew which methods were likely to 
succeed and had grave doubts about the abilities of older voenspetsy to adapt to these 
and command within the Red Army. What occurred during his 5th Army command to 
reinforce or develop these early ideas further? 
Early Command - Reorientation and Remanisation 
Kolchak launched a two-pronged counter-offensive against Eastern Front, 
advancing on sledges through the sub-zero snow-covered terrain. The Siberian Army 
under GaJda, a former Austrian NCO, advanced in the north against 2nd and 3rd Red 
3 Armies, the latter holding the left flank of Eastern Front. 4th Army under Frunze 
held Eastern Front's right flank at Orenburg with Tukhachevsky's old Ist Army, still 
commanded by Gai, on its left flank. 5th Army bore the brunt of Kolchak's offensive, 
defending the central sector attacked by Western Army under General Khanzhin, 
Kolchak's most capable and senior commander. 4 Eastern Front had still been moving 
eastwards when Kolchak launched his counter-offensive and if not completely 
strategically overstretched, was weakened by continuous combat and troop transfers 
south. With just 83,000 men facing the 143,290 of Kolchak's Armies and cossacks, 
Eastern Front was hopelessly outnumbered and far from its supply bases. 5 
5th Army was attacking in Zlatoust-Cheliabinsk sector in the Ural Mountains 
when Khanzhin's counter-offensive began. By I Oth March, Kamenev reported that it 
had been forced back by deep envelopments and had to abandon Ufa, withdrawing 
behind the River Chermasan. 3rd Army was retreating, suffering heavy losses from 
Kolchak's I st Siberian and Perm' Divisions, which left 2nd Army threatened on both 
2 RGUA, f. 37605, op. 1, kniga 1, p. 9; DkfK, 4, Tom IV, p. 537. 
3 Rudolf Geigl Gajda (Radola) (1892-1948). 
4 E. Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War, (Edinburgh, 2000), p. 145. 
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flanks. Kamenev requested that Vacietis postpone the Tashkent Operation to allow 
Red forces to turn north into the South Urals and Orenburg area and for I st Army to 
attack Verkhneural'sk and Cheliabinsk to relieve the pressure on Eastern Front's 
centre and left flank. 6 
The Whites captured Ufa on 14th March and 5th Anny's 26th and 27th Rifle 
Divisions retreated along the Volgo-Bugul'ma Railway to Bugul'ma and the Samaro- 
Zlatoust Railway to Belebei. Receiving reinforcements from I st Army, 5th Army held 
these positions for twelve days before Western Army pushed them back once more, 
7 capturing Sterlitamak, Belebei, Bugul'ma and Buguruslan. between 5th- I 5th April . 
Tukhachevsky inherited a disintegrating force, demoralised by a month's constant 
retreat. Facing 49,000 Whites, 5th Army had been outnumbered nearly 5: 1, suffering 
horrific casualties, which were augmented by troops taken prisoner and desertions. 
5th Army numbers plummeted from 11,000 on I st March to 6,500 on 19th March and 
8 5ý500 by April 
. Therefore, reorganisational work under fire was Tukhachevsky's first 
task upon arriving on Eastern Front, as it had been the year before, attempting to 
screen the front to allow mobilisations. 9 With Moscow amassing its best people in the 
East, he had the help of capable figures. 
Influential Fiswes 
On I st April, Ivan Nikitovich Smirnov was appointed a 5th Army R VS member. ' 0 
He became the vital link between 5th Army and Red partisans in Kolchak's rear in the 
months ahead. On 8th April, at Frunze's request, V. V. Kuibyshev was appointed to 
Southern Group RVS to coordinate the work of local Party and Soviet organisations 
5 Direktivy komandovaniiafrontov Krasnoi Armii (1917-1922). Sbornik dokumentov v 4-kh tomakh. 
(Moscow, 1971-1978). (hereafter DkfK, 4), Tom IV, pp. 56 & 477. 
6 DkJKA, Tom 11, docs. 585-586, pp. 623-24. 
7V boiakh rozhdeniia, 1918-1920. - boevoi put'5 armii (1918-1920). Sbornik dokumentov, (Irkutsk, 
1985), (hereafter Vbr), p. 8; M. V. Frunze na Vostochnom Fronte: Sbornik dokumentov, (Kuibyshev, 
1985), (hereafter Fn Vj), doc. 47, pp. 92-95. 
8 A. S. Bubnov, S. S. Kamenev, M. N. Tukhachevsky and R. P. Eideman, Grazhdanskaia voina 1918- 
1921 v 3-kh tomakh. Tom III, (Leningrad, 1930), p. 173; Vbr, doc. 33, pp. 388 & 59-60; A. S. Popov, 
Trud. Talant. Doblest', (Moscow, 1972), p. 40; Kaufmann quotes a figure given in J. Erickson, The 
Soviet High Command: a military-political history, 1918-1941, (London, 1962), p. 60, of "... less than 
5,500 men". However, the table provided by Erickson gives troop numbers for the period 25th 
January- I 5th February, before Kolchak's offensive, A. F. Kaufmann, A ristocratic- Communist: the life 
of M. N. Tukhachevsky and the continuity of imperial army tradition in the Soviet military, (Kansas, 
199 1), p. 112. 
9 Vbr, doc. 36, pp. 64-65. 
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reorganising Eastern Front forces. Therefore, Tukhachevsky worked again with the 
man who had provided the greatest help and support on Eastern Front in 1918.11 
Concentrated within 5th Army were capable divisional command staff, including: 
26th Division Commissar V. K. Putna, 27th Division Commander A. V. Pavlov and 
26th Division Commander G. K. Eikhe, all voenspetsy; 25th Division Commander V. 
1. Chapaev, a former NCO; and 25th Division Commissar Furmanov, some of whom 
Tukhachevsky would also work with later. This would have eased the initial 
reorganisational burden. 12 
However, the most important figure Tukhachevsky encountered, both in terms of 
how he fought during 1919 on Eastern Front and his post-Civil War career, was 
Mikhail Vasil'evich Frunze. This was the man Tukhachevsky had praised as the prime 
example of a capable Red Commander whilst complaining about Gittis. A Bolshevik 
Party member since 1904, Frunze had no professional military training, but proved a 
natural in command under Civil War conditions. He became the main proponent of a 
new revolutionary doctrine and replaced Trotsky as Narkomvoen in 1925, making 
Tukhachevsky his deputy, before dying on the operating table amid suspicions of 
Stalin's involvement. Tukhachevsky is usually associated with Frunze and credited 
with carrying on his ideas after his death and Soviet biographies relate Frunze as 
having a major influence on Tukhachevsky's military theory. However, as has already 
been shown, Tukhachevsky had already identified new conditions of class civil 
warfare and had conducted his commands under these beliefs before meeting Frunze. 
I would argue that Tukhachevsky and Frunze saw in each other someone of similar 
beliefs and this is why they worked so well together. Undoubtedly Frunze did 
influence Tukhachevsky, but then Tukhachevsky undoubtedly did the same in return. 
The similarity of opinion regarding military strategy and how to fight the Civil War 
was reflected in Frunze making Tukhachevsky his main commander on Eastern Front 
in 1919. For four months they conducted operations, which further developed the 
conclusions Tukhachevsky had already drawn, to move him closer to the "Deep 
Battle" theory. This cemented a lasting comradeship on both a professional and 
personal basis. 
10 DkJKA, Toin IV' , p. 537. 11 Fn P'/, doc -27, pp. 
70-7 1. 
12 Vbr, pp. 405-406; Furmanov wrote the book Chapaev in 1923, upon which the film Chapaev was 
based. 
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Beyond the Volga: Buguruslan, Bugullma and Belebei Operations 
Eastern Front's counter-offensive, which began with the Buguruslan Operation, to 
prevent Kolchak reaching Simbirsk and Samara on the Volga and push him back 
beyond Ufa, originated with Frunze. It was then discussed on 10th April at Simbirsk 
with Kamenev, Vacietis and other Eastern Front staff. Eastern Front was divided into 
Northern and Southern Groups to face Siberian and Western Annies. 1 3 Southern 
Group, comprising Ist, 4th, 5th and Turkestan Armies, was headed by an RVS of 
Frunze, Novitskii and Kuibyshev. 14 
Frunze envisaged forming an attack group at Buzuluk on Southern Group's right 
flank, shielded behind I st and Turkestan Armies. This was the section of Eastern 
Front against which Kolchak had not concentrated and therefore an attack group 
could be deployed safely and secretly there. The attack group would advance from 
south to north into Western Army's left flank, whilst 5th Army would perform a 
frontal holding operation in Samara sector, allowing the attack group to punch 
through at Buguruslan and encircle Western Army. To enable this, whilst reorganising 
5th Army, Tukhachevsky was to screen the Buzuluk-Buguruslan-Bugul'ma highway, 
the main intended route for the attack, and regroup a reserve to screen his left flank 
from Bugul'ma. Turkestan Army Commander Zinov'ev was given command of the 
attack group, whilst 4th Army and Gai's I st Army had to hold screens at Ural'sk, 
Saratov and Orenburg, reuniting Gai in action with his former commander. ' 5 
Whilst planning the counter-manoeuvre, Eastern Front forces were still trying to 
halt the White advance. On 13th April, Tukhachevsky reported 5th Army would 
probably not hold Buguruslan as it was hopelessly outnumbered, but described 
conditions which did help to stem the tide. Dirt roads were virtually impassable as the 
thaw occurred, later on the Volga than in the Don, and destroyed bridges were 
13 Fn Vf, doc. 29, pp. 72-74; Vbr, p. 8; DkfK, 4, Tom II, doc. 616, pp. 648 & 799. Northern Group 
contained all forces north of the River Kama, 2nd and 3rd Armies, under 2nd Army Conunander 
Shorm, but this only lasted in practice for several days. 
14 Fn Vf, docs. 30-3 1, pp. 74-75. Lazarevich and lakhovskii became Southern group Chief-of-Staff and 
Head of Operational Staff respectively, whilst Avksent'ievskii replaced Frunze as Acting 4th Army 
Commander. 
15 Fn Vf, docs. 33-34,37,50,56 & 58, pp. 77-81,83,97-99,105-106 & 108; Direktivy Glavnogo 
komandovanda Krasnoi A rmii (1917-1920). Sbornik dokumentov, (Moscow, 1969), pp. 553 -5 5 5. 
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hindering White artillery advancing up the railway. 16 This slowed the White advance, 
but Frunze delayed his attack and regrouped his forces until the roads had firmed up, 
by which time he hoped to have stopped Kolchak's offensive. 17 
He bombarded Moscow with requests for more political workers and command 
staff for Southern Group's Armies, to enable local mobilisation of new recruits and 
political work amongst existing troops. ' 8 in response, the Komsomol Central 
Committee instructed local organisations to mobilise 20% of their members for 
military training, posting eastwards and political agitation. 19 This combined with 
Eastern Front mobilisations, which raised forces including Syzran' Workers 
Regiment, Samara Internationalist and Volunteer Detachments and 4,000 armed 
workers from Orenburg. 20 Samara area was fortified by workers and volunteers led by 
kursanty, 21 whilst any troops were sent to the armies. 
Tukhachevsky's experience from 1918 undoubtedly helped with this 
reorganisation. He would have known workers in Party organs (Vareikis still headed 
the Simbirsk Province Communists) and been known by reputation to many local 
inhabitants. He carried out the rebuilding and reequiping of 5th Army with Smimov 
and by 25th April numbers had risen to 15,073 infantry and 971 cavalry. This 
included 25th Division, but without it, 26th and 27th Divisions had risen from the 
5,500 of early April to 9,500 men. 22 By I st May, 5th Army numbers had risen to 
1,615 command staff, 35,002 infantry, and 1,633 cavalry. 2nd Division had also been 
added for the offensive, but 26th and 27th Divisions had themselves increased to 
14,338 in total, a remarkable rise in barely three weeks. 23 Given these conditions, this 
was perhaps an even greater achievement than I st Army. 
Whilst regrouping proceeded, Siberian Anny continued advancing further against 
2nd and 3rd Armies, occupying Chistopol' on 25th April and threatening Kazan' and 
Southern Group's left flank . 
24 Frunze's counter-manoeuvre had to be brought forward 
16 Fn Vf, doc. 40, pp. 86-88. 
17 Dk: IK4, Tom H, doc. 614, p. 647. 
18 Fn Vf, docs. 38& 41-42, pp. 84 & 89. 
19 Ibid. doc. 43, p. 90. 
20 Ibid. docs. 45 & 47, pp. 91 & 93. 
21 Ibid. doc. 39, pp. 85-86. 
22 Vbr, doc. 39, pp. 69-72. 
23 Ibid. p. 388. 
24 Dkj", Tom H, p. 659. 
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to 28th April before all reinforcements had arrived, but 5th Army received 
reinforcements to secure the left flank against Siberian Army's advances. Kakurin 
suggests that 5th Army's tasks were upgraded, when it received these reinforcements, 
from a defensive holding operation to attacking towards Bugul'ma, enveloping 
Western Army's forces there. However, Tukhachevsky had actually suggested this a 
week earlier. In a Hughes Telegraph conversation with Frunze on 17th April, 
Tukhachevsky said, 
... 
it seems easier to me to coordinate the attack on Buguruslan from two 
sides. Under this proposition, it would be necessary for these two groups 
to guarantee themselves sufficient forces. If the Samaro-Zlatoust road has 
a very weak group, then the attack from Buzuluk will not achieve the 
desired results, it is essential to press from two sides. 
Frunze replied that he did not agree as the main attack should come from Buzuluk. 
Tukhachevsky said that he also thought so, but without the second attack, the Buzuluk 
group would face all enemy forces. However, two days later, Frunze outlined 
Southern Group's tasks for the Buguruslan Operation, 
5th Army, strengthened by 74th and 75th brigades of 25th Division, is not 
only to hold the enemy and its further movement along Bugul'ma and 
Buguruslan Railways, but counter-attack to press it back, having the first 
25 
task of taking Buguruslan area.... 
On the same day, Tukhachevsky requested that Frunze inform him of Eastern 
Front's offensive plan, as he felt the counter-attack to defend Samara (5th Army and 
Buzuluk attack group) had insufficient troops and did not address the problems of the 
whole front. He reported that the snow had almost completely melted and the roads 
were virtually impassable, but might improve in a few days, continuing, "... a very 
strong concentration is needed, moreover it is necessary to even consider deploying 
those forces on the Volga". He expressed concern that, although Samara was 
defended, Simbirsk and Chistopol' sectors were weak and could threaten the whole 
front, concluding, 
In order to prepare earlier for future operations, it is necessary for me to 
know about Eastern Front plans for launching an offensive, what resources 
it will have, from where and when these resources and forces will be 
transferred and where deployed, and also which will be the main 
operational sector, moreover I personally consider this Bugul'ma Railway. 
I consider it my duty to report and await your rep ly. 
26 
25 Fn Vf, docs. 47 & 50, pp. 92-95 & 97-99. 
26 Vbr, doc. 38, pp. 68-69. 
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The same day Frunze demanded reinforcements from Kamenev for 5th Army and 
Zinov'ev's attack group after "... discussions with all army commanders". 27 Also, on 
23rd April, he reported to Kamenev that 5th Army's right flank was to attack up the 
strip between the Rivers Kinel' and Kutuluk and its left flank up Bugul'ma Railway. 28 
When Tukhachevsky issued operational orders to 5th Army on 25th April, he 
instructed Eikhe's 26th Division to concentrate at Tolkai Station, a location he had 
also suggested to Frunze on 17th April. 29 
Several points are apparent here. Tukhachevsky must be credited with having a 
crucial influence on the Buguruslan Operation and those which followed, which he 
has not previously been afforded. He suggested the double envelopment of the White 
Buguruslan group instead of the tone strike from Buzuluk and also the advance up 
Bugul'ma Railway. It shows that Frunze was willing to listen to suggestions from 
those under him and his working relationship with Tukhachevsky was two-way. 
Tukhachevsky was suggesting a variant to his successful concentric offensives and as 
in 1918, when the double envelopment at Simbirsk allowed a continuous flow into the 
same at Syzran', in 1919 the Buguruslan Operation led directly into the Bugul'ma 
Operation, in the sector Tukhachevsky emphasised as the principal one. It is very 
likely that he considered this when making his recommendations and that he chose the 
Bugul'ma railway as the main route from his experience of the pursuit operations he 
carried out in this exact area the previous year. This all helped him to formulate a 
winning plan. His close involvement in operational planning at this early stage 
probably played a part in him retaining the major role in Southern Group and Eastern 
Front offensives during 1919. Frunze regarded him as his main commander, valued 
his advice and acted upon it. 
Frunze had originally planned a regrouping of forces to concentrate 22-26,000 
troops in the attack group and 11,000 in 5th Army, with I st and 4th Armies shielding 
the right flank with 20,000 troops. 30 However, with 5th Army now also attacking, 
further regrouping gave Tukhachevsky 24,000 men to face the 18,000-22,000 
remaining in Khanzhin's group. Khanzhin's left flank had been defeated by Gai from 
22nd-25th April, losing three divisions, one of which defected to the Reds, and a 
27 Fn Vf, doc. 5 1, p. 100. 
28 Ibid. doc. 56, P. 105. 
29 Vbr, doc. 39, pp. 69-72; FnVf, doc. 47, pp. 92-95. 
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peasant revolt in Khanzhin's rear lessened the effectives he could put in the 
frontline. 31 By this point, the overall White offensive was overstretched and no 
reinforcements were likely to arrive quickly, as a hostile rear disrupted 
communications and supply lines. 
However, Khanzhin still attacked, threatening Kinel' on Southern Group's right 
flank, which would have cut its rear lines at the same time as Chistopol' fell. The 
Buguruslan Operation was therefore launched on 28th April to prevent this and seize 
the offensive initiative. The double-envelopment operation envisaged, although not 
encircling the Whites, did force them to abandon Buguruslan, which was taken on 4th 
May. 32 On Ist May Tukhachevsky had requested by Hughes Telegraph that Frunze 
commit his last reserves, 2nd Division, for the final assault, which Frunze did. This 
conversation, which followed one between Frunze and KamenevI illustrates the 
workings of Eastern Front command clearly. 
Frunze explained that Kamenev had directed him to continue and develop the 
Buguruslan offensive by attacking Sergievsk, Bugul'ma and Belebei, outlined the plan 
and asked for Tukhachevsky's thoughts. Tukhachevsky agreed with the general plan, 
but suggested 25th Division, which had been operating alongside Turkestan Army, be 
transferred to 5th Army to move against Bugul'ma and then south-east to take Belebei 
with Turkestan Army, the latter advancing east to the town. This would allow the 
offensive to "... not lose any time and develop maximum energy ...... 
33 Frunze ordered 
the continuation of the Buguruslan Operation into the Bugul'ma Operation on 4th 
May, acting on Tukhachevsky's suggestion, and the offensive proceeded. 25th 
Division reached Bugul'ma on I Ith May after a two-day battle with a White counter- 
attack group massed behind the town, comprising 1zhevsk Brigade and 4th Ufa 
Division, taking 2,000 prisoners, various hardware and securing the town by 13th 
34 May. By 12th May, Eastern Front had taken over 9,000 prisoners from Western 
Army, many of whom were inducted into the Red forces. Smirnov reported that the 
seizing of White carts during the Buguruslan Operation had quickened 5th Army's 
30 N. E. Kakurin, Kak srazhalas'revoliutsda. Tom IT 1919-1920, (Moscow, 1926 & 1990), p. 17 1; A. 
S. Bubnov et al. Tom III, p. 183. Kakurin gives the lower figure. 
31A. S. Bubnov et al. Tom III, pp. 184 & 190. 
32 DkfKA, Tom II, p. 669. 
33 Fn Vf, doc. 64, pp. 119-12 1; Vbr, doc. 40, pp. 73 -75. 
34 Fn Vf, docs. 65 & 70-7 1, pp. 122 & 125-127; DkfY, 4, Tom II, p. 677. 
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ability to conduct pursuit. 35 Mobilising on the move was again visibly working, 
strengthening the advancing Reds at the expense of the retreating Whites and 
illustrating the advantage of offensive over defensive tactics again. 
Pressing on for Belebei, Tukhachevsky shielded Turkestan Army's left flank by 
sending a division up the Bugul'ma-Ufa Railway and transferred 25th Division back 
to Turkestan Army on 16th May. Belebei was taken the following day. 36 
This demonstrates how Eastern Front operated and the trust which the command 
staff had in each other. Kamenev was Eastern Front Commander, Frunze Southern 
Group Commander and Tukhachevsky 5th Army Commander. However, the lower 
ranking man was the one on the spot and closest to the action. Giving out general 
directives, but allowing Tukhachevsky a vital input to the actual operational planning 
was the type of command Tukhachevsky had wanted when he complained about 
interference from Murav'ev, Vacietis, Medvedev and Kalnins. It is no wonder 
Tukhachevsky, Kamenev and Frunze formed lasting working relationships, forged 
conducting these continuous manoeuvre operations, which they all agreed were the 
correct way to win civil war battles and were all able to utilise effectively. 
The Ufa Operation 
The capture of Bugul'ma and Belebei cleared both the Bugul'ma-Ufa and Syzran'- 
Ufa railway lines for pursuing the Whites to the River Belaia and taking the town of 
Ufa, which lay on its east bank, the last major town before the Urals. Frunze tried to 
maintain the momentum of the continuous offensive by sending plans for the Ufa and 
Orenburg Operations to Samoilo, the new Eastern Front Commander on 19th May. 
Frunze wished to push on immediately, whilst Western Anny was on the backfoot. 37 
I st Army was to advance towards Orenburg, whilst Turkestan Army and Chapaev's 
25th Division of 5th Army were to take Ufa. Turkestan Army was to cross the Belaia 
south of Ufa and attack in the White rear, with their cavalry raiding deep to cut the 
rail lines and prevent a White retreat into the Urals. 25th Division, on Turkestan 
An-ny's left flank, again received the toughest task, crossing the Belaia and launching 
35 RTsKhIDNI, f 325, op. 1, d. 479, p. 19. 
36 Fn Pj, docs. 73 & 75, pp. 128-130 & 13 1; DkfY-4, Tom II, p. 677. 
200 
a frontal pinning attack on Ufa. 26th Division was to guard the left flank north of Ufa 
by moving to the front Bazilevka-Birsk and capturing the crossing at Akhlystina, to 
38 prevent a White flotilla attacking the other Red forces, during the river crossing. 
Tukhachevsky had been advancing with 26th and 27th Divisions after capturing 
Bugul'ma because Siberian Army was still pressing 2nd Army and threatening 5th 
Army's left flank. Samoilo detached 5th Army from Southern Group and ordered 
Tukhachevsky to cross the River Kama, using pontoons, to guarantee Bugul'ma-Ufa 
and Bugul'ma-Birsk sectors. 39 When Samoilo ordered Frunze's offensive to proceed, 
he instructed 5th Army to cross the Kama and Belaia at their confluence and attack 
Ufa in the rear from the north, subordinating the Volga Flotilla to Tukhachevsky, to 
block the White flotilla. 40 Tukhachevsky ordered this on 21 st May. 41 
Frunze was appointed Turkestan Army Commander on 23rd May and took direct 
command of the Ufa Operation. 42 Therefore, he and Tukhachevsky commanded the 
two armies attacking Ufa. They discussed the operation by Hughes Telegraph on 27th 
May and Tukhachevsky advised Frunze to direct 31 st Division, on Turkestan Army's 
left flank, further left, as sizeable enemy forces had concentrated before 26th Division 
on 5th Army's right flank. 43 This endangered the juncture between 5th and Turkestan 
Armies and Frunze agreed to the adjustment. After this discussion, Tukhachevsky 
ordered 5th Army to attack at dawn the following morning. 44 
The attack was initially to be launched on 25th May, but was put back three days, 
probably because of reorganisation, as Frunze replaced Zinov'ev as Turkestan Army 
Commander and the latter replaced Gai as I st Army Commander. 45 Machinations 
were also underway to bring Kamenev back as Eastern Front Commander and 
relations within Eastern Front R VS were not good. This must have effected the pace of 
operations. It was this delay which allowed Western Army to regroup and concentrate 
forces before 26th Division and along the whole front, entrenching behind the Belaia 
37 DkJKA, Tom H, doc. 638, pp. 677-680; Fn VF, doc. 76, pp. 132-34. Former Tsarist Major-General 
Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Samoilo (1869-1963) served as Eastern Front Commander from 5th-29th 
May. 
38 Fn Vf, doc. 76, pp. 132-134; DkJK, 4, Tom H, pp. 677-680. 
39 DkfKA, Tom H, doc. 637, p. 677; DGkK, 4, doc. 561, p. 569. 
40 DkfKA, Tom H, doc. 639, pp. 680-68 1. 
41 Vbr, doc. 49, pp. 96-98. 
42 FnVf, docs. 83-85, pp. 142-145 & 258, endnote 30. 
43 Vbr, doc 52, pp. 105-106. 
" Ibid. doc. 5 1, pp. 103-104. 
45 Gai was apparently demoted. 
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with artillery and machine-gun emplacements, giving 5th and Turkestan Armies a 
much harder task. 
5th An-ny numbers for the Ufa Operation were 18,710 infantry, 429 cavalry, 53 
guns and 337 machine-guns, whilst Turkestan Arrny fielded 28,430 infantry, 1,443 
cavalry, 39 guns and 408 machine-guns on Ist June. Western Army numbers had 
dwindled as it retreated with casualties, desertions, defections and men captured 
taking their toll. Widely varying figures are given, but it probably numbered 
somewhere between 15,000-28,500, with a lower number more likely. 46 
The operation was launched on 28th May, with Sterlitamak taken by I st Anny en 
route to Orenburg, on 25th May. 47 On 29th May, Tukhachevsky reported that 27th 
and 35th Divisions had routed the Whites on the west bank of the Belaia, taking over 
800 prisoners and forcing them over to the east bank. He suggested advancing 
towards Birsk, since reconnaissance had detected White forces there, which could 
threaten the Ufa attack force. After consultations with Frunze and Kamenev, he 
ordered 26th, 27th and 35th Divisions to advance and take up positions along the 
River Belaia to prepare for crossing on 4th June, a date suggested by Frunze, and 
prepare to take Birsk, preventing the Whites retreating to lavgel'din. 48 Kamenev, 
restored as Eastern Front Commander, confirmed this in a general directive to Eastern 
Front on 31 st May and on 3rd and 5th June instructed the Volga Flotilla to cooperate 
with 5th and Turkestan Armies, as they would be attempting crossings of the Belaia 
on 6th June. 49 
On 3rd June, Tukhachevsky showed that he was thinking ahead again when he 
suggested to Kamenev that 5th Army, whilst covering Turkestan Army's advance on 
Ufa by driving back the White group at Birsk, should be looking to attack the White 
Permsko-Krasnoufimsk Group in the flank and rear, with a view to attacking towards 
Zlatoust in the Ural Mountains. Zlatoust would become the next target for 
Tukhachevsky and one of his most imaginative victories and Kamenev suggested this 
to Vacietis on 6th June . 
50 This was another example of Tukhachevsky taking the lead 
in operational planning and illustrates how he operated under conditions of 
46 E. Mawdsley, p. 146, gives the lower figure and N. E. Kakurin, Tom II, p. 236 the higher. A figure 
of 46-47,000 is given in A. S. Bubnov et al. Tom III, p. 202, but this is almost certainly far too high. 
47 D kfKA, To m II, p. 687. 
41 Vbr, docs. 53-56, pp. 107-112. 
49Dk)KA, Tom II, docs. 646,648 & 650, pp. 687-688,690-691. 
50 Vbr, doc. 57, pp. 113 & 378, endnote 24. 
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continuous offensive, always thinking of the next target and planning current troop 
movements, to facilitate a smooth transition to the next operation quickly afterwards. 
Back on the Belaia, on 5th June, Tukhachevsky ordered 5th Army to cross the 
next day and 26th Division captured Birsk on 8th June. 51 On 9th June he ordered 
pursuit of the Whites down the right bank of the river, keeping pace with 2nd Army 
on the left flank, which Kamenev had ordered to advance on 6th June. Six days later 
the two men discussed 5th and 2nd Armies cooperating to attack Krasnoufimsk 
sector, the next operation to maintain the continuous offensive. 52 5th Army was 
engaged in fighting in lavgeldin and Ufa sectors, cooperating with 2nd and Turkestan 
Armies for the next week until they were secured, holding the centre of Eastern Front 
together and having to cooperate with both flanks simultaneously. 53 That 
Tukhachevsky still managed to plan for his next operation a month ahead was quite 
remarkable and displays the level of work he put in to his command. 
26th Division, crossing the Belaia on 6th June, secured Frunze's left flank for the 
attack towards Ufa and he ordered 2nd, 3 5th and 31 st Divisions to cross the Belaia on 
the night of 7th-8th June. Crossing proved to be more difficult here however, as the 
Whites were entrenched along the river bank at the crossings and bridges they had not 
destroyed. The Red forces were met with machine-gun and artillery fire as they tried 
to cross and aerial bombardment was used by both sides, a new phenomenon in civil 
warfare. 54 Equipment for crossing was scarce and Karnenev asked Tukhachevsky if he 
had any which could be sent down. Tukhachevsky did not, but suggested Frunze have 
the local peasantry build ferries. 55 On 9th June, Frunze telegrammed Tukhachevsky to 
inform him that 25th Division had crossed the Belaia at dawn on 8th June and, after 
bitter fighting, had broken through the White trenches and occupied several villages. 
However, the Whites had moved up artillery and counter-attacked, pinning down 25th 
Division. Frunze requested that Tukhachevsky swiftly send 26th Division to help. 
However, the following day he reported 25th Division had taken Ufa after stubborn 
fighting. 56 Chapaev had captured two White steamboats and secretly crossed the 
51 Ibid. doc. 59, pp. 10 & 114-116. 
52 Ibid. does. 63-64, pp. 119-123. 
53 Ibid. does. 65-66, pp. 123-126. 
54 RGVA, f 37605, op. 1, kniga 5, p. 40-41; FnVf, does. 96-98, pp. 156-159. 
55 Vbr, doc. 62, pp. 117-119; Tukhachevsky wrote in early 1920 that it had taken 12 days to construct a 
workable ferry for transporting rail stock over the River Ufa and River Belaia, M. N. Tukhachevsky, 
"Inzhenemoe sorazmerenle operatsil", Voina klassov, (Moscow, 192 1), p. 120. 
56 Fn Vf, does. 99- 100, pp. 160-162. 
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Belaia, conducting a surprise attack on the White left flank. 25th Division suffered 
2,000 casualties in this fighting, almost half its number, whilst Western Army 
suffered 3 '000.57 
The Ufa Operation and associated tasks was another classic manoeuvre operation 
through difficult terrain dissected by several rivers. Natural obstacles were important 
lines of defence in the Civil War and engineering work, such as the building of 
temporary bridges or ferries, to traverse such obstacles, was an area Tukhachevsky 
emphasised as crucial in conducting successful operations in the Civil War. The 
swifter engineers could reopen transport routes, the swifter the offensive could 
proceed, 58 
Tukhachevsky and Frunze had jointly led Eastern Front's main operations and 
worked well together, both finding in the other someone who understood their 
thoughts and vision on how to fight. They advanced in slightly different directions for 
the next month, but would work together again in July. 
As already mentioned, Tukhachevsky had already planned ahead for 5th Army's 
next Zlatoust Operation. Frunze planned a parallel advance to Ural'sk further south, 
whilst 2nd and 3rd Armies were moving for Ekaterinburg on 5th Army's left flank. 
However, conflict arose with Vacietis and Trotsky at this point, starting a process of 
clique-fon-nation within the Red Army, which would stretch into the 1920s and 1930s. 
Tukhachevsky was involved in the dispute, but the way he approached it was largely 
determined by the ideas we have witnessed him amass so far on civil war and how it 
should be fought. 
Army Politics: Kamenev Versus Vacietis 
The dispute was preceded by another incident centring around Kamenev. After 
jointly planning the Buguruslan Operation, the Kamenev-Frunze-Tukhachevsky team 
was broken up. The following Bugul'ma, Belebei and Ufa Operations occurred against 
the background of bickering amongst the Red Army hierarchy, as Vacietis, backed by 
Trotsky, replaced Kamenev with Samoilo, after tactical disagreements with the 
former. However, Samoilo only lasted from 5th-29th May as Gusev, Lashevich and 
57 RGVA, f 37605, op. 1, kniga 5, p. 53; N. E. Kakurin, Tom II, p. 238. 
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lurenev of Eastern Front R VS sent a telegram to Lenin, requesting Karnenev's 
reinstatement and accusing Chief-of-Staff F. V. Kostiaev of groundlessly removing 
arrny commanders, and Aralov of counter-signing his orders. In response, Lenin 
informed Trotsky on 20th May that he was reinstating Kamenev, removing Kostiaev 
and replacing Aralov with Lashevich. He confirmed this to Eastern Front R VS on 29th 
May, 
On your insistence I have reappointed Kamenev. If we do not conquer the 
Urals by winter, then I consider the revolution will inevitably perish. Exert 
all forces. Follow these considerations for reinforcements; mobilise to a 
man the front area population; follow up with political work... Turn 
deepest attention to mobilising Orenburg cossacks. 59 
This reflected the underlying tactical dispute between Kamenev and Vacietis 
which had led to Samoilo's appointment. Vacietis was concerned at Siberian Army's 
advances against 2nd Army and wanted 5th Army to cross the River Kama and move 
north to help 2nd Army's right flank. However, Kamenev had wanted, along with 
Frunze and Tukhachevsky, to press on and destroy Western Army in front of Southern 
Group's forces, then sweep north with a flanking envelopment of Siberian Army. This 
was a similar tactic to the Buguruslan Operation. When Samoilo replaced Kamenev, 
he executed Vacietis' tactics and this was the reason he directed 5th Army over the 
Kama towards Birsk. However, between I lth-19th May, Samoilo gave Tukhachevsky 
four successive instructions, directing him in different directions and preventing any 
development of pursuit after the Bugul'ma Operation, with 5th Army effectively 
turning on the spot. On 21st May, a disillusioned Tukhachevsky sent Samoilo a 
stinging telegram, 
Beginning from I Oth May, probably in view of many circumstances 
unknown to me, five tasks were sent for 5th Army, each one changed from 
the last. Firstly it was given the task to attack north into the rear of the 
enemy, acting on the River Viatka, then the direction of attack was 
deflected 130 degrees to Belebei, followed by a directive which ordered to 
attack partially to the north, partially to the east, then was allocated a 
crossing point over the River Kama close to the River Viatka estuary, then 
I was asked to choose a crossing point and finally, was ordered to cross 
not the River Kama, but the River Belaia. These changes of order have 
completely exhausted the divisions and units are completely confused, 
communications are broken etc. 
58 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Inzhenemoe sorazmerenie operatsii", pp. 116-133; Izbrannyeproizvedeniia, 
Toni 1,1919-1927, pp. 59-72. 
59 L-ip, docs. 267 & 284, pp. 145-146,153-154 & 347, endnote 173. 
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Tukhachevsky concluded by referring Samoilo to article 19 of the 1918 Field 
Regulations which stated "... before giving an order, it is necessary to think. 60 
The first two orders had been sent on II th and 14th May and Tukhachevsky 
replied to the first on 12th May, saying he could not send his troops north as they 
were still engaged in the Bugul'ma battle, but that he would direct them there as soon 
as this was over. On 15th May, Tukhachevsky replied, 
Your directive No. 02003, which changed my order No. 920/n, is fulfilled, 
but I consider it my duty as a conscientious army commander to add that I 
do not agree with your directive since I consider that your decision is not 
the most energetic... In taking your decision the enemy will perhaps only 
be pressed, that will not allow our task to guarantee on the right for an 
attack to the north. If General Kappel's corps is directed at one point, then 
it is more necessary to annihilate it, not press it. I considered it my duty to 
report to you about your view of what is occurring since I considered it 
intolerable to remain silent about holding a difference in views. 61 
Tukhachevsky disgreed with Samoilo's operational plan, but was also infuriated 
by the constant direction changes. His telegrams to Samoilo have a completely 
different tone than his communications with Kamenev or Frunze. It displays again the 
hostility he displayed towards those with whom he disagreed over military matters. 
In his memoirs, Samoilo wrote that he had taken the posting against his will and 
did not know the course of events at the front or the troops, commanders or staff 
there . 
62 He also wrote of intransigence and deliberate non-cooperation by Eastern 
Front R VS, who invented reasons to complain about him and get Kamenev back. This 
was very likely the case. As has been shown, a good working relationship had 
evolved between Eastern Front command, within the RVS and between the 
commanders. They wanted Kamenev back to revert to the original operational plan, 
but personal loyalty also played a part and Samoilo was doomed to fail from the start, 
although his indecisive command did not help. He was appointed 6th Army 
Commander, but did not display any bitterness in a report of 7th June on Eastern 
Front Operations under his command . 
63 However, this in-fighting was most likely the 
main reason for delaying the Ufa Operation. 
60 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Na Vostochnorn Fronte", Izbrannye proizvedennia, Tom 11,1928-193 7, pp. 
224-225. 
61A. S. Bubnov et al. Tom III, p. 195; Vbr, docs. 47-48, pp. 95-96. 
62 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Na Vostochnorn Fronte", p. 224, editonial footnote. 
63 DkfK, 4, Toin II, doc. 654, pp. 697-700. 
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The Kamenev-Vacietis rift erupted again in June. With the routes to the Urals now 
open, Eastern Front wanted to pursue Western Army, preventing it reinforcing and 
rebuilding in the Urals. If the Whites dug in to defend the wooded mountainsides, 
conducting guerilla tactics to hold the mountain passes against larger forces, Eastern 
Front could be bogged down indefinitely. However, Denikin had launched an 
offensive in the South and ludenich was beginning to threaten at Petrograd. Vacietis 
wanted Eastern Front to dig in before the Urals and concentrate on Denikin, 
transferring forces southwards, and gave a directive to this effect on 6th June. 64 
Eastern Front RVS again appealed to Lenin on 9th June, complaining bitterly about 
Vacietis' directive, stating that they wished to continue the offensive, whilst he was 
65 advocating defensive tactics . Tukhachevsky, anxious to press on to Zlatoust, as he 
had already outlined to Kamenev, would have supported this as he believed the 
offensive was stronger than the defensive. He also believed the Red Army were 
incapable of defending static emplacements as it did not have enough men for this and 
the existing troops were not confident of using them. 66 Eastern Front's argument was 
actually an early case of the new revolutionary military doctrine being presented over 
Great War bourgeois positional defensive doctrine, exactly as Tukhachevsky would 
outline in Strategiia natsional'naia i klassovaia. 
Lenin, having already stated his intention to clear the Urals before winter, replied 
on 9th and II th June that he understood the difficulty of Eastern Front's position, but 
the worsening of the position at Petrograd and Denikin's breakthrough in the South 
67 
necessitated more transfers from the East. Kamenev complained to Vacietis about 
the "intolerability" of ending Eastern Front's offensive action, but Lenin sided with 
Eastern Front, an RVSR decree on 17th June ordering Eastern Front's offensive to 
continue, but with troops transferred to other fronts. 68 Southern Front was perhaps 
under threat, but Eastern Front was also crucial, as Moscow looked to knock one of 
their opponents out of the war. Lenin confinned this on 9th July in "All Out For the 
Struggle With Denikin" in which he wrote that all forces were to be mobilised to 
64 DGkKA, doc. 565, pp. 571-572. 
65 DkfKA, Toni II, doc. 657, pp. 701-702. 
66 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Ukreplennye raiony", Voina klassov, pp. 89-90. 
67 DkfKA, Tom H, docs. 655 & 658, pp. 700 & 703. 
68 DGkKA, doc. 573, p. 584. 
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defeat Denikin "... whilst not ending the victorious offensive of the Red Anny into 
Ural and Siberia. In this consists the basic task of the moment". 69 
Kamenev replaced Vacietis as Supreme Commander on 8th July to bring the 
dispute to an end . 
70 The latter and other voenspetsy such as Kostiaev were in fact 
arrested in July under dubious circumstances, but later released without charge. This 
was a blow for Trotsky and he offered his resignation as Narkomvoen, but was 
refused. Stalin became involved, backing Karnenev, and after the Tsaritsyn incident 
of 1918, his feud with Trotsky was well under way. However, it would be wrong to 
suggest that Tukhachevsky moved apart from Trotsky at this time. Tukhachevsky 
became involved in the dispute primarily from the strategical angle, but also perhaps 
through personal loyalty to Kamenev. Military success was Tukhachevsky's major 
motivation though and if Vacietis had proposed a continuation into the Urals, 
Tukhachevsky would have backed him. His relationship with Trotsky remained 
sound, but his doubts in older voenspetsy waging civil war had been reinforced by 
Samoilo's actions and Vacietis' call for a defensive strategy. Tukhachevsky and 
Vacietis never seemed to enjoy a good working relationship and military and 
personality differences combined again, as with Gittis, to become the same problem 
for Tukhachevsky. He wrote Vozniknovenie grazhdanskoi voiny and Sootnoshenie sil 
v grazhdanskoi voine on 4th and II th July, with these disputes firmly in mind and it is 
clear the central tenets of his Civil War theories were based directly on his personal 
command experiences. 
Into the Urals: Zlatoust 
Frunze served as Eastern Front Commander from 19th July- I 5th August, when he 
became Turkestan Front Commander. 71 The latter front was created because Eastern 
Front had split Kolchak's forces into two groups, under Frunze's direction, but with 
Tukhachevsky's 5th Army playing the major operational role. Working closely with 
Kamenev before his departure and again with Frunze after 19th July, Tukhachevsky 
69 Vbr, doc. 77, pp. 139-140. 
70 DkJKA, Toni IV, p. 529. 
71 Ibid. pp. 529 & 532. Pavel Pavlovich Lebedev (1872-1933), served as Acting Eastern Front 
Commander from 8th- 19th July. 
208 
planned 5th Army's Urals operations, achieving victories by applying the methods he 
had seen work so far - manoeuvre, speed, stealth and concentration of forces. 
Gaining the go-ahead for the Zlatoust Operation on 6th June, Tukhachevsky set 
about securing his route. As 2nd Army was still pressed back behind the River Kama 
on his left flank, he decided to attack the White group at lavgel'din to secure it. 
Discussing this with Kamenev on 12th June, Tukhachevsky attacked with 26th and 
27th Divisions and 2nd Army's 35th Division, taking lavgeldin on 14th June. 72 2nd 
Army could now advance to fight its way through Krasnouflmsk and Kungur to join 
at Ekaterinburg with 3rd Army, which retook Perm' as Tukhachevsky advanced to 
Zlatoust and Cheliabinsk. These two axes followed the main rail routes through the 
Urals which then carried on eastwards to Omsk, Kolchak's capital. Kamenev planned 
pushing the Whites all the way back, capturing territory and troops as they 
advanced. 73 
Zlatoust sat on a plateau within the Ural Mountains on the Ufa-Cheliabinsk 
Railway. Advancing up the rail line would have been a prolonged costly exercise, so 
Tukhachevsky devised another direction of attack. On 13th June, he suggested 
moving a division secretly north-east up the ravine of the River luriuzan', to reach the 
Zlatoust plateau and launch a surprise flank attack to envelop the Whites, whilst the 
remainder of 5th Army attacked frontally. 74 
With Kamenev's final approval, Tukhachevsky planned the operation, giving 
Eikhe's 26th Division the flanking manoeuvre. 75 Tukhachevsky communicated the 
orders in person, not transmitting them, as secrecy was regarded as the key for the 
flanking movement to succeed. From south to north troop positions for the advance 
had I st Army's 24th Division covering the right flank. On its left flank 26th Division's 
3rd Brigade and a cavalry division advanced up the narrow defile of the Ufa-Zlatoust 
Railway. Starting in the centre, the main group of 26th Division secretly advanced 
swiftly up the luriuzan' ravine, which twisted to the south-east and then back up to the 
north-east, to bring them onto Zlatoust plateau in the left flank and rear of the Whites. 
27th Division advanced on the left flank in a 15-regiment attack group north of the 
impassable Kara-Tau Ridge, skirting round the Birsk-Zlatoust highway. 2nd Army's 
72 Vbr, docs. 64-66, pp. 121-126. 
73 DkfY, 4, Tom II, doc. 665, pp. 709-716. 
" Vbr, doc. 65, pp. 123-125. 
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3 5th Division guarded 27th Division's left flank and joined the attack after 2nd Army 
captured Krasnoufimsk on 4th July. Therefore, most troops were grouped on the left 
of the front to draw the Whites away from 26th Division's flanking manoeuvre. No 
forces advanced directly along the Birsk-Zlatoust highway, the shortest route to 
Zlatoust. Most White troops guarded this road, giving a great element of surprise to 
the Red attack and helping with the envelopment. 
After transfers, mobilisations and reorganisation, which all continued whilst 
taking lavgel'din and preparing for the operation, 5th Army strength in early July was 
16,000-23,000 infantry and 820-1,400 cavalry, 50-70 guns and 328-545 machine- 
guns. 76 Whichever figures are most accurate, Tukhachevsky was commanding a 
similar-sized force as previously. Khanzhin's forces by now numbered around 18,000, 
but perhaps lower. 77 
Eikhe's flanking group crossed the River Ufa on the night of 25th June and moved 
undetected into the luriuzan' Ravine. 27th Division crossed the Ufa the next night and 
began its advance. Upon gaining the ravine, Eikhe's group advanced along the 40 cm 
deep riverbed, dragging their artillery and machine-guns. In three days, they covered 
120 kms (110 versty), lowering and lifting guns by hand as they climbed through the 
ravine. The main column of troops stretched 20 kms and engineers worked ahead, 
building bridges where necessary from logs. On Ist July, 26th Division reached the 
plateau and advanced north-east towards Zlatoust. Tukhachevsky gave further orders 
on 7th and 10th July to develop the attack into the foothills and take the Eastern 
slopes of the Urals. On 13th July, Eikhe's troops launched a surprise attack, capturing 
the town from Western Army, which was apparently holding a troop inspection when 
the attack arrived. Over 3,000 prisoners and vast stocks of materiel were taken. 78 
The Zlatoust Operation was a crucial point in Eastern Front's offensive and 
Tukhachevsky's career. Zlatoust was the key to holding the Urals and its loss flung 
the renamed 3rd White Army back to Cheliabinsk and opened the way to Siberia. 
79 
75 Ibid. doc. 68, pp. 128-130; G. Kh. Eikhe, "Na glavnom napravlenii" Razgrom Kolchaka. 
Vospominaniia, (Moscow, 1969), p. 15 1. 
76 DkfK, 4, Tom H, p. 71 gives the lower figures; Vbr, pp. 388-389, gives the higher numbers. 
77 A. S. Bubnov et al. Tom III, p. 206. 
78 RGV4, f 37605, op. 1, kniga 5, p. 12; Vbr, docs. 76-79, pp. 138-142; DkfKA, Tom H, doc. 672, pp. 
722-723; M. B. Zabolotnyi, Tiataia armiia v bor'ba za luzhnyi Ural", Iz Istorii Iuzhnogo Urala i 
Zaural'ia, 5, (197 1), pp. 114-118; Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia interventsiia v SSSR. 
Entsiklopediia, (Moscow, 1983), p. 220.26th Division was named the ZIatoust Division for its role in 
the operation. 
79 Siberian Army facing 2nd and 3rd Red Annies was divided into I st and 2nd White An-nies. 
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The Urals were the final line upon which Kolchak could hope to hold the Reds and, 
with their loss, ended any hope of another advance towards Moscow. The operation to 
take Zlatoust had been conceived, planned and conducted by Tukhachevsky and had 
been a stunning manoeuvre success in terribly difficult terrain. He had been 
recognised as a capable commander already, but after Zlatoust he must have been 
rated as one of the top army commanders in the Red Army. 
Tukhachevsky had little time to rest on his laurels as Kamenev and Lebedev 
80 directed the general offensive to continue. On 5th Army's right flank, Ural'sk had 
been captured on II th July by I st and 4th Armies, which Frunze immediately directed 
to advance towards Orenburg. On the left, Lebedev ordered 2nd and 3rd Armies to 
take Ekaterinburg, which was captured on 14th July by 2nd Army. 81 
Tukhachevsky's next task was to take Troitsk and Cheliabinsk sectors. He ordered 
5th Army to assume launching positions for the Cheliabinsk Operation, which began 
on 17th July, two days before Frunze became Eastern Front Commander. 82 The latter 
decision was taken after Lenin consulted Lashevich and lurenev of Eastern Front R VS 
if they thought they could work with Frunze, perhaps showing that Lenin was still 
mindful of the Samoilo episode. 83 
Cheliabinsk 
On 20th July, Frunze ordered Novitskii to prepare for transferring troops to 
Southern Front and 3rd and 5th Armies to continue pursuit operations eastwards, with 
Tukhachevsky to base his advance around the Trans-Siberian Railway. 84 
Tukhachevsky received 5th Division on 22nd July and commanded 24th Division 
on his right flank, giving 5th Army overall numbers for taking Troitsk and 
Cheliabinsk of 834 command staff, 29,638 infantry and 1,578 cavalry, with 108 guns 
and 664 machine-guns. 85 Kolchak threw his last reserves into the defence of 
Cheliabinsk, giving 3rd White Army 27,600 men in total, 110 guns and 345 machine- 
80 DGkKA, doc. 58 1, pp. 592-593; DkfKA, Tom II, doc. 673, pp. 723-725. 
81 Dk)X4, Tom II, doc. 672, pp. 722-723; FnVf, p. 261, endnote 56; FnVf, doc. 137, pp. 207-208. 
82 1'1? r, doc. 80, pp. 142-143. Novitskii became Southern Group Commander. 
83 Fn 1j, doc. 141 pp. 214-215; L- Vp, doc. 357, p. 188. 
84 Fn J, "/' docs. 142-143, pp. 215-216; DkfKA, Tom II, doc. 674, pp. 725-726. 
, 15 Vbi-, pp. 388-389. 
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guns. 86 Tukhachevsky therefore, had a slightly larger force than previously, but only a 
small advantage in numbers, and there was no element of surprise this time. 
24th Division advanced on the right flank towards Troitsk. On its left flank, 26th 
Division advanced along the south side of the Trans-Siberian Railway, whilst 27th 
Division moved along the north side. On its left flank, 35th Division advanced down 
the Ekaterinburg- Cheliabinsk lateral railway and 5th Division covered the left flank. 
As a preliminary task, 24th Division took Verkhneural'sk on 25th July and 
advanced on Troitsk. 26th Division advanced to 40 versty from Troitsk by 26th July 
and 27th Division moved into Cheliabinsk on 25th July, with no fighting. 
3rd White Army pulled out of Cheliabinsk in an effort to trap 5th Army in the 
town and attack it from three sides, cutting it off from its rear on the other side of the 
Urals. Therefore, whilst Frunze congratulated Tukhachevsky on 26th July for taking 
the town, a battle ensued. 27th Division was pinned in the town after the centre 3rd 
White Army group attacked it frontally, whilst General Voitsekhovskii's right flank 
3rd White Army group drove a wedge between 27th and 35th Divisions. 26th 
Division was attacked frontally by 3rd White Army's left flank group under Kappel'. 
Tukhachevsky ordered that the White counter-offensive be eliminated on 28th July. 87 
Amid three days fierce fighting, the battle was turned by an 8,500-strong workers' 
rising in 3rd White Army's rear, combined with Tukhachevsky regrouping 5th Arrny's 
troops. The White forces found themselves in the very trap they had laid for 5th 
Army. By I st August, the town was secured and on 4th August, 26th Division, aided 
by partisans, took Troitsk, bringing the Cheliabinsk Operation to a close. 88 3rd White 
Army lost 4,500 killed and 8,000 prisoners at Cheliabinsk, whilst 5th Army suffered 
2,900 killed and wounded and 900 missing. 89 
The capture of Cheliabinsk secured the Urals for Eastern Front and importantly 
secured the lateral Ekaterinburg-Cheliabinsk railway, which linked 3rd and 5th 
Army's rear areas. The victory broke the back of 3rd White Army, its remnants 
retreating eastwards and Kolchak's last sizeable reserves being wiped out. On 5th 
August, the first anniversary of 5th Army's creation, Tukhachevsky was awarded the 
Order of the Red Banner, as was 5th Army itself. The RVSR telegram read, 
86 Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia interventsiia v SSSR. Entsiklopediia, p. 649. 
87 Vbr, doc. 83, pp. 146-147. 
88RGIA, f 37605, op. 1, kniga 5, p. 13; Vbr, doc. 87, pp. 151-152. 
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Brave troops of 5th Army under the artful leadership of army commander 
comrade Tukhachevsky, overcoming stubborn resistance of the enemy and 
defeating it, has crossed the Urals. 
Buguruslan, Bugul'ma, Birsk, Zlatoust and the gates of Siberia - 
Cheliabinsk fell under the blows of the glorious red eagles of 5th Army... 
[Eastern] Front RVS is confident that the red eagles of 5th Army under 
the leadership of the heroic army commander comrade Tukhachevsky will 
cover its weapons with new glories and return the working Siberia to 
workers'-peasants' Russia. 90 
Tukhachevsky's stock was at great heights. 
Siberian Pursuit: Petro pavlovsk-0 m sk 
Again, however, no respite was allowed for Eastern Front. Frunze had pressed 
Novitskii, Tukhachevsky and 3rd Army Commander Mezheninov on 26th July, the 
day after Cheliabinsk was reached, to continue the offensive into the Southern Urals 
and up to the River Tobol, the next natural barrier and possible line of defence for 
Kolchak's forces. He did so again in early August. 91 With Cheliabinsk secured, on 3rd 
August Tukhachevsky ordered 5th Army to cut 3rd White Army's route of retreat to 
Siberia and annihilate it. He then ordered pursuit of the Whites over the River Tobol 
on II th August. 92 The crossing of the Tobol on 20th August began the Petropavlovsk 
Operation, a prolonged campaign which lasted until 13th October, but set up the final 
assault on Kolchak's Omsk. However, before the operation was underway, 
fundamental changes occurred on Eastern Front. As the overall Civil War situation 
changed, Moscow prioritised Southern Front as Denikin advanced and threatened to 
link with the Ural'sk Cossacks. 
On 14th August, Frunze renamed Southern Group, containing I st, 4th and 11 th 
Armies, as Turkestan Front. Under his command, it acted against the Ural'sk 
Cossacks. V. A. 01'derogge became Eastern Front Commander with only 3rd and 5th 
89 Fn Vf, doe. 153, pp. 223-224; M. B. Zabolotnyi, pp. 120-123; Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia 
interventsiia i, SSSR. Entsiklopediia, pp. 649-650. 
90 Vbr, doe. 16 1, pp. 23 1-232. 
91 Fn doe. 160, pp. 230-23 1; DkfKA, Tom II, does. 681-682, pp. 731-732. 
92 DkJK, 4, Toni H, doe. 678, pp. 728-729; Fn Vf, doe. 154, pp. 224-225; DkJX4, Tom IV, p. 535. 
Mezheninov commanded until 26th August when Alafuzo took over temporarily until 6th October 
when MatiiaseNich assumed command; Vbr, does. 85 & 90, pp. 149-150 & 153-154. 
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Armies. 93 Kolchak's forces had been split in two with the capture of Cheliabinsk and 
Troitsk. Eastern Front pursued Western Army eastwards, whilst Turkestan Front 
pursued Southern Army south-east to Turkestan. 94 
This was the first time in the Civil War that Tukhachevsky did not fight on the 
prioritised front. Smirnov reported that 5th Army Communists wanted to fight in the 
South on the most threatening and dangerous front, but they remained in the East with 
Tukhachevsky. 95 Why was he not sent to the prioritised front as he had been 
throughout the Civil War and why was Frunze chosen ahead of him? 
Frunze was the natural choice to lead Turkestan Front, having commanded 
successfully at Front level on prioritised fronts, with Southern Group and Eastern 
Front, by July 1919. He was the ideal Red Commander, a Party member since 1904 
with no professional military education, who nevertheless had proved to be a natural 
at leading civil warfare. He also originated from Pishpek, Kirgizia and local 
knowledge was valuable, as had been evident with Tukhachevsky in 1918. 
Tukhachevsky was a lower rank, but became a front commander in January 1920 and 
was not far behind Frunze in terms of Moscow's trust. He had only been a Communist 
for seventeen months, but had shown his capabilities and continued loyalty to the 
regime and was making all the right noises in his assessment of class civil warfare. 
His retention on Eastern Front, despite it losing its prioritised status, was an indication 
of his high standing. Frunze and Tukhachevsky were the two top men Moscow could 
rely upon. Therefore, whilst Frunze led Turkestan Front, Tukhachevsky remained in 
the East to finish off the task to which he had contributed most of all the Eastern Front 
personnel to achieve. 5th Army had operated virtually independently since June, 
capturing the main targets in the most-fiercely defended central sector. As indicated 
in the congratulatory RVSR telegram, Moscow needed it to continue east and finish 
off Kolchak and it was most likely to achieve this with its "heroic" commander still at 
the helm. There is a possibility that, as in January 1919, Red Command felt 
Tukhachevsky was still better suited to army command, but this is less likely by now 
and, once he had led the final rout of Kolchak, he would be awarded with front 
command. 
93 Fn Vf, doc. 165, pp. 235-236; Vladirnmir Alekseevich 01'derogge (1873-193 1), a fonner Tsarist 
Major-General. 
94 RGIA, f 37605, op. 1, d. 11, p. 6. 
95 DkfK, 4, Tom II, pp. 800-801, note 139. 
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The Petropavlovsk Operation 
On 15th August, Kamenev instructed Ol'derogge to advance 3rd and 5th Armies 
to the line Tobol'sk-Kurgan, to begin the Petropavlovsk Operation. 96 Ol'derogge 
relayed this to 3rd and 5th Armies. 5th Army's right flank was to move down the 
Cheliabinsk-Troitsk-Kustanai branch-line to occupy the latter town, then advance 
with all forces along the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Troitsk-Petropavlovsk 
highway to occupy Kurgan, the next main rail station which lay on the east bank of 
the Tobol. 3rd Army, on its left flank, was to advance along the Ekaterinburg-Omsk 
Railway, occupying Tiumen and lalutorovsk as a prelude to capturing Tobol'sk, which 
lay on the east bank of the Tobol, just north of its confluence with the River Irtysh'. 
lalutorovsk was occupied on 17th August and Kustanai, by 35th Division, two days 
later. 97 
For the Petropavlovsk Operation, 5th Army contained 5th, 26th, 27th and 35th 
Divisions, having lost 21st Division through transfer to Southern Front. It numbered 
1,204 command staff, 22,400 infantry, 1,946 cavalry, with 91 guns and 565 machine- 
guns against 3rd White Army's 19,640 infantry and 4,130 cavalry, with 122 guns and 
356 machine-guns. 3rd Army comprised 29th, 30th, 51st and 10th Divisions, 
numbering 33,512 infantry, 3,595 cavalry, 107 guns and 612 machine-guns, against 
I st and 2nd White Armies' 2 8,140 infantry and 5,640 cavalry, with 117 guns and 4 10 
machine-guns. 98 
However, on 16th August, 5th Division, numbering 618 command staff, 4,037 
infantry and 124 cavalry with 12 guns and 86 machine-guns, was withdrawn into 
reserve. On 19th August, N. D. Tomin's combined cavalry detachment containing 
3,411 cavalrymen and 44 machine-guns transferred from 3rd to 5th Army to aid in 
operations at Kurgan. 99 
5th Army began attempts to cross the Tobol on 18th August. 35th Division on the 
right flank, advanced via Kustanai along the Zverinologovskaia-Petropavlovsk 
highway, with 26th Division on its left flank advancing between the highway and 
96 DGkKA, doc. 583, pp. 593-594. 
97 DkJKA, Tom II, docs. 683-684, pp. 732-734; Vbr, doc. 91, pp. 154-163. 
98 DkJKA, Tom IV, pp. 93 & 490; Vbr, pp. 388-389. 
99 DkJKA, Toin II, docs. 684 & 686, pp. 733-734,735-736 & 800, endnote 138. 
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Trans-Siberian Railway. 27th Division advanced north of the Railway, holding 5th 
Army's left flank after 5th Division, initially positioned there, was withdrawn into 
reserve. 3rd Army's right flank 30th Division advanced north of 5th Army. 
Conditions along the River Tobol were good for defence. A high east right-bank 
was lined by shrubbery amongst which 3rd White Army entrenched with machine- 
gun nests and barbed wire entanglements. Only by 20th August did 5th Army manage 
to fight its way across, breaking through the White positions and launching 
immediately into a pursuit operation. By 28th August, 5th Army had covered 180 kms 
to reach the approaches to Petropavlovsk, which sat on the east bank of the River 
Ishim. 3rd White Army had suffered 15,000 casualties. 100 Garf and Ol'derogge 
ordered Tukhachevsky to force the river on Ist September. 101 However, 3rd White 
Army had withdrawn behind the river, regrouped and reinforced, and launched a 
counter-offensive on 2nd September. 
5th Army's rapid advance had not been matched by Turkestan Front's I st Army on 
its right flank, leaving the former exposed to the open steppeland southwards. 3rd 
White Army and Siberian Cossacks launched infantry and cavalry flanking 
manoeuvres, with artillery support, in a surprise attack and 5th Army, overstretched 
and far from its supply bases, had to retreat to avoid encirclement. 5th Division was 
rushed forward from front reserve to plug the gaps. 01'derogge repeatedly ordered 
Tukhachevsky and 3rd Army Commander Alafuzo to stop the White offensive and 
counter-attack and Tukhachevsky launched 26th and 27th Divisions into fierce 
meeting battles. However, 5th Army's outnumbered troops were forced to constantly 
retreat to avoid envelopment. This threatened 3rd Army's right flank and it also had to 
withdraw. 
By 28th September, 01'derogge was ordering 5th and 3rd Armies to prevent the 
Whites reaching the River Tobol, the starting point for the Petropavlovsk Operation 
on 20th August, but the Reds were forced to withdraw behind the river the next day 
and dug in on the west bank to hold the defensive line. Ol'derogge expressed dismay 
that 26th and 27th Divisions had destroyed the river crossings and not dug in on the 
100 RGVA, f 37605, op. 1, d. 11, p. 87. 
101 DkfY, 4, Tom II, docs. 687-688, pp. 736-737. Garf was Eastern Front Chief-of-Staff, but served as 
Acting Eastern Front Commander in late August. No indication is given why. 
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east bank before the river, holding both banks as he had ordered, but this appears to 
have not been possible. ' 02 
However, Kolchak's forces were unable to advance any further. Just as 5th Army 
had been overstretched before Petropavlovsk, 3rd White Army had no reserves to 
bolster its attack and it petered out at the Tobol. This was another classic instance of 
Civil War toing and froing, but was also Kolchak's final offensive in the Civil War. 
In the first two weeks of October, Tukhachevsky reorganised and rebuilt 5th 
Army for a renewed offensive to Petropavlovsk, whilst holding defensive positions 
behind the Tobol. Regrouping was completed on 13th October and 3rd and 5th 
Armies attacked the next day. ' 03 
Differing figures are available for troop strength. Tukhachevsky estimated 5th 
Army to have 30,500 against 3rd White Anny's 22,200. Other sources give 5th Army 
as 2,106 command staff, 17,021 infantry and 4,522 cavalry with 134 guns and 511 
machine-guns against 3rd White Army's 21,610 infantry and 11,970 cavalry, with 136 
guns and 546 machine-guns. On 10th September, 3rd Army numbered 3,262 
command staff, 47,796 infantry and 4,186 cavalry, with 86 guns and 642 machine- 
guns facing Ist and 2nd White Armies' 26,530 infantry and 5,180 cavalry, with 90 
guns and 439 machine-guns. ' 04 Tukhachevsky noted 5th Army had a superiority of 
forces, but was perhaps including the Siberian partisan movement, which numbered 
an estimated 40,000 in Kolchak's rear. 105 
5th Army advanced with 35th Rifle Divison on the right flank and 5th Division on 
its left, moving up the Zverinogolovskaia-Petropavlovsk highway. 54th Division 
joined the right flank group after crossing the Tobol. 26th and 27th Divisions 
advanced either side of the Trans-Siberian Railway, 27th Division holding 5th 
Army's left flank, and 3rd Army's 30th Division on its left. The right wing group was 
the strongest with 16,500 men and 4,600 in reserve. It was to gradually move tighter 
to the railway group, narrowing the front, as 5th Army approached Petropavlovsk, and 
envelop the town from the right. 
Fighting raged around the Tobol for a week before the Reds finally battled over 
and broke through. The stronger right-wing group advanced ahead, turning 3rd White 
102 DAfKA, Tom H, docs. 689-697, pp. 738-745; Vbr, doc. 91, pp. 154-163. 
103 DkJKA Toni H, docs. 698-699, pp. 745-746. 
104 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Kurgan-Omsk", Izbrannyeproizvedennia, Tom 1,1919-1927, pp. 266-267; 
DkJKA, Tom IT', pp. 92-93 & 496; Vbr, pp. 390-391. 
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Army's left flank northwards as it retreated and shortening 5th Army's front as 
planned. The weaker railway group progressed more slowly, but by 21st October all 
divisions had crossed the Tobol. 3rd Army captured Tobol'sk on 22nd October. ' 06 
The fierce battles now turned into a continuous pursuit operation as Kolchak's 
Armies retreated back to Petropavlovsk. The right-wing group pushed on ahead, 
turning the White left flank inside more as it advanced and by 29th October, 35th 
Division fought its way over the River Ishim and into Petropavlovsk beyond. With 
27th Division approaching to reinforce the right-wing, 3rd White Army pulled out of 
Petropavlovsk on 30th October. 3rd Army occupied Ishim, further north upriver on 
4th November, to maintain the offensive across Eastern Front. Kolchak's forces 
retreated east towards Omsk. 107 
The recently- formed 13th Siberian Cavalry Division failed in two deep 
enveloping manoeuvres to cut off 3rd White Army's HQ at Lebiazh'a Station behind 
the Tobol and then to cut the rail line behind Petropavlovsk, allowing 3rd White 
Army to twice escape encirclements. 1 08 Tukhachevsky despatched infantry in carts to 
gather intelligence and this revealed 3rd White Army was planning to regroup in the 
Isil'kul' area before Omsk. Therefore, the offensive had to continue unabated to catch 
the Whites before they could regroup and dig in again. However, 5th Army was so 
exhausted and overstretched, the divisional commanders met in the Field HQ in 
Petropavlovsk and declared that the troops must recuperate for several days. This was 
not allowed though, as the day after the capture of Petropavlovsk, Ol'derogge ordered 
the development of the offensive towards Omsk. Tukhachevsky outlined 5th Army's 
tasks on I st November and launched the operation on 4th November. 109 
105 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Kurgan-Omsk", p. 265. 
106 DkfKA, Tom 11, docs. 702 & 704, pp. 751-752; Vbr, docs. 97 & 99, pp. 171-175 & 176-177. 
107 DkJKA, Tom II, doc. 705, pp. 753 & 754; Vbr, docs. 100-105, pp. 177-188; M. N. Tukhachevsky, 
" Kurgan- Omsk", pp. 266-269; Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia interventsda. Entsiklopediia, pp. 454- 
455; The future World War 11 general Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskii (1896-1968) was 
Commander of 2nd Cavalry Division of 30th Rifle Division and received the Order of the Red Banner 
for action on 4th November 1919, RGVA, f. 37,605, op. 1, d. 11, p. 79; Vbr, p. 357. 
108 13 th Siberian Cavalry Division was formed on 21 st September and served until 20th November 
1919. DkfKA, Tom IV, p. 592. 
109 DkfKA, Tom H, doc. 796, p. 754; Vbr, docs. 107-108, pp. 188-192. 
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Omsk 
5th and 3rd Armies had swollen by I st November to contain 91,402 infantry and 
7,296 cavalry, with 304 guns and 1,211 machine-guns. However, 5th Army's actual 
frontline strength was probably 2,109 command staff, 24,822 infantry and 3,209 
cavalry with 116 guns and 303 machine-guns and 3rd Army was probably around the 
same size. Kolchak's Armies fielded 36,600 infantry and 17,100 cavalry, with 126 
guns and 908 machine-guns. 110 Red numbers were supplemented by the vast partisan 
movement and the White forces conversely disintegrated as they retreated further 
east, constantly defeated by Eastern Front before them and partisans behind. 
5th Army advanced with 26th Division on the right flank moving north-east up the 
dirt road to take Omsk from the south. 35th Division and 27th Divisions advanced 
either side of the Trans-Siberian Railway. 5th Division held the left flank, advancing 
by road, but attempting to manoeuvre north-east to link with 3rd Anny's 29th 
Division and block the retreat of Ist and 2nd White Armies" elements from Ishim, 
down the Ishim-Ornsk Railway. 
By 8th November, as Eastern Front advanced, 27th Division occupied Isil'kul' 
Station and prevented 3rd White Army concentrating there. Tukhachevsky initially 
sent 13th Cavalry Division towards Omsk, hoping to cut the railway and envelop 3rd 
White An-ny. However, 5th Army's advance opened up its right flank to a possible 
attack from Kokchetav-Akmolinsk area to the south. On 6th November, Ol'derogge 
ordered 13th Cavalry Division to clear this area, pulling it back from the Omsk 
attack. "' On 9th November, 01'derogge ordered the final assault on Omsk and 
Tukhachevsky authorised this two days later. Kokchetav was taken on 12th 
November, which secured the right flank, and Omsk was captured on 14th 
November. 1 12 
5th Army had advanced 600 versty and crossed three rivers in 30 days from the 
River Belaia to Omsk. 40,000 prisoners, over 100 guns, 500,000 shells, 5 million 
110 DkfKA, Tom IV, pp. III& 50 1. 
111 DkfK, 4, Toni H, pp. 754-755. 
112 RGVA, f 37605, op. 1, d. 11, p. 49, DkfKA, Tom H, doc. 708, pp. 755-757; Vbr, doc. 109, pp. 192- 
193. 
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cartridges and 3 armoured-trains were captured in the town, finishing Kolchak as a 
force in the Civil War. 113 
Although Kolchak's capital was captured, he escaped, and on 18th November 
Tukhachevsky ordered pursuit of the scattered remnants of the White forces, with 
Kolchak the main target. This eventually led to the further capture of Tomsk, 
Novonikolaevsk and Krasnoiarsk, but this was Tukhachevsky's last instruction to 5th 
Army before he was recalled to Moscow amid more transfers, as Eastern Front had all 
but completed its task. ' 14 
Tukhachevsky and 01'deroue 
Tukhachevsky's command would not have been complete without an altercation 
with his superior and this duly occurred. Tukhachevsky recalled the argument in his 
essay Na Vostochnom fronte (On Eastern Front), written in 1935, when the terror 
process was starting to take hold in the USSR. This probably explains his statement, 
"It is hard to understand where Trotsky sought out such people! ", but the dispute 
Tukhachevsky had with Ol'derogge was again over military matters. 115 It centred 
around the first attack on Petropavlovsk which led to 3rd White Army's counter- 
offensive. Tukhachevsky related that he had opposed Ol'derogge's plan for the main 
attack group to move up the railway, as this left the right flank road open to the 
Siberian Cossack counter-attack. He noted that he had wanted to conduct the first 
offensive using the plan of the second, a strong right-wing group, which could have 
protected against flank attack, but was overruled by 01'derogge. Ultimately 
Tukhachevsky was proven correct. He also complained about 01'derogge pulling back 
the cavalry from the Omsk Operation, hinting that Kolchak may have been captured if 
they had been allowed to cut the rail line behind Omsk. ' 16 
113 RGVA, f. 37605, op. 1, d. 11, pp. 49 & 63. 
114 Vbr, doc. 110, pp. 193-194; 5th Army pursued Kolchak, capturing Novonikolaevsk on 14th 
December. 5th Steppe Partisan Regiment, which had been active in Kolchak's rear, met up with 227th 
and 228th Regiments on 12th December and fought alongside them afterwards. Kolchak handed 
responsibility for the fight in Siberia to Ataman Semenov and made Denikin Supreme Ruler of Russia 
on 5th January 1920. On the same day, partisans took over the town of Irkutsk. Kolchak arrived here 
on 15th January and was arrested by the partisans, tried and executed on 7th February. Kappel' also 
died at Irkutsk, retreating to here and dying in action on 25th January, RTsKhIDNI, f. 71, op. 35, d. 
984, pp. 171 & 413-420. 
115 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Na Vostochnom fronte", p. 227. 
116 RGJA, f. 37605, op. 1, d. 11, p. 49. 
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This essay was written in 1935 amid growing tension and Tukhachevsky possibly 
had to justify his role in the offensive at this time. Other sources do not reveal 
arguments over orders or strategy, as with Tukhachevsky's other disputes, and there 
appears to be no reply by 01'derogge. There is no guarantee that the cavalry would 
have encircled and cut off Kolchak as it had failed to complete similar operations 
twice already. As for the strategic argument, the second offensive was a great 
manoeuvre success, but there is no way to tell if Tukhachevsky did plan this in 
September. 
However, if this disagreement did occur and Tukhachevsky had suggested the 
successful strategy and later complained about 01'derogge's rebuff, it would have 
benefited Tukhachevsky's reputation in the same manner as the Don incident with 
Gittis. Also, despite withdrawing 150 kms in September, this was not a rout, but a 
fairly orderly retreat. It gave Tukhachevsky another chance to display his 
reorganisational skills and 5th Army attacked successfully afterwards. Tukhachevsky 
had shown himself to be strategically astute, but also adaptable and able in command, 
demonstrating initiative to act independently and quickly under great pressure to save 
the situation. This would have gone in his favour as far as further promotion was 
concerned. The 01'derogge episode would again have reinforced his belief that old 
voenspetsy did not understand class warfare, as the tactic Tukhachevsky proposed was 
based on the presence of hostile class elements on the right flank, but 01'derogge did 
not seem to grasp this. When the second offensive worked because of the same tactic, 
it would have confirmed Tukhachevsky's belief in his class warfare methods. 
A definite pattern is evident throughout Tukhachevsky's Civil War army 
commands of him working well and having good relations with one superior, but not 
the next. Murav'ev can be discounted as Tukhachevsky did not fight a campaign 
under his command, but we can begin with Vacietis. Tukhachevsky never worked 
easily with him, registering complaints about interference, but relations with 
Kamenev as Eastern Front Commander went very smoothly. Transferred to Southern 
Front, Tukhachevsky fell out completely with Gittis. Eastern Front in 1919 is slightly 
different in that Kamenev was Eastern Front Commander, but Frunze commanded 
Southern Group. In this way, Tukhachevsky served under both, but relations were 
excellent and operations planned jointly, as has been shown. However, the pattern 
reemerges with Samoilo's appearance and bitter complaints lodged by Tukhachevsky 
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again. With Kamenev restored, Tukhachevsky served happily under him and Frunze 
until August. Only when Frunze was replaced by Ol'derogge did a dispute arise again. 
What lay behind this pattern? 
The basic reason was a clash in military outlook and how operations should be 
waged. Frunze and Kamenev fought the same way as Tukhachevsky and so they 
worked well together, discussing tactics and acting upon advice from each other. This 
comes across in the tenor of their communications. However, Gittis, Samoilo and 
01'derogge were three men who failed to come up to the standards of Kamenev and 
Frunze in Tukhachevsky's eyes, mainly because they thought differently, but also 
because they did not appreciate the changes in class warfare that Tukhachevsky saw 
as crucial to not only winning the Russian Civil War, but also other civil and class 
wars to come. The Russian Civil War could be turned into a European conflict and 
perfecting the proper methods to fight it was essential, as they would be replicated in 
war-torn Europe. Tukhachevsky wrote in cutting and sarcastic terms about those he 
disagreed with, but the arguments were over military matters and the nastier tone, 
which is visible in the clipped, efficient communications he had with them, was part 
of this. No personal vendetta was aimed at these people, but they were old voenspetsy 
who could not adapt to civil warfare and so had to be removed before they did any 
more damage. Vacietis is slightly different in that Tukhachevsky disagreed with his 
defensive strategy for Eastern Front in 1919, but in 1918, although they had disagreed 
and Vacietis forced him to attack before I st Army was ready, Tukhachevsky did seem 
to respect him and relations appear wanner in their communnications than with Gittis, 
Samoilo or 01'derogge. Tukhachevsky retained these types of relationships 
throughout his life, unable to respect those he disagreed with over fundamental 
military concepts and having friendships only with those with whom he readily 
agreed and worked well. 
Partisans in Siberia 
A central tenet of Tukhachevsky's military concepts emerged in Siberia with 5th 
Army. The aid given by partisans in Kolchak's rear caused a major evolution in his 
idea of the possibility of continuous offensives because of the ability to mobilise 
class-friendly troops along the way. Uprisings in the enemy rear had already played 
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an important part in Samara in 1918, forcing Komuch troops to flee the town to 
prevent encirclement as Ist Army approached from the front, and adding 1,000 men 
to Ist Army in addition to those mobilised en route through Simbirsk and Syzran'. 
This had been replicated in a spectacular manner at Cheliabinsk in August 1919,5th 
Army's victory only secured because 8,500 workers rose in the White rear, to ruin the 
trap laid for the Red troops. However, in the pursuit operations after this, a 
completely new phenomenon emerged which altered Tukhachevsky's thinking 
fundamentally. 
Whilst conducting the continuous pursuit of Kolchak's forces to Kurgan, 
Petropavlovsk and Omsk, Tukhachevsky had to constantly give up troops for transfer 
to Southern and Petrograd Fronts. However, 5th Army numbers remained constant 
and even rose as he progressed eastwards because of mobilisation carried out on the 
move. Partisan formations fought alongside 5th Army formations and also secured 5th 
Army's rear and flanks, allowing Tukhachevsky to keep his regular troops in the front 
line. He wrote in January 1920 that 5th Army had successfully defended the open 
steppelands on its flanks and rear by creating fortified areas under the authority of 
local military commissariats. These contained lines of separate blockhouses 
garrisoned by small units of platoon or company size, which cooperated with partisan 
detachments operating in the countryside to defend against White raids, especially by 
cavalry. In this way, 5th Army's rear was secured, whilst "not expending one regiment 
of the field army on this matter". ' 17 
Such support was available because of the vast Siberian partisan movement which 
rose against Kolchak during 1919. This was encouraged by Moscow from early in the 
year. The Siberian oblast' Bolshevik Conference, on 20th-21st March 1919, passed a 
resolution to organise the peasantry for the struggle with Kolchak, but the partisan 
movement which emerged was far more widespread than they could have 
anticipated. ' 18 The Siberian partisan composition differed from the earlier workers' 
risings in Samara and Cheliabinsk, which Tukhachevsky had witnessed and used to 
his advantage. The Siberian partisans were almost predominantly peasants who were 
rising against the corruption and violence in the rear of the Kolchak regime. These 
117 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Ukreplennye raiony", pp. 89-94. 
1 RTsKhlDNI, f71, op. 35, d. 984, pp. 429-430. 
223 
partisans originated from the section of society not normally supportive of and 
ambivalent at best towards the Bolsheviks. ' 19 
Moscow jumped at this support, coordinating the partisans with the Siberian 
Revolutionary Committee, formed on 27th August by CEC decree under 1. N. 
Smirnov., 20 The Sibrevkom gained power over all organs of civil administration in 
Siberia and all resources, bar foodstuffs and played an integral part in 5th Army's 
success on Eastern Front. The peasant and Red partisan movements had been active in 
Siberia for much of Kolchak's reign, but at this point in many ways acted as 
replacements for the regular troops Eastern Front lost to Southern and Petrograd 
Fronts, crucially reinforcing the depleted Red forces when the Red offensive began to 
stall in early September. As 5th Army moved further east and came into closer contact 
with the partisan formations, reorganisation of the irregular troops was conducted. On 
9th October, West Siberian Peasant Red Army was created, with a command staff and 
military revolutionary tribunals. It was commanded by a Siberian partisan leader E. 
M. Mamontov and grew to 15,000 partisans. 12 1 This replicated Tukhachevsky's Red 
Army formation process in summer 1918 and regulated cooperation between 5th 
Army and partisan forces. 
G. V. Smimov suggests the credit for 5th Army's successful cooperation with Red 
partisans should go solely to 1. N. Smirnov as Tukhachevsky did not know about the 
secret work undertaken by his fellow-RVS member, but this can be discounte . 
122 
Tukhachevsky and Smirnov were based together in 5th An-ny HQ for virtually the 
whole campaign and worked together on all operational aspects, including the raising 
of uprisings and partisan activity in Kolchak's rear. 
The success of the 40,000-strong partisan forces in helping maintain 5th Army's 
advance to victory convinced Tukhachevsky of the efficacy of class warfare. These 
were peasants who had rebelled against the bourgeois Whites and supported the 
advance of socialism and Tukhachevsky saw it as one of the major factors in his 
ability to maintain the continuous offensive. He stated clearly in Strategiia 
natsional'naia i klassovaia that the use of partisans in the rear must be researched and 
119 For a detailed study of the Kolchak regime see, J. Smele, Civil War in Siberia: the anti-Bolshevik 
government ofAdmiral Kolchak, 1918-1920, (Cambridge, 1996). 
120Sibirskaia Vandeia: Tom 1,1919-1920. Dokumenty. (Moscow, 2000), doc. 1, p. 13. 
12 'RTsKhIDNI, f. 71, op. 35, d. 984, pp. 166-167 & 444; Efim Mefod'evich Mamontov (1888-1922) 
became Deputy Inspector of 5th Army infantry in February 1920, Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia 
interventsiia. Entsiklopediia, pp. 340-341. 
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utilised to the full and he never lost belief in its effectiveness, stressing the point in 
the 1929 article on the Red Army Field Regulations which introduced "Deep 
Battle". 123 The ability to have sizeable forces in the enemy rear was evident to him in 
1919 as a vital method by which to attack the enemy in depth, disrupting 
communications and the ability to move reserves to the front line. In later years, with 
technological developments and imagination, he tried to replicate the conditions he 
had seen work so well in Siberia, by introducing the notion of paratroopers into "Deep 
Battle". 
Tukhachevsky was the first to experiment with dropping sizeable formations of 
lightly-equipped men behind enemy lines to disrupt the rear and take out vital points 
to help the attack from the front. The need to reach these troops quickly because of 
their light armament was paramount to avoid their annihilation and so quick strike 
tank formations were developed to do so. These ideas all stemmed from what 
Tukhachevsky had seen work in action against Kolchak. Partisans were crucial for 
maintaining offensive momentum, disrupting Kolchak's rear, cutting communications 
and preventing reserves reaching the frontlines with sabotage of transport and 
transport routes. However, they could also combine with infantry forces attacking 
from the front travelling quickly by cart, or cavalry conducting deep raids to the 
enemy's depth, and in this way added troops to the regular formations. The basic 
operational ideas for "Deep Battle" originated from Tukhachevsky's Civil War 
commands. He believed these were the true methods to win class war under the 
changing conditions of socialism against capitalism and he was determined from the 
outset to achieve a class-based army utilising these methods. This underlay his 
disagreements with those wishing to follow defensive or "national" warfare methods. 
It is also possible that he saw the development of paratroopers as either a way to help 
foment risings in the rear of enemy armies or conversely, with the hopes for uprisings 
in Western countries perhaps fading by the end of the 1920s, this was an alternative to 
the help provided by partisans in the rear. Loyal troops dropped into the enemy rear 
would do the job instead. 
122 G. V. Smimov, pp. 254-257. 
123 See chapter 111, p. 143 
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From late November, Tukhachevsky had the opportunity to disseminate his ideas 
as a cogent theory when he was recalled to Moscow and then had the chance to 
practise them on a front command level in early 1920. 
Moscow Interlude 
On 25th November, Tukhachevsky was recalled to Moscow. ' 24 He was appointed 
Southern Front 13th Army Commander on 22nd December, but did not leave 
immediately, delivering his lecture on 24th December. On 4th February, having 
apparently not taken up 13th Army command, he was appointed Acting Caucasian 
Front Commander, a post he held until 22nd April. Various stories and suggestions 
surround this period, the only time during the Civil War Tukhachevsky was not 
commanding in the field. 
Gul' suggests Tukhachevsky was recalled to Moscow for investigation after Cheka 
personnel, tipped off by "enemies", discovered Tukhachevsky had given his wife, 
Marucia, extra food from his command train to take home to her parents. As this was 
illegal she shot herself on his train to avoid disgrace for her husband. 125 Gul' is the 
only source containing this story. None of the Soviet biographies reproduce it, but this 
is to be expected, whether it occurred or not. Post-Soviet biographies do not mention 
it either, not even Smimov, but of the Western accounts, Spahr does not mention it, 
Butson again reproduces it as fact without question, whilst Simpkin and Erickson and 
Kaufmann question its validity. 126 As previously mentioned, Tukhachevsky's wife and 
his family visited him on the command train and his brothers worked in his staff. It is 
possible to tendentiously link this story to the arguments Tukhachevsky had with 
Medvedev about the former using army supplies for family and friends. However, 
ultimately Gul's story must be dismissed as more emigre gripes. In Tukhachevsky's 
personal file in RGVA, his sister Elizabeth explains what happened to Marucia. She 
did commit suicide, but it was nothing to with being caught with contraband 
foodstuffs. Tukhachevsky had an affair with another woman whom he eventually 
married and this was the reason his first wife committed suicide. She had taken drugs 
124 lu. A. Shchetinov & B. A. Starkov, Krasnyi marshal, (Moscow, 1990), p. 122. 
125 R. Gul', Tukhachevsky. - krasnyi marshal, (Berlin, 1932), pp. 112-113. 
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to "scare him" previously, but took a large dose of a sleeping draught and died. 127 
This explains the absence of this seedier side to his life in the Soviet biographies. It 
does not sit well with the image of the Communist hero. However, it is unlikely that 
Tukhachevsky was recalled in disgrace because this occurred, although perhaps he 
was given compassionate leave. 
Ivanov suggests Tukhachevsky arrived in Moscow at the end of November, and 
visited the R VSR repeatedly, which was based in his old Aleksandrovskii Military 
Academy building, to receive a new posting. However, he received nothing, probably 
because of his July statements about older voenspetsy and the need to replace them 
with communist-commanders. 128 Therefore, did the hierarchy block his appointment? 
Daines, in an archival ly-based essay, writes the R VSR took the decision to appoint 
Tukhachevsky 13th Arrny Commander on 6th November, when 13th Army 
Commander A. 1. Gekker fell ill and an urgent replacement was required. However, 
once recalled (after the fall of Omsk), the ruined transport system prevented 
Tukhachevsky returning quickly. ' 29 Gekker was not replaced until 18th February 
1920 by 1. Kh. Pauka and Tukhachevsky is not recorded as ever holding this 
position. 
130 
The ruin of the railways was a major obstacle to travel. The situation worsened as 
the Civil War progressed and also the further from the centre one travelled. 
Tukhachevsky was hundreds of miles away in Omsk when he was recalled. He 
handed over command to Eikhe on 25th November, but evidently did not depart for 
Moscow immediately, signing an order as a member of 5th Army RVS on 3rd 
December. 131 It appears the transport chaos delayed Tukhachevsky in Omsk until at 
least this date and it is unlikely he arrived in Moscow long before he met Sklianskii. 
Taking into account time lost because of the ruined Civil War rail network cuts down 
the period Tukhachevsky was in Moscow, which is variously referred to as "shrouded 
126 T. Butson, The Tsar's Lieutenant. The Soviet Marshal, (New York, 1984), p. 66; A. F. Kaufmann, 
pp. 127-128; R. Simpkin & Erickson, J., Deep Battle - The Brainchild ofMarshal Tukhachevskii, 
(London; Washington, 1987), p. 7. 
127 RGII'A, f 37605, op. 1, d. 3, pp. 46-47. 
128 V. M. lvanov, Marshal M. N. Tukhachevsky, 2nd Edition, (Moscow, 1990), pp. 131-134. 
129 V. 0. Dairies, "Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky", Voprosy Istorii, No. 10, (Oct. 1989), pp. 45- 
46. 
130 DkfK, 4, Toin IV, p. 542. 
13 1 Tukhachevsky is listed as 5th Army Commander until 25th November 1919, upon which date Eikhe 
is listed as taking over. V'br, p. 404, DkfKA, Tom IV, p. 537; Vbr, doc. 182, p. 346. 
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in mystery" or a period in which he was "cooling his heels". In fact, this was not a 
long mysterious gap in his Civil War career at all. 132 
Tukhachevsky was simply recalled to become 13th Army Commander because he 
had accomplished his task in the East with the capture of Omsk and Kolchak was 
finished as a force. However, Southern Front was still locked in battle with Denikin 
and, since Tukhachevsky was no longer needed in the East, Moscow wanted to use its 
best army commander in the prioritised South. However, with the delays, it appears 
Lenin and Sklianskii decided to keep Tukhachevsky in Moscow for a few days longer 
to deliver his lecture and compile his report. G. V. Smirnov suggests Trotsky seized 
the chance to "... bring his creature into the light" and this was why Tukhachevsky was 
in Moscow for so long. 1 33 We have already established he was not in Moscow very 
long and although Trotsky did describe Tukhachevsky as "... one of our best army 
commanders" on 12th December, it was Lenin who requested Tukhachevsky's report 
and lecture. 134 The Red hierarchy no doubt were all anxious to hear what the 
commander who had chased Kolchak back from the Volga had to say. 
1. N. Smirnov had sent a report to the RVSR, which Lenin received on 15th 
November, describing the command courses which Tukhachevsky had formed to 
recruit and train command staff for 5th Army. 50 battalion and company level officers 
had been produced and 800 more were currently completing the courses. ' 35 This was 
how Tukhachevsky could claim 5th Army had Red Commanders who were 
communists and make a case for unified command in his 19th December report. 
Smirnov's report and Tukhachevsky's assertions in Vozniknovenie grazhdanskoi voine 
in July 1919, about the need to replace old voens etsy with Red Commanders, were P 
probably the catalyst for Lenin requesting Tukhachevsky's report in December. 
Lenin's response to Tukhachevsky's report is illustrated by a telegram 
Tukhachevsky sent on Lenin's request to 1. N. Smirnov on 19th December, the same 
day Tukhachevsky submitted his report to Sklianskii and Lenin. After reading the 
report and probably discussing Eastern Front with Tukhachevsky, Lenin instructed 
him to ask Smirnov to prepare the best command staff of 5th Army for transfer to 
Southern Front "within a month" because of the "severe insufficiency of reliable 
132 A. F. Kaufmann Jr., pp. 127-128; T. Butson, p. 66. 
133 G. V. Smirnov, p. 258. 
134 L. D. Trotsky, How the Revolution Armed, Volume II. - The Year 1919, (London, 1979), p. 113. 
135 M. N. Tukhachevsky, Izbrannyeproizvedeniia, Tom I, pp. 6-7. 
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command staff' there and the fact that "Transfer of units of 5th Army is impossible in 
a short time because of the state of transport". These were the young commanders 
from 5th Army's military courses, the people Tukhachevsky praised so highly and 
recommended for promotion in his report. If 5th Army en masse could not be quickly 
transferred south, at least its commanders could be, to organise the forces there. After 
relaying this instruction from Lenin, Tukhachevsky wrote to Smirnov, 
I do not know now the circumstances in Siberia, but if Kolchak is already 
annihilated, then this measure would bring great advantages. I propose this 
is fulfilled as fully as possible to boldly move for the transfer of the 
command staff of good military commanders and excellent kursanty and 
to give promotion to the young command staff. 136 
It is interesting to see Tukhachevsky expressing his ignorance of the situation in 
the East and allowing Smirnov to decide if transfers were possible, a courtesy he 
probably wished had been shown to himself previously. Whether this transfer en 
masse from the East to the South would be greeted as well by those already there was 
another matter and one perhaps influential in the treatment Tukhachevsky initially 
received when sent southwards. 
Transfer to Caucasian Front 
Some uncertainty lingers over the early January 1920 period. Tukhachevsky was 
apparently informed on 22nd December that he was still to become 13th Army 
Commander as Gekker's health had not improved. 137 He delivered his lecture on 24th 
December and four days later was awarded a golden revolver for his command of 5th 
Army. 138 He departed for Caucasian Front shortly after this. Two essays in Voina 
klassov are dated 5th and 18th January 1920 at Southern Front HQ in Kursk, and two 
more were written during this period, so he spent much of this time writing. 
' 39 
However, his patience had evidently ended by 19th January, as he telegrammed 
Trotsky, 
136 T"br, doc. 122, p. 227. 
137 V. M. Ivanov, p. 134; V. 0. Daines, p. 47. 
138 V. 0. Daines, pp. 46-47. 
139 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Ukreplennye raiony", "Politika i strategiia v grazhdanskoi voine", 
'Revoliutsiia izvne" & "Statistika v grazhdanskoi voine", Voina klassov, pp. 31-36,50-60 & 78-88, 
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I earnestly ask you to release me from having nothing to do. I have been 
or almost three sitting around aimlessly at South-Western Staff HQ f 
weeks and I have been without work for two months in all. I can neither 
elucidate the reason for the delay nor obtain a further posting. If I should 
have any services to my credit over almost two years in command of 
various armies, I request that I may be given an opportunity of getting 
down to some active work or, if this cannot be found at the front, I request 
that I may be given it in the transport field or military commissariats. 
Trotsky, upon receiving this, noted at the bottom of the telegram, "Inform Comrades 
Lenin and Stalin". 140 It is evident from this that Tukhachevsky arrived at Kursk in 
early January, but did not actively become 13th Army Commander. 
Butson relates this telegram to Tukhachevsky being punished for his wife's 
indiscretion with the contraband foodstuffs, but this has been shown not to be the 
case. He does also mention Trotsky blaming Stalin for Tukhachevsky's idleness at 
Kursk. Ivanov also stresses this, suggesting Stalin blocked Tukhachevsky taking up 
the position, as he looked on him as either a voenspetsy or an outsider with whom he 
did not want to share the defeat of Denikin. This is feasible and could have been 
exacerbated by the transfer of 5th Army's command staff. Did Stalin feel the success 
gained in the south was in danger of being undermined and taken over by those 
transferred from the East who would look to Tukhachevsky for leadership? As 
Southern Front political commissar, Stalin had the position to block Tukhachevsky. 
However, if he did so initially, Stalin played a part in Tukhachevsky becoming Acting 
Caucasian Front Commander on 24th January. 
Stalin telegrammed Voroshilov and Budennyi on 3rd February, 
Eight days ago, during my visit to Moscow, I achieved the replacement of 
Shorin and appointment of a new Front Commander Tukhachevsky - the 
conqueror of Siberia and victor over Kolchak. He arrived in Saratov only 
today and any day now will join the front command. 141 
Whether Stalin did originally block Tukhachevsky's appointment as 13th Army 
Commander, events on Caucasian Front worsened during January, forcing Stalin to 
demand a replacement for Front Commander Shorin. Therefore, perhaps 
Tukhachevsky was in the right place at the right time again. However, I would 
suggest this is an instance in which Stalin has simply been pinned with the blame, as 
he is for most things which went wrong in the Soviet Union during his time. He 
sounded delighted in the telegram to have secured Tukhachevsky's posting and by this 
140 j. M. Meijer, ed. The Trotsýy Papers, Volume II, doc. 43 9, pp. 10- 13. 
14 1 A. S. Popov, p. 52. 
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point I do not think he doubted Tukhachevsky's credentials. Stalin later described 
Tukhachevsky as the "Demon of the Civil War" and with Caucasian Front falling 
apart in January he was glad to have him there. 142 It is also possible Tukhachevsky 
was kept inactive on Caucasian Front because the voenspetsy there did not take kindly 
to him after his December comments and Shorin blocked his posting. This is probably 
the most likely scenario. 
Lenin sent a telegramm to Trotsky asking "... 2) Where is Tukhachevsky? 3) How 
are things on Caucasian Front? ". 143 This has been dated as after 7th February because 
of a reference to Kolchak which could have been about his execution, but it is 
possible this was written when he was under arrest and before the execution had 
occurred. Either way, Lenin was curious as to what Tukhachevsky was doing and the 
reference to Caucasian Front suggests, if it was sent earlier, Lenin wanted 
Tukhachevsky to go there. Trotsky had informed Lenin and Stalin of Tukhachevsky's 
19th January telegram and Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin evidently met and decided to 
appoint Tukhachevsky. Tukhachevsky's telegram also negates the suggestion that he 
was previously under investigation in Moscow, as he would not have written he could 
not "elucidate" the reasons for the delay in his receiving a posting, if he had been. 
For Tukhachevsky to be deemed capable of handling front command, which 
Trotsky had advised against a year earlier, shows he must have impressed during his 
time in Moscow. Perhaps an element of luck was still involved, being in right the 
place at the right time to replace Shorin, but Tukhachevsky again had to prove himself 
capable of fulfilling this higher role. However, as Stalin recognised, he was the man 
who infamously led 5th Army to the final rout of Kolchak. Therefore, when Denikin 
was threatening to regain the initiative in the South, the boost to morale for Caucasian 
Front of gaining the leadership of a now renowned military commander would have 
been tangible and was probably considered in Moscow's decision. 
Caucasian Front Commander: February-April 1920 
Tukhachevsky assumed the post of Caucasian Front Commander on 2nd February 
1920 and held it until 24th April, by which time he had completely routed the Armed 
"2 f 37,605, op. 1, d. 11, p. 9. 
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Forces of South Russia, and for the second time in six months forced the Supreme 
Ruler of Russia to flee the oncoming Red Army-144Unlike Kolchak however, Denikin 
managed to escape with his life, leaving Russia for Turkey on an Allied transport on 
4th April, handing over command of the remaining White troops in the Crimea to 
Baron Petr Wrangel. Disagreements between the two Southern White supremos 
contributed to the disintegration of the White forces. Denikin removed Wrangel from 
his command after learning of a plot by the latter to replace him as Supreme 
Commander of the Armed Forces of South Russia. Also, the Kuban Government 
refused to help Denikin, not recognising his authority, which led him to threaten the 
abandonment of the Kuban. 145 This bickering was symptomatic of the White 
movement and weakened it, easing the path of the Red Caucasian Front, as did the 
fact that Denikin's rear collapsed rapidly around him amid partisan activity. However, 
this was encouraged by the major factor in the White defeat, the February-April Red 
North Caucasus Operation, Tukhachevsky's meticulously planned and executed 
offensive, which in hindsight was perhaps the apogee of his wartime command career. 
Its stunning success, kickstarting the Red offensive in the Caucasus which had 
completely stalled in mid-January, led to Kamenev recommending him as Western 
Front Commander in March to take on Poland. Was the North Caucasus Operation 
influenced by Tukhachevsky's earlier campaigns, did it reflect his Moscow analysis 
and are there any pointers towards why the Polish campaign failed afterwards? 
Circumstances on Southern Front had radically changed between November 1919 
and January 1920, with Denikin pushed back from whence he came. The rising Polish 
threat in the West led to the reorganisation of Southern and South-Eastem Fronts into 
South-Westem and Caucasian Fronts, in accordance with the geographical areas in 
which they now operated. South-Westem Front under A. 1. Egorov was based at 
Kharkov and Caucasian Front under V. 1. Shorin was based at Rostov. 146 
After the reorganisation, Shorin ordered a renewed offensive. The direction of the 
attack, the Don-Manych' Operation, and his choice of troops for the main sector led to 
a collapse in Red morale, retreat before a White counter-attack and Shorin's removal. 
143 V. M. Poniaeva, Biograficheskaia khronika VI Lenina, kak istochnik izuchenda kulturnogo 
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By mid-January 1920, the Armed Forces of South Russia had split into three 
groups. Red South-Western Front formed screens against Polish incursions into 
Ukraine, whilst pushing on to Odessa and Crimea, pursuing and routing the two 
smaller White groups retreating here. Caucasian Front faced the largest White group 
under Denikin, containing Don Army, the remnants of Kuban Army and the 
Volunteer Corps. Wrangel had reorganised and reduced the Volunteer Army to corps 
size in early December as losses sustained through battle, disease and desertion were 
not replaced. Continued retreat through a hostile peasant rear prevented mobilisation 
of reinforcements. 147 Retreating down the left bank of the River Don, the Whites, 
numbering around 11,000 cavalry and 13,000 infantry, headed for the North 
Caucasus. By mid-January the Volunteer Corps occupied Azov Sea-Bataisk area, with 
the fortified zone of Bataisk on its left flank. The Don Cavalry (3 Cavalry Corps) 
were positioned around Ol'ginskaia Station area and south of Bataisk were 3 Kuban 
Cavalry Corps in reserve. 
Facing the largest White force, Caucasian Front was prioritised by Moscow and 
allocated more troops, gaining 8th Army and Ist Cavalry Army from South-Western 
Front and a further five divisions to complement its 9th, I Oth and II th Armies. This 
occurred on 9th January, and Shorin continued South-Eastem Front's offensive, 
concentrating on the Volunteer Corps, to clear Rostov-on-the-Don area. 148 This task 
was allocated on 14th January to Ist Cavalry Army under Semen Budennyi and 8th 
Army under G. Ia. Sokol'nikov. 149 On 15th January, the former comprised 9,000 
cavalry and 9th and 12th divisions' 5,000 infantry. Positioned along the front Rostov- 
on-the-Don-Novocherkassk-Aksai', 8th Army comprised 11,000 infantry and 2,022 
cavalry, with 1,681 light and heavy guns. 9th, I Ith and 10th Armies, the latter of 
which recaptured Tsaritsyn on 2nd January, were to advance with supporting 
operations. 1 50 
Therefore, the Reds had numerical superiority and with morale high, especially 
amongst the unstoppable I st Cavalry Army, prospects for a further Red victory were 
favourable. However, Shorin, disregarding Budennyi's request to cross the frozen 
River Don and envelop the Bataisk stronghold in the rear, ordered a frontal attack by 
A. S. Bubnov, et al. Tom III, (Moscow, 1930), p. 285. 
DkfKA, Toni H, p. 468. 
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I st Cavalry Army over the Don from Rostov to Bataisk, through a low-lying marshy 
plain intersected by streams and lakes. This prevented rapid advance and forced the 
Red cavalry together as they attempted to cross the mainly impassable land before 
Bataisk, allowing the Whites to concentrate fire on the bunched cavalrymen - hardly 
the ideal offensive situation for a cavalry force requiring freedom of movement and 
swift manoeuvrability to succeed. 
Shorin authorised the operation on 15th January and ordered its continuation on 
17th and 19th, despite the failure of I st Cavalry Army and 8th Army to make any 
ground on Bataisk. 15 1 The repeated frontal attacks by Ist Cavalry Army cost it almost 
half its number in casualties and a collapse in morale and provoked stinging rebukes 
from Budennyi, backed by 10th Army Commissar Voroshilov, a powerful figure in 
the Red South. 
Kamenev tried to salvage the offensive, submitting a report on 22nd January to 
Trotsky, demanding more troops for Caucasian Front. He reported that 8th and 9th 
Armies and I st Cavalry Army had successfully pushed Denikin's forces over the Don, 
but a crossing was impossible with all bridges destroyed except the rail crossing at 
Rostov. This was defended by entrenched Whites on the southern bank, who had 
reinforced and regrouped, rendering a boat crossing impossible. Commenting on 
Caucasian Front's low quality troops and poorly-trained command staff, the majority 
of whom were not capable of manoeuvre warfare, Kamenev stressed the need to 
quickly transfer troops from all over the Soviet Republic - 40,000 initially, then 
60,000, even up to 100,000. Quantity rather than quality would break through the 
entrenched White forces. 
152 
Also on 22nd January, Kamenev directed 9th Army to postpone its attack, as 8th 
Army and I st Cavalry Army had failed to cross the Don the previous day and would 
not do so under present conditions. 9th and 10th Armies were to manoeuvre for a 
breakthrough of the River Manych' line with Dumenko's cavalry, into the rear of 
Volunteer An-ny, which was entrenched in front of 8th Army and Ist Cavalry 
Army. 153 Changing the direction of the attack hinted at what Tukhachevsky would do 
the next month. However, Shorin relayed Kamenev's directive, ordering 9th and 10th 
Armies to manoeuvre across the Manych' into the White rear, but did not alter Ist 
151 Ibid. pp. 470-476. 
152 DGkKA, doc. 725, pp. 725-727. 
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Cavalry Army's and 8th Army's tasks. 154 8th Anny, I st Cavalry Army and Dumenko's 
Cavalry Corps were pushed back to Rostov by a counter-attack on 29th January by a 
20,000 strong cavalry force led by Mamontov. 155 Shorin flung the Red forces into 
another frontal attack on 31 st January, which despite isolated breakthroughs, was 
pushed back again. This was the last straw for Budennyi who wrote to Lenin on Ist 
February, 
... I 
have to inform you comrade Lenin that the Cavalry Army is going 
through a difficult time. Never yet has anyone beaten my cavalry, like the 
Whites have beaten it now. And they have beaten it because the Front 
Commander has positioned the Cavalry Army in such conditions, that it 
might perish altogether. It is shameful for me to speak to you about this, 
but I love the Cavalry Army, yet I love the Revolution still more. And the 
cavalry is still very necessary to the Revolution. Front Commander Shorin 
first positioned the cavalry in the Don swamp and obstructed the crossing 
of the River Don. The enemy profited by this and nearly wiped out all our 
cavalry. And when the RVS demanded that the line of advance of the 
Cavalry Army be changed, comrade Shorin deprived me of the army 
infantry entrusted to me... the Cavalry Army was thrown alone against the 
enemy and for a second time ended up being severely knocked about. 
During the whole of my command there were never any tragic events like 
these. And since only Shorin had the right to decide on the disposition of 
the anny entrusted to me, so calamities poured out. As far back as 26th 
October 1919 when I was subordinate to comrade Shorin, he gave me a 
task which damaged our prospects and was beneficial to the enemy. Then 
I told him about this by telegraph and he, evidently, was hurt and 
remembered it, and now all that is being reflected in our revolutionary 
work. Today I got the assignment of beating the enemy and moving on 60 
versty, but the neighbouring armies are stationed according to Shorin's 
directive in the place and in such a way they give the enemy the chance of 
removing his units from the front and throwing them in against the 
Cavalry Army. That is a patent crime. I beg you to turn your attention to 
the Cavalry Army and other armies, else they lay down their lives in vain 
because of such criminal command. 156 
The similarity in tone and invective to Tukhachevsky's telegram to Lenin about 
Gittis is striking. Evidently Budennyi felt little sympathy towards this old voenspets 
either. 
Stalin was instructed to travel from South-Westem to Caucasian Front, to join its 
RVS, taking political workers and reinforcements with him to restore the situation. 
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However, he sent a reply to Lenin and Trotsky stating he was unwell and should not 
travel and did not think one man would make any difference anyway. He continued, 
... it is not journeys by individuals that are needed but the transfer of 
cavalry-reserves, the South-West being without them. Moreover the delay 
in taking the situation in hand has absorbed precisely as much time as that 
wasted by us in standing still on the line Rostov-Manych', for which 
thanks to Shorin. Budennyi and Ordzhonikidze consider the unskilful 
command exercised by Shorin to be the reason for our failures.... ' 57 
On 3rd February Kamenev directed Caucasian Front RVS, "Military action of the 
combined cavalry on the Front's right flank again failed on I st February because there 
was no support from 8th and 9th Armies' infantry". He halted all attacks on Bataisk 
and declared a new plan of attack should be formulated, 
regrouping forces to enable attacks with a concentration of forces, well 
coordinated in terms of time and direction to achieve the generally laid 
down tasks. Special attention should be paid to newly-arriving divisions 
and steps quickly taken to restore order to the front and relaunch the 
offensive. 158 
Therefore, when Tukhachevsky relieved Caucasian Front Chief-of-Staff 
Afanas'ev, who had apparently taken over as Acting Caucasian Front Commander on 
24th January, although Shorin still signed the orders, he again had to reorganise 
crumbling troops, but a front, not just an army. 159 9th Army R VS member 
Beloborodov telegrarnmed Moscow on 3rd-4th February after Mamontov's counter- 
attack, noting, 
The situation that has developed so unfavourably for us was brought about 
by the extreme reduction in strength of our regiments, which have not 
been made up in numbers since the very beginning of the general advance 
and have thinned out in the fighting and been devastated by typhus. The 
enemy, by means of general mobilisation and rounding up all horses, has 
been able to get his cavalry back into shape, after putting all Cossack 
deserters into the line; and at present has at his disposal more man-power 
than us. Absence of reinforcements, which were despatched too late or 
held up in transit on the railway, threatens to turn our individual failures 
into a general crisis on the whole Caucasian Front. ' 60 
Reorganisation of Caucasian Front, especially the demoralised 8th Anny and I st 
Cavalry Army, was essential to bring them back up to fighting strength. 
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Simultaneously, to seize back the initiative in the North Caucasus, a successful 
offensive was required. Shorin's attempts with the Don-Manych' Operation had 
wholly failed. Therefore, Tukhachevsky decided on a change of direction and target, 
as suggested by Kamenev's directive, to achieve the breakthrough. 
Tukhachevsky and Kamenev now worked in higher positions than on Eastern 
Front in 1919, but retained the same working relationship. The plan for the North 
Caucasus Operation followed Kamenev's general directive, but Tukhachevsky worked 
it out by local conditions and the two men discussed it. It was a brilliantly-calculated 
combined arms operation, concentrating the majority of Caucasian Front forces for 
large enveloping manoeuvres by cavalry and infantry to outflank Denikin's forces on 
their right and push back their centre. Meanwhile, a frontal infantry screen pinned 
down the strongpoint of Bataisk on the White left flank, which had previously proved 
impossible to penetrate with the cavalry. This was the plan to encircle and annihilate 
Denikin's Armed Forces of South Russia in the Caucasus. It was the archetypal Civil 
War strategic combat operation as formulated by Tukhachevsky in Voina klassov, and 
its success vindicated at this time his military writings on the conflict. 
The operational success was even more remarkable because of several new factors 
for Tukhachevsky. He had never previously fought in the Northern Caucasus and was 
not familiar with local conditions for planning his operation. More significantly 
however, Tukhachevsky commanded a sizeable cavalry force for the first time. I st 
Cavalry Army is the Red formation most often mentioned in writings on the Red 
Army in the Civil War and the role of cavalry, because of its ability to manoeuvre 
quickly, is often presented as a key factor in Civil War combat. However, 
Tukhachevsky had achieved his success with virtually no cavalry formations under 
his command, 3-4,000 at most. He had fought a manoeuvre war with infantry. This 
had forced him to use any resources available, motorised vehicles and boats when 
possible, but mainly railways and carts. Caucasian Front was the only time in his 
command career he commanded a cavalry army. 
Therefore, he could be expected to have struggled to employ this correctly. 
However, a major difference he brought to Caucasian Front was to end Shorin's 
incorrect employment of Ist Cavalry Army and prove remarkably astute in using 
cavalry. The result was a combined arms operation which Tukhachevsky planned and 
coordinated to achieve the type of encirclement he had so often attempted on Eastern 
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Front. Smimov criticises Tukhachevsky for consistently failing to execute 
encirclements successfully on Eastern Front, "' but the bare facts are he did not have 
enough mobile troops to do so. Infantry in carts were not as mobile or quick as 
cavalry and were more restricted by rough terrain. Tukhachevsky finally had some 
cavalry from September 1919, but they were raw and inexperienced and were 
withdrawn at Omsk when he thought an encirclement was possible. He had employed 
cavalry successfully for reconnaissance and raiding, to disrupt communications and 
transport resources in the White rear, but on Caucasian Front he achieved success 
with I st Cavalry Army in a full-scale operation. 
The fact that Tukhachevsky did not use cavalry in 1919 must have influenced his 
thought. He mainly had to use carts, but saw the advantage of motorised vehicles to 
transport infantry and would develop this into tank formations later. Whilst Budennyi 
and Voroshilov remained loyal to the horse with which they had found victory, 
Tukhachevsky benefited from his need to improvise and innovate to use the most 
effective means available. The openness to varied ideas he developed allowed him to 
broaden his theories to incorporate mechanised formations. 
Influential Fi2ures 
As with previous commands, Tukhachevsky worked in the Caucasus with figures 
who were important at the time, but also in later life. Perhaps the most notable of 
these was Grigorii Konstantinovich (Sergo) Ordzhonikidze, a Communist Party 
heavyweight and member since 1903 who had become Caucasian Front R VS political 
162 
commissar on 3rd February and held this position until 29th May 1921 . 
Tukhachevsky and Ordzhonikidze formed a lasting working and personal relationship 
in the Caucasus, remaining close friends and collaborating during the 1930s, when 
Ordzhonikidze served as Commissar for Heavy Industry, when Tukhachevsky was 
Deputy Defence Commissar. They cooperated in forming the Military-Industrial 
Complex which dominated the Soviet Union for its duration. The untimely suicide in 
1937 of Ordzhonikidze in an NKVD cell removed the last major Party figure 
16 1 G. V. Smirnov, pp. 253-255. 
162 Sergo Ordzhonikidze (1886-1937) served as political commissar in the Don Soviet Republic and at 
Tsaritsyn in 1918 and on the RVS-. v of 16th and 14th Armies through 1919-, DkJK, 4, Tom IV, p. 530. 
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protective of Tukhachevsky and paved the way for Stalin to conduct the military 
purge in May-June 1937. 
The other Caucasian Front RVS members, V. A. Trifonov and 1. T. Smilga, had 
comprised South-Eastern Front RVS, so provided continuity for the Front. 
Tukhachevsky had previously met the final RVS member, S. 1. Gusev, at Sviiazhsk 
with Trotsky in 1918. 
Tukhachevsky had Gai under his command again in the Caucasus, leading 2nd 
Cavalry Corps after Dumenko's arrest. 163 
Reor$! anisation and Preparation 
Tukhachevsky quickly acted upon Kamenev's 3rd February directive and on 6th 
February ordered Caucasian Front Armies to prepare for an offensive into the North 
Caucasus. The first step was to stabilise the line in Rostov sector at the juncture of 8th 
and 9th Armies, where Mamontov had counter-attacked from Bataisk and the Whites 
were "most active". Therefore, I st Cavalry Army was instructed initially to remain in 
position, ready to aid 8th Army's left flank and 9th Army's right flank, with a rifle 
division to transfer to Ist Cavalry Army and supply the infantry support denied by 
Shorin. Demarcation lines between the frontline forces were marked out, but also 
between the rear and front of the annies. Tukhachevsky instructed army commanders 
to recognise their rear as separate from their front area within a ten-day period, thus 
allowing them to mobilise reinforcements within their areas and maintain supply and 
communication lines. All resources were to be used for reinforcing. 164 Tukhachevsky 
was stressing the importance of the rear in strategic terms for planning offensive 
operations and impressing this on the army commanders under him, a crucial part of 
operational art which would be developed after the Civil War. 
On 7th February, Tukhachevsky informed 8th Army Commander Sokol'nikov, 
... the enemy 
is regrouping and concentrating cavalry units in Azov- 
Bataisk area, possibly with the aim of active action in Rostov- 
Novocherkassk area. 
163 Boris Mokeevich Dumenko (1888-1920), a foriner Tsarist cavalry sergeant-major. He was arrested 
and executed under military tribunal after authorising the execution of his political commissar V. N. 
Mikeladze, Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia interventsiia v SSSR. Entsiklopediia, p. 20 1. 
164 DkfKA, Toni H, doc. 447, p. 480. 
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... take all measures for holding the positions your army now occupies, 
since enemy success could hinder the proposed operation. ' 65 
From reconnaissance, Tukhachevsky calculated Denikin was planning to 
breakthrough in Rostov area to prevent a renewed Red Caucasian Front offensive, 
seize the initiative and throw the Reds back. To prevent this, Tukhachevsky decided 
to launch a pre-emptive strike, despite Caucasian Front not being reorganised or ready 
in every sector. He gambled that by creating a strong enough attack-group, a quick 
breakthrough could be achieved, which would offset any gains made by Denikin in 
the weaker section of the Red line at Rostov. By instructing 8th Army to hold fast, he 
played for time to regroup his other forces to bypass and envelop the Bataisk 
strongpoint and enable an advance across the whole Front and envelopment with the 
powerful Red left flank. This placed 8th Army in a precarious position, but 
Tukhachevsky was willing to cede ground here, as it would actually draw the 
Volunteer Army forward and allow the envelopment to perhaps become an 
encirclement. 
On 9th February, Tukhachevsky ordered Caucasian Front annies to regroup 
within four days. 8th Army was to increase its frontage to cover from the Sea of Azov 
to the River Manych', to screen the areas it and I st Cavalry Army currently occupied, 
allowing the latter to withdraw from the frontal attack on Bataisk and transfer to the 
centre of the Red Front between 9th and 10th Armies. The plan was to drive a wedge 
between Don and Kuban Armies with Ist Cavalry Army, which would also cut off 
Don Army's path of retreat at Tikhoretskaia Station and form concentrated attack 
groups with 9th and I Oth Army. 9th Anny guarded 8th Army's left flank and had I Oth 
Army on its left. 9th Army was to cross the Manych' and press Don Army from the 
front, whilst I Oth Army was advance to Armavir and cut Kuban Army's path of retreat 
there. II th Army was to send an Expeditionary Force to clear the western shore of the 
Caspian Sea. With its main forces, it was to hold Caucasian Front's left flank and 
sweep down to secure Stavropol', cutting the White path of retreat south-east down 
the railways from Tikhoretskaia, through Stavropol' and Armavir to Kavkazkaia- 
Vladikavkaz-Petrovsk. 166 In this way, the White forces were to be split, enveloped on 
their right-flank and driven south-west towards the Sea of Azov. 8th Army with 
165 Ibid. doc. 448, p. 48 1. 
166 Ibid. doc. 449, pp. 481-482 
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16,327 troops was to bear the main White attack, whilst the other four armies 
numbering 65,171 troops were to envelop and crush. Therefore, a bare frontal screen 
was to hold the strongest White sector, whilst the majority of Red forces were to 
bypass the White strongpoint and effect an enveloping and encircling manoeuvre to 
breakthrough in the weak sector, despite being outnumbered over the whole front. 167 
On 12th February, Tukhachevsky ordered the attack to begin in two days time 
emphasising, "Begin offensive simultaneously with all available forces, not 
weakening yourselves with excessive reserves. Act with compact attack groups". 168 
Strategic reserves were not to be retained, with all troops used in the initial attack, as 
Tukhachevsky remained loyal to his previous tactics. 
This also reflected the limited time and troop numbers Tukhachevsky had at his 
disposal. The Western Front situation with Poland was deteriorating and Lenin 
instructed Stalin on I Oth February, "... the troops now freed after taking Odessa are not 
to remain on the Dnestr, but move to Western Front to guarantee it from the Poles". 169 
On 19th February, Lenin instructed Trotsky and 5th Army Commander Smimov that 
in Siberia there should be, 
11 ... not a step further east, all forces to be exerted for the swift movement 
of troops and steamships to the west to Russia". We shall be idiots if we 
distract ourselves with a deep movement into the depths of Siberia, and in 
this time Denikin revives and the Poles attack. This would be a crime. 170 
Tukhachevsky knew the liklihood of an armed conflict with Poland was rising and 
he would lose resources. With Western Front being strengthened, despite Caucasian 
Front still being prioritised, he did not necessarily have first refusal on 
reinforcements. This made a swift victory in the Caucasus essential and illustrates the 
dual process behind the development of continuous offensives as the Red method in 
the Civil War. They were used to keep the enemy in constant retreat, disallowing 
regrouping and reinforcing, but also campaigns had to be conducted as quickly as 
possible to release resources for the next front. This idea never disappeared from 
Soviet military thinking as the Soviet Union was Permanently surrounded by 
167 Ibid. Tom IV, pp. 120-123. 
168 Ibid. Tom 11, doc. 450, pp. 482-483. 
169 L- Vp, doc. 450 p. 23 1. Joseph Stalin (1878/9? - 1953) was South-Western Front political commissar. 
170 L- Vp, doc. 453, p. 232; DGkKA, doc. 592, p. 599; DkfKA, Tom H, doc. 732, pp. 776-777; Kamenev 
followed up this order on 24th February, instructing Smirnov to halt further movement after taking 
Irkutsk, DGkKA, doc. 593, p. 600. This was achieved on 7th March. 
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capitalism and would have to defeat different foes successively to survive, as 
Tukhachevsky noted in 1926.171 
On 15th February, Caucasian Front comprised overall 214,783 and 97,082 men 
and horses respectively. By I st April, when the operation was almost over, this had 
risen to 378,316 and 147,696.172 Transfers from other fronts, mobilisations within 
Caucasian Front areas, incorporation of partisans into Red Armies as they advanced, 
and deserters from the Armed Forces of South Russia, all contributed to the increase, 
replacing casualties. 
On 15th February, frontline Caucasian Front forces numbered 11,876 command 
staff, 47,560 infantry and 22,759 cavalry, with 591 guns, 2,732 machine-guns and 8 
armoured-trains, against the 60,520 infantry and 31,560 cavalry, 451 guns and 1,185 
machine-guns of the Armed Forces of South Russia. 173 Superiority of numbers lay 
with the Whites early in the campaign and Denikin introduced reinforcements before 
the Red offensive began. However, by I st May, the Whites numbered 60,000 infantry 
in Sochi sector, but had no cavalry and by Ist June White resistance in the Caucasus 
had disappeared as Wrangel fled into Crimea. 174 Superior Red ability to reinforce, as 
Denikin's rear crumbled in the same manner as Kolchak's, was crucial to the outcome 
of the North Caucasus Operation and further reinforced Tukhachevsky's beliefs in the 
efficacy of class warfare. 
Following Tukhachevsky's Front directives, the operation can be divided into 
phases. Phase I started with the pre-emptive strike to launch the offensive on 14th 
February and lasted until 21st February, when Denikin recaptured Rostov and 
Nakhichevan'. Phase 2 from 22nd February-2nd March, saw the Red frontline 
restored, but the offensive still struggling as several of Tukhachevsky's orders were 
not fulfilled correctly. He rectified this to accelerate the offensive and manoeuvre for 
the vital breakthrough at Egorlykskaia, throwing the Whites into retreat. Phase 3 from 
2nd March-7th April, saw the offensive develop along the whole front with further 
breakthroughs and Caucasian Front launching a continuous pursuit operation, 
advancing to the Caspian and Black Seas to rout the Armed Forces of South Russia. 
171 See chapter 111, pp. 140-14 1. 
172 DkJKA, Toni R", pp. 120-123 & 140. 
173 Ibid. pp. 120-123 & 506-507. 
174 Ibid. p. 513. 
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Overall the operation followed a similar pattern to previous offensives. A quick 
strike was attempted before the Front was ready, which achieved mixed results, 
before correct organisation set up an envelopment victory followed by strategic 
pursuit. Speed, surprise, concentration and manoeuvre. These were the keys identified 
by Tukhachevsky and he used them here. 
Phase 1: Pre-Emptive Strike 
With timing of the essence, Tukhachevsky pressed home the need for 
reorganisation, regrouping and starting positions to be achieved by 14th February. 
However, Ist Cavalry Army, with the furthest to move to reach Shara-Bulutskii- 
Platovskaia, did not make it by this date. Denikin meanwhile, learning of Ist Cavalry 
Army's movement, pressed ahead with his Rostov offensive, encouraged by the lone 
8th Army occupying the sector. Expecting this, Tukhachevsky launched the Red 
offensive on 14th February without Ist Cavalry Army. This was a very risky decision 
since it had the pivotal role in the operation, cutting between Don and Kuban Armies 
to split the two White forces and allow 8th, 9th and I Oth Armies to act against the 
separated groups. Without I st Cavalry Army, this was not possible, but with the 
White offensive imminent, Tukhachevsky took the gamble of attacking, believing I st 
Cavalry Army could catch up and make its manoeuvre down to Tikhoretskaia station, 
to cut the rail line and White retreat route. Therefore, 8th, 9th and I Oth Armies 
advanced at dawn on 14th February to cross the River Manych' and attack Don and 
Kuban Armies, whilst I Ith Army advanced south-east against Kuban Army towards 
Stavropol' and Armavir railway junction, to cut off retreat into the South-East 
Caucasus by the Volunteer Corps and Don Army. 
By 17th February, the mixed results of the offensive led Lenin to telegram Smilga 
and Ordzhonikidze, 
I am extremely worried about the state of our troops on Caucasian Front, 
Budennyi's complete demoralisation, the weakness of all our troops, 
weakness of the general command, spaces between the armies, the 
strength of the enemy. It is essential to use all efforts and conduct a series 
of extraordinary measures with revolutionary energy. Telegraph encoded 
in detail exactly what is being done. 175 
175DkfK, 4, Tom II, doc. 45 1, p. 484. 
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The fluctuating progress of the offensive was echoed by Tukhachevsky in his 
order of the same day to Caucasian Front. 10th Army had defeated the enemy in its 
sector, but the Whites had attacked on 16th February along 8th Army's front and was 
pushing back 9th Army's right flank and centre. This was the White offensive 
Tukhachevsky had anticipated, but with Ist Cavalry Army not yet fully engaged and 
behind schedule, 8th and 9th Armies were struggling to hold position. The White left- 
wing attack group based around 2nd and 4th Don Cavalry Corps, under General A. A. 
Pavlov, was threatening to break through the Red infantry forces. 
Tukhachevsky attempted to restore his right flank, instructing 8th Army to form 
an attack group to aid the crumbling 9th Arrny right flank in Tuzulukovskii sector. 
10th Army, clearing the defeated Whites in its sector, was to concentrate in zimov, e 
Popova-zimov'e K. Korol'kova sector, to help 9th Army attack in Gudovskii area, 
cooperating with Blinov's Cavalry Division, attacking from zimove S. Zherebkova to 
zimov'e K. Korol'kova. I st Cavalry Army was to "decisively continue the offensive to 
Kruchenaia Balka-Lopanka-Sredne-Egorlykskoe-Tikhoretskaia", whilst II th Army 
was to continue as before. 176 
Don Army was pushed back to the left bank of the Manych' in 9th Army's sector 
by the following day. However, Pavlov's three-division White cavalry group was 
moving towards Torgovaia to cut off Ist Cavalry Army's delayed advance and now 
threatened the juncture between 9th Army's left flank and 10th Army's right flank in 
Platovskaia-lanov area. Therefore, Tukhachevsky ordered 9th Army to organise a raid 
by Dumenko's cavalry corps into Pavlov's rear area in Korol'kova-Zherebkova area, 
supporting this with a left flank infantry attack. Budennyi was ordered to halt the 
Whites in K. Korol'kova-S. Zherebkova area, cut them off and rout them, whilst 10th 
Army was to attack Pavlov with its right flank group in a north-westerly direction. 
177 
However, whilst Tukhachevsky dealt with the centre threat, 8th Army again came 
under sustained attack on the Red right flank. The Volunteer Corps and 3rd Don 
Corps broke through the weakened screen to reach Rostov and Nakhichevan' on 21st 
February, forcing 8th An-ny to withdraw. The Reds recaptured them two days later, 
but this threatened Caucasian Front's position. ' 78 
176 Ibid. doc. 452, pp. 484-485. 
177 Ibid. doc. 453, p. 485. 
171 Ibid. doc. 456, pp. 487-490. 
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The danger to Rostov and Novocherkassk prompted Lenin to instruct Stalin on 
18th and 20th February to send reinforcements to Caucasian Front. Stalin replied, "It 
is not clear to me why Caucasian Front's troubles are laid first of all on me... The 
troubles about reinforcing Caucasian Front lie wholly on the RVSR, the members of 
which, by my infori-nation, are fully well, and not on Stalin who is so overloaded with 
work". Lenin responded, "On you lies the troubles about quickly moving 
reinforcements from South-Western to Caucasian Front. It is necessary to help in any 
way possible and not squabble about departments' competency". 179 
This provides an excellent insight into Stalin's idea of how a combined war effort 
worked. If not impacting negatively in the Caucasus, it is a preview of things to come 
in the Polish-Soviet War, where he had a greater influence. 
Tukhachevsky stressed the threat to Novocherkassk on 20th February, ordering 
8th and 9th Armies to hold it, 8th Army to regroup and push the Whites back over the 
Don and 9th Army to send Dumenko's cavalry into the White flank and rear in the 
Starocherkasskaia-Krasnodborskii area. ' 80 
Tukhachevsky had to justify his actions in a Hughes Telegraph discussion with 
Kamenev on 21st February, whilst the White advance continued and the loss of 
Rostov and Nakhichevan' loomed. Discussing the perilous state of the front and 
stating that regrouping of forces was not near to completion when the offensive 
began, Tukhachevsky explained to Kamenev about reconnaissance reports and the 
need to launch the pre-emptive attack. Kamenev had initially commented, 
After your explanation I am completely lost as to why you could launch an 
offensive on 14th February, if by 26th February you will in fact have been 
able to concentrate two divisions on this front and precisely 18 regiments, 
not considering five regiments, moving from Voronezh.... 
However, he conceded after Tukhachevsky's explanation, "I consider that even 
without preliminary discussions with me you were correct in this matter and now can 
only say that the circumstances were correctly evaluated by you ... 
11.181 
Tukhachevsky had evidently launched the offensive without consulting Kamenev, 
illustrating the need for immediate action that Denikin's attack caused. He had taken a 
huge risk, but had avoided being forced on the defensive. It makes an interesting 
comparison with his attitude as Ist Army Commander in 1918, appealing to Moscow 
179 L-1, " , 
docs. 454-456, pp. 232-234 & 362-363, endnote 273. P 
180 DkfKA Tom II, doc. 455, p. 486. 
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for time to completely reorganise 1 st Army before attacking, against the wishes of his 
Front Commander, who demanded he attack immediately and prevent the 
Czechoslovaks seizing the initiative. One and a half years later, Tukhachevsky was a 
Front Commander demanding exactly the same from his subordinates. His experience 
gained between these two dates had shown him the necessity and advantages a pre- 
emptive attack could offer, but there was also possibly an element of over-confidence 
in Tukhachevsky's actions. He had previously taken risks on several occasions, indeed 
gambling was a characteristic of his command and in the North Caucasus, he took the 
biggest yet. He got away with it here, but his luck could not last forever. 
The pre-emptive attack to seize the initiative was another case of utilising 
offensive rather than defensive tactics whenever possible, with 8th Army defending 
merely to allow the offensive and even when sufficient troops were not available to 
ensure success. It had been vital to seize the initiative with both sides weakened and 
the next victory crucial in deciding the whole campaign. This was a similar method to 
that employed on Eastern Front, continually pushing to retain the initiative, and was 
indicative of his later theories, but also tactics in Poland. A definite continuity and 
development ran through Tukhachevsky's Civil War commands. 
By 22nd February, the Red offensive had not progressed as well as Tukhachevsky 
had planned. He had been forced to begin without the force required to make the vital 
manoeuvre to split the White forces and as a result the White cavalry under Pavlov 
had been able to manoeuvre instead, initially cutting between 8th and 9th Armies, 
then moving swiftly to Torgovaia to prevent the delayed Ist Cavalry Anny offensive 
and I Oth Army's advance. This was the same method by which Denikin had foiled the 
Don-Manych' Operation and was reminiscent of the Czechoslovaks on the Volga in 
1918 - utilising a mobile cavalry defence group. It was effective, but only if the Red 
offensive was not coordinated along the whole front simultaneously. However, by 
22nd February, Tukhachevsky ordered the offensive to continue, with Ist Cavalry 
Army in position and acting alongside the advancing 10th Army, providing the 
mobility required to create the breach for the infantry to exploit. 
181 Ibid. doc. 456, pp. 487-490. 
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Phase 2: Manoeuvre and Combined Arms Operation for the Breakthrough 
The tasks of Tukhachevsky's 12th February directive were still largely unfulfilled 
by 22nd February. II th Army advanced towards Stavropol' and Armavir and I Oth 
Army approached Kavkazkaia, but neither had reached its target. To the north-west, 
9th and 8th Armies crossed the Rivers Don and Manych', but were pushed back again, 
with 8th Army abandoning Rostov and barely holding Novocherkassk. Ist Cavalry 
Army had barely advanced at all, struggling to complete its regrouping manoeuvre. 
However, Tukhachevsky's aim of preventing a White advance had been achieved and 
Ist Cavalry Army, using the extra time provided by the other forces, was now in 
position to attack. It proved its worth in the next phase of the offensive, carrying out 
the Tikhoretskaia Operation and cooperating with 10th Army in the decisive 
Egorlykskaia Battle from 25th February-2nd March, defeating Pavlov's Cavalry 
Group. 
The Reds benefited from disaster striking Pavlov on 18th February. After 
manoeuvring to Torgovaia to block I Oth Army and I st Cavalry Army, but suddenly 
facing a joint offensive by these two forces, Pavlov retreated towards Sredne- 
Egorlykskaia. However, caught in a snowstorm on the exposed steppeland, Pavlov 
lost half his 12,000-strong attack group overnight. ' 82 This devastated Denikin's most 
potent force and was a major factor in the Red victory. 
On 22nd February, Tukhachevsky ordered Caucasian Front to continue the 
offensive. Aided by South-Western Front's 13th Army on its right flank, 8th Army 
recaptured Rostov, pushing the Volunteer Corps back over the Don on 23rd February. 
9th Army, guarding 10th Army's right flank, attacked towards Mechetinskaia Station, 
north-west of Egorlykskaia. Ist Cavalry Army assisted 10th Army's right flank to 
occupy Egorlyskaia, before continuing to Novoelizavetinskii-Novoleushkovskaia 
area. 10th Army's main group continued towards Tikhoretskaia, garrisoning villages 
to guarantee its flanks. I Ith Army was to quicken the taking of Armavir- 
Nevinnomysskaia-Stavropol' sector. 1 83 
This order resulted in the meeting battle at Egorlykskaia involving Ist Cavalry 
Army (4th, 6th and II th Cavalry Divisions) and 10th Army attack group (20th, 34th 
182 A. S. Bubnov et al. Tom III, p. 300. 
183 DkfK, 4, Tom. II, doc. 45 7, p. 49 1. 
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and 50th Rifle Divisions), against Pavlov's Group (2nd and 4th Don Cavalry Corps 
and a small number of infantry). Pavlov was moving towards Belaia Glina, to attack 
I st Cavalry Army and I Oth Army which he thought were advancing to Tikhoretskaia. 
However, Tukhachevsky flung his attack group at Egorlykskaia-Sredne Egorlykskoe 
area, from where Ist Cavalry Army's right flank had been forced to retreat the 
previous day. This took Pavlov by surprise 10 kms south of Sredne-Egorlykskoe, 
pushing him back in disarray. Ist Cavalry Army enveloped Pavlov's Group's right 
flank, whilst 20th and 50th Divisions of 10th Army attacked it head-on. 
Ist Cavalry Army had been highly successful carrying out deep raids and 
sweeping manoeuvres characteristic of White and Red Civil War cavalry. However, 
Egorlykskaia was a wel I -coordinated combined infantry and cavalry operation, with 
cooperation between the two different arms the key to victory. Credit goes to 
Tukhachevsky for directing and to Budennyi and A. V. Pavlov for conducting the 
operation. 1 84 Tukhachevsky displayed his experience of civil warfare here, utilising 
his most effective force, I st Cavalry Army, to remove the Whites' mobility, allowing 
the infantry to plough in. This was the vital battle in the North Caucasus Operation 
and a crushing blow for Denikin, almost wiping out Pavlov's White mobile cavalry 
formation, which had successfully defended against the first phase of the campaign. 
Tukhachevsky had finally completed an encirclement operation now that he had the 
correct troops to do so and it validated the methods he endorsed for fighting the Civil 
War. I st Kuban Cavalry Corps was captured with over 1,000 prisoners, 29 guns, 100 
machine-guns and three armoured-trains. Budennyi reoccupied Egorlykskaia as 
Pavlov reeled southwards towards Sredne-Egorlykskoe. Denikin was forced to 
withdraw the bulk of his troops from Bataisk to reinforce Pavlov with the Volunteer 
Corps, 3rd Cavalry Corps and part of the Kuban brigades. 185 
Tukhachevsky gave further orders on 25th and 28th February to develop the 
offensive. With Bataisk weakened, 8th and 9th Armies were to break through the 
White screen left against them and 8th Army was to advance to Kaisur- 
Khomutovskaia area. 10th Army was to occupy Tikhoretskaia and Kavkazkaia areas, 
transferring sufficient infantry to Ist Cavalry Army for liquidating the White cavalry 
' 8' Aleksandr Vasil'evich Pavlov (1880-1937) was Red 10th Army Comrnander, DkfKA, Tom IV, p. 
540; A. S. Bubnov et a], Tom III, p. 301. 
185 DkfKA, Tom II, doc. 45 8, p. 492; A. S. Bubnov et al, Tom III, p. 30 1; Grazhdanskaia voina i 
voennaia interventsda v SSSR: Entsiklopediia, pp. 204-205. 
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regrouping in Sredne-Egorlykskaia area and joining the attack with the rest of its 
forces afterwards. II th Anny was to move swiftly to Stavropol' and Armavir. 1 86 
Acting on these orders, 8th Army finally took Bataisk on Ist March and crossed 
the Manych' with 9th Army. Budennyi attempted to take Egorlykskaia, but found 
himself and Velikanov's 10th Army attack group 70 kms south-east of 8th and 9th 
Armies and in danger of being encircled by the White troops transferring from Rostov 
and Bataisk. Tukhachevsky informed Kamenev by Hughes Telegraph that I st Cavalry 
Army and 10th Army had let their right flank unravel and become isolated from the 
main attack sector, but he hoped the 15,000 cavalry and infantry of Ist Cavalry Army 
would still secure the area, since the Whites at Egorlykskaia had only 10,000, after 
the reinforcements from Rostov. The attempt to take Egorlykskaia without infantry 
support from 26th-28th February failed, but once the other Armies caught up with Ist 
Cavalry Army, the general offensive resumed. 10th Army took Kavkazskaia on 29th 
February and II th Army occupied Stavropol' on the same day. 187 
Kamenev's views of Budennyi and Gai, the two Red Cavalry leaders, are 
interestingly shown in the Hughes Telegraph conversation. He criticised Budennyi for 
not fulfilling Tukhachevsky's directive to move to Egorlykskaia, but moving to Belaia 
Glina instead. Then, ordered to go directly west, significantly north of Tikhoretskaia, 
Budennyi advanced straight on Tikhoretskaia, completely against the directive, and 
greatly increased the risk involved. Kamenev also criticised Gai for "dancing to his 
own tune". This was typical of cavalry on both sides, acting independently and 
recklessly, with tales of pillage and looting following them around. However, 
Tukhachevsky and Ordzhonikidze defended Ist Cavalry Army in a telegram to the 
RVSR on 25th March against "false information" Lebedev had received, through 
which the "RVSR has gained a mistaken impression of Cavalry Army and especially 
its commander, Budennyi". They described Ist Cavalry Army as "beyond praise" in 
battle and "Not one of the enemy's cavalry units can withstand a head-on attack by... 
Cavalry An-ny". Budennyi was described as having, 
186 DkfKA, Tom 11, docs. 45 8& 46 1, pp. 492 & 495. 
187 DkJK. 4, Tom I!, docs. 460-463, p. 493-496; Mikhail Dmitrievich Velikanov (1892/93-1938) was 
20th Division Commander from 17.7.19-29.2.20 and 4.5.20-13.10.2 1, with Divisional Chief-of-Staff 
Boris Vladimirovich Maistrakh, Acting Cominander between these dates, suggesting Velikanov was 
perhaps wounded in action. Velikanov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for the Tikhoretskaia 
Operation, DkJKA Tom IV, p. 565, Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia interventsiia v SSSR: 
Entsiklopediia, p. 88.20th Rifle Division was Penza Division formed by Tukhachevsky in 1918. 
249 
... exceptional natural talent both in operational and other respects. None of 
the other commanders, except comrade Uborevich, can surpass him. 
Regarding the brilliant manoeuvre and victory, when the enemy moved 
into our rear in Sredne-Egorlykskoe area, credit must be given to 
Budennyi rather than 10th Army Commander Pavlov, since the latter was 
a long way off from the troops and had lost touch with them, so that units 
of I Oth Army were... led by the cavalry commander. Politically Budennyi 
is an unsophisticated Communist, but he is absolutely devoted to the cause 
of Soviet power. 
They continued that I st Cavalry Army had received no pay for months and had to 
fend for itself supply-wise. 1 88 
Tukhachevsky valued I st Cavalry Army as his main arm and Budennyi 
personally, despite an apparent coldness between the pair. 189 This also illustrates 
clearly that the supply system for the Red Armies had not perceptibly improved since 
1918. The reference to Uborevich is intriguing as Tukhachevsky would take him to 
Tambov in 1921 to lead motorised formations against Antonov. Beside Triandafillov, 
Uborevich was Tukhachevsky's closest collaborator in the mechanisation of the Red 
Army in the 1920s and 1930s and indeed may have been the expert in this field. 
Friendships with the ma or figures in the team Tukhachevsky worked closely with for 
the rest of his life were formed during the Civil War. 
Phase 3: Continuous Pursuit Operation 
On I st March, Tukhachevsky ordered the next stage of the North Caucasus 
Operation, liquidating the White group in Mechetinskaia-Egorlykskaia area and 
launching the offensive to Ekaterinodar. This was the main town in the south-west of 
the North Caucasus and the communications hub for Denikin's rear, sitting above the 
River Kuban and on the railway to Novorossiisk on the Black Sea coast, the point 
from which the Whites could escape. Tukhachevsky allowed no respite for the 
Whites, maintaining momentum by launching the familiar continuous pursuit 
operations he had employed in previous commands. The character of the remainder of 
the North Caucasus Operation was a sustained pursuit of the routed Armed Forces of 
South Russia. 
188 A. B. Murphy, The Russian Civil War, pp. 203-204. 
189 Ordzhonikidze apparently informed Budennyi that Tukhachevsky was not well-disposed towards 
I st Cavalry Army or him especially, S. M. Budennyi, 
Proidennyi put', (Moscow, 1965), pp. 434-436. 
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9th Army had broken through in Kagal'nitskaia area, taking over 2,000 prisoners, 
and the remainder were retreating to Khomutovskaia-Kagal'nitskaia, with the main 
White force grouped around the towns of Mechetinskaia and Egorlykskaia. These lay 
south-east of 8th and 9th Armies down the railway line and north-west of 
Kavkazskaia and Stavropol', occupied by I Oth and II th Armies respectively. An 
opportunity existed to encircle the main White force and wipe it out. Tukhachevsky 
ordered this, but it was not completed and the general White retreat towards 
Ekaterinodar and Novorossiisk continued. This phase of the operation, moving along 
the railway lines, was reminiscent of the eshelonnaia voina of early 1918. The Whites 
had lost their mobility with their cavalry, leaving the railways as their final hope for 
swift retreat and escape from the Red trap. The capturesof railway stations and 
junctions were now the important points for the Reds to trap the fleeing Whites. 190 
The White forces routed at Bataisk were retreating before 8th Army, behind the 
River Eia to Eisk on the Azov Sea coast, and on 3rd March Tukhachevsky ordered 
their pursuit and encirclement. Again it was not achieved, but 8th Army occupied 
Eisk on 9th March and 10th Army captured Tikhoretskaia on 10th March. 191 
This progress was marked by Caucasian Front HQ advancing from Millerovo to 
Rostov on 4th March, following the pursuit operation. 192 Denikin's rear was 
collapsing around him as partisan activity increased, but the Reds could not encircle 
the routed White forces, only catching them at the Black Sea, when the Whites had 
nowhere to run. Why was this the case? 
On II th March, Kamenev directed Tukhachevsky to take Groznyi, but asked for 
his thoughts on the course of events on his front as "... already it is necessary to carry 
out regrouping. " 193 Kamenev was referring to the deteriorating situation in the West 
with Poland. Trotsky had been appointed Commissar for Transport on 7th March to 
oversee the swift transfer of as many troops as possible to the West from other fronts 
and Moscow was moving towards prioritising Western Front, especially since 
Caucasian Front was developing well. 194 Time was of the essence as the need to 
dispense with Denikin to enable a full concentration against Poland was paramount. 
190 DkfK, 4, Tom II, docs. 462-463, pp. 495-496. 
19, Ibid. doc. 464, pp. 495 & 497. 
192 Ibid. doc. 465, p. 498. 
193 DGkKA, doc. 733, p. 73 1. 
194 L-Vp, doc. 465, p. 238. 
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On 12th March, Tukhachevsky ordered II th Army's Expeditionary Group to 
move towards Groznyi and its main group to take the Vladikavkaz railway around 
Armavir-Nezlobnaia. With the Whites only active in Kavkazkaia- Stavropol' area, 
Tukhachevsky urged a general offensive to attempt encirclement again. 8th Army was 
to attack in Novorossiisk area to cut off the retreat. 10th Army was to swing round on 
the left flank and occupy Ekaterinodar with its right flank group by 18th March, 
whilst directing its left flank group southwards, to take Petropavlovskaia-Kurgannaia 
station-Ubezhenskaia area. Ist Cavalry Army was to cooperate with 10th Army, 
whilst 9th Army was to press forwards in the central sector, forcing the Whites back 
into the enclosing 8th and 10th Army pincers. Tukhachevsky stressed the importance 
of seizing intact the railway bridges over the River Kuban, illustrating again that time 
was of the essence and no delays in crossing the river could be tolerated, but also 
lessons learned from previous campaigns. 195 
On 15th March, Kamenev expressed some concern about Tukhachevsky swinging 
I Oth Army southwards, as this endangered the weak left flank of I st Cavalry Army 
and I Oth Army attacking towards Ekaterinodar. The Whites were regrouping in 
Ekaterinodar and Armavir- Stavropol' areas which introduced the possibility of a 
counter-attack into the gap. Kamenev advised forming an attacking fist of several 
divisions, beyond the left flank on the Ekaterinodar-Tikhoretskaia Railway, to guard 
against this. 196 Kamenev was watching over the operation and ready to give advice to 
the young Front Commander if necessary. 
However, Ekaterinodar and Annavir were taken on 17th March by I Oth and II th 
Armies respectively. ' 97 Piatigorsk, south-east down the Vladikavkaz railway line, was 
taken the same day by II th Army's Expeditionary Corps with Prokhladnaia reached 
on 20th March. 198 
On 18th March, Tukhachevsky ordered the final push, with the Whites desperately 
seeking the shores of the Black and Caspian Seas to escape the oncoming Red hordes. 
Caucasian Front was now advancing in two completely different directions, the 
195 DkfKA, Tom H, doc. 467, p. 499. 
196 DGkKA, doc. 734, p. 732. 
197 D kfKA, To m H, p. 499. 
198 Ibid. p. 501. 
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Expeditionary Corps moving for Petrovsk on the Caspian Sea, whilst the main forces 
closed on Novorossiisk and Tuapse on the Black Sea. 199 
Following this order, I st Cavalry Army occupied Labinskaia and Maikop on 20th 
and 22nd March and the Expeditionary Force occupied Groznyi and Petrovsk on 24th 
and 30th March, encouraging Daghestani partisans to take Derbent on 25th March, 
another instance of partisans in the rear activated by Red Amy offensive success. 200 
However, the shift from Caucasian to Western Front was evident in Kamenev's 
instruction of 19th March, indicating Ist Cavalry Army should only advance to the 
Armavir-Tuapse Railway and not exceed Maikop and Tuapse areas, to avoid creating 
"difficulties for its allocated transfer to the Polish Front". Tukhachevsky had to select 
one division from Ist Cavalry Army and position it in the Kavkazskaia-Rostov 
railway sector, to reinforce and re-equip it for transfer West. 201 Moscow wasted no 
time reinforcing Western Front with troops from the Caucasus and Tukhachevsky was 
pressurised to quickly complete the North Caucasus Operation. 
This was underlined by Kamenev's report to Lenin on 20th March in which he 
asked for instructions on what action to take when Caucasian Front reached the 
border with Georgia and Azerbaijan. The main body of his report was taken up with 
transfer details for the majority of Caucasian Front troops to Western Front. He 
concluded, 
... 
in view of the importance of the Polish Front and the seriousness of 
planned operations here, Supreme Command recommends for the moment 
of decisive operations, to transfer to Western Front the present Caucasian 
Front Commander comrade Tukhachevsky, who capably and decisively 
conducted the final operations for routing General Denikin's army, and in 
his place in the Caucasus to appoint current Western Front Commander 
202 comrade Gittis.... 
Novorossiisk was captured on 27th March, with thousands of White troops 
stranded in the town, ending Denikin's involvement in the Civil War. 203 The 
remainder of the North Caucasus Operation occurred against a background of 
constant demands for troop transfers to Western and South-Western Fronts and the 
remaining Caucasian Front forces advancing in three different directions. 9th Army 
199 DkfKA, Tom H, doc. 469, pp. 500-0 1. 
200 Ibid. pp. 499, & 502-504. 
20 1 DGkKA, doc. 736, p. 733. 
202 Ibid. doc. 737, pp. 733-35. 
203 DkfKA, Tom H, doc. 471, p. 502; docs. 740-741, DGkKA, p. 737. 
253 
moved south-east down the Black Sea's eastern coast, towards Tuapse and Taman' 
Peninsula, pursuing White forces retreating from Novorossiisk, 10th Army advanced 
directly westwards towards Taganrog, and I Ith Army moved south-east down the 
Caspian Sea's west coast towards Derbent and Baku. On 30th March, Tukhachevsky 
ordered regrouping to achieve these targets and create the Caucasus Labour Army 
from 8th Army units, administration and rear institutions, reflecting Caucasian Front's 
changing role . 
204 With Denikin defeated, the Caucasus, the main oil-supplying region 
of Russia, would fuel the Red Army's advances on other fronts. 
9th Army captured Tuapse on 7th April, then received the remainder of 8th 
Army's units and was directed with the Don-Azov Flotilla to attack Crimea, assisting 
South-Western Front's 13th Army. This was the start of action against Wrangel in 
Crimea. 205 
White forces were attempting to make the short crossing from Taman' to Kerch', 
on the Crimean peninsula, to join Wrangel. Moscow wanted to prevent this and 
Tukhachevsky ordered 9th Army to wipe them out. If the Poles launched an attack in 
the West, Wrangel would pose a danger to South-Westem Front's underbelly. This 
became crucial in the Polish-Soviet War and the need to allow as few Whites as 
possible to reach Crimea would quicken the final resolution of the overall conflict. 
The weakened 9th Army made slow progress and Kamenev voiced concerns that a 
White counter-attack may defeat it, but it eventually captured Sochi on 29th April, 
clearing the eastern Black Sea coastline and completing this part of Caucasian Front's 
tasks. 206 
Events on the Caspian shores panned out more successfully, with the eastern shore 
fort of Aleksandrovskii taken by the Volga-Caspian Flotilla on 5th April, opening the 
way eastwards. II th Army, reinforced by I Oth Army elements, reached the Russo- 
Azerbaijani border and Tukhachevsky ordered it to begin an offensive for Baku and 
Azerbaijan on 27th April. 207 Tukhachevsky was to have led this, meeting with 
204 DkfKA, Tom H, docs. 472-475, pp. 503-507; DGkK, 4, doc. 743, pp. 739-740; DkfKA, Tom III, p. 
746, endnote 58. 
205 DkfKA, Tom H, doc. 475, pp. 506-507, DGkKA, doc. 746, p. 741; DkfKA, Tom III, doc. 363, p. 305. 
206 Ibid. doc. 366, pp. 307-308 & 314; DGkKA, doc. 747, pp. 741-742. 
207 DkfKA, Toni III, docs. 3 65,3 68-3 69, pp. 3 07 &3 09-3 10. 
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Ordzhonikidze and Sergei Kirov in Vladikavkaz on 30th March to formulate plans, 
but Western Front events took over. 208 
Kamenev had suggested that Tukhachevsky replace Gittis as Western Front 
Commander because of the former's perforinance against Denikin. After Poland's 
invasion of Belorussia on 25th April began the Soviet-Polish War (in Soviet eyes), 
Kamenev gained approval for this, and appointed Tukhachevsky Front Commander of 
the prioritised Western Front . 
209 How Tukhachevsky's star had risen to eclipse his 
erstwhile Southern Front superior, Gittis. Western Front Commander was the most 
important active frontline position, completing Tukhachevsky's rapid Civil War climb 
up the promotional ladder. Caucasian Front was the culmination of a quite stunning 
Civil War career in which he had served on every major front, almost always at the 
most crucial time, playing the role of troubleshooter or "fireman" for Moscow, taking 
on the most difficult tasks and each time turning them round. 
Conclusion 
Tukhachevsky was now one of the Red Army's top two military commanders and 
the only former junior officer from the Tsarist Army to command at army level and 
above. He had constantly improved as a military leader, risen to meet the challenges 
before him and striven to understand the conflict in which he was involved, the 
methods to be employed to win it and who should be employed to utilise the methods. 
The level of responsibility and trust shown in him increased with each posting and as 
he moved further from his former Tsarist superiors, he moved closer to the 
Communist Party hierarchy. This was the way in which to be successful in the Red 
Army, but Tukhachevsky did not profess to believe in Communism because of career 
ambition, although he did harbour this. 
Fighting in the Civil War, working with those of similar outlook as well as those 
who differed, convinced Tukhachevsky that the methods he was using were correct 
for victory in a class war. From the outset, the Red Command had no real army and 
only a vague idea of how to build one and fight. Tukhachevsky had shown it was 
208 R. Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union. Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923, 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 224; Sergei Mirinovich Kirov (1886-1934) became Leningrad Party 
boss, but was murdered in 1934. Stalin has been implicated, but no concrete evidence exists. 
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possible to do these simultaneously in 1918 and continued to do so during the next 
two years. Swift, continuous operations, using whatever technical resources were 
available and political agitation to raise partisan support to compensate for low troop 
numbers, accompanied by strict revolutionary discipline, were the general methods. 
Constantly mobilising whilst on the move and fighting was how Tukhachevsky 
started out in 1918 and this was the methodology used by the Red Army throughout 
the Civil War. It was a methodology born out of necessity under Civil War conditions 
and prompted by constant Moscow demands for swift task fulfillment, but one 
Tukhachevsky proved particularly adept in using. However, by April 1920, the 
support Tukhachevsky saw these methods generating at the expense of the White 
Armies, which simply disintegrated under the pressure, convinced him they were 
correct. His absolute belief had led to several confrontations with superior officers, 
but this actually made him stand out as the capable leader in the midst of the rapidly- 
evolving mass which was the Red Army. He had been recognised to have this 
potential early on by the Red leadership and had fulfilled it throughout the conflict. 
The ideas he had formulated met with Moscow approval, as did the formation of 
courses to create Red Commanders, the ultimate aim for the class-based army. 
Tukhachevsky himself, a former Tsarist officer, had joined the Bolshevik Party and 
risen to become the epitome of the many former voenspetsy, loyally serving the 
Communists. He had remained faithful to the tenets of manoeuvre, pursuit and 
continuous offensive and had taken this to a new level in the North Caucasus 
Operation, when able to command the mobile I st Cavalry Army for the first time, in 
combined operations with infantry and artillery. The North Caucasus Operation, 
Tukhachevsky's first as Front Commander, illustrated that the lessons learned and 
experience gained from previous commands, which he had formulated into Voina 
klassov, were accurate portrayals of Civil War conflict and effective methods for 
achieving victory. 
Tukhachevsky was now to lead the Red Army against Poland in the first Soviet 
invasion of Europe, the extension of the Civil War about which he had written. 
Tukhachevsky had reached this position on merit and with a good measure of luck. 
However, for various reasons this luck deserted him at the most crucial and dangerous 
209 Gittis moved in the opposite direction, serving as Caucasian Front Commander from 15th May 
1920-29th May 192 1, when the front was disbanded, DkfKA, Tom IV, p. 530. 
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moment and his Civil War achievements were in danger of being all but forgotten by 
a rout and messy retreat back to Soviet soil. 
257 
Chapter V: Front Comander - Polish-Soviet War., 1920 
Polish and Soviet historiography record varying starting dates for the Polish- 
Soviet War. For Poland, the conflict began in 1919 with the first clashes over areas 
vacated by Germany after the Great War - Ukraine, Belorussia, Galicia and the Baltic 
States. However, the Soviets dated the conflict from the Polish offensive into Ukraine 
on 25th April 1920 and did not regard it as a separate war at all, but another front in 
the Civil War, with the "White Poles" allies of the interventionary Entente. As has 
been shown in chapters III and IV, Moscow fought the Civil War through a process of 
threat determination, concentrating the majority of men and resources on the 
prioritised front. Therefore, although the Soviets wished to secure European Russia 
and had originally formed the Red Army to meet the threat of Germany in this area, 
Western Front remained a system of screens once the Civil War began in the East and 
South. ludenich's advance on Petrograd saw Northern Front activity intensify in 
autumn 1919, but Western Front was never the centre of attention, despite Poland 
occupying much of the area. 
Moscow avoided open war, whilst trying to recover as much as possible of the 
territory surrendered at Brest-Litovsk, and the Western theatre was only prioritised 
after Poland attacked South-Western Front. 1 Kamenev had recommended 
Tukhachevsky as Western Front Commander in March and as the Western situation 
deteriorated, this was approved days before Poland attacked. Tukhachevsky 
performed the "fireman" role again, taking on the most difficult and responsible post 
on 29th April. 2 
Tukhachevsky's success on Caucasian Front made him the prime candidate for the 
post. He was also closer geographically than Frunze, the other leading candidate, who 
was leading the drive into Turkestan. Kamenev later lamented not also having Frunze 
in the European theatre, indicating he would have liked to reunite the team which had 
This was decided at a Central Committee meeting of 4th May and officially declared on 23rd May 
with the publication of the Central Committee theses, Pol'skiifront i nashi zadachi. V. M. Ivanov, 
Marshal M. N. Tukhachevsky, (Moscow: 1990), p. 15 1; Direktivy komandovaniiafrontov Krasnoi 
Arinii, 1917-1922, Tomy I-IV. (Moscow, 1971-1978), (hereafter DkfY, 4), Tom III, doc. 1, pp. II- 14. 
2 Dk I 
. 
fY-4, Tom IV. (Moscow: 1978), p. 529, gives 29th April as the date Tukhachevsky assumed the 
post, but A. S. Bubnov et al, eds. Grazhdanskaia voina, 1918-1921, Tom III, (Moscow, 1930), p. 319, 
gives 30th April. However, from the evidence of a Hughes Telegraph conversation between 
Tukhachevsky and Kamenev taking place on 29th April, it is apparent that Tukhachevsky had assumed 
the Western Front Command no later than this date, DkJX4, Tom III, pp. 21-22. 
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worked so well on Eastern Front, and that these were the two top Red commanders by 
1920. Tukhachevsky was confident within himself and with the methods he had used 
to emerge victorious so far. Now he would face the Polish Army united under JoS'ef 
Pilsudski and intent on regaining Poland's historical pre-partition borders. 3 
By Tukhachevsky's definition in Strategiia natsional'naia i klassovaia, the Polish- 
Soviet War appears to be a "national" conflict rather than a "class" one. However, 
Tukhachevsky and the majority of the Red leadership saw it differently. Moscow 
viewed the clash with Poland as another Civil War front, but did not wish to clash 
with Poland in the spring of 1920, prioritising Wrangel's defeat in Crimea. However, 
once Poland had attacked and large-scale clashes were unavoidable, the 
internationalist Bolsheviks viewed it as a chance to spread revolution into Europe. 
Post-war Germany, on Poland's western border, seemed ripe for revolution, as the 
effects of the Treaty of Versailles began to be felt. Eastern Europe had already 
witnessed revolutionary attempts in the wake of the Great War and Russian 
Revolution, but these had failed, through lack of force, to defeat the established 
regimes. By 1920, the Red Army had emerged as the force to ensure that the next 
uprising in Eastern Europe succeeded. If this was in Germany, from where Marx 
originated and an industrialised state in which Marxism could blossom, it could 
provide the industrial base and educated proletariat absent in peasant Russia. 
Therefore, spreading "Revolution on the point of bayonets" became the Bolshevik 
4 catchphrase for summer 1920 . Did Tukhachevsky 
believe this? 
Whilst in Ingolstadt, Tukhachevsky had reportedly stated to Fervacque that 
Poland should be within the Russian Empire. By April 1920, he still believed this, but 
now within the context of the class struggle he had been waging since early 1918. In 
the essay Revoliutsiia izvne (Revolution From Without), written in early 1920, 
Tukhachevsky wrote of revolutions being caused by internal uprisings or introduced 
by force from without and he believed the Red Anny could perform the latter in 
Poland. 5 The transformation Tukhachevsky had undergone during the Civil War, by 
3 Poland was divided between Russia, Prussia and Austria in 1772,1793 and 1795. 
' Lenin used this phrase in a speech on 22nd September 1920, assessing the defeat in Poland, A. 
Richardson, ed., Nikolai Bukharin, Lev Kamenev, Vladimir Lenin, Karl Radek, Leon Trotsky, Mikhail 
TukhachevsA: y and Grigotý, Zinovev: In Defence of the Russian Revolution, A Selection of Bolshevik 
Writings, 1917-1923, (London: 1995), p. 14 1. 
5 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Revoliutsila izvne", Voina klassov, pp. 50-59. 
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which he now believed in the possibility of a conquering revolutionary doctrine to 
spread Russian influence to Europe and the world, manifested itself in his Western 
Front Command. The clash with Poland was not a different war, but an extension of 
the Civil War between Communist Russia and Western capitalism, and should be 
fought the same way. Tukhachevsky wrote, 
This ability of the Red Army to carry revolution by offensive and 
infinitely reinforce at the expense of the revolutionary masses of all 
nations and peoples, - gives extraordinary possibilities of socialist, class 
strategy. It with full belief can consider its future victory over world 
capitaliSM. 6 
Tukhachevsky believed the Polish workers and peasants would support a Red 
Army advance into Poland. This matched the view of Lenin and the majority of the 
Communist Party, with dissenting voices such as Dzierzyn'ski, Julian Marchlewski 
and Trotsky ignored. 7 
To study the Polish-Soviet War around Tukhachevsky, it is essential to realise this 
was how he viewed and fought it. His performance can only be considered as part of 
his Civil War campaigns. This is how I shall examine his conduct of the Polish Front, 
taking into account conditions he fought under, numbers involved, his opponent and 
the type of fighting involved. 
Patterns have emerged running through his Civil War commands. Under Civil 
War conditions and in the role of "troubleshooter", Tukhachevsky consistently arrived 
in new postings which required the initial reorganisation and reformation of broken 
forces to fight with. Whilst conducting this work, he was pressurised into offensive 
action before his troops were ready, which achieved little or mixed results, although 
in his pre-emptive attack against Denikin he fared better with early military action 
than during previous commands. This stage was followed by the completion of 
reorganisation and regrouping and an all-out offensive to gain victory. This pattern 
which developed throughout Tukhachevsky's commands was how the Reds generally 
fought the Civil War - urgent appeals, mobilisations and hurried attacks - but 
Tukhachevsky had mastered it by the time of the North Caucasus Operation. When he 
arrived at Western Front, precisely the same pattern unfolded and it is little wonder he 
used the same methods. 
6 Ibid. p. 56. 
7 Julian Marchlewski (1866-1925) was a Polish member of the Communist Party and was Chairman of 
the Polish Revolutionary Committee set up in Bialystok in July-August 1920. 
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He inherited a weak, disorganised front, low in morale, which required instant 
reorganisation under fire, as Poland had already attacked. Two weeks into his 
command, Tukhachevsky had to launch a pre-emptive strike which lasted until early 
June, producing the same apparently mixed results, although actually as effective as 
in the Caucasus. The rest of June saw him complete reorganisation of Western Front 
for the main Belorussian offensive in July, which was again a stunning success, 
developing into continuous manoeuvre pursuit operations into Lithuania and Poland. 
However, offensive success slowed under strategic overstretch and Poland launched 
an all-or-nothing counter-offensive in mid-August from behind the River Wisla at 
Warsaw, similar to Kolchak from behind the Ishim at Petropavlovsk. The pattern 
deviated here though, as the counter-strike became an irrecoverable defeat and rout 
for Tukhachevsky's forces, the first time this had occurred. 
As with his previous Civil War commands, Tukhachevsky recorded his thoughts 
on the Polish campaign, both at the time and later. Voina klassov contains writings 
completed during or just after the conflict and these compare well to a series of 
lectures Tukhachevsky delivered to the Red Army General Staff Academy in 1923, 
under the title Pokhod za Vislu "March Beyond the Wisla". 8 This provides an 
excellent insight into his command of the Polish campaign, why decisions were made 
and why it went wrong. It was written with hindsight, but the conclusions drawn show 
his views remained remarkably consistent three years later. The conclusions 
Tukhachevsky drew became part of the heated debate within the Red Army and 
Communist Party over who or what was to blame for the failure of the Polish 
offensive, a debate which, it has been suggested, was linked to the military purges in 
1937. The question must be asked why Tukhachevsky was defeated at Warsaw after 
conquering so completely elsewhere and I shall examine this later in the chapter. To 
do so accurately, it is first necessary to examine Tukhachevsky's conduct of the Polish 
campaign in close comparison to his Civil War commands, to determine why his 
success and luck finally ran out and why the methods applicable to Civil War thus far, 
were not as suitable for a "War of the Classes" in Poland. At the end of the chapter I 
shall return to the debate over the genesis of "Deep Battle", introduced at the 
8 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pokhod za Vislu", Izbrannyeproizvedeniia, Tom 1,1919-1927, pp. 114-168; 
This is translated into English and published as an appendix in J. Pilsudski, Year 1920 and its climax: 
Battle qf lVarsaw during the Polish-Soviet War, 1919-1920. (London: 1972), pp. 223-275. 
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beginning of Chapter 111, and demonstrate why the Polish campaign in defeat 
provided a crucial part of the operational theory. 
The Western Theatre 
European Russia was guarded by two Fronts separated by the Pripet Marshes - 
Western and South-Western - similar to Russia's approach to the Great War. While 
Tukhachevsky commanded the former, the latter was headed by A. 1. Egorov. Ten 
years older than Tukhachevsky and an ex-Tsarist colonel, Egorov appeared to be the 
exception which made the rule for Tukhachevsky's assessment of older voenspetsy 
and makes an interesting comparison to him. He commanded Southern Front's 9th and 
10th Armies, receiving the Order of the Red Banner at Tsaritsyn in May 1919, before 
assuming Southern Front command in October 1919. He was the most prominent Red 
Commander in this area, working well with Stalin, despite his background. Formerly 
a Left SR, 9 he joined the Communist Party in 1918 and was another of the few 
commander-communists in the country, who made the transition to the Red Army 
easily. Egorov was probably regarded as the next most capable Red Commander after 
Frunze and Tukhachevsky and his career after 1920 is also comparable with the 
latter's. They were two of the first five Marshals of the Soviet Union in 1935, but 
were both executed in 1937. These were the two men who led the Soviet campaign 
against Poland. 
Kamenev prepared a general plan of offensive, which the Politburo passed on 
28th April, eannarking Western Front's Belorussian theatre as the main sector. 10 
Poland had attacked in Ukraine, therefore this would allow a Soviet attack into the 
weaker sector. Besides, whilst facing Poland in Ukraine, South-Western Front had to 
guard against possible Rumanian incursions from Bessarabia and Wrangel in Crimea, 
three fronts. 
Ukraine was the main sector for Poland, targeting Kiev, with a supplementary 
attack aiming for Odessa on the Black Sea to open an Entente supply line. Fielding 
39,300 infantry and cavalry, they found immediate success against the 14,209 troops 
of South-Western Front's 12th and 14th Armies. 13th Army, fielding only 4,456 men, 
9 L. D. Trotsky, (trans. and annotated B. Pearce), How the Revolution Armed: The Miltary Writings 
and Speeches ofLeon Trotsky, Volume III: The Year 1920, (London: 198 1), p. 2 10. 
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was trying to prevent Wrangel's retreat to Crimea, but did not succeed, meaning that 
18,000 infantry and 5,200 cavalry faced South-Western Front's underbelly. South- 
Western Front's troops had little experience of the victorious campaigns on other 
fronts and were generally low in confidence and morale. However, although the Poles 
occupied the Ukrainian capital Kiev on 6th May, South-Western Front managed to 
stem the advance, 12th Army limiting the Poles to a small bridgehead on the eastern 
bank of the River Dnepr opposite Kiev by mid-May. 11 
Western Front was not attacked, but on the day he arrived, Tukhachevsky 
discussed launching an attack to aid South-Western Front, with Kamenev. Kamenev 
had previously ordered Mozyr' to be attacked on 29th April, but this had not occurred. 
However, Kamenev asked Tukhachevsky's opinion on the best course of action now 
he had arrived to take command and said he would support whatever decision 
Tukhachevsky made, as the latter was now the man on the spot and conditions may 
well have changed since Kamenev himself was in Smolensk. 12 This reflects the trust 
Kamenev had in Tukhachevsky, giving him the plan to assess and amend as he saw 
fit, to local conditions. 
Western Front's theatre of operations was bisected by the River Beresina running 
diagonally from south-east to north-west. The River Dvina joins the Beresina between 
the towns of Zhlobin and Gomel', just north of the eastern end of the Pripet Marshes 
and the town of Mozyr' on the River Pripiat. Mozyr' formed the juncture point of 
Western and South-Westem Fronts and was an important target to secure Western 
Front's left flank and South-Western Front's right flank. The banks of the Beresina 
were marshy and wooded and its upper course in the north was surrounded by forest- 
covered swampland, difficult for manoeuvre. The south of the river was surrounded 
by marshy woodland and sparsely populated. Three railway crossings existed over the 
river at Borisov, Bobruisk and Shatsilki in the south. The only area of dry ground, 
around the town of Igumen, had no road or rail communications. North of the Upper 
Beresina marshes lay a belt of dry ground between the River Dvina and railway 
junction of Polotsk - the "Gates of Smolensk". Tukhachevsky assessed the 
10 V, M. Ivanov, pp. 152-153. 
11 DkJKA, Toni III, p. 149-, N. Kakurin, Russko-Pol'skaia kampaniia, 1918-1920. Politiko- 
strategicheskii ocherk, (Moscow: 1922), p. 4 1. 12 DkJKA, Toni III, pp. 21-22. 
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Belorussian operational theatre and decided on the "Gates of Smolensk" and Igumen 
as the best routes of attack. 13 
Remanisation 
On 1 st May, Tukhachevsky directed 16th Army Commander N. I. Sollogub to 
attack with his left flank towards Domanovichi-Mozyr', to relieve South-Westem 
Front's 12th Army. 14 However, Tukhachevsky did not limit the attack to this, but 
proposed a similar tactic to that used in the Caucasus, reorienting his troops for a pre- 
emptive attack into the northern sector of Belorussia to pre-empt a second Polish 
offensive, which he correctly estimated would be made in the Belorussian theatre. He 
intended to use offence as the best forrn of defence, to gain the offensive initiative and 
aid South-Westem Front, but it was another gamble. 
When Tukhachevsky launched the attack on 14th May, Western Front was not 
fully reorganised. Many reinforcements earmarked for the general offensive had not 
arrived and the Front was short of signal and rail troops. Supplies and equipment, 
especially communications and signalling equipment and transport resources, were 
scarce. 15 Therefore, whilst reorganising for the general offensive, Tukhachevsky 
planned and launched the pre-emptive attack with scarce numbers on a new Front 
working with new people, in the knowledge that time was at a premium to forestall 
the Polish attack. 
Gittis had apparently planned to attack through the "Gates of Smolensk", 
advancing straight towards Minsk to take the Belorussian capital, a good target in 
political terms, 16 but Tukhachevsky altered this. He envisaged a right flank 
envelopment and encirclement through the "Gates of Smolensk", supported by a 
central frontal attack through Igumen, with the left flank guarded at Mozyr', pinning 
down and wiping out the Polish forces. This was similar to the North Causcasus 
Operation and was the tactic employed by the Soviets in 1944 in this area against 
Germany. For the general offensive, more formations were required than the 15th and 
16th Armies which currently existed, but Tukhachevsky used the same plan on a 
13 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pokhod za Vislu", p. 115. 
14 DkfKA, Tom III, doc. 10, pp. 22-23; Former Tsarist Colonel Nikolai Pavlovich Sollogub (1883- 
193 7) commanded 16th Army from 14th August 1919-2 1 st September 1920, DkXA, Tom IV, p. 543. 
15 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pokhod za Vislu", pp. 225-226. 
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smaller scale for the pre-emptive strike. On Ist May, he instructed 15th Army 
Commander A. 1. Kork to attack from Polotsko-Vitebsk sector on the fight flank, 
whilst 16th Army, already moving towards Mozyr', would hold from the front. 17 Kork 
was to use seven rifle divisions and make every effort to use horses and automobiles 
for transporting units during the operation, whilst Sollogub was to use four rifle 
divisions for the supplementary attack, concentrating on the main flanking movement 
and supplying speed, echoing previous Civil War operations. 
Already beginning reorganisation, Tukhachevsky created a fight flank Northern 
Group, comprising two divisions and a brigade of 15th Army, for which Kork formed 
a field HQ using Velikolutskii Fortified Zone HQ. This was formed on 5th May under 
E. N. Sergeev, becoming 4th Army, on 2nd June. ' 8 On 25th June, it received 3rd 
Kavkor (Cavalry Corps), formed in June from 10th and 15th Cavalry Divisions and 
commanded by Tukhachevsky's old comrade Gai. 19 Unsurprisingly, Tukhachevsky 
entrusted Gai with the vital role during the summer offensive. 
Tukhachevsky also created a separate 16th Army left flank group on 18th May, 
comprising two divisions and a brigade of 16th Army, for which Sollogub created a 
field HQ using Gomel' Fortified Zone HQ. This became Mozyr' Group under T. S. 
Khvesin. 20 
Finally, Tukhachevsky created Southern Group on 18th May, which became 3rd 
Army on 2nd June under V. S. Lazarevich .21 Therefore, 
by early June, Tukhachevsky 
16 V. M. Ivanov, p. 153. 
17 Direktivy Glavnogo komandovaniia Krasnoi Armii (1917-1920), Sbornik dokumentov. (Moscow, 
1969), (hereafter DGkKA), doc. 619, pp. 632-633; Fon-ner Tsarist Lieutenant-Colonel Avgust 
Ivanovich Kork (1887-1937) commanded 15th Army from 31 st August- I 5th October 1919 and 22nd 
October 1919-16th October 1920, DkJK, 4, Tom IV, p. 543. 
18 Lieutenant-Colonel Evgenii Nikolaevich Sergeev (1887-1937) commanded Northern group and 4th 
Army until 31 st July, DGkK, 4, pp. 805 -806, note 108; Aleksandr Dmitrievich Shuvaev commanded 
4th Army until 17th October, when former Tsarist Colonel Nikolai Evgen'evich Kakurin (1883-1936) 
replaced him on 17th October, DkfK, 4, Tom IV, p. 536; Both Sergeev and Kakurin wrote accounts of 
the Polish-Soviet War, with Kakurin also completing a two-volume history of the Russian Civil War. 
These are two early and invaluable sources on the conflicts: E. N. Sergeev. Ot Dvinska k Visle, 
(Smolensk, 1923). N. E. Kakurin. Russko-Pol'skaia Kampaniia, 1918-1920. Politiko-strategicheskii 
ocherk. (Moscow, 1922), and Kak srazhalas'revoliuaiia, Tomy 1-11, (Moscow/Leningrad, 1925 & 
1926). 
'9 Dk)X4, Tom III, p. 739, note 12.15th Cavalry Division was headed by Borevich, another Pole, who 
had fought with Tukhachevsky and Gai in 24th Simbirsk Iron Division in 1918. 
20 DGkKA, p. 806, note 109. Tikhon Serafimovich Khvesin (1894-193 8), a former Tsarist NCO, 
commanded Mozyr'group until its disbandment in September 1920. 
21 Southern Group was commanded by 29th Division Commander Vladislav Flonanovich Grushetskii, 
DGkKA, p. 806,; DkfK, 4, Tom IV, pp. 568-69; Vladimir Salamanovich Lazarevich (1882-1938) 
commanded 3 rd Army from 12th June- I 8th October when N. E. Kakurm took over until 31 st 
December, DkfKA Tom IV, pp. 530 & 535. 
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had on paper reorganised Western Front, although in practice it was not fully ready 
until July. In early May however, Tukhachevsky was only beginning this when he had 
to launch the pre-emptive offensive, which gives some indication of how unprepared 
Western Front was and how much of a risk Tukhachevsky was taking. 
The comparison to Tukhachevsky's Civil War commands are apparent, as he spent 
the first half of May moving around Western Front, issuing orders to 15th and 16th 
Armies and preparing for the offensive. He instructed Sollogub on 3rd and 8th May to 
concentrate at Borisov and Igumen by 13th May for crossing the Beresina and 
22 attacking towards Minsk . 
This would allow an advance directly up the railway and 
via Igumen, the shortest route over dry land through the marshes, allowing 15th and 
16th Armies to arrive at Minsk simultaneously. Mozyr' was to be occupied before 
this to secure the left flank, but by 6th May Kamenev had directed 16th Army to only 
screen the sector south of the Beresina and advance to BoriSOV. 23 This was a reaction 
to the Polish advance on Kiev, which was captured on 6th May. With South-Western 
Front retreating so rapidly, there was no time for the preparatory attack on Mozyr', 
which would also have brought 16th Army into direct contact with the Polish forces 
advancing against 12th Army and prevented its concentration in Borisov sector. 
Therefore, securing Mozyr' and the left wing had to be sacrificed, which proved 
important to the outcome of the pre-emptive attack and planning for the general 
offensive. 
On 5th May, Tukhachevsky directed Kork to attack at dawn on 14th May, using 
all rifle divisions, with none kept in reserve and the "most urgent" measures to be 
taken to prepare the rear and communications in the attack area. 24 Tukhachevsky 
recognised that bad communications between frontline and rear areas and between 
neighbouring frontline areas would be problematic and urged his commanders to 
solve any problems as quickly as possible, as he had done in the Caucasus. With 
communications "unreliable", he decided to lead operations from Vitebsk which was 
closer than Smolensk. 25 
22 DkfKA, Tom Iff, docs. II& 14, pp. 23 & 25. 
23 Ibid. docs. II& 13, pp. 23-24. 
24 Ibid. doc. 12, p. 24. 
25 Ibid. doc. 15, pp. 25-27. 
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As Mozyr' was not secure, the weakness of the left flank was another problem. A 
Polish attack towards Bobruisk could threaten Zhlobin and Gomel and the Poles had a 
3: 1 advantage in Mozyr' sector. They had pushed the Soviets behind the Dnieper en 
route to Kiev by 10th May, but Tukhachevsky calculated they would not advance 
north towards Mozyr', reporting to Kamenev, 
... Altogether, if we consider not men, 
but bayonets, then the enemy has 
65,000 and we have in thousands up to ten less, apart from that, many 
badly reinforced. In view of this for creating a strong attack group we 
have to take several risks in other sectors, otherwise it is difficult to hope 
26 for success . 
This clearly illustrates Tukhachevsky's tactical thinking. Troop shortages led him 
to concentrate the majority of his troops on the right-wing and centre for the 
envelopment and front holding groups, but weakly screen the left flank despite the 
Polish offensive against South-Western Front. This was a risk, but Tukhachevsky felt 
it was worth taking, if it allowed concentration elsewhere. 
Kamenev pressed for reinforcements for the pre-emptive strike and on 12th May 
Lenin emphasised to Smilga, "It is necessary to energetically help Western Front", 
asking him to personally ensure all divisions asked for by Kamenev reached Western 
Front without delay with their full compliment, (ie. with no desertions). 27 
Reinforcements were on the way, although Kamenev informed Tukhachevsky that he 
must take his share of the blame for 12th and 21st Divisions arriving in an 
unbattleworthy state. As Caucasian Front Commander, Tukhachevsky had argued 
about transferring them from Caucasian Front and had insisted that they be equipped 
at Western Front. 28 He must therefore, have stripped them of a good deal of their 
equipment before they were transferred, retaining the equipment on Caucasian Front. 
This decision was now backfiring because he had to equip them on Western Front. 
However, this illustrates the supply problems and shortages which persisted 
throughout the Civil War. 
26 Ibid. 
27 V. 1. Lenin, Voennaiaperepiska, 1917-1922gg. (hereafter L-Vp), docs. 475 &477, pp. 243-244 & 
365, note 286; DGkK-4, docs. 749 & 75 1, pp. 743-744 & 744-45; Ivar Smilga was Temporary 
Caucasian Front Commander until 20th May 1920, DkfK, 4, Tom IV, p. 530. 
28 DkfKA Tom III, doc. 15, pp. 25-27. 
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Pre-emptive Strike 
On 15th May, Western Front comprised 49,474 infantry and 3,993 cavalry facing 
50,700 Polish infantry and 5,800 cavalry. South-Western Front fielded 49,676 
infantry and 29,633 cavalry against 30,800 and 7,900 Polish infantry and cavalry. 
45,000 infantry and 6,200 cavalry were positioned in Bessarabia and Wrangel fielded 
28,400 infantry and 11,500 cavalry. 29 Even without action from Bessarabia, South- 
Western Front was outnumbered. 
31,230 infantry and 2,644 cavalry were concentrated by Tukhachevsky in 
Northern Group and 15th Army in the "Gates of Smolensk" sector for the quick 
envelopment, with 18,244 infantry and 1,349 cavalry in the southern sector to pin 
down frontally, displaying the concentration on the right. 30 
With the Poles already attacking at Borisov, on 12th May, Tukhachevsky ordered 
Northern Group to force the Western Dvina in Disna-Polotsk area and attack in 
Zagat'e station area. 15th Army was to take Sharkovshchizna station-Novodrutsk 
station-Dokshitsy-River Serguch' estuary area on 18th May. 16th Army was to push 
the Poles back, force the Beresina in Borisov-Beresina (the town) area by 17th May, 
for a further offensive in Minsk sector, involving screening the Beresina and Dnieper 
Rivers, whilst guaranteeing the left flank with its remaining forces. 31 Therefore, 15th 
Army was to rapidly envelop in its sector, whilst 16th Army was to cross the Beresina 
and pin the Poles down, to prepare an attack on Minsk. 
The offensive began on 14th May with Northern Group crossing the Western 
Dvina. Tukhachevsky directed Sollogub that Polish forces had dug in along the River 
Dnieper and that he should guard against an attack in Mozyr'-Zhlobin area on the left 
flank. He agreed with Sollogub that he should use air squadrons to "ease the crossing 
for the troops by a massive raid and attacks from the air on the enemy positions on the 
bank". The crossing would be difficult with poor engineering resources, so an aerial 
bombardment was to be used, reminiscent of the Ufa Operation in May 1919 and 
another combined operation. 32 
29 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pokhod za Vislu", pp. 119-120, Dk)KA, Tom IV, pp. 152-155 & 522. 
30 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pokhod za Vislu", pp. 119-120. 
31 Dýý, Tom III, doc. 16, p. 28. 
32 Ibid. docs. 17-18, pp. 28-29. 
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15th Army and Northern Group advanced successfully, with Northern Group's left 
flank aiding 15th Army's right flank, to force the Western Dvina River and attack 
33 
along its left bank. However, 16th Army and the Poles both attacked in Borisov and 
Zhlobin sectors, with neither side making headway. 34 Tukhachevsky urged Sollogub 
to attack towards Minsk on 17th May, to aid 15th Army, before the Poles could attack 
further in Borisov sector and Sollogub launched the Borisov Operation that day. 35 
Tukhachevsky's confidence in his class warfare methods is illustrated by his order 
to Kork on 18th May, urging him to develop 4th Rifle Division's breakthrough, by 
advancing 15th Cavalry Division into the Polish rear to encircle and wipe them out. 
Tukhachevsky said that the flanks and rear of the cavalry would be secured because 
36 Minsk Province was rife with uprisings and partisans. He was utilising the presence 
of pro-Soviet forces in his enemy's rear as he had done against Kolchak and Denikin. 
With 15th and 16th Armies across the Beresina, Tukhachevsky directed the next 
stage of the offensive to "... be decisively developed" on 19th May. Northern Group 
was to clear the Western Dvina's left bank, not crossing the Latvian border, and move 
to Sharkovshchizna area to guard 15th Army's right flank by 24th May. 15th Army, 
screening Sventsiany area, was to take Molodechno (the railway station after Minsk) 
on 25th May. 16th Army was to screen Rogachev and Gomel', whilst advancing to 
Minsk-Ruvnopol' area by 25th May. 37 In this way, Minsk would be encircled by the 
right flank envelopment and frontal attack. 
Kamenev directed South-Western Front to inunediately attack to support Western 
Front and Egorov directed 14th Anny and I st Cavalry Anny to attack into the Right- 
38 
Bank Ukraine and 12th Army to encircle and wipe out the Polish Kiev Group. The 
opportunity provided by Western Front's breakthrough, forcing Polish troops to 
transfer northwards, was seized by South-Westem Front. 
By 23rd May, 16th Anny held a bridgehead on the Beresina right bank. Following 
advice from Kamenev, Tukhachevsky directed 15th Army to occupy Zembin area, 
then advance to Smolevichi and occupy Lake Velikoe-Lake Maloe area by 25th May. 
16th Army was to occupy Zhodzina sector, whilst screening south of Borisov 
33 Ibid. docs. 19-20, pp. 29-30. 
34 Ibid. doc. 2 1, p. 3 1. 
35 Ibid. doc. 22, p. 32. 
36 Ibid. doc. 23, p. 32. 
37 Ibid. doc. 24, p. 33. 
38 DGkKA, doc. 678, pp. 682-683; DkfKA, Toni III, docs. 184-186, pp. 156-159. 
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bridgehead. With Zembin and Zhodzina occupied to the south-west and north-west of 
Borisov respectively, 15th and 16th Armies could then encircle it, cut rail 
communications and capture the town and the Polish troops within it, another case of 
screening one sector to allow a pincer manoeuvre operation in the main sector. 39 
However, by 25th May Polish reinforcements had been introduced. 15th Army 
had been engaged in battle for three days around Polotsk-Molodechno Railway, 
slowing its envelopment manoeuvre, and Tukhachevsky urged Kork to take 
Molodechno in 3-4 days to aid 16th Army. The latter had also encountered stiff 
resistance, but both Kork and Sollogub advanced the next day, towards Molodechno 
and Zhodin respectively. At this point, Tukhachevsky asked Kamenev for more staff, 
telegraph-construction companies and workers columns to be hurried to the front, as 
communications were poor, especially with 15th Army, whose messages were 
incomprehensible. Kamenev said staff and reinforcements would arrive, but, clearly 
displeased, asked Tukhachevsky if he had absolutely no reserves left. However, 
Tukhachevsky had used all available troops in the offensive, instructing his army 
commanders to hold none back and was counting on reinforcements in transit as 
reserves. 
This was not the first time he had clashed with superiors over this tactical measure 
and it would not be the last. However, Tukhachevsky had launched the pre-emptive 
attack with barely enough troops and resources and as Polish reinforcements arrived, 
the offensive slowed . 
40 This was demonstrated on 26th May, when Polish 
reinforcements, advancing north from Ukraine, attacked 16th Army's left flank, 
forcing it back over the Beresina the following day. 41 
In a 27th May Hughes Telegraph discussion, Tukhachevsky reported the Poles 
had drafted in great numbers of reinforcements and stated that 15th and 16th Annies 
had suffered serious losses and required reinforcement and reformation to retain 
battleworthiness. He stressed the need for more staff and communications resources 
for the new divisions now on Western Front. 
Tukhachevsky also criticised Sollogub for continually conducting small attacks 
(instead of presumably forming a concentrated attack group for a breakthrough - NQ, 
but he believed Kork ". Jully can and must win the operation, if only he wasn't 
39 DGkKA, doc. 620, p. 633; DkfK, 4, Tom III, doc. 25, pp. 33-34. 
40 DkfK, 4, Toni III, docs. 26-27, pp. 34-36. 
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nervous. iiQ Sollogub evidently was not following Tukhachevsky's instructions on 
concentration, but Kork was manoeuvring well on the right flank. 
By the end of May, the Poles had gained the upper hand. A counter-offensive was 
launched on 31 st May by Polish Reserve Army under General Sosnkowski, attacking 
between Northern Group and 15th Army, and by I st Polish Army in Molodechno and 
Zembin areas against 16th Army. 43 
Kamenev and Tukhachevsky urged Northern Group and 15th Army to advance on 
the right flank and 16th Army to cross the Beresina once more, aided by the now- 
active Mozyr' group on its left flank. 44 However, little progress was made and by 4th 
June Tukhachevsky ordered Sollogub and Head of Western Front Air Fleet, E. 1. 
Tatarchenko, 
... on beginning a second crossing with all air resources, in full tactical 
cooperation with the crossing infantry, attack the opposite bank of the 
River Beresina at the points of crossing and by this guarantee the 
fulfillment of the crossings. Aeroplanes must not be spread out, but must 
be used in mass squadrons. The task of land forces command must be to 
give the air fleet deten-ninedly clear points for attacks from the air, they 
must not be very scattered. 45 
Tukhachevsky was demanding concentrated strikes to provide air cover for the 
infantry, targeted by spotters on the ground, a combined-arms operation again. 
Explaining it in such detail suggests that Sollogub had never carried out such an 
operation before or had done so poorly. Tukhachevsky also gave detailed 
topographical advice to Kork and Sergeev, telling them which areas of land to use 
amongst the marshy areas of the Upper Beresina and River Servech'. Knowledge of 
the area, amassed during the Great War, would have been invaluable to 
Tukhachevsky, but he would also have been aided by his Civil War command 
46 experience, and this was another area he wrote about . However, 
he did not always 
listen to advice from Kamenev so easily. 
On 2nd June, Kamenev voiced his concerns over Tukhachevsky apparently 
nervily throwing reserves from one sector to another, when using neighbouring units 
" A. S. Bubnov et al. Tom X. p. 347. 
42 DkfKA Tom III, doc. 29, pp. 37-40. 
43 A. S. Bubnov et al., pp. 347-348. 
4'DkfK, 4, Tom III, docs. 28 & 30-36, pp. 37 & 40-43; DGkKA, doc. 622, p. 634. 
4' DkJKA, Tom III, doc. 3 8, p. 45. 
46 Ibid. doc. 39, p. 46; M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Statistika v grazhdanskoi voine", "Inzhenemoe 
sorazmerenie operatsii", Voina klassov, pp. 78-88 & 116-134. 
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to help each other would be more effective. Tukhachevsky replied, "That is why I 
don't like reserves which are scarcely able to be used, I personally always help with 
neighbours". Kamenev's reply, "Yes, only without reserves it is difficult to develop 
success and gives no breathing-space to exhausted units" may well have fallen on 
deaf ears, with no reply to this forthcoming from Tukhachevsky. 47 
Tukhachevsky hoped to stop the Polish counter-offensive by re-launching 
Western Front's offensive. 15th Anny could ease the pressure on 16th Army, whilst 
Mozyr' Group could take Mozyr' to secure the left flank. 
However, concerns in Moscow about Western Front's position are shown by a 2nd 
June telegram from Lenin to Stalin noting, 
On Western Front the position is worse than Tukhachevsky and Supreme 
Commander think, therefore it is necessary to ask you to send divisions 
there, as it is impossible to take any more from Caucasian Front because 
an uprising there would make the position ultra-worrysome. Trotsky is 
working on sending you reinforcements from Crimean Division that 
perhaps will give you the possibility to take two-three divisions from these 
for Kiev sector. Try to pressure the units at all costs to continue beginning 
the offensive energetically. You of course remember that the Politburo 
decision to attack Crimea is postponed until a new Politburo decision. 48 
South-Western Front was to attack to relieve Western Front, but Lenin seemed to 
doubt that Kamenev appreciated the seriousness of the situation. 49 However, 
Kamenev was trying to direct reinforcements to Western Front and his appraisal of 
the Front situation is shown in a 4th June directive to Tukhachevsky noting, 
The circumstances on your front clearly underline the following three 
facts, which in my opinion, must be placed as the basis of any further 
directives: 1) The inability of 16th Army to cross the Beresina and by this 
render help to 15th Army; 2) the complete insecurity of 15th Army 
Southern Group's left flank, without which 15th Army is not able to risk 
wide operations; 3) in view of the strength of resistance by enemy troops 
in Molodechno area, the decision of this... sector... can be achieved by 
developing the success in Vilensk sector, with actions further on the flank 
of the enemy Molodechno Group. 
He urged quick regrouping and conducting an attack into Molodechno sector to 
prevent further Polish action and seize back the initiative. 
50 
47 DkfKA, Tom III, doc. 37, pp. 44-45. 
48DGkKA, doc. 683, p. 686; L- Vp, doc. 480, pp. 244-245. 
49DGkK4, doc. 684, pp. 686-688. 
50 Ibid. doc. 623, p. 635. 
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South-Western Front launched an attack on 6th June and Tukhachevsky urgently 
issued orders to support it, stating, "Only by energetic and brave tasks will you stop 
the retreat of your troops", again indicating his belief in attack being the best form of 
defence. 51 
The reason for launching the May offensive was to pre-empt the Poles in 
Belorussia and to relieve South-Westem Front in Ukraine. This had been achieved by 
early June because the Poles had not been able to launch their Belorussian attack and 
had transferred the ma ority of their forces from the Ukrainian to the Belorussian 
theatre to halt Tukhachevsky, thus relieving the pressure on Egorov. However, 
Western Front now faced vastly superior Polish forces, with only depleted, exhausted 
troops still awaiting reinforcement and resupply. To add to the general problems 
facing the Soviets, Wrangel launched an offensive from Crimea into the Tauride on 
6th June, taking advantage of the Red decision to delay offensive action against him. 
This put pressure on Egorov, just as he was beginning his offensive into Ukraine to 
regain Kiev. 
Soviet forces were back at their starting points for the May offensive by 8th June 
and Tukhachevsky and Kamenev discussed a new Western Front offensive to support 
South-Western Front's attack. Tukhachevsky stressed that the main problem was the 
quality and organisation of Polish reinforcements, compared to Western Front, and 
said he hoped to raise 30,000 reinforcements, but that he would accept any help 
Kamenev could give. He then stated, 
The war with Poland, as you have already noted, is significantly closer to 
regular forms of war of big armies, in connection with this I have prepared 
calculations, so to speak, for a plan for a summer offensive. Figures are 
important and perhaps for the first time, can allow us to wage war not with 
just what there is, but to create what is demanded for the war. 




Both Kamenev and Tukhachevsky knew that a different approach was necessary. 
The pre-emptive offensive, although quickly planned and unprepared, had served its 
purpose, but now the Poles had reacted and with their superior ability to reinforce 
formations, prevented the Soviets making further gains. Both men realised that 
operations were on a larger scale on Western Front than previous Civil War fronts and 
51 DkJK. 4, Tom III, docs. 40-44, pp. 47-49. 
52 Ibid. doc. 45, pp. 49-5 1. 
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therefore required careful planning, for which time would be needed. Northern Group 
and 15th An-ny had advanced some 100-130 kms and secured the use of the Polotsk- 
Molodechno Railway for the general offensive, but 16th Army's lack of progress had 
exposed 15th Army's left flank and forced Kork to spread his men over an ever- 
widening front, eroding his attacking impetus. Therefore, the time had come to dig in 
and prepare for the general offensive in the summer. Tukhachevsky pulled his forces 
behind the Rivers Auta and Beresina to stabilise the Soviet line and using the time 
won by the May offensive, reinforced and reorganised Western Front in June. 
Kamenev ordered regrouping to begin and Mozyr' Group's operation to take Mozyr' 
was postponed, although Western Front forces were to keep the Poles in their sector 
53 occupied, to prevent forces being transferred back to face South-Western Front. 
Build-Up of Western Front 
The rest of June followed a similar pattern to the first two weeks of May. 
Tukhachevsky reorganised Western Front for the general offensive, prevented Polish 
advances with defensive measures and limited advances, and supported South- 
Western Front's right flank. Tukhachevsky had tremendous experience in 
reorganisational work under fire, having conducted it on every Civil War front. His 
command record, but also probably the military ideas he had already formulated and 
command courses he had created, were recognised on 22nd May when he was 
appointed a member of the Red Army General Staff, despite being too young to have 
attend Nikolaevskii General Staff Academy. 54 
To begin reorganisation, on 9th and 10th June, Tukhachevsky ordered 15th and 
16th Armies to dig in behind the Dvina and Beresina Rivers to hold the Polish 
advance, allow reinforcements to be introduced and begin regrouping. 55 On II th June, 
he formed 3rd and 4th Armies from Southern and Northern Groups, reorganising 
Western Front for the summer offensive. 56 Tukhachevsky infon-ned Sollogub on 12th 
June that in the forthcoming operation, he was to cross the Beresina and attack Minsk 
sector, whilst the three-army Northern Group attacked on the right flank. He was to 
53 Ibid. doc. 46, p. 52; DGkKA, doc. 624, p. 636. 
54 N. 1. Koritskii, ed., Marshal Tukhachevsky: Vospominaniia soratnikov i druzei, (Moscow: 1965), p. 
231. 
55 DkfKA, Tom III, docs. 48-49, pp. 53-54. 
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attack with four divisions and prepare beforehand all resources for crossing, 
communications and transport in his selected crossing area. 57 Therefore, the offensive 
was planned well beforehand, using the same areas of operations, but this time 
ensuring enough men and resources were available to exploit any breakthrough. 
Whilst reorganising however, Tukhachevsky was forced to attack with Mozyr' 
Group. South-Western Front's offensive continued and Mozyr' was as important for 
the security of its right flank as for Western Front's left flank. On I Ith June, 
Tukhachevsky ordered Mozyr' Group to cross the River Dnieper and occupy Rechitsa, 
to guarantee the railway bridge on the river's right bank, aiding 12th Army and 
opening up an advance to Mozyr'. 58 
The Poles were still active against Western Front, anxious to use their numerical 
superiority and advance as far as possible before the Soviets reinforced. Therefore, on 
14th June, Tukhachevsky was forced to order 3rd, 15th and 16th Armies to launch 
limited counter-attacks to secure their areas. 59 
Whilst the northern forces held position, Mozyr Group's attack in support of 
South-Western Front developed into an operation to occupy Mozyr', with 16th Army 
advancing to support its right flank on 18th June. Khvesin supported 12th Army, 
which was attacking along the River Pripiat', by moving towards Mozyr' area. 60 
Khvesin had already learned of a Polish retreat from Rechitsa and attacked on his 
own initiative, crossing the River Dnieper and capturing Rechitsa station-Derazhnia 
area. 61 On 19th June, Tukhachevsky ordered him to develop this further by taking 
Vasilevichi-Khoiniki area. 16th Army was to cross the Beresina in its left flank area 
no later than 21st June and advance to take Evtushkevichi-Domanovichi- 
Novosovichi-Zolotukha area. 62 12th Army pushed on with 24th Division and the 
Dnepr Flotilla, to aid the occupation of Mozyr'. 63 
As well as guarding 12th Army's right flank, occupying Mozyr' was a vital 
precondition for the summer offensive into Belorussia, guarding Western Front's left 
flank. The Poles knew the tactical importance of the town and transferred troops from 
56 Ibid. doc. 5 1, p. 55. 
5' Ibid. doc. 52, pp. 55-56. 
58 Ibid. doc. 50, p. 54. 
59 Ibid. doc. 53, p. 56. 
60 Ibid. doc. 54, p. 57. 
61 Ibid. p. 57, footnote. 
62 Ibid. doc. 55, pp. 57-58. 
63 Ibid. doc. 22 1, p. 199. 
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the northern sector to try to hold Mozyr'. On 27th June, Kamenev instructed 
Tukhachevsky and Egorov to take all possible measures to occupy Mozyr'. 64 The two 
Front Commanders relayed these instructions and 12th Army and Mozyr' Group 
pressed on, taking the town on 29th June. Tukhachevsky directed Khvesin and 
Sollogub to secure the town and area the next day. This linked Western and South- 
Western Front and provided the security for Western Front's left flank, which had 
been missing during the pre-emptive attack, clearing the way for the general 
offensive. 65 
Whilst offensive action was encouraged in southern sector, on 22nd June 
Tukhachevsky had ordered 15th and 4th Armies, which were involved in protracted 
battles along their front, to withdraw, dig in and conduct energetic reconnaissance to 
seize prisoners. Troops were to be withdrawn to reinforce divisions for the 
forthcoming offensive, which was to be completed by 28th June, for the offensive to 
begin along the front of 4th, 15th and 3rd Armies on 5th July. 66 On 26th June, the 
urgency to attack and again relieve South-Western Front was underlined by Kamenev 
stressing, "... the circumstances taking shape on South-Westem Front demand action 
begins on your front to achieve general results, the circumstances for which already, 
visibly are favourable. 167 Tukhachevsky was to attack as soon as possible, whilst the 
situation remained so. South-Western Front had retaken Kiev on 12th June and 
Novograd-Volynskii fortified zone further west and maintained pressure on Poland, 
relieving Western Front and allowing Tukhachevsky to reinforce and prepare for the 
general offensive. 68 Now Western Front had to attack to retain the initiative won in 
Ukraine and wrest this back from Poland in Belorussia. 
By early July, Tukhachevsky had successfully conducted his reorganisational and 
reformational work on Western Front, forming 3rd and 4th Armies and Mozyr' Group 
to compliment 15th and 16th Armies. Whilst doing this, he had also directed Mozyr' 
Group's occupation of Mozyr', cooperating with 12th Army, and had stabilised the 
line in the other sectors. He had transformed a weak front, manned by troops low in 
morale, into a strong eager fighting force. Numbers had risen from 49,474 infantry 
64DGkKA, pp. docs. 627-628 & 691, pp. 637-38 & 699-701. 
65 DkfKA, Tom Iff, docs. 58-59 & 224, pp. 59 & 201. 
66 Ibid. docs. 56-57, pp. 58-59. 
67 DGkK, 4, doc. 626, p. 637. 
68 DkfKA, Tom III, p. 186, footnote-, DGkKA, docs. 628 & 694, pp. 638 & 701. 
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and 3,993 cavalry in early May to 80,912 infantry and 10,569 cavalry by 4th JUly. 69 
The 30,000 recruits Tukhachevsky had informed Kamenev he was hopeful of raising, 
was exceeded as deserters were rounded up or voluntarily surrendered, to supplement 
those mobilised. 100,000 people were mobilised and entered the Reserve Army and 
frontline reinforcement groups, but, as with previous fronts, no time existed for 
intensive training. New pontoon bridges were constructed to cross the Dvina at 
Polotsk and the Beresina at Borisov, providing railway crossings and ensuring 
communications for the Belorussian offensive. Reminiscent of the Civil War, local 
transport resources were mobilised. 4th Army mobilised 8,000 carts, 15th and 3rd 
Armies 15,000 each, and 16th Army 10,000. Tukhachevsky recalled that the local 
population reacted well to this as they were afraid of the Polish invasion. 70 
Belorussian 12umen-Minsk Operation 
If the North Caucasus Operation was the archetypal Civil War operation, the 
Belorussian campaign, which started with the Igumen-Minsk Operation does not lag 
far behind. If the Polish-Soviet War had ended after this campaign, Tukhachevsky 
would have been remembered as an undefeated, victorious commander who led 
sweeping manoeuvre campaigns througout the Russian Civil War. The Igumen-Minsk 
Operation was on a bigger scale than the North Caucasus Operation and against an 
arguably more effective force than the Armed Forces of South Russia in early 1920. 
The Poles were relatively inexperienced, but were well-equipped and supported by 
the Entente, especially France. They were fighting for their new nation with a 
nationalism which united them more effectively than Denikin's notion of "Russia, One 
and Indivisible" had for the lower class troops in his forces. 
As with earlier commands, the pre-emptive May offensive gave Tukhachevsky an 
example to follow, when planning the Igumen-Minsk Operation. The capture of 
Mozyr' secured Western Front's left flank and the friendly Lithuanian and Latvian and 
neutral Prussian borders secured the right. This enabled Tukhachevsky to again plan a 
strong envelopment by the right flank, but with three armies this time - 15th, 3rd and 
4th, whilst launching a powerful frontal attack with an enlarged 16th Army guarded 
69 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pokhod za Vislu", pp. 119-120 & 129-13 1. 
70 Ibid. pp. 127-128. 
277 
on the left by Mozyr' Group. In this way, Minsk area and the Poles positioned there 
were to be encircled and wiped out. 
In the right-wing "Gates of Smolensk" Northern Group, Tukhachevsky placed: 4th 
Army, including 3rd Kavkor (Cavalry Corps) - 9,715 infantry and 4,119 cavalry; 15th 
Army - 23,174 infantry and 2,762 cavalry; 3rd Army - 17,893 infantry and 2,255 
cavalry; in total 50,692 infantry and 9,133 cavalry facing 32,600 and 2,200 Polish 
infantry and cavalry. 
In southern sector, Tukhachevsky placed 16th Army - 24,045 infantry and 953 
cavalry; Mozyr' Group - 6,105 infantry and 483 cavalry, in total 30,150 infantry and 
1,436 cavalry facing 26,800 and 5,200 Polish infantry and cavalry. 71 
Tukhachevsky had concentrated almost twice the number of troops on the right 
wing as the Poles could muster and planned a double envelopment by 4th and 3rd 
Armies on the right and left flanks, whilst 15th Army pressed from the front to 
encircle the Poles in the northern sector. 3rd Army would then turn south to cut the 
Minsk-Molodechno Railway, preventing a Polish retreat from Minsk and encircling 
the Polish group there, as 16th Army pressed from the front, covered by Mozyr' 
Group advancing on the left flank. 
Tukhachevsky gave final directives on 30th June and 2nd July for the offensive to 
begin on 4th July. To encircle the Poles in Dokszyce-Glqbokie-Germanovichi area, on 
the right flank 4th Army was to cross and attack with its main forces south of the 
Western Dvina River and north of Lake Belaia El'na to reach Sharkovshchina-Luzhki 
by 5th July, whilst 3rd Kavkor advanced north of the river, deep into the Polish rear, 
to cut the path of retreat at Swienciany. 15th Army was to attack down the Polotsk- 
Molodechno Railway, reaching Parafianowo Station by 6th July, cutting the retreat 
from Germanovichi to Glqbokie. 3rd Army was to attack along the Kasari-Dokszyce 
highway, attacking the Dokszyce-Parafianowo Station sector, before turning down 
towards Pleshchenitsy-Minsk. 
In Southern sector, 16th Army Commander was to cross the Beresina on the night 
of 5th-6th July at the River Bobr estuary-River Kleva area, to attack Igumen-Minsk 
area. Mozyr' Group, after an intervention by Kamenev, had its main task changed 
from pursuing the Poles along both banks of the River Pripiat' to aid South-Westem 
" Ibid. pp. 129-13 1. 
278 
72 orces were to Front's right flank . This remained a secondary task, 
but its main f 
advance north-west along the Beresina right bank to aid 16th Army's left flank. 
Tukhachevsky's final instruction was to not retain many reserves, but attack 
"... immediately with maximum forces" . 
73 Evidently the earlier conversation with 
Kamenev had not changed his mind on this tactic. 
By 5th July, 16th Army had crossed the River Beresina and reached Baranowicze 
area and Mozyr' Group, also making good ground, was instructed to alter its direction 
again, from north-west towards Slutsk area, to directly west towards Pinsk, to cover 
16th Army's left flank. 74 4th Anny had achieved its initial targets and was ordered to 
cut off the Polish path of retreat to Swieciany at Glqbokie area by the night of 6th-7th 
July. 15th Army was to continue pushing forwards, whilst 3rd Army was to take all 
measures to cut off the Polish retreat route along the railway in Parafianowo area no 
later than 6th July. 75 
3rd Kavkor occupied Glqbokie on 5th July, taking prisoners, whilst 15th Army's 
33rd Division reached the line Zhuki-Seslavino and 15th Division reached the line 
Glqbokie-Lawrinowka-Matiqsy, but suffered heavy casualties to command staff and 
line troops from a Polish counter-attack. 3rd Army occupied its initial target of 
Dokszyce on 6th July, a day behind schedule, but cut the railway line and forced the 
Poles northwards, as planned. 76 
Tukhachevsky reported on 7th July that 16th Army was just beginning its 
offensive, whilst Mozyr' Group had repelled Polish attacks at Kowalewichi and 
Katsury station and was engaged in battle at the River Ptich'. Weaponry and 3,000 
prisoners had been taken, and he felt that 4th Army's envelopment was developing 
successfully and that the general operation was proceeding well, but did not know 
which railway the Poles were primarily retreating along. Although agreeing that the 
first three days of the offensive had developed excellently, Kamenev suggested that 
4th Army's envelopment could have been deeper, since moving to Germanowichi 
would not result in an envelopment. He noted that Tukhachevsky had made 
72 1 st Cavalry Army occupied Rovno on 4th July, DkfY, 4, Tom Iff, p. 202. 
73 DkfKA, Toni 111, docs. 60-62, pp. 60-62; DGkKA, doc. 629, pp. 638-639 & 806, note 112. 
" DkfKA, Tom III, docs. 63-64, pp. 62-63. 
75 Ibid. doc. 65, pp. 63-64. 
76 Ibid. docs. 62 & 66, pp. 61-62 & 64-66; 16th Division is mentioned as part of 15th Army's 
complement in doc. 66, but is not listed in either DkfKA, Tom IV, p. 142 or in M. N. Tuhkachevsky, 
"Pokhod za Vislu", p. 273. This could be an error and should possibly be 15th Division. 33rd division 
is listed in "Pokhod za Vislu", but not Dk)KA, Tom IV. 
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corrections already, but said he felt the tasks involved were unfeasible because it 
expected infantry to cover 35-40 versty in 24 hours. If half of this was achieved, the 
envelopment would still be deeper. He also asked about 16th Army and remarked that 
Mozyr' Group should be pushed as it had "disgraced itself a little today". 
Tukhachevsky replied that he expected great success from 16th Army because 
Sollogub had 22,000 troops against 3,000 Poles, who could only be reinforced to 
around 8-9,000, and that Mozyr' Group was engaged with the greater part of 14th 
Polish Division. They also discussed Latvia's attitude and agreed that it would view 
Soviet success favourably and do nothing. 77 
Tukhachevsky and Kamenev were working well as a team again, with the latter 
ready with suggestions, but leaving the ultimate decision to Tukhachevsky as the man 
on the spot. 
On 9th and 10th July, Tukhachevsky outlined the next stage of the operation. 4th 
Army was to cut down with its enveloping manoeuvre towards Vilno-Grodno area, 
behind the Polish troops retreating through Molodechno, and to use the Molodechno- 
Wilno Railway, as the Poles may have cut the Wilno-Swiqcany-Postawy Railway. 
15th and 3rd Armies were to occupy Molodechno, from where 3rd Army should help 
16th Army southwards at Minsk and 15th An-ny should advance south-east to cross 
the River Nieman towards Grodno. 16th Army was to take Minsk from the north and 
east, then move down the Aleksandrovsk Railway to Baranowicze, whilst Mozyr' 
Group cleared Slutsk and Bobruisk areas south of Minsk and advanced to 
Baranowicze. 78 Shvarts outlined the next phase of the operation, 
Western Front Commander's basic idea is that the main mass of Western 
Front forces must be grouped on the right flank and we must conduct our 
offensive guaranteeing our right flank with the friendly attitude of 
Lithuania and further along of Eastern Prussia. If the enemy resists mainly 
in Baranowicze sector, then the enveloping movement of 15th and 3rd 
Armies must bring the full rout of the enemy forces, concentrated in that 
sector. If the enemy intends to hold us at the line Krevo-River Beresina, 
then 4th Army moving to Oszmiana must assist the offensive of 15th and 
3rd Armies. Concerning Mozyr' Group, its task remains as before - leave 
for Slutsk and a further attack to Pinsk. 
77 Ibid. doc. 66, pp. 64-66. 
78 Ibid. doc. 68, p. 67. 
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Army commanders were to base future actions on this and organise their rear 
accordingly. 79 
Tukhachevsky was unsure where the Poles would make a stand, therefore he 
issued the general directive and entrusted his army commanders with their own zones. 
Operational lines were lengthening and an advanced front base was established at 
Molodechno, as the base of operations advanced to keep up with the frontline, after 
Molodechno and Minsk were occupied on I Ith July. This successfully concluded the 
Igumen-Minsk Operation and began a period of continuous pursuit operations to clear 
Belorussia and advance to the Polish border. 80 
Tukhachevsky and Kamenev discussed this on II th July and Kamenev warned 
that, after Minsk, the way eastwards from Lida was an area like Polesia, limiting 
movement between Lida and Slonim and perhaps temporarily separating Western 
Front in two. Therefore, Tukhachevsky should consider local natural conditions. 
Tukhachevsky replied that 4th, 15th and 3rd Armies were guaranteed on the right 
flank by Lithuania and Eastern Prussia and were moving north of the Nieman- 
Beresina marshes. However, until Grodno, the Nieman was not a serious obstacle in 
many places. 16th Anny was advancing along the Aleksandrovsk road, but for the 
main attack Tukhachevsky considered this latter to be disadvantageous because it 
would have to advance with inverted flanks. 81 
On 12th July, Tukhachevsky ordered the pursuit and annihilation of Polish forces, 
who were retreating along the whole front, setting targets to be reached by 17th July. 
4th Army was to take Orana railway junction; 15th Army, Zyrmuny area; 3rd Army, 
Lida-Lake Glukhoe area; 16th An-ny, Baranowicze area; Mozyr' Group, Timkovichi- 
Semezhevo-Wyzna-Starobino area, continuing to attack with the left flank along the 
River Pripiat'. Deep raids by cavalry to secure communications and maintain 
offensive momentum were used again as the cavalry of 4th, 15th and 3rd Armies 
moved forwards to take the crossings over the River Nieman. 82 
79 Ibid. doc. 69, pp. 67-68. Nikolai Nikolaevich Shvarts was Western Front Chief-of-Staff from 25th 
February-30th September 1920, DkfK, 4, Tom IV, p. 530. 
80 Dk)X4, Toni III, pp. 66 & 67. 
81 DGkKA, doc. 630, pp. 639-640. 
82 DkfK, 4, Tom III, doc. 70, pp. 68-69. 
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Diplomatic Influences 
On 12th July, the RSFSR and Lithuania signed a peace agreement which gave 
Vilno to Lithuania and secured the Lithuanian Army's cooperation against Poland. 
This was crucial for the Western Front offensive as it secured the right flank of the 
northern sector until East Prussia. 
Diplomatic affairs played a crucial role in the Polish-Soviet War at this point. 
Protracted peace negotiations had continued throughout the conflict. The Soviets had 
offered terms as the Poles advanced in late May/early June, but now the Poles, 
retreating rapidly in both Belorussia and Ukraine, pressed for a peaceful settlement. 
The British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, intervened at this point with the 
suggestion for a border to be drawn and hostilities to end. What became known as the 
Curzon Line ran along the border of the ethnic Poland Congress Kingdom and the 
Tsarist Empire. 83 Curzon's note was wired to Moscow, leading to the pivotal political 
decision whether or not to continue attacking into ethnic Polish territory or stop 
advancing, pull back to this line, and sign a peace treaty with Poland. With hindsight, 
the Soviets should perhaps have sought peace to end the six years of the Great War 
and Civil War, but this is where the Soviet view of the conflict comes into focus. Had 
the Soviets viewed it as a national war, they would perhaps have halted, settling their 
national border and gaining a chance to re-build the Soviet state. However, the Polish- 
Soviet War was not viewed in these terms by Lenin, the majority of the Communist 
hierarchy or by Tukhachevsky and the Red Army leadership. They were engaged in a 
war with the "bourgeois" Polish Government and wanted to spread revolution on the 
point of bayonets into Europe. However, indecision still existed. 
On 12th- 13 th July, Lenin contacted Stalin in Kharkov, infon-ning him of Curzon's 
note and that a peace conference could be held in London between representatives of 
Soviet Russia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and East Prussia. Wrangel was also 
invited to London to meet Curzon separately to discuss the fate of his army and a 
suggested peace settlement between Wrangel and Soviet Russia. By this point 
Wrangel was looking to evacuate the remnants of the White movement from Crimea. 
83 The border was to run through Grodno, lalovka, Nemirov, Brest-Litovsk, Dorogusk, Ustilug and 
Krylov with Poland receiving Galicia between Przemy§I and Rava-Russkaia to the Carpathian 
Mountains and Russia gaining everything to the east, but having to withdraw the Red Arrny a ftirther 
50 kms east of the line. 
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He knew his forces would stand little chance once the Polish-Soviet War was over 
and the Red Army could concentrate against him. Lenin asked Stalin how the 
offensive was progressing against Wrangel, adding that he felt Curzon was trying to 
cheat the Soviets out of gaining Crimea. 84 Lenin was canvassing the opinions of those 
in the frontline areas to aid discussions in Moscow. He also telegrammed Sklianskii, 
Comrade Sklianskii! International circumstances, especially the proposal 
of Curzon (annexation of Crimea for peace with Poland, line Grodno- 
Bialystok), demandsfurious quickening of the offensive into Poland. 
Is this happenning? Everything? Energetically? 85 
From this, it is clear that Lenin wished the offensive to be driven on as quickly as 
possible against Poland. The more territory the Soviets could conquer, the better 
terms they could demand in peace negotiations, but this also reflected the mistrust of 
the Communists towards the Curzon Note and Polish peace proposals. The Soviets 
were worried these were delaying tactics to allow the Poles to regroup, receive new 
equipment and weaponry from the Entente, and renew their offensive. The Soviets 
were advancing across the whole European theatre, but Moscow and the Supreme 
Command knew that this would become more difficult as they progressed further 
towards Poland and away from their supply bases and secure rear. If the Soviets were 
to defeat Poland and foment European revolution, as well as securing the Soviet 
Western border, they would have to press on as vigorously as possible. This matched 
the need for the continuous offensive theory which Tukhachevsky had utilised so 
successfully during the Civil War. The Soviets had to keep pushing, giving the Poles 
no respite, but would the Red Army receive the support of the workers and peasants 
in the areas they conquered, to gain the supplies and recruits necessary, to keep the 
offensive moving? This was the crucial question surrounding the Red Army's military 
capabilities. However, the political decision was the one which governed whether or 
not the offensive proceeded, not Tukhachevsky acting independently, as suggested by 
Fiddick. 86 
The final decision was taken in Moscow and Lenin informed Stalin and Smilga on 
South-Western and Western Fronts by telegram on 17th July. Peace negotiations were 
" L-Vp, doc. 490, pp. 248-249. 
85 Ibid. doc. 49 1, p. 249; DkfK, 4, Tom III, doc. 7 1, p. 69. 
86 T. Fiddick, Russia's Retreat From Poland, 1920. - from permanent revolution to peaceful coexistence, 
(London: 1990), p. 141-142. 
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rejected by the Central Committee on Lenin's recommendation and the offensive 
continued. 87 
Pursuit Operations 
There had been no break in the offensive, despite the diplomatic manoeuvres. On 
13th July, Kamenev directed Tukhachevsky and Egorov that current circumstances 
demanded they push on, seizing as much territory as possible, whilst pursuing the 
Polish troops and preventing them establishing "favourable lines". 88 
By favourable lines, Kamenev was referring to the German Great War trenches 
and the Rivers Nieman and Szczara, to which the Poles had retreated. On 14th July, 
Tukhachevsky, on Kamenev's advice, directed 3rd and 16th Armies through the 
forested-marshy areas of the River Nieman running through the German trenches, 
since the area was similar to the Polesian marshes, and passable. Sollogub was to 
mass reserves on his right flank and cooperate with 3rd Army to breakthrough the 
German trenches, bypassing and enveloping the fortified areas. 89 
This was an ideal opportunity to try out manoeuvre warfare against entrenched 
positions to achieve a swift, decisive breakthrough, avoid positional warfare and 
allow the continuous offensive to develop. Tukhachevsky had sufficient troops for 
such an operation and an envelopment of the Polish left flank by 4th Army, combined 
with the above movements, forced the Poles back from the German trench line, which 
had endured for so long in the Great War. 90 Its defensive potential was much lower 
than before, but the principle of allowing no time for organising defence or 
reinforcement was working. 
On 17th July, 3rd Army occupied Lida, the railway junction connecting the lines 
from Wilno and Molodechno to Baranowicze and an important target before Grodno. 
The next day, Tukhachevsky directed the next stage of the Belorussian Operation. 4th 
An-ny was to cross the River Nieman with its main forces south of Grodno no later 
than 21st July and 15th Army was to cross the Nieman a day later, with 
Tukhachevsky's reserve, 5th Rifle Division, to concentrate by 21st July in Myto-Lida 
87 L- Vp, doc. 492, p. 250; Lenin said the decision had been taken in a Central Committee meeting 
called after receiving the Curzon Note, A. Richardson, p. 139. 
88 DGk-KA, doc. 63 1, p. 640. 
89 Ibid. doc. 632, p. 64 1; DkfK, 4, Toni III, doc. 72, pp. 69-70. 
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area. 3rd An-ny was to cross the Nieman on 22nd July with its main forces at Mosty- 
Orlia and with its left flank take Vseliub, continuing its attack south of the Nieman. 
16th An-ny, breaking through the German trenches, was to pursue the Poles, cross the 
River Szczara with its main forces north of Slonim no later than 22nd July and use 
2nd Rifle Division from Tukhachevsky's reserve, for attacking Korelichi-Novogrudok 
sector. Mozyr' Group was to take Pinsk in the next few days. 91 Conducting these 
movements, 3rd Kavkor and 16th Army occupied Grodno and Baranowicze on 19th 
July and Mozyr' Group captured Pinsk on 23rd July. 92 
Acting on the political decision of 17th July, three days later Kamenev directed all 
other Soviet Fronts to render all possible help to South-Western and Western Fronts. 
He directed Tukhachevsky, Egorov and Northern Front's 7th Army to pursue the 
Poles and maintain the pressure, ignoring border constraints suggested by the Curzon 
Note. Egorov was to prepare reserves in case of Rumanian intervention, but ensure no 
measures were taken which Rumania could interpret as aggressive, whilst 
Tukhachevsky and Odintsov were to block Latvian and Finnish troops if they 
attempted to intervene. 93 All measures were to be taken to reinforce armies with men 
and horses, and cavalry was to be prepared for operations for the next three months. 94 
This signalled the end of the Belorussian Operation and the beginning of the push 
beyond the Curzon Line into ethnographic Poland. 
The Drive for Warsaw 
The swift execution of the Belorussian Operation ensured that Western Front 
routed the Polish forces and pushed them back to Poland within three weeks. 
Tukhachevsky had regained the territory lost to Poland since 1919. As Western Front 
advanced, mobilisation was again conducted on the move. The addition of 30,000 
new recruits from liberated Belorussia showed support for the Red Army advance, as 
did German Spartacists and workers crossing the Prussian border to join the advance, 
who were formed into a German infantry brigade. This would have convinced 
90 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pokhod za Vislu", p. 140. 
91 DkfKA, Toni III, doc. 74, pp. 68 & 70-71. 
92 Ibid. pp. 69-71. 
93 Former Tsarist Major-General Sergei Ivanovich Odintsov (1874-1920) commanded 7th Army of 
Northern Front from 17th November 1919-30th July 1920. 
94 DGkKA, docs. 633-634, pp. 641-643. 
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Tukhachevsky and the Red leadership that class warfare methods were working, with 
the international working class joining the Red Army to fight. 95 
However, the Belorussian Operation was not an unmitigated success. Despite 3rd 
Kavkor rapidly advancing on the right flank, the movement of the other forces had not 
been quick enough to complete encirclement and annihilation of the Polish troops - 
Tukhachevsky's ultimate objective. The Poles had been able to retreat, holding the 
Soviets temporarily at the German trench line and behind the Rivers Nieman and 
Szczara. Although routed again by envelopments of their positions, they managed to 
extricate most of their troops. It became a matter of where the Poles would stand and 
fight. 
Conducting continuous pursuit operations from mid-July to mid-August, 
Tukhachevsky reached the outskirts of the Polish capital of Warsaw and seemed on 
the cusp of another momentous victory, but a massive Polish counter-offensive 
completely split and routed Western Front, pushing it back to its 4th July starting 
positions. Various factors combined to cause the Soviet offensive to fail and, whilst 
examining the conduct of the operation, I shall highlight these to show where it went 
wrong, before discussing which factors were more significant. 
Kamenev's strategy for the campaign against Poland involved Western and South- 
Western Fronts advancing independently within their theatres until the capture of 
Brest-Litovsk, which occurred on Ist August. 96 At this point, Tukhachevsky was to 
take command of all Soviet forces in a massed offensive to wipe out the Polish 
Armies. The Western Front operation to swing around Warsaw from the right, 
encircling and wiping out the Polish forces, was the main operation. Egorov was to 
support Western Front's left flank with 12th Army and draw Polish forces to the 
Ukrainian theatre, but to be prepared, upon switching to Tukhachevsky's command, to 
move north-westwards towards Warsaw, to protect Western Front's northern 
envelopment, from the south. 
The operation eventually centring on Warsaw was due to the Poles withdrawing 
and grouping their troops there, not because the Soviets planned to take the political 
95 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "The March Beyond the Vistula", J. Pilsudski, The Year 1920, pp. 242-243. 
Section 8 of "Pokhod za Vislu" entitled "Exporting the revolution" is omitted from Izbrannye 
proizvedeniia. It was also apparently omitted from the Polish version, also published in 1964. It is 
included in the version published in "The Year 1920", pp. 241-244. The Soviets must have found the 
idea of exporting revolution on the points of bayonets, which underlay the Warsaw offensive, too 
sensitive to include in the 1964 edition. 
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target of Warsaw. Kamenev and Tukhachevsky aimed to destroy the Poles militarily 
in the field, wiping out their annies. 
For the Soviet strategy to work, Tukhachevsky and Egorov had to cooperate fully, 
having confidence in each other and a belief in the joint strategy. In July however, 
this appeared stretched already. Budennyi had been unhappy at the delay in launching 
the Belorussian offensive, whilst Tukhachevsky conducted reorganisation. On 19th 
July, however, Tukhachevsky informed Kamenev that Ist Cavalry Army was perhaps 
being employed wrongly by Egorov. This was reminiscent of Budennyi complaining 
about Shorin on Caucasian Front. Tukhachevsky stated, 
Before leaving I wanted to share several thoughts with you. Circumstances 
on South-Western Front concern me -I wonder how South-Western Front 
has not tattered Budennyi's army. Budennyi occupies a front of 80-100 
versty that is totally unusual and altogether disadvantageous for the action 
of cavalry. Continuous stubborn battle can break up this mighty cavalry 
force. It seems to me that it would follow immediately to swap some 
infantry units for Budennyi and give the Cavalry Army three-five days 
rest, after that throw it into battle in one sector without specifying 
demarcation lines. Apart from that, learning of the difficulties which the 
cavalry has met in breaking through the German trenches, it would be 
possible to think about a Cavalry Army attack in a south-western direction 
in order to bypass the fortified area, weakly defended by the Poles and 
further to take the flanks of the Poles, similar to Gai's Cavalry Corps. 97 
Kamenev replied that 24th Rifle Division had already swapped with I st Cavalry 
Army and the latter would be used in a south-westem direction without limit of area 
or demarcation lines. 
98 
Whether this decision had anything to do with Tukhachevsky's telegram is 
unclear. If the decision had already been taken, it probably did not. However, because 
I st Cavalry Army was transferred further south to attack south-westwards, this moved 
it away from Western Front towards Lwow area, where it was involved when 
Tukhachevsky demanded its transfer to help Mozyr' Group later. He evidently did not 
have this in mind at this point, but perhaps regretted speaking up about it later. It also 
raises questions about Tukhachevsky's and Egorov's relationship. Egorov would not 
have been impressed to learn that Tukhachevsky was questioning his decision-making 
and this possibly gives some indication of the level of trust Tukhachevsky held in 
Egorov's abilities. Did this effect their cooperation? 
96 DkfKA, Tom III, p. 73, note. 
97 Ibid. doc. 75, pp. 71-72. 
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On 22nd and 23rd July, Kamenev directed the offensive to continue, stressing that 
current circumstances demanded an energetic pursuit towards Warsaw and the final 
defeat of the Poles. The line of Lon-i2a-Brest-Litovsk was to be reached no later than 
4th August and the line of Przasnysz-Novogeorgiewsk and south along the River 
Wisla to Novo-Aleksandrov, including the capture of Warsaw, no later than 12th 
August. Western Front's right flank should not cross the Eastern Prussian border and 
12th Army should advance to the front Kovel'-Wladimir-Wolynski by 4th August, 
protecting Western Front's left flank. Ist Cavalry Anny and 14th Army were to take 
LwOw-Rava-Russkaia by 29th July and the River San crossings at Siniawa-PrzemyS'l 
area. 99 These set the tone for Kamenev's directives over the next few weeks, 
constantly urging swift and energetic action, whilst conditions were ripe to attack. 
By 23rd July, 4th Army had crossed the River Nieman and 3rd and 16th Armies 
had crossed the River Szczara. Tukhachevsky directed the offensive to continue with 
the line Ostrolqnka-Ostrow-Kossow-Droginin-Bela-Wlodava to be reached no later 
than 3rd August. He ordered his reserve, 5th Division, to return to 3rd Army, 
indicating that all forces were to be thrown into the attack again. ' 00 
Kamenev and Tukhachevsky had met in Minsk on 23rd July to discuss operations. 
The former reported to Sklianskii that troop morale was high, the breakthrough of the 
line of the Rivers Nieman and Szczara meant the Poles had no more natural defensive 
lines upon which to hold the Soviets and the operation could be completed within 
three weeks. 10 1 Therefore, the target for defeating the Polish armies was mid-August. 
From 27th July-Ist August, 16th Army and Mozyr' Group advanced on Brest- 
Litovsk. Tukhachevsky directed 16th Army to isolate Brest-Litovsk from Piszczats 
area to the north and Mozyr' Group to isolate it from WIodava area and occupy it, 
whilst 12th Army supported in Kovel' area on the left flank. 102 
Brest-Litovsk was captured on Ist August and the same day Tukhachevsky 
directed Northern Group to encircle and annihilate the Polish forces dug in before the 
River Narew marshes. 4th Army was to press down from the north and 3rd Arrny to 
98 Ibid. p. 740, endnote 14. 
99 DGkKA, doc. 635, pp. 643-644; DkfKA, Tom III, doc. 260, p. 227. 
loo DkfK, 4, Tom III, doc. 76, p. 72. 
101 DGkKA, doc. 636, p. 644. 
102 DkfKA Tom III, docs. 77-78 & 273, pp. 73 & 238. 
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push up from the south, whilst 15th Army continued to move forwards. ' 03 
Tukhachevsky had ordered a double envelopment, which succeeded in forcing the 
River Narew by 3rd August, as the Poles had to retreat again to avoid encirclement. 
South-Western Front's advance was slowing, with Ist Cavalry Army and 14th 
Army encountering fierce resistance in Lwow area. ' 04 However, Kamenev urged both 
Fronts onwards on 30th July, insisting the Poles were on the brink of collapse and 
could sue for peace. He stated that this would only be accepted if they could be sure 
the Poles would not use the breathing-space to rebuild their forces for further action 
and stressed that the Polish forces must be annihilated before any negotiations 
started. 105 This was the typical attitude shown to peace negotiations by both sides 
during the conflict. 
The military offensive was augmented from 2nd August, when Northern Group 
captured the town of Bialystok. The warm welcome for the Red Army from the 
inhabitants of the town and area encouraged the creation of a Polish Revolutionary 
Committee (Polrevkom). This was to oversee the political-agitational side of the 
offensive now that the Soviets were on Polish Soil. 106 It became very influential in 
determining the reaction of the Polish population to the Soviet advance and levels of 
support. The Polrevkom issued a "Manifesto to the Polish Working Peoples of the 
Towns and Countryside" on 30th July and on 3rd August, Lenin instructed Smilga 
and Tukhachevsky to use all measures possible for distributing this, including 
aircraft. 107 This was the beginning of the Polrevkom's agitation offensive and 
illustrates one of the more common uses for aircraft in the Russian Civil War - the 
dropping of political literature. 
With Brest-Litovsk captured, Kamenev directed, "... the administration for all 
armies continuing to move towards the River Wisla, to be in the hands of Western 
Front Conu-nander, ie, transfer in the next few days of 12th and Ist Cavalry Armies 
from South-Western Front to... Western Front Commander. " Tukhachevsky and 
103 Ibid. doc. 79, p. 74. 
104 Ibid. docs. 269 & 272, pp. 235 & 237-238. 
105 DGkK, 4, doc. 638, p. 645 
106 DkfKA, Tom III, doc. 275, p. 239. On 30th July, Egorov reported Western Front had occupied 
Bialystok, suggesting that it was taken the previous day. Members of the Polrevkom included several 
influential Polish Bolsheviks, including J. Marchlewski, F. Dzierzyfiski, Head of the Cheka, F. Kon, E. 
Pr6chniak and I- Unszlicht. Dzierzyfiski and Unszlicht were also members of Western Front R VS from 
9th August- I Oth September 1920 and II th December 1919-12th April 1921 respectively, DkfKA, Tom 
IV, p. 530. 
107 L- Vp, doc. 498, p. 254. 
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Egorov were to ensure the close cooperation of Mozyr' Group and 12th Army, whilst 
Tukhachevsky was to send enough forces to Lublin-Kholm area to help 12th Army 
reach the River Bug. Tukhachevsky was to establish communications with 12th Army 
and I st Cavalry Army, whilst Egorov was to transfer them quickly. 108 Therefore, the 
order for all forces to come under Tukhachevsky's overall command had clearly been 
given on 2nd August. 
Kamenev also instructed Tukhachevsky to transfer two divisions from 12th Army 
to the Wrangel Front to relieve the pressure there. Tukhachevsky insisted this was 
impossible "... in view of strengthening enemy resistance and its constant 
strengthening by units of the volunteer army formed in Warsaw area and also losses 
which have resulted from continuous battles and general tiredness of the troops". 109 
Despite assuming overall conunand, Tukhachevsky had to fight to retain his forces. 
Western Front was still advancing well, but moving further from its supply bases and 
reinforcements each day, whilst the retreating Poles were now within their heartland 
and gaining fresh forces daily. Tukhachevsky did not want to give up any troops, 
indeed he wanted and needed more. 
Fiddick suggests this episode was the beginning of Tukhachevsky's "independent 
actions" which led to the Battle of Warsaw and that he disobeyed direct orders by not 
transferring the divisions. 110 However, this was just another case of Supreme 
Commander and Front Commander haggling over troops, which had occurred on 
every front with every commander, during the Civil War. Nothing unusual stands out 
about this exchange and Kamenev took no action because Tukhachevsky said he 
needed the divisions. Fiddick appears to have viewed events purely from the 
perspective of the Polish campaign without taking into account Red Army leadership 
dynamics. 
South-Westem Front was also struggling by this point, as its advance stuttered at 
Lwow, and Egorov tried to coordinate the Wrangel Front simultaneously. On 2nd 
August, the Politburo decided to split South-Westem Front in two, leaving South- 
Western Front under Egorov to fight Poland and creating South-Eastem Front against 
108 DGkK, 4, doc. 639, p. 646. 
109 Ibid. p. 806, endnote 115. 
110 T. Fiddick, pp. 141-142. 
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Wrangel. "' This sparked some debate between Lenin and Stalin, with the latter 
disputing the decision. ' 12 The Front did not split until September when Frunze 
became Southern Front Commander, 113 but this was too late to allow Egorov to 
concentrate on Poland. Vital time and resources were diverted to the Wrangel Front 
which could have been used against Poland. 
Meanwhile, Tukhachevsky ordered Western Front to press on. With Polish 
reinforcements being introduced against Northern Group's right flank, on 3rd and 4th 
August Tukhachevsky directed 4th Army to attack north of the River Narew with at 
least three rifle divisions and 3rd Army to attack north of the River Bug with its main 
forces. Pushing the armies north-eastwards would take on the stronger Polish sector 
and with Mozyr' group attacking westwards to assist 12th Army, Western Front was 
to reach the line Przasnysz-Wyszkow-Siedlce-Parczew, no later than 8th August. 1' 4 
Tukhachevsky was expecting 12th Army to continue advancing westwards and I st 
Cavalry Army to move north-westwards to aid Western Front's left flank, but on 3rd 
August, Kamenev advised Egorov to direct 12th Army to Wladimir-Wolynski area 
north of Lwow to help lst Cavalry Army, which was involved in heavy fighting. 
Therefore, on 4th and 7th August, whilst instructing 12th Army and lst Cavalry Army 
to establish communications with Mozyr' Group, Egorov directed 12th Army to attack 
Wladimir-Wolynski area and then southwards to Kholm, Rava-Russkaia and 
Tomashov. This meant 12th Army was moving away from Mozyr' Group and not 
covering its left flank. Ist Cavalry Army was to be withdrawn into reserve and 
regroup for transfer to Western Front, once 12th Army relieved it, and 14th Army was 
to transfer northwards with it, but this all delayed Tukhachevsky receiving any forces 
to guard the weak left flank. ' 15 
Egorov was complying with Kamenev's directives at this point, but was in the 
difficult position of trying to transfer troops which were engaged in combat. Ist 
Cavalry Army was the formation which Tukhachevsky wanted on his left flank as this 
would have given him a cavalry force on each wing, but for this, 12th Army had to 
1" This had previously been undertaken by South-Western Front's 13th Army and Caucasian Front 
under Gittis in Kuban. 
112 L-Vp, docs. 496-497, pp. 252-253. 
113 DkJKA, Tom IV, p. 533. Frunze oversaw the final defeat of Wrangel from 21 st September- I Oth 
December 1920. 
'" DkfKA, Tom III, docs. 81-82, pp. 75-76. 
115 DGkKA, docs. 701 & 640, pp. 707 & 647; DkfKA, Tom III, docs. 284-285 & 289-290, pp. 245-246 
& 248-249. 
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swap with I st Cavalry Army, moving away from Mozyr' Group, leaving an uncovered 
gap. 
Moscow's concern at South-Western Front's faltering progress was shown on 4th 
August when Lenin asked Stalin why Budennyi was "hesitating". Stalin reported that 
the Polish Lithuanian, Lutsk and Galician Groups had attacked in Brody area, 
preventing Ist Cavalry Army moving on Lwow, and the latter was fatigued and in 
need of rest. ' 16 
Another problem associated with the transfers was the providing and setting-up of 
sufficient communications. On 7th August, Tukhachevsky informed Kamenev that he 
would need help to organise the rear and communications for the three South-Western 
Front armies transferring to Western Front. He asked for a supply base to be 
established and for the three armies not to be stripped of depot battalions and 
communications resources upon leaving South-Western Front jurisdiction, especially 
telegraph construction and work companies. An operational Point would be needed in 
South-Western Front area to provide communications until direct links with 
Tukhachevsky in Minsk could be established, which could take ten to fourteen days. 
Therefore, Tukhachevsky expected Egorov to send all communications resources with 
the armies. The lengthening of supply lines is also shown by Tukhachevsky asking for 
South-Western Front to provide equipment until it could be brought from the depots 
to the intermediate bases. " 7 
The next day, Kamenev agreed to these conditions, but said an entire operational 
group might be better than an operational point, interestingly conu-nenting that he 
wished Frunze could have reached the area quickly enough to lead this, but not 
indicating he wanted Frunze to replace Tukhachevsky, as Fiddick suggests. 118 He 
instructed Tukhachevsky to pick a group leader from his army commanders. 
However, Egorov stated that it would be impossible for him to provide all these 
communication resources. He needed them for the remainder of South-Western Front 
against Wrangel and did not have the apparatus to set up an operational point, but 
agreed that each army must retain its reserve units and apparatus and South-Western 
Front could be an intermediary point for armies transferring from the centre. 119 
116 L-Vp, doc. 499, pp. 254 & 368, endnote 303. 
117 DkfKA Tom III, doc. 83, pp. 76-77. 
118 T. Fiddick, p. 207. 
119 DGkKA, doc. 642, pp. 648-649; DkfKA, Toin III, doc. 292, p. 250. 
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Insufficient communications was a problem, especially since Tukhachevsky 
would not have the ten to fourteen days necessary for proper organisation, even if all 
resources were available immediately. Communications failures were to contribute to 
the Soviet defeat. 
To compound this, renewed offensive action by Wrangel into South-Western 
Front's underbelly forced Kamenev to cancel the transfer of units from Caucasian 
Front, cutting reinforcements available for Western Front later. 120 
With these problems mounting, Kamenev and Tukhachevsky disagreed over the 
latter's direction of attack. Tukhachevsky ordered 15th An-ny to advance north- 
westwards, moving north of the River Bug along with 3rd and 4th Armies, to create a 
strong right-wing group to envelop the Polish forces behind the Bug, before Warsaw. 
This placed only 16th Army on the east bank of the Bug and Mozyr' Group on its left. 
Tukhachevsky was acting further against the Polish reinforcements he had said were 
being introduced against the right flank and calculating on help from South-Western 
Front's forces, but on 6th and 8th August Kamenev pointed out that 16th Army could 
not depend on help from 12th Army because of the latter's forced move towards 
Wladimir-Wolynskii-Tomashov area. He continued that Tukhachevsky's grouping for 
crossing the Bug was incorrect and wondered if Tukhachevsky had considered how 
serious an obstacle it posed with the Poles dug in behind it. He stressed the taking of 
the Bug was more important than the right wing achieving an even deeper and longer 
envelopment and warned that the concentration of Northern Group north of the Bug 
endangered 16th Army to a similar fate as during the first Minsk Operation, when it 
gained the bridgehead over the Beresina, but couldn't hold it through lack of support. 
He recommended that 3rd Army helped 16th Army, in Siedlce area and that 
Tukhachevsky should bear in mind that 16th Army advancing under his current 
demarcation lines, would come up against Ivangorod fortress. He also disagreed with 
Tukhachevsky's notion that the transfer of the South-Western Front armies would 
produce more decisive action and better results, as he did not believe South-Western 
Front had held Tukhachevsky up or lagged behind his line, which had not acted 
decisively enough anyway. 121 
120 DGkK, 4, doc. 758, pp. 748-749. 
121 Ibid. docs. 641-642, pp. 647-649. 
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Kamenev had doubts over Tukhachevsky's tactics and felt he should concentrate 
on moving his own forces, instead of complaining about South-Western Front's 
progress. However, Tukhachevsky did not heed Kamenev's advice. In final 
discussions on 10th August, he informed Kamenev that between 3rd and 9th August 
the Poles had increased their troops from 50,000 to an estimated 70,000, but had 
grouped most of them in the north, transferring them away from South-Western Front. 
He reported he had decided to group 16th Army further north, as he did not want to 
cross the Wisla with two attack groups, meaning that he had acted contrary to 
Kamenev's advice. The four Western Front armies were now attacking north of 
Warsaw, with 16th Army acting alone, whilst the other three swept round to envelop 
from the right. Mozyr' Group was acting on the left flank in a very isolated position, 
but 58th Division was transferred to it. 
Kamenev reiterated his warning about leaving 16th Army to face 70,000 Polish 
troops alone and that no help would be forthcoming from South-Western Front, as 
Polish forces remained there. He stated that a quick rout over the Bug would be better 
than a long manoeuvre, was worried about 16th Army's exposure and did not agree 
that Polish forces had transferred northwards. However, Tukhachevsky insisted that 
the main Polish forces, up to 40,000 troops, were north of the Bug, with captured 
prisoners confirming this. Kamenev said he felt more inclined to believe the Poles had 
retreated behind the Bug because of the overhanging Western Front right flank, but 
concluded that, since Tukhachevsky was so categorically insistent on this point and 
had more detailed knowledge, although he could not agree with this from infon-nation 
he had at Western Front HQ in Smolensk, Kamenev would give Tukhachevsky 
freedom of action. Kamenev still instructed Tukhachevsky to quickly rout the Poles, 
wiping out their main forces, but said he was not keen on the depth of Tukhachevsky's 
strategy, since it introduced the danger that there would be insufficient time to employ 
it. 122 
Therefore, Kamenev expressed severe doubts over Tukhachevsky's tactics, but 
eventually gave him freedom of action, as he had done in the past, trusting his 
commander on-the-spot. Kamenev anticipated correctly where the Polish counter- 
attack would be made, but was willing to trust Tukhachevsky, as he had done in the 
past with great success. The offensive had to continue swiftly to have any chance of 
122 Ibid. docs. 643-644, pp. 649-652. 
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success and on 7th August Lenin urged it on, commenting that peace talks continued 
in London and a Polish delegation was travelling to Russia, but the military offensive 
was the key factor. He noted "Altogether, much depends already on Warsaw and its 
fate". 123 Clearly worried however, he contacted Smilga, Dzierzyn'ski and Marchlewski 
on 9th August to find out the mood of the Polish peasantry and Warsaw workers. ' 24 
To influence peace negotiations the offensive had to proceed quickly, but the Polish 
population they were advancing to liberate had to support the Red Army. The 
possibility of the bourgeois and landowning Poles creating nationalist resistance 
concerned the Soviet leadership, as did possible intervention by the Entente. The 
Baltic, Black and Azov Sea Fleets were put on full alert on 8th and 9th August in case 
of Entente naval intervention. 125 
Genuine fears existed over foreign intervention and Kamenev informed 
Tukhachevsky that the Entente were reportedly supporting Poland, with British ships 
en route to Riga to intervene through Latvia and Lithuania; France by rail through 
Germany; and Italy through Austria, Czechoslovakia and Rumania .1 
26 
Therefore, despite mounting problems, the need to seize the opportunity offered 
demanded the offensive continue without respite. On 10th August, Tukhachevsky 
ordered the final assault on Warsaw. 4th Army, holding the right flank, was to occupy 
lab lonov-Graudents-Tom area, whilst crossing the Wisla with the main part of its 
forces no later than 15th August in Vlotslavsk-Dobrzhin area. 15th and 3rd Armies 
were to cross the Wisla no later than 15th August, with the latter advancing from 
Zalubitse area, to attack Praga area and push the Poles from Warsaw, which would be 
retreating before 16th Army. 16th Army was to cross the River Wisla with its main 
forces north of Warsaw on 14th August. Mozyr' Group was to take Kozenitsy- 
Ivangorod area on 14th August. Tukhachevsky concluded by emphasising that 
political circumstances demanded the immediate rout of the Polish forces. ' 27 
On Ist August, Western Front forces numbered 117,280 frontline troops, although 
Tukhachevsky estimated active troop numbers to be as low as 46,279 infantry and 
6,484 cavalry with 31,502 in Northern Group, 10,584 in 16th Army and only 4,193 in 
123 L-Vp, doc. 502, p. 255; DkJKA, Tom III, doc. 288, p. 247; The Polish peace delegation passed 
through the Soviet lines on I Oth August, en route to Minsk, L- Vp, doc. 504, p. 256. 
12' L- Vp, doc. 503, pp. 255-256; DkfKA, Tom III, doc. 85, p. 78. 
125 DkfKA, Tom III, docs. 84 & 29 1, pp. 77-78 & 249. 
126 DGkL4, pp. 806-807, endnote 117. 
127 DkfKA, Toni III, doc. 86, pp. 78-79. 
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Mozyr' Group. On 25th August, Polish forces numbered 123,320 infantry and 18,830 
cavalry, but Tukhachevsky's estimate is 45,400 infantry and 5,855 cavalry with 
29,600 in the north and 15,800 south of the Bug. Pilsudski estimated the figures to be 
130,000-150,000 Soviets and 120,000-180,000 Poles. 128 The Soviet and Polish figures 
are fairly comparable and probably do provide a good indication of the total effectives 
of both sides. Tukhachevsky based his figures on troops involved in the actual 
frontline battles, with those too far away to influence the fighting, ie. reserves, not 
included. In all three sets of figures the Soviets and Poles are quite evenly matched. 
The crucial factor behind the numbers was where the troops of each side were 
concentrated. Whilst Tukhachevsky had concentrated most of his forces in the right- 
wing attack group, the majority of Polish troops were not in the northern sector as he 
had thought, but behind the Bug, south of Warsaw, where Kamenev had predicted the 
counter-attack would come. 
By I Ith August, the second day of the attack, Kamenev was expressing concern at 
apparent Polish strength in the southern sector. He reported that 12th Army and Ist 
Cavalry Army were heading south to attack Lwow, but, since Tukhachevsky had 
turned his forces northwards, 12th Army and Ist Cavalry Army would have to go 
northwards to prevent a thinning of forces in the centre. Intelligence had revealed that 
the Poles were not generally retreating behind the Wisla, therefore Kamenev 
recommended Tukhachevsky take the whole 12th Army for the left wing, not just 
58th Division. Tukhachevsky agreed it was essential to move Ist Cavalry Army and 
12th Army north, as the Poles were resisting between the Bug and Narew and daily 
launching counter-attacks. He had communications with 12th Army, but contact was 
more erratic with Ist Cavalry Army, although he hoped to have more reliable morse 
communication by 12th August. In the north, 3rd Kavkor had taken Mlava and 
Ciekanow by 9th August, 4th Army had taken Makov and 3rd and 15th Armies were 
fighting on the railway and road to WyshkOw. 129 
Wyshkow fell on 12th August and Western Front was advancing despite stiff 
resistance, but with 12th Army and Ist Cavalry Army attacking Lwow and not 
transferring northwards, the left wing was perilously weak. 
128 DkJKA, Tom IV, pp. 180-181 & 52 1; M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pokhod za Vislu", pp. 150-15 1; J. 
Pilsudski, The Year 1920, p. 52. 
129DkfKA, Toni III, doc. 87, pp. 79-80. 
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Kamenev directed Egorov on I lth and 12th August to break off the Lwow attack 
and move 12th Army to Lublin area to aid Mozyr' Group, which was attacking from 
Kotsk to Ivangorod on 14th August. Ist Cavalry Army was to move to Zamos'c'- 
Tomashow-Grubeshow area to aid Tukhachevsky's left flank, and both annies were to 
transfer to Tukhachevsky's command on 13th and 15th August respectively. ' 30 
However, when Tukhachevsky contacted Kamenev by Hughes Telegraph at 00.25 
hours on 13th August, Kamenev reported that Egorov had ordered 12th Army to 
attack Rava-Russkaia, the complete opposite of Kamenev's order. He thought that a 
misunderstanding must have occurred, but this complicated the transfer. He also 
related a request by Egorov to retain 6th Cavalry Division of Ist Cavalry Army for 
use against Wrangel, but agreed with Tukhachevsky that I st Cavalry Army needed to 
remain intact for immediate use without reorganisational work. Tukhachevsky urged 
Kamenev to get Egorov to fulfill his duty to the Soviet offensive, saying that he could 
send Ermolin down to oversee it, if Petin would not interfere, and demanded that Ist 
Cavalry Army and 12th Army be transferred immediately and intact with 
equipment. 131 
It appears that Tukhachevsky felt that South-Western Front may have deliberately 
not fulfilled its orders and the request to retain a division of Ist Cavalry Army 
probably increased his suspicion that they did not want to transfer it and were stalling. 
On 13th August, Kamenev again directed Egorov to transfer 12th Army and Ist 
Cavalry Army fully-equipped at 12.00 hours on 14th August. 132 However, Egorov 
replied the same day, reporting that orders No. 4738/op 1041/sh and No. 4752/op 
1044/sh had only just been received and decoded, and stating the reasons for the 
lateness had been discovered. 133 These were Kamenev's directives from II th August 
to redirect and transfer 12th Army and Ist Cavalry Army and for 12th Army to aid 
Mozyr' Group. The delay meant that Egorov only read the directives on the day he 
was supposed to transfer 12th Army. Egorov continued in his report that he had 
dispatched 12th Army's left wing to help Mozyr' Group, but South-Western Front 
130 DGkK, 4, doc. 705 -706, pp. 709-7 10. 
131 lbid, doc. 645, pp. 652-654, Egorov ordered I st Cavalry Army to attack Rava-Russkaia and 
requested the retention of 6th Cavalry Division on 12th August. Karnenev turned down this request 
one hour after the discussion with Tukhachevsky, DkJKA, Tom III, docs. 295-296, pp. 251-252; 
DGkKA, doc 708, p. 711; Fonner Tsarist Colonel Nikolai Nikolaevich Petin (1876-1937) was Chief- 
of-Staff of South-Western Front. 
132 DGkKA, doc. 709, pp. 711-712. 
133 DkfK, 4, Tom III, doc. 298, p. 253. 
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forces were engaged in their original task to take Lwow and he thought it impossible 
to stop this and transfer them. However, the delay only partially explains why Egorov 
ordered South-Western Front to attack Lwow instead of subordinating it to 
Tukhachevsky. It does not excuse it because Kamenev had ordered the transfer to 
happen back on 2nd August. It was a costly and critical error for Tukhachevsky's 
offensive plan. Although Egorov reported that he knew why the orders had arrived 
late, this is not expanded upon. Therefore, what caused it? Poor communications? 
Telegraph operators? The answer to this is unknown, but would help clear up the 
puzzle. 
Egorov wrote another directive, relaying Kamenev's instructions to 12th Army 
and I st Cavalry Army to transfer to Western Front at 12.00 hours on 14th August, but 
it was not counter-signed by his political commissar R. 1. Berzin until early on 14th 
August and sent at 04.00 hours, giving little time for either arrny to withdraw and 
comp Y. 
134 
It emerged in a Hughes Telegraph conversation with Kamenev on 14th August 
that Stalin had refused to sign the order. Berzin had also refused, explaining that he 
was subordinate to Stalin and had already submitted a report to Trotsky and Sklianskii 
on the matter. Kamenev replied in some disbelief that he did not know why they 
could not fulfill the order, as it had been decided long before that command of South- 
Western Front would transfer to Tukhachevsky. Egorov then read a note from Stalin 
to Kamenev in which Stalin said that Kamenev's order could have been fulfilled on 
II th August, when I st Cavalry Army was in reserve, but it was now involved in battle 
at Lwow and could not conduct another regrouping to transfer to Western Front, so 
Stalin had refused to sign the order. 135 
Therefore, Ist Cavalry Army had been withdrawn into reserve and could have 
moved north, but the delay in receiving and decoding the orders saw it sent back to 
Lwow and made a transfer virtually impossible. 
Tukhachevsky and Kamenev discussed all this by Hughes Telegraph on 15th 
August and the former agreed to reinforce 12th Army, which had been pushed behind 
the Bug and lost Grubeshow, with 1,500-2,000 men and then 58th Division. 
Tukhachevsky then directed the South-Western Front forces on their tasks for shoring 
131 Ibid. doc. 299, p. 254. 
135 Ibid. doc. 300, pp. 255-256. 
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up Western Front's left flank. 12th Army and Mozyr' Group were to attack the Polish 
Group at Siedlce-Krasnostaw-Kholm from the north and south respectively. He 
ordered 45th and 47th Divisions to swap with I st Cavalry Army, which was to move 
to Ustilug-Wladimir-Wolynski, and 14th Army was to extend its right flank to the 
demarcation line between Western and South-Western Fronts at Dubno-Toporow. 136 
However, in a Hughes Telegraph conversation on the night of 17th August, 
Kamenev infon-ned Tukhachevsky that these directives were invalid as only he had 
signed them, without an RVS member's counter- signature. Tukhachevsky disputed 
this, but Kamenev countered that he had received a note from Minin which said it was 
only signed by Tukhachevsky. 137 However, Unszlicht wrote to Lebedev, explaining 
the directives had been signed by Tukhachevsky, the Chief-of-Staff and an RVS 
member, but the copy sent to Ist Cavalry Army by automatic telegraph machine had 
only one signature. Therefore, communications had broken down again, which further 
delayed the movement of I st Cavalry Army to support the left flank. 
12th Army and Ist Cavalry Army were finally subordinated to Tukhachevsky at 
12.00 hours on 17th August and 14th Army was to follow. Tukhachevsky was 
eventually being forced to transfer two of his own infantry divisions, 45th and 47th, to 
swap with Ist Cavalry Army and attack Lwow. 138 However, this had been a long and 
protracted affair which could have been completed earlier by the original plan. A 
combination of confused and delayed dispatches and possibly disagreements amongst 
the Red Army frontline hierarchy over how the war should be fought, combined with 
stiff resistance from the small Polish force remaining before Lwow, to prolong the 
issue. However, as was constantly stressed by Kamenev, Tukhachevsky and Egorov 
in their orders, speed was essential for the Soviet continuous offensive, as political 
and military conditions fluctuated, but turned more and more towards Poland as time 
wore on. The delay in completing the transfers was disastrous for the Soviet 
offensive. 
136 DGkKA, docs. 648-649, pp. 655-657; DkfK, 4, Tom III, docs. 90-91, pp. 81-82. 
137 DGkK, 4, doc. 650, pp. 657-59 & 807, endnote 119. 
138 Ibid. doc. 7 10, p. 712; DkfKA, Tom III, doc. 30 1, p. 256. Iona Enunanuilovich Iakir (1896-1937) 
was to lead the attack on Lw6w. 
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Pilsudski's Counter-Offensive and Tukhachevsk-y's Retreat 
Pilsudski launched a massive counter-offensive on the night of 16th-17th August. 
Secretly regrouping five divisions into an attack group behind the Wisla, south-east of 
Warsaw, he struck through the weak Mozyr' Group sector, sweeping aside the few 
thousand Soviet troops and striking northwards behind 16th Army and Northern 
Group, to attempt an encirclement of Western Front. Simultaneously, a Polish attack 
was launched in the north, driving a wedge between 15th and 4th Armies. The attack 
was a complete surprise to Tukhachevsky, who believed the Polish forces to be 
crumbling and retreating behind the Wisla, with their main forces still in the northern 
sector, about to be enveloped by Northern Group. 139 
Kamenev urged Tukhachevsky to press on with the north to south right wing 
attack, since an envelopment of the Polish left flank may still have thrown the Polish 
forces off balance and saved the day. However, the overstretched Red 
communications collapsed under Pilsudski's northward thrust. 16th Army had been 
reorienting its position southwards to cover the left flank when the attack occurred 
and Sollogub lost contact with his frontline troops. No report came from the swamped 
Mozyr' Group. Therefore, Tukhachevsky did not actually learn of the counter-attack 
until 18th August, by which time the Poles were advancing across the front. 
Communications were also lost with 4th Army and 3rd Kavkor. West of Warsaw and 
attempting to cross the River Wkra, they were completely cut off. Tukhachevsky 
ordered them to strike southwards, but with no communications established until 19th 
August, this did not occur and by this date, the Polish advance prevented their retreat. 
Communications were also lost with Ist Cavalry Army, which was still attacking 
Lwow on 19th August, and the left flank received no help. 140 
On 20th August, Tukhachevsky ordered 16th, 3rd, 4th and 15th Armies to retreat 
behind the Rivers Bobr and Narew to stabilise the line and put Kork in command of 
coordinating the latter three armies in case of further communications loss. However, 
4th Army and 3rd Kavkor, with their path of retreat blocked by the completed Polish 
encirclement, despite fighting their way back to Augustow by 25th August, could not 
cut their way out, and were forced over the Prussian border into internment. 3rd and 
139 DGkKA, doc. 654, p. 662; DkJKA, Tom III, doc. 92, pp. 82-83. 
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15th Armies, fighting fierce rearguard battles to buy time for their isolated comrades, 
lost half their number. 16th Army, overwhelmed by the Polish right-wing attack, also 
suffered terrible losses and Mozyr' Group ceased to exist as an operational formation. 
Its remnants were combined with the remnants of 4th Army and 3rd Kavkor on 30th 
August. 141 Soviet losses are evident in troop numbers recorded for 22nd August-15th 
September. 3rd, 4th, 15th and 16th Armies in total numbered 72,402, a drop of some 
45,000 from early August, the majority of whom must be considered casualties. On 
22nd September, Lenin actually said 100,000 troops had been lost, taken prisoner or 
were interned in Prussia, meaning new recruits probably comprised the majority of 
Western Front's forces by mid-September. The Red Army suffered staggering 
losses. 142 
Pilsudski's counter-manoeuvre bore a striking resemblance to that planned and 
conducted by Kamenev, Frunze and Tukhachevsky at Buguruslan in 1919, when the 
Buzuluk attack group had struck from south to north behind Khanzhin's Western 
Army. However, Pilsudski's superior numbers ensured his manoeuvre was more 
successful, completing part of its encirclement. Tukhachevsky in hindsight must have 
admired the manoeuvre. It was the epitome of everything he had been practising and 
preaching for the previous two years. 
However, the Polish operation overall is more comparable to Western Army's 
Petropavlovsk counter-offensive in September 1919. The Polish attack started from 
the Wisla, as Kolchak's began at the Ishim. The Poles were able to counter-attack into 
Tukhachevsky's weak left flank because South-Western Front's advance had not kept 
pace and exposed it, just as I st Army of Turkestan Front had not matched 5th Army's 
advance to Petropavlovsk, exposing 5th Army's right flank to the Siberian Cossack 
counter-attack. However, Tukhachevsky had made the very mistake for which he had 
criticised 01'derogge. Whilst 01'derogge had concentrated 5th Army's forces on the 
left flank, leaving the exposed right flank undermanned and ripe for a flanking 
counter-manoeuvre, Tukhachevsky massed his troops on the right flank at Warsaw 
and left the exposed left flank with only a few thousand troops. Finally, the most 
striking resemblance was the Polish counter-attack pushing Western Front almost 
140 DGkKA, doc. 653, pp. 660-66 1; DkfKA, Tom III, doc. 100 & 308, pp. 87-88 & 261-262; A N. 
Tukhachevsky, "Pokhod za Vislu", p. 163. 
'1 Dk)X4, Tom III, docs. 10 1- 102 & 109, pp. 88-89 & 93-94; DGkKA, p. 807, endnote 120. 
142 DkJKA, Toni 11 "1 PP. 186-187; A. Richardson, p. 147. 
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back to its starting positions of early July around Minsk, as Kolchak had pushed 5th 
Army back to the Tobol. 
Kamenev and Tukhachevsky tried to steady the retreat, with a defensive line 
envisaged along the River Nieman, but by 23rd August, the retreat was in danger of 
turning into a rout and Kamenev ordered Tukhachevsky and the army commanders to 
get it under control, as troops fled without resisting. 143 It seems likely blocking 
battalions and Cheka would have been over-employed at this point, trying to slow the 
retreat. 
From late August until 18th October, when the armistice was signed between the 
Soviet Republic and Poland, Tukhachevsky returned once more to reorganisational 
work under fire, attempting to form defensive lines to hold the Polish advance, whilst 
regrouping for a renewed offensive. A defensive line was attempted behind the 
Nieman. Reinforcements eventually arrived through the ruined transport network, as 
the retreating Soviet frontline moved closer to its bases. Divisional strength was 
raised to around 6,000 by 15th September and communists drafted in to restore the 
hardcore of units, stiffened morale, although supply shortages almost led to 
mutinies. 144 
Whilst trying to stabilise and reorganise Western Front, Tukhachevsky typically 
attempted to attack with 12th and 14th Armies and I st Cavalry Army, to relieve the 
northern situation. Fighting still raged around Lwow until late August and on 28th 
August, Tukhachevsky ordered I st Cavalry Army, at last withdrawn from Lwow, to 
attack north-west to Zamos'c', to reach Lublin and aid the retreating northern annies. 
This was the manoeuvre Tukhachevsky had envisaged for two weeks before, but now 
I st Cavalry Army marched into a Polish trap. Engaging vastly numerically superior 
Polish forces at Zamos'c' and Komorowo on 31 st August, Budennyi was forced to cut 
his way out to avoid encirclement by a Polish concentric offensive. 6th Cavalry 
Division alone had faced 13 Polish divisions and, unsurprisingly, the losses suffered 
in these engagements forced I st Cavalry Army into retreat, diminishing its 
effectiveness as a force. 145 
The Poles launched a general offensive in the southern sector after this and 
advanced across the whole of Western Front. However, on 2nd September, the RVSR 
143 DkJY, 4, Tom III, doc. 105, p. 9 1; DGkKA, doc. 665, p. 663. 
"' DkfKA, Tom III, docs. 113 & 115, pp. 96-98 & 99-102. 
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instructed Tukhachevsky to forrn an attack group to renew the offensive in the 
northern sector. Conducting reorganisation and regrouping, Tukhachevsky was 
planning to attack in late September/early October. However, it was Poland's turn to 
pre-empt the Soviet attack this time. With peace talks beginning in Riga on 21st 
September, the Poles wished to increase their bargaining position and launched the 
Battle of the Nieman, pushing the Soviets back from their defensive line in late 
September. 146 
Further efforts to hold the Polish advance at the German trench lines and the River 
Sczara collapsed when the Lithuanian Army fell back on the right flank, exposing 
Western Front to a flank envelopment once more and forcing retreat. By mid-October, 
with the armistice about to be signed, Tukhachevsky was holding a line before the 
River Beresina after abandoning Minsk on 15th October. 147 The town was regained 
with the armistice, but Tukhachevsky had been almost pushed back to his starting 
positions for the July Igumen-Minsk Operation, just as he had been pushed back 
behind the Tobol from Petropavlovsk. However, the comparison to Civil War 
operations ended here as, although plans for a renewed offensive were made, despite 
the armistice, Tukhachevsky never launched another offensive towards Warsaw to 
retake the lost territory. He had been able to learn from defeat previously to turn it 
into attack, but not on this occasion. Therefore, why had the Polish campaign turned 
out so differently from previous Civil War fronts? 
Causes of Defeat 
In Pokhod za Vislu, Tukhachevsky made several criticisms regarding the conduct 
of the Polish campaign. He slammed the terrible mobilisation. and training of 
Vserosglavshtab, which necessitated mobilisation in frontline areas. 148 This echoed 
the criticism he made of the recruitment apparatus in his May 1918 report. The central 
system had not improved and it has been shown how Tukhachevsky had to constantly 
mobilise men. This necessity found its way into his military thinking - the ability of 
the Red Army to mobilise on the move. 
145 Ibid. docs. 112-113,115 & 311, pp. 96-98,99-102 & 263. 
146 DGkKA, docs. 657,662-664, pp. 664-665,668-670; DkfKA, Tom III, docs. 126,128-131 & 134, pp. 
109-110,110-112 & 114. 
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He also criticised the general staff for gathering inaccurate information on Polish 
troop placements before Pilsudski's counter-offensive. The general staff believed that 
Polish forces were still positioned against South-Western Front, but they had actually 
been transferred northwards. However, Tukhachevsky did not have too much cause 
for complaint here. As has been shown, he argued with Kamenev over the Polish 
positions and was also mistaken in his belief that most of the Polish forces were 
facing Northern Group, when they were actually before the Wisla, waiting to sweep 
northwards through Mozyr'Group, as Kamenev suggested. 
Tukhachevsky also highlighted the poor state of communications, which did 
indeed influence the battle in several ways. The problems with the telegraph network 
and loss of communications with several of the annies has been illustrated. 
Tukhachevsky also mentioned a lack of signalling apparatus. He recalled that the July 
offensive was the first occasion the Red Army attempted the use of operational 
centres and signalling units at the front along an organised plan, but the shortages 
affected the operation's success. Similarly, at Warsaw, communications were affected 
by signalling apparatus shortages, which made coordination of Western and South- 
Western Fronts impossible at the crucial point. 149 Interestingly, when retreating in 
September, Tukhachevsky mentioned radios, suggesting Western Front was 
experimenting with field radio usage. ' 50 Communications were a major problem and 
the stretching of operational lines, as the Soviets advanced further from their bases, 
exacerbated the problems. 
Tukhachevsky specifically mentions 4th Army losing communications, but is also 
critical of 4th Army Commander for not acting independently to attack southwards, 
behind the northern Polish group. Sergeev was replaced by Shuvaev on 31 st July and 
it is the latter Tukhachevsky criticised for inaction and poor leadership overall. It is 
unclear why Shuvaev assumed command and Sergeev himself did not mention it in 
his book. Shuvaev was an ex-Tsarist Lieutenant Colonel, and being an older 
voenspetsy, perhaps did not come up to Tukhachevsky's standards like Gittis et al .1 
51 
However, the major reason Tukhachevsky saw for the failure at Warsaw was the 
delay by South-Western Front to despatch Ist Cavalry Army north-westwards to 
148 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pokhod za Vislu", pp. 122 & 126. 
149 lbid, pp. 128 & 153. 
150 DkfKA, Tom III, doc. 14 1, pp. 119-120. 
15 1 DkfK, 4, Toin IV, p. 740, endnote 19. 
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guard his left flank. He criticised South-Western Front's concentration on a task of 
"local importance", capturing the Galician capital of Lwow, and compared Egorov's 
and Stalin's actions to those of Rennenkampf in 1914, when he failed to assist 
Samsonov, resulting in the latter's defeat by Ludendorff 152 
The fact that Tukhachevsky publicly drew this conclusion has led to suggestions 
Stalin purged him in 1937 because he had a long memory, bore grudges and 
eventually repaid Tukhachevsky's allegation. On 19th August 1920, after discovering 
that the Polish counter-offensive had cut through his weak left flank, Tukhachevsky 
had immediately criticised Budennyi for his lateness, whilst admitting surprise at the 
direction of the Polish attack. The day before, Kamenev informed Egorov that his 
delay in fulfilling the I Ith and 12th August orders had proved costly for Western 
Front. 1 53 Therefore, anger towards South-Westem Front's actions was vented as the 
events occurred, but perhaps became more public with Tukhachevsky's lectures. I 
shall talk more about the liklihood of this being connected to Tukhachevsky's 
execution in my conclusion, but for now shall examine the accuracy of 
Tukhachevsky's suggestion, the fact he accepted no blame personally and the 
accuracy of other accounts. 
As the sources show, I st Cavalry Army was not supporting Mozyr' Group when 
the Polish counter-offensive occurred. Problems with communications could be 
blamed for this, but it seems to have been the case that all the problems, where orders 
concerning the transfers were concerned, were at South-Western Front's end. Egorov 
had the delay in decoding the II th and 12th August orders and Tukhachevsky's 
counter-signed 15th August order managed to reach Egorov with only 
Tukhachevsky's signature on it. Egorov also wanted to retain at least part of Ist 
Cavalry Army, which adds fuel to the possibility he stalled on the transfer. On top of 
this, Stalin refused to obey a direct order from Kamenev, taking it upon himself to 
decide that Ist Cavalry Army should not be transferred because it was fighting at 
Lwow. Trotsky later blamed Stalin for his part, agreeing with Tukhachevsky on the 
former's wish to gain the prize of Lwow. Lenin's assessment of South-Western Front's 
actions was, "Ach, who would go to Warsaw via Lwow? ". 
152 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pokhod za Vislu", pp. 153-154. 
153 DGkKA, doc. 654, p. 662-, DkfKA, Tom III, doc. 304, pp. 258-259. 
305 
An air of suspicion does hang around the delayed or mis-signed orders, but South- 
Western Front was only attacking Lwow because Kamenev had previously ordered it 
on 23rd July. I st Cavalry Army and 14th Army were to capture the town and Rava- 
Russkaia by 29th July, but the attack became bogged down because of stiff Polish 
resistance. This led South-Western Front to be two weeks behind schedule by mid- 
August, as they were still fighting in this area when Tukhachevsky had reached 
Warsaw. However, if obeying orders thus far, Egorov seemed to do little to comply 
with Kamenev's 2nd August order to subordinate his command to Tukhachevsky and 
transfer his forces northwards. If measures had been taken from this date to swap 
infantry divisions for I st Cavalry Army, the latter could have been transferred in time. 
The fact that this did not occur, even for ten days before the telegram fiasco began, 
suggests a reluctance to subordinate command. Perhaps dislike of Tukhachevsky's 
superior position lay at the root of South-Western Front's actions rather than a wish to 
take Lwow. Either way, South-Western Front RVS must take a share of the blame, 
although Budennyi and his fellow army commanders may be exempt from it. 
In Egorov's defence, he did also have to direct 13th Army against Wrangel and 
screen the Bessarabian border against possible Rumanian incursions. The severity of 
the Wrangel Front is demonstrated by Moscow prioritising it again on 19th August, 
even whilst Tukhachevsky was trying to extricate his forces from the Polish 
encirclement. 154 
Hostilities on the Wrangel Front also affected Tukhachevsky, as reinforcements 
intended for Western Front were re-routed to the Caucasus in August, when Wrangel 
attacked at the height of the Battle of Warsaw. This meant that Tukhachevsky had less 
men than he could otherwise have done at Warsaw and also did not receive 
reinforcements whilst retreating, necessitating local mobilisations once more. 
Tukhachevsky did not criticise Kamenev, but the latter has been criticised for his 
role in the offensive, with Davies claiming that he was "chiefly responsible" and did 
not lead the offensive firmly enough. 
155 However, the offensive had progressed 
virtually to plan until early August. Criticism of the Soviet offensive claims Western 
and South-Westem Fronts advanced independently of each other, with Tukhachevsky 
and Egorov even being able to wage their own private wars in their respective 
154 L- Vp, pp. 3 69-3 70, note 3 10. 
155N. Davies, White Eagle, Red Star: the Polish-Soviet War, 1919-1920. (London, 1972), p. 219. 
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theatres. However, the sources show that the two Fronts, although separated 
geographically and with separate objectives within their own areas, were coordinated 
by Kamenev. As has been shown, each Front alternately attacked to ease the burden 
of its neighbour and Tukhachevsky and Egorov both made the importance of this 
point clear to their army commanders on several occasions. Each knew the 
importance of ensuring the other was still progressing. 
Kamenev conducted the campaign exactly as he had done during the Civil War. 
He had general plans for actions within his strategy, but whilst giving directives, 
would readily discuss tactical operations with his front commanders to get the input of 
the man at the frontline, who had knowledge of prevailing local conditions. This had 
previously worked effectively and there was nothing unusual in it now. In this way, 
Kamenev discussed Tukhachevsky's direction of attack to Warsaw in early August, 
debating the wisdom of the northern envelopment. However, after discussing it with 
Tukhachevsky and hearing the latter's reasons, he was happy to trust Tukhachevsky's 
judgement. He had done this before and the results had proven this method to work. 
His decision to allow Tukhachevsky to decide from his local position and knowledge 
came from trust of the latter and not, as Fiddick suggests, because he felt he needed to 
keep Tukhachevsky sweet. ' 56 
This is why an examination of the conduct of the Polish campaign can only be 
accurately made alongside the other Civil War campaigns. Studying the Polish 
campaign in isolation precludes an accurate portrayal and understanding of the 
mechanisms of Red Army leadership. Fiddick and Davies selectively use documents 
from DGkKA, but do not use Dkjn alongside these to reflect the full command 
picture. A study of these ample sources and other collections of army command 
documents throughout the whole Civil War, illustrates the style of command of 
Kamenev, Tukhachevsky and the other Red Army commanders very well and avoids 
theories based on a few documents selectively translated. In Poland, Kamenev worked 
with Tukhachevsky, and indeed Egorov, in the same manner he had during the whole 
conflict. 
Both Davies and Fiddick cite notes from Lenin to Sklianskii, although Davies 
translates them differently from Fiddick to provide a different nuance. Davies 
suggests that they show Lenin felt Kamenev to be weak, whilst Fiddick suggests a 
156 T. Fiddick, pp. 211-212. 
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difference existed between the Red Army Command and Communist Party hierarchy 
over policy in Poland. The notes read, 
Supreme Commander does not dare to be nervous. If the military 
department or Supreme Commander does not give up taking Warsaw, it 
must be taken (Are there any extra measures for this? Tell me? ). 
To speak about swiftening an armistice when the enemy is retreating is 
idiocy. 
If the Poles have launched an offensive along the whole line, it is 
necessary to not whimper (like Danishevskii) for that is absurd. 
It is necessary to counter-manoeuvre: military measures (evade, delay 
all negotiations etc. ). 157 
Fiddick translates the document roughly as above, but Davies produces, "The 
Supreme Commander does not dare to get angry with anyone... Warsaw must be 
taken... To talk of speeding peace talks ...... This selective translation with an extra 
phrase in the first sentence gives the document an entirely different meaning. In fact, 
this telegram is typical of those sent by Lenin in tone, style and content - brusque and 
to the point. To suggest that this displays weakness on Kamenev's part is inaccurate. 
If anyone is being criticised for weakness, it is Danishevskii. Kamenev still believed 
that the campaign could reach Warsaw and beyond, as the document states. Also, if 
Kamenev displayed any caution at this point, it was because he had surmised the 
Poles were strengthening and was not sure about Tukhachevsky's direction of attack, 
when South-Western Front could not move up to protect it. In the end he was proven 
correct about this and was leading the attack in the correct manner, taking account of 
all details and reports. 
Fiddick produces this telegram, along with other notes exchanged between Lenin 
and Sklianskii, as part of his general argument that a dispute existed between the 
Party and Red Army hierarchies, with the former more cautious about attacking, but 
being led along by Tukhachevsky. However, he has again misinterpreted events. ' 58 
He believes that Lenin was "Operating, albeit unconsciously, according to the 
Metternichian maxim - "negotiate only when advancing"". However, this was the 
policy Lenin had conducted consciously from the beginning of the conflict and it 
matched Poland's policy. Negotiations were only pursued by either side with interest 
15 'DGkKA, doc. 646, p. 654; An accurate translation of this document is included in J. Meijer, ed., The 
Trotsky Papers, Volume 11,1920-1922, pp. 254-257; Karl lulii Khristanovich Danishevskii (1884- 
1938), Communist Party member since 1900 and Deputy Military Commissar of the Red Army Field 
Staff in August 1920. 
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if they were in retreat. Fiddick further states the notes exchanged referred 
"undoubtedly to Tukhachevsky's desire to attain Warsaw", but the notes actually 
appear to refer to Kamenev and the decisions he wished to make. Lenin stated to 
Sklianskii "... at whatever cost Warsaw must be taken in 3-5 days", which Fiddick 
remarks is "usually quoted out of context", but the context of it was that Lenin and the 
Red An-ny Command wanted the same result -a victory over Poland - and Lenin was 
pushing them on as he had been doing from the start of the campaign. Fiddick's 
assertion that Tukhachevsky independently decided to attack Warsaw just does not 
stand up to an accurate reading of the battle orders. Tukhachevsky only acted after 
directives or discussions with Kamenev, who was in constant contact with Moscow. 
The idea that Lenin and Trotsky allowed Tukhachevsky to dictate policy towards 
Poland and had to try all manner of measures to rein him in (combining Western and 
South-Western Fronts under his command to overload him with work and prevent him 
attacking Warsaw, being one) is just pure fancy. The Red Army did not work that 
way. If Lenin and Trotsky felt that Tukhachevsky was overstepping the mark, they 
would simply have ordered him to stop or recalled him. This had happened to various 
personnel during the Civil War. There was no mechanism whereby Moscow felt the 
need to take major measures such as combining Western and South-Western Fronts to 
restrain a commander. This was a strategical decision. It is true that commanders, as 
has been shown, had great leeway in deciding tactics at the battlefield level according 
to local conditions, but they were not able to take matters into their own hands and 
determine Moscow policy by military actions. The decision to attack into Poland 
came from Lenin and the decisions to maintain the offensive also originated from 
Moscow. Peace negotiations were conducted, but as much territory as possible had to 
be seized in the process and the decisions on whether to maintain attacks came from 
Moscow. The crucial point which Fiddick misses, possibly by treating the Polish 
campaign in isolation from the Civil War, is that the Party and Red Army hierarchy 
did work very closely over ma or military decisions. Tukhachevsky was well- j 
respected by Lenin and Trotsky by this point and his opinions were sought. Moreover, 
his opinions matched those of the majority of the Communist leadership. Trotsky had 
158 These notes are translated into English in J. Meijer, ed., The Trotsky Papers, Volume II, pp. 252- 
255. 
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reservations over the decision to advance into Poland, but these were general political 
ones, not directed at Tukhachevsky personally or at his handling of the campaign. 
Kamenev's handling of the campaign went reasonably well and problems arose 
only with the delay at Lwow and South-Western Front's reluctance to comply. 
However, he was firm here and demanded their compliance. It was not Kamenev's 
weakness, but Stalin's apparent dominance of South-Western Front RVS and Egorov's 
reluctance to follow Kamenev's orders. If Kamenev is to be criticised, then perhaps it 
could be over his trust in Tukhachevsky's judgement, if he indeed did have other 
information at Smolensk on Polish dispositions. However, the two men had already 
worked well together and trusted each other's judgement and this is why Kamenev 
allowed Tukhachevsky to decide on the troop placements and direction of attack. 
Kamenev and South-Western Front RVS can perhaps be criticised in different 
ways as contributing to the defeat in Poland, but Tukhachevsky must share the blame. 
He was personally at fault for turning the majority of his troops northwards, despite 
warnings from Kamenev on 8th August that South-Western Front forces would not be 
arriving. Sollogub seemed to realise 16th Army's left flank was exposed, but moved it 
too late, as the Polish attack began. 
Tukhachevsky, as has been shown, was a firm believer in the principle of 
manoeuvre to complete flanking, envelopment and encirclement movements. He also 
firmly believed in the concentration of forces in the vital sector, leaving weak screens 
elsewhere to facilitate it, and explained this to Kamenev in May 1920 before the 
preemptive attack over the Beresina. He had used this tactic to great effect in the 
North Caucasus Operation and in earlier operations against the Czechoslovaks and 
Kolchak. He got away with his gambling and risk-taking on these occasions, but in 
Poland, came up against a better, more disciplined foe, led by an experienced leader 
in Pilsudski, who also understood the principles and advantages of manoeuvre. 
Pilsudski beat Tukhachevsky at his own game and perhaps there is a suggestion 
that Tukhachevsky had become over-confident after his continued successes during 
the Civil War, believing that he was the master of manoeuvre operations and noone 
would beat him with these. He had risen up the Red Army ladder swiftly, was popular 
with Lenin and Trotsky and was appointed to the general staff on 22nd May, as he 
prepared the Polish campaign. 
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I would suggest that Tukhachevsky exuded too much over-confidence by the time 
of the Warsaw battle. He had never been defeated and any time he ran into 
difficulties, he blamed it on his superiors for not understanding class warfare, new 
concepts he personally was responsible for putting into print. The blame he attached 
to I st Cavalry Army and South-Western Front R VS, although partially justifiable, was 
symptomatic of his Civil War command career. He never fell out with Kamenev or 
Frunze, who agreed with his ideas, but did fall out with Budennyi, Egorov and Stalin. 
This brings us back to the underlying principle of how Tukhachevsky fought 
against Poland. He used exactly the same methods as during the Civil War, as 
studying the campaign has demonstrated. He believed that it was an extension of the 
Civil War, whether because Poland had been part of the Russian Empire, was working 
with the interventionary Entente or because this Front could lead into Europe and 
extend the Civil War internationally. By April 1920, he probably looked on it as a 
mixture of all three, as national considerations of Poland against Russia combined 
with class warfare of socialism against bourgeois capital. 
However, Tukhachevsky's class warfare methods were not suitable for fighting in 
Poland because the Poles viewed the conflict as a national war. The major flaw in 
Tukhachevsky's class warfare theory was that, like the concept of communism in 
general, for it to work, everybody else had to believe in it too. This had led him into 
disagreements with superiors during the Civil War who did not hold with these ideas 
and so planned operations differently. However, a similar problem emerged in 
Poland. 
The Polish workers and peasants did not believe that the Red Army was attacking 
to liberate them, but saw the historic Russian oppressor advancing to dominate once 
again. Many of those fighting in the Red Army felt the same and the patriotic ticket 
was used by the Communists to recruit more troops. Many voenspetsy who had sat out 
the Civil War so far, joined the Red Army to fight a national war against Poland, the 
most striking case being Russia's best Great War General, A. A. Brusilov. 159 
Tukhachevsky wrote in Revoliuaiia izvne that a protracted war would benefit the 
working-class as it would gradually pull away from the bourgeoisie, as its own 
159 Aleksei Alekseevich Brusilov (1853-1926) led the "Brusilov Breakthrough" in 1916, punching a 
hole through the Austrian frontline and advancing some 60 miles and capturing vast numbers of 
prisoners and materiel before his offensive momentum dissipated through tardiness by the 
neighbouring Russian armies and German reinforcements. 
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interests became clearer, but time may have to be spent educating the working classes 
in bourgeois nations before a successful class war could be mounted. 160 However, he 
also promoted the continuous offensive which was to press on relentlessly, allowing 
no respite for the enemy, but this also precluded time to prepare the working-class. In 
the Polish campaign this was an insurmountable dialectic. 
Lenin and Kamenev consistently emphasised that political and military 
circumstances determined a rapid advance and this was the case. Poland could not be 
allowed to reinforce and regroup with Entente help. However, this prevented any 
preparation of the Polish working-class, necessary to utilise class war methods. 
Dropping Polrevkom leaflets by aircraft was a useful method of agitation, but did not 
have enough time to make an impact. The Red Army was fighting the wrong war. 
However, it is inaccurate to suggest that Tukhachevsky infected the Party leadership 
with these ideas. Tukhachevsky's ideas fitted hand-in-glove with those of Lenin and 
the international revolutionists. He fought the Polish Front as he had fought every 
other front, by the methods imposed on him by circumstance and urgency, to 
complete the tasks set by the leadership. This led to the decision not to wait at the 
border for reinforcements and supply lines to catch up and the frantic advance through 
Poland which resulted in only 50,000 weary Western Front frontline troops facing 
almost double the number of fresh Polish troops. The recruits raised in Belorussia and 
indeed at Bialystok and the Prussian border were not trained, fully-equipped or even 
all participating in frontline divisions by the time Tukhachevsky reached Warsaw. 
The methods of mass mobilisation, whilst marching through the Russian 
countryside, had worked well because peasants wanted to fight to defend their home 
territories. The fact that they deserted again once the fighting had passed their homes 
did not matter greatly because new peasants would be mobilised in the next area. This 
was how Tukhachevsky had advanced from the Volga to Siberia, to the Don and the 
Caucasus, and was the method by which he won his Civil War campaigns. However, 
in Poland, he encountered a "dying centre", with Polish workers and peasants who 
had not been oppressed by White leaders, but were gaining land and freedom to live 
in a national state, led by a heroic national leader in Pilsudski. The Red Russian Army 
marching through their territory was not a force they wished to join. The complete 
opposite was the case and scorched-earth policies and the destruction of the transport 
160 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Revoliutsiia izvne", Voina klassov, pp. 55-58. 
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infrastructure resulted, meaning the Red Armies could not feed from the localities as 
they had done during the Civil War, and could not travel easily and quickly enough to 
catch and envelop the retreating Polish forces. No workers' uprisings or widespread 
partisan activity occurred in the Polish rear because support for the Red Army was 
absent. Hostile partisan activity would undoubtedly have occurred in the Red rear, 
adding to the chaos. This was not the class war Tukhachevsky and Moscow 
envisaged, but a national conflict, and they suffered as a result. 
Conclusion: Influence on Military Thinkin2 
To return to the discussion at the beginning of chapter III on the origins of 
Tukhachevsky's operational "Deep Battle" ideas, the fundamental cornerstone of this 
emerged from the rubble of the Polish campaign. Tukhachevsky's belief in the 
efficacy of the continuous offensive gave way to the conduct of successive operations 
within the deep strike context. He saw with hindsight, that although political and 
military considerations in July 1920 indicated that the Red Army should press on 
without pause at the Polish border, if they had in fact halted to organise the rear, the 
defeat at Warsaw may have been avoidable. 
If communications had been properly constructed and reinforcements allowed to 
catch up, Western Front would not have faced the Poles at Warsaw with battle-weary 
troops who had marched some 600 kms in six weeks of continuous fighting and 
pursuit operations. Tukhachevsky had commented to Kamenev in early June 1920 
that the war with Poland was closer to regular forms of warfare with mass annies than 
the previous Civil War fighting had been and after the defeat he saw that he would 
have to adapt his theories accordingly and did so. 
Although retaining manoeuvre and concentration as the basis of the tactics of his 
class warfare theory - envelopment, encirclement, breakthrough - Tukhachevsky 
slowed the overall attack down for the ultimate strategic objective. In this way 
continuous operations became successive operations, with pauses in the offensive 
necessary to allow the rear to remain organised, communications retained and 
reinforcements to catch up, before targeting the next objective and moving on. 
However, "Deep Battle" developed to compensate for this necessity to pause. 
Attacking to the depth of the enemy force, taking out its reserves and HQ 
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simultaneously to the frontline attack, meant that the enemy would still have 
insufficient time to recover from the initial attack, even whilst the attacking troops 
paused to regroup and reinforce, before launching the next attack and so on. 
Therefore, although the continuous offensive had slowed down to successive 
operations, it still would be a relentless pursuit of the enemy, giving no respite for 
reorganisation or regrouping. 
The necessary pause in successive operations would also provide the extra time 
necessary for agitation amongst the working-classes to prepare the ground for the 
renewed class offensive and mobilise recruits on the move. By extending the war, it 
would allow time for the working-class in the bourgeois countries to realise the Red 
Army was fighting for their liberation and interests. This would allow workers' 
uprisings to occur in the enemy rear and partisan movements to appear. As mentioned 
earlier, the development of paratroopers as either a substitute for these or to foment 
revolution by agitation, along with their military tasks, was introduced by 
Tukhachevsky in the late 1920s. 
To coordinate the international class war, Tukhachevsky envisaged the formation 
of an international general staff via the Comintern (Communist International). He 
wrote to Comintern Chairman Zinov'ev in July 1920 at the height of the Polish-Soviet 
War, suggesting such a plan, but this was one area of Tukhachevsky's military 
thinking which was not taken up by the Communists. 161 
This was the influence of the Polish-Soviet War on the conclusions Tukhachevsky 
had drawn from the Civil War and on his future operational theory in "Deep Battle". 
As we can see from looking back to the statements he made througout the 1920s and 
into the development of "Deep Battle", he still believed in the same principles he had 
fought by in the Civil War, but had modified them after the Polish Front experience. 
The manoeuvre warfare of the Great War Eastern Front also influenced his thought, 
as did the reading of military history, casting an eye back to Napoleon and Suvurov 
and his Tsarist military academy education to find the roots of his conduct of the Civil 
War. However, the conu-nand experience he gained in the latter conflict, including the 
Polish-Soviet War, led directly to the operational side of "Deep Battle". Adapting 
these ideas to developments in weaponry and technology was typical of 
161 M. N. Tukhachevsky, "Pis'mo k tovarishchy Zinov'evy", Voina klassov, pp. 138-140; A translation 
is provided as an appendix in J. Erickson, The Soviet High Command, pp. 784-785. 
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Tukhachevsky's actions during his frontline command years and the ability to 
innovate and match his military theory to the evolution of the Soviet Union, saw his 
rise continue after the Civil War years. This was the genesis of "Deep Battle" and it 
had evolved over two and a half years combat experience. 
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Conclusion 
In October 1917, Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky was a 2nd lieutenant in the 
Tsarist Army. He had just returned to Russia after escaping from two and a half years 
imprisonment in German POW camps. By October 1920, he was a Front Commander 
in the Red Army and one of the top two military figures in the Soviet Republic. 
Tukhachevsky had gained an effective promotion in October 1917, when he was 
elected a company commander in the Semenovskii Life-Guards Regiment, but this 
was soon disbanded and he was demobilised and out of work at the turn of the year. 
However, after joining the Red Army in early 1918, his rise began once more after he 
showed great administrative acumen on an investigative tour of frontline provinces 
and demonstrated he could work under fire. His performance and the ideas he put 
forward for Red Army reorganisation led his department bosses to bring him to the 
attention of Lenin and Trotsky and he was despatched eastwards as the Civil War 
broke out in the Volga. Sent out to conduct the organisational work in practice, that 
he had so far shown himself capable of in theory, by a measure of luck, he was 
appointed Eastern Front lst Army Commander. He was the right man in the right 
place at the right time, primarily because he had joined the Bolshevik Party in April 
1918. 
Tukhachevsky was not a communist at this stage. He had joined the Red Army to 
rejoin the fight against Germany in the Great War after being their involuntary guest 
for so long. The Red Army was the only force forming in Russia in early 1918 to face 
Germany. Also, it was based in Moscow, closer geographically than the alternatives, 
such as the Whites, forming in the south. If Tukhachevsky had decided to travel there, 
he would either have not seen his family again or they would had to uproot to go with 
him. Moreover, he believed that the Bolsheviks were the group with the greatest 
vision and best chance of pulling Russia out of the chaos into which it had fallen. 
Therefore, he joined the army they were forming to defend Russia. 
The decision to join the Bolshevik Party was completely separate and was only 
taken after his friend Kuliabko, suggested it. Tukhachevsky was already working with 
the CEC Military Department at the hub of Red Army formation and saw that the new 
army was to be politically-based. Therefore, to advance in it, he would have to be 
politically reliable as well as good at his job, so he entered the Party. This provided 
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him with the necesary background and qualification to become I st Army Commander. 
He was interviewed by Lenin and passed muster with Trotsky as one of the very few 
"commander-communists" in the country. This made him the ideal military leader for 
the Simbirsk Bolsheviks in their power struggle with the SRs in the Volga. 
On Eastern Front, Tukhachevsky showed his prowess in conducting army 
reorganisational work, turning scattered partisan formations into regular army units, 
based on the regimental structure he had known in the Tsarist Army. He was the first 
person in the Red Army to conduct frontline mobilisations, initially of voenspetsy, to 
create army and divisional command staffs, and then of regular troops, to create the 
regular I st An-ny in less than two months. 
However, this was also achieved by a readiness to resort to strict measures of 
revolutionary discipline. Tukhachevsky was the first to form Revolutionary Military 
Tribunals, within a week of his arrival in the East, and he was very likely the first to 
employ zagraditel'nye otriady (blocking detachments). He was willing to work 
closely with the Cheka to retain order and stressed from early on that a hardcore of 
Communists were needed to instill discipline into the other troops. He had witnessed 
this in action in his May tour of the provinces and realised that those who believed in 
the political ideals of Bolshevism had something to fight for and would persuade or 
force the disinterested peasant masses to do the same. Political agitation accompanied 
by force - this was the way the Red Army worked from the outset. Tukhachevsky saw 
this and saw that it worked. He adopted these methods for the duration of the Civil 
War, when he was consistently sent to take charge of disorganised or routed armies 
and had very little time to pull them together before counter-attacking. 
In this way, Tukhachevsky progressed through command of 8th and 5th Armies, 
defeating Kolchak at the head of the latter, before gaining promotion as Acting 
Caucasian Front Commander to defeat Denikin. Promotion to full Front Command 
followed as he led the Soviet Western Front against Poland. Although this ended in 
defeat, Tukhachevsky was not held in disgrace, but was later called upon to suppress 
the Kronstadt and Tambov uprisings in 1921. These lie outwith the boundaries of this 
thesis, but another post Tukhachevsky received, in August 1921, sternmed directly 
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form his Civil War record. ' He was appointed Head of the Red Army Military 
Academy? Why was this so? 
Tukhachevsky had pushed from the very beginning of Red Army organisation for 
"unified command". He wanted Red Commanders to lead the armed forces and did 
not appreciate the interference of political commissars. He felt that professional 
soldiers could do the job, but that they also had to be politically sound. Tukhachevsky 
produced a plan for command courses for Red Commanders in June 1918 and these 
were running by the end of the year. In 1919, he set up courses himself and taught on 
them, whilst 5th Army Commander. When the troops were not attacking, they were 
being educated in how to attack. This was recognised in Moscow and Tukhachevsky 
was recalled to lecture to the Red Army Military Academy and share his ideas with 
the Party leadership. Lenin asked him for a report on the likelihood of creating a Red 
command staff based on his 5th Army experiences. In 1920, Tukhachevsky created 
the Smolensk State Military Polytechnical Institute of Western Front to educate 
kursanty and produce young Red Commanders. 2 His vision of youth as the future of 
the communist state matched that of Lenin and Trotsky. Tukhachevsky was at the 
forefront of this process and in May 1920 was admitted to the general staff, despite 
never having attended the Nikolaevskii Academy, as he was too young. He was the 
prime candidate to head the Red An-ny Military Academy. 
But why did Tukhachevsky go to all this bother? He did not believe in 
communism when he joined the Party, but did so for career reasons. Did he simply 
remain a careerist, immune to the ideals? The answer to this question is no. 
During the Civil War, Tukhachevsky saw that the methods by which he was 
forced to fight the conflict were working. Rapid attacks turned into continuous 
offensives to keep the enemy on the backfoot and press home the advantage whilst it 
lasted. Such tactics required a continuous supply of troops. Therefore, mobilisation at 
the front was required and this had to be conducted quickly as the attack moved on. 
This proved to be the perfect system to win the Civil War as it matched conditions 
within Russia in every way. The infrastructure was ruined, so troops could not 
quickly be transferred from one front to another and reinforcements could not be 
rapidly despatched. Therefore, frontline mobilisation was needed. However, this 
A study of Tukhachevsky's Kronstadt and Tambov commands and counter- insurgency theories will 
be the subject of later work by this author. 
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system also matched the socio-econornic composition of Russia and the wonts of the 
peasant masses. 
Tukhachevsky won his campaigns by marching vast distances across Russia with a 
hardcore of communists, Cheka and trained staff, mobilising peasants as they went. 
Constant mobilisation was needed because peasants were willing to fight to defend 
their home areas, but would then desert when the fighting moved on. However, plenty 
of peasants existed to be mobilised and so the process worked. As thousands deserted, 
thousands more were mobilised. But why did the peasants want to fight for the Red 
Army? They did so because the Reds were the side who said the peasants could retain 
their land. The Whites redistributed land within their areas, turning the clock back to 
pre-1917 Tsarist times. These methods worked and Tukhachevsky fought the Civil 
War by them. 
This methodology also matched Moscow's continuous demands for rapid action 
and quick advances to turn military situations around. However, it did not always 
work. Tukhachevsky failed in the Don in early 1919, when he was forced to advance 
across the steppeland populated by cossacks supportive of the Whites. Why did this 
cause the offensive to fail? The secure rear which had been supplied on other fronts 
by a sympathetic peasant population and friendly partisans in the enemy rear, causing 
disruption and destroying enemy communications, was not present in the Don. 
However, the Siberian partisan movement on Eastern Front in 1919 reached vast 
proportions which further fuelled Tukhachevsky's belief in the ability to mobilise 
constantly on the move, if the motivation was there. He saw that Marxism and the 
class struggle provided this motive and came to believe in the efficacy of a Marxist 
Revolutionary doctrine. This was how he fought the Civil War and how he believed 
the Reds should progress. 
However, Tukhachevsky's theory came unstuck in Poland, the first attempt to 
carry revolution abroad on the point of bayonets. Tukhachevsky, like Lenin and the 
majority of the Communist Party, believed that the Polish masses would rise, but 
when they did not, he was left waging a stretched campaign, with a hostile rear and no 
freshly-mobilised reinforcements, as in the Don. "Class" war tactics had not worked 
in a "national" war context. The flaw in the theory was that everyone had to believe it 
for it to work. The Polish masses did not, so it failed. 
2 Marshal Tukhachevsky: Vospominaniia dru--ei i soratnikov, (Moscow, 1965), pp. 141-145. 
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However, Tukhachevsky did not abandon his ideas. He was a true believer by now 
and advocated political measures to prepare the proletariat and allow them to realise 
that the Red Army was attacking for their interests. Poland also brought a change of 
tack to Tukhachevsky's offensive theory - continuous offensive slowed to successive 
operations to allow the rear to catch up and prevent a hostile rear and broken 
communications causing the offensive to collapse. Tukhachevsky retained these basic 
beliefs in his tactics and overall strategy to win a class war and carried this through 
the 1920s until it became the operational side of "Deep Battle". 
The openness to idea and innovation which Tukhachevsky displayed in the Civil 
War meant that he was willing to take on new ideas constantly. In this way, he 
developed his basic premise of attacking quickly with manoeuvre for encirclement to 
wipe out the enemy force and proceed onto the next target, to include modem 
developments. He also developed his theory again to suit the socio-economic fabric of 
the Soviet Union which emerged in the late 1920s. The Five Year Plans, with 
collectivisation and industrialisation, led to heavy industry concentration creating 
plants which could convert to munitions production, tractor works for building tanks 
and so on. It was Tukhachevsky's open mind to innovation and willingness to try new 
ideas, developed during the Civil War, which led him to develop his theories and rise 
to the top of the Red Army tree. 
This ability to adapt and get the job done had also led Tukhachevsky to become 
the conu-nunist "fireman" or "troubleshooter" during the Civil War. He had 
consistently been sent to fronts prioritised by the Red leadership, the areas in most 
trouble and in need of a steady hand, to reorganise and motivate the troops. In this he 
used sound military methods, but was also willing to resort to brutal revolutionary 
discipline via the Tribunals. This was why he was chosen by Lenin and Trotsky to 
fight on the prioritised fronts. 
Whilst rising through the Red Army ranks and currying favour with the Bolshevik 
leadership, Tukhachevsky did ruffle a few feathers. His methods were alien to the 
hard-left Bolsheviks, but also to older voenspetsy, whom he considered outdated and 
unwilling to adapt to his new methods of class warfare. This could be put down to 
career ambition once more, wishing to get ahead by getting rid of the senior officers, 
but it was not. Instead it represented Tukhachevsky's conversion to a belief in class 
warfare principles and methods. The squabbles he had with superiors occurred over 
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strategic or tactical matters, but it was part of the process of needing to educate a Red 
Command Staff. This necessitated the removal of those who did not believe in the 
ideals and methods. Tukhachevsky's habit of complaining to Moscow over superiors' 
heads, playing the communist card, must have rankled, although he was not the only 
one to do so. 
However, Tukhachevsky also developed early friendships during the Civil War. 
Relationships with those with whom he would work closely throughout his life, were 
formed on the battlefields. In this way he became closest to Frunze and Kamenev, the 
two people he had fought most closely and most effectively alongside. Tukhachevsky 
met Triandafillov, the theoretical genius involved in the operational side of "Deep 
Battle", fittingly at a conference in December 1919, at which they both gave papers 
on the nature of Civil War combat. He would also work with Uborevich, his closest 
collaborator in developing mechanised forces in the 1920s and 1930s, at Tambov in 
192 1. Ordzhonikidze became a close friend as well as a collaborator in the formation 
of the military-industrial complex. Countless others, some of whom have been 
flagged up during this thesis, and many further down the command chain, fought 
alongside Tukhachevsky during the Civil War and continued to work with him in 
different capacities. Junior officers such as Rokossovskii, Konev and Zhukov all 
fought under Tukhachevsky during the Civil War and benefited from his notion of a 
Red Command Staff and the need to maintain a regular Red Army. 3 
The seeds of Tukhachevsky's ftiture success can be found in his Civil War record. 
The positions of Deputy Peoples' Commissar for Defence, Chief of Armaments and 
Chief-of-Staff, all originated from the fact that he had shown himself to be a good 
man-manager, who could inspire his troops to do well and carry out his orders. His 
military theories and organisational abilities were clear to see and he produced Red 
Army Field Regulations, manuals and a plethora of written work incorporating his 
operational ideas and his views on Red Army organisation. 
But can the roots of his downfall also be located there? Various theories are 
presented surrounding Tukhachevsky's execution. One argument is that Stalin never 
forgave Tukhachevsky for blaming him and his dominance of South-Western Front 
R VS for the Warsaw defeat. Also suggested is that Tukhachevsky was preparing a plot 
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to overthrow Stalin and set up an alternative military or political regime. Another 
possibility is the involvement of emigre's who, bitter at his betrayal of his aristocratic 
heritage, fabricated evidence that Tukhachevsky was involved with the Nazis and/or 
Trotsky. Alternatives on this theory are that Stalin had him removed to appease Nazi 
Germany, as Tukhachevsky was the most vociferous critic of Nazism in 1930s Russia, 
or that the Gestapo forged the coup evidence to remove him. However, I would 
speculate a slightly different theory. 
As has been shown, Tukhachevsky demonstrated his abilities during the Civil 
War. He completed the hardest tasks by taking whatever measures were necessary. He 
matched his Civil War military theories to the needs of the nation and they worked 
because of this. In the 1920s, the theories he developed for mass, mechanised armies 
also matched the needs of Russia. The Five Year Plans created the possibility to build 
a mass army and Tukhachevsky pressed continually for this. He fell out of favour in 
the late 1920s for suggesting to Stalin that vast military development was necessary, 
but used the time he was in Leningrad to conduct further experiments, adding 
paratroopers to his ideas and beginning research which led to the Katiusha rocket 
launcher. 4 However, when the needs of the Soviet Union again turned towards 
Tukhachevsky's ideas and the creation of a new vast army to take on the capitalist 
world, Stalin looked to Tukhachevsky once again. The "troubleshooter" was recalled 
to carry out further reorganisation and Tukhachevsky was still engaged in this task 
when he was executed. Why then did Stalin kill him? 
The way the Soviet Union developed in the 1920s under Stalin was apparently the 
way Tukhachevsky had hoped and envisaged during his conversations with Fervacque 
in 1917. The Bolsheviks had indeed pulled Russia out of the fire and had won the 
Civil War. However, under Stalin, the mixture of Russian nationalism with 
communism which "Socialism in One Country" engendered, was exactly that which 
Tukhachevsky sought. The Red Army became one of the main lynchpins in the 
country alongside heavy industry and the Five Year Plans. Tukhachevsky achieved 
his ambition of leading the army and hoped to lead it into battle using his theories to 
win a mass, mechanised manoeuvre war with the capitalist West. By 1937, 
3 Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskii (1896-1968) fought with 5th Army in 1919, Ivan 
Stepanovich Konev (1897-1973) fought at Kronstadt, whilst Georgii Konstantinovich Zhukov (1896- 
1974) served in the cavalry on Eastern Front in 1919 and Southern Front in 1920. 
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Tukhachevsky was the picture of a perfect Stalinist. He was willing to carry out 
whatever operations were required, using whatever means necessary. In this way, he 
was no different to any of the others who pinned their sail on the mast of the Stalin 
regime. By the time of the "Great Terror" in 1937-38, it was the Stalinists who were 
removed, as the leader dealt with every sector of society in turn. Tukhachevsky was 
the most prominent military figure in the nation, a man who was good at completing 
his tasks and willing to take whatever measures were necessary to defend his country. 
He was the one most likely to lead a coup to overthrow Stalin, either to end the purge 
process, accelerate it further, change the direction of the economy or step up efforts 
against Hitler. However, it is highly unlikely that Tukhachevsky would have done 
this, unless perhaps the future of the Red Army and the nation depended on it. I would 
speculate that Stalin removed Tukhachevsky, his "Demon of the Civil War", because 
he saw in him someone very much like himself in terms of method and ruthlessness, 
someone ambitious and willing to resort to any means necessary to triumph and 
progress. Perhaps Stalin was afraid someone would once again hire the "fireman" as 
troubleshooter. 
For details on Tukhachevsky's posting to Leningrad see, D. R. Stone, "Tukhachevsky in Leningrad: 
Military Politics and Exile, 1928-193 1 ", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, No. 8,1996, pp. 1365-1386. 
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APPENDIX A 
Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky -3 (15). 2.1893-12.6.1937. 
3 (15). 2.1893 - Born on Alexandrovskii Estate, Dorogobuzhskii uezd, Smolensk 
guberniia. 
1898 - Tukhachevsky family moves to Grandmother's estate near Vrazhskoe, 
Chembarsk uezd, Penza guberniia. 
1904-09 - Attended I st Penza gimnasiia. Withdrawn from school in 5th Year and 
moves with family to Moscow. 
1911 - Completes 6th Year at I Oth Moscow gimnasiia. 
August - passes entrance exam to I st Moscow Empress Ekaterina 11 Cadet Corps, 
graduating top of year in June 1912. 
1912-1914 - Attended Aleksandrovskii Military Academy, graduating July 1914, first 
in his year. 
Commissioned as 2nd Lieutenant. 
Chose to join Semenovskii Life-Guards Regiment. 
Anust 1914-February 1915 - Active service in Great War. Decorated six times 
before being taken prisoner by Germans. 
February 1915-Au2ust 1917 - POW. Transferred to increasingly secure camps for 
repeated escape attempts, ending up in high-security Bavarian Castle of Fort 9 
Ingolstadt. Fifth escape attempt successful, returning to Petrograd just before October 
Revolution. 
1918 - February-May - Employed as Inspector of Red Army Formations in Military 
Department of All-Russian Central Executive Committee. 
4th April - Joins Bolshevik Party. 
27th May-22nd June - Military Commissar of Moscow Region of Western Screens. 
26th June 1918-4th January 1919 -I st Revolutionary Army Commander 
(komandarm-1) of Eastern Front against Komuch Government's "People's Army" and 
Czechoslovak Legion. 
26th June-7th September - Forms and organises Ist Army, conducts defensive 
actions and three abortive offensives, one on Samara and two on Simbirsk 
8th-27th September - Third Simbirsk Operation 
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28th September-8th October - Syzran'-Samara Operation 
14th-30th October - Buguruslan, Bugul'ma and Buzuluk Operations 
31st October-24th November - Belebei Operation 
25th November-31st December - Ufa Operation 
1919 - 4th-20th January - Acting Southern Front Commander (vremkomiuzhfront) 
20th January-15th March - 8th Army Commander (komandarm-8) of Southern 
Front against Krasnov. 
Late January-Mid-February - Operations against Krasnov and Volunteer Army, 
pressing them back to right bank of Don in Kalitvenskaia-Glubokaia-Krasnovka- 
Inganskaia area, until spring thaw ends campaigning 
4th April-25th November - 5th Army Commander (komandarm-5) of Eastern Front 
against Kolchak. 
4th-28th April - Conducts defensive actions and reorganisation of 5th Army 
28th April-4th May - Buguruslan Operation 
4th-13th May - Bugul'ma Operation 
14th-17th May - Belebei Operation 
25th May-9th June - Ufa Operation 
9th June-7th July - Pursuit operations crossing Rivers Ufa and Belaia 
7th-13th July - Zlatoust Operation 
16th July-4th August - Cheliabinsk-Troitsk Operation 
7th August - Awarded Order of Red Banner 
11 th-20th August - Pursuit operation to River Tobol. 
20th August-2nd September - Petropavlovsk Operation 
2nd September-13th October - White counter-offensive pushes Eastern Front back 
behind River Tobol. Tukhachevsky conducts reorganisational and reinforcement work 
to rebuild shattered 5th Army. 
14th-30th October - Second Petropavlovsk Operation 
1st-14th November - Omsk Operation 
20th November - Appointed 13th Army Commander 
(komandarm-13) of Southern 
Front 
25th November - Recalled to Moscow 
1920 - 4th Februarv-22nd 
April - Acting 
(vremkomkavkazfront) against Denikin. 
Caucasian Front Commander 
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14th February-29th April - North Caucasus Operation 
21st April - Orders Baku Operation and crossing of Azerbaijan, border. 
29th April 1920-6th May 1921 - Western Front Commander (komzapadfront) against 
Poland in Polish-Soviet War. 
29th April-13th May - Conducts reorganisation of Western Front 
14th May-2nd June - Battle of Berezina to pre-empt Polish strike and relieve South- 
Western Front 
3rd-22nd June - Conducts reforination, reinforcement and reorganisation of Western 
Front, whilst fighting defensive actions and launching small counter-attacks 
24th-30th June - Mozyr' Operation 
4th-12th July - Igumen-Minsk (Belorussia) Operation 
13th-22nd July - Pursuit operations taking Molodechno, Lida, Vil'no and Grodno 
23rd July-16th August - Warsaw Operation 
16th August - Polish counter-offensive launched from behind River Wisla 
16th August-18th October - Conducts rearguard actions in gradual retreat until 
signing of armistice in Riga 
October-November - Operations against band of Bulak-Balakhovich 
1921 - 3rd-18th March - Acting 7th Army Commander (vremkomandarm-7), led 
suppression of Kronstadt Revolt. 
6th May-25th July - Commander of Soviet forces in Tambov Province. Leads 
crushing of Antonov peasant uprising in Tambov Province. 
25th July or 5th August - Appointed Head and Military Commissar of Military 
Academy of Red Army (RKXA). 
24th January 1922, - Appointed Western Front Commander. 
1st April 1924 - Appointed Deputy Chief-of-Staff of RJM. 
13th November 1925 - Appointed Chief-of-Staff of RJM. 
5th May 1928-19th June 1931 - Commander of Leningrad Military District. 
19th June 1931-11th May 1937 - Deputy Chairman of RVS SSSR and Head of 
Armaments of Red Army. 
February 1934 - Elected Candidate Member of Russian Communist Party Central 
Committee at 17th Congress (Congress of Victors) of Communist Party. 
20th November 1935 - Appointed one of first five Marshals of the Soviet Union, the 
highest military rank in the country. 
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11th May 1937 - Stripped of duties as Deputy Peoples Commissar of Defence and 
appointed Head of Volga Military okrug. Arrested en route to take up new command. 
11th June - Tried in closed military court along with seven other high-ranking 
colleagues - accused of treason and plotting a military coup - shot the next day. 
31st January 1957 - Military Collegiate of Supreme Court of USSR declared 
Tukhachevsky and co-defendants not guilty of "Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Military 
Organisation" charges. 
27th February 1957 - Readmitted as member of Communist Party. 
27th March 1988 - Documents relating to Tukhachevsky case released under 
glasn ost' process. 
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Appendix B: Maps. 
1. German Great War POW camps in which Tukhachevsky was imprisoned. 
2. Tukhachevsky's Great War frontline service. 
Russia in summer 1918 and Tukhachevsky's frontline tour of May 1918. 
4. General map of Volga Region. 
5. The "fluid" Eastern Front: June-August 1918. 
6. Tukhachevsky as I st Army Commander of Eastern Front: September 1918-January 
1919. 
7. Tukhachevsky's change of manoeuvre on Southern Front: February-March 1919. 
8. The drive against Kolchak. Tukhachevsky as 5th Army Commander on Eastern Front: 
April-November 1919. 
9. The North Caucasus Operation. Tukhachevsky as Acting Caucasian Front 
Commander: February-April 1920. 
10. The Belorussian Operation and Drive for Warsaw. Tukhachevsky as Western Front 
Commander: April-August 1920. 
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Maps adapted from oriainals by: 
1. R. B. Speed, Prisoners, Diplomats and the Great War. A Study ofDiplomacy in 
Captivity, (New York, 1990). 
2. J. Keegan, The First World War, (London, 1998). 
3. E. Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War, (Boston, 1987). 
4. K. Baedeker, Baedeker's Russia, 1914, (London, 1971). 
5. D. Footman, Civil War in Russia, (London, 196 1). 
6. N. Croll, 2002. 
7. P. Kenez, Civil War in South Russia, 1919-1920; the defeat of the Whites, (Berkeley, 
Calif., 1977). 
8. D. Footman, Civil War in Russia, (London, 1961). 
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